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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
This thesis uses the theory of ‘social consciousness’ to analyse elite perceptions of poverty in Malawi, 
 
and identify the circumstances under which elites are willing to mobilize resources for poverty reduction. 
 
‘Social consciousness theory’ stipulates that pro-poor policies in European welfare states developed as 
a result of ideological and pragmatic concern about the negative impact of poverty on elite welfare. This 
study shows however that although elites in Malawi have a deep understanding and appreciation of the 
extent and severity of poverty and are linked with the poor through strong social networks and the 
extended family structure, they do not perceive the poor as a threat to their welfare. Therefore collective 
action to address the problem of poverty has not occurred. In circumstances where elites acknowledge 
some negative externalities of poverty requiring action, individual solutions are sought. However, elite 
perceptions still illuminate the following: first, there is a causal explanation between elites’ perceptions 
of the causes of poverty and their support for particular policies.  Second, elites’ perceived causes of 
poverty include structural, behavioural and the perceived future actions of the poor, such as laziness, 
following implementation of redistributive policies. Third, elites’ seem to support policies with wider 
benefits for society. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 The Problem and its Theoretical Basis 
 
 
 
This thesis is a study of elite attitudes to poverty and pro-poor policies in Malawi. Specifically, the study 
utilizes De Swaan’s theory of “social consciousness” to examine the conditions under which Malawian 
elites act in pursuance of pro-poor objectives and outcomes. In this thesis elites are defined in 
institutional terms as those in strategic positions of powerful organisations such as political, 
governmental, economic, military, professional, communications, cultural organisations and social 
movements. They control the key material, symbolic and political resources within a country (Reis and 
Moore, 2005)1. Indeed, the concept of ‘elite’ is spongy and porous, whose membership is frequently 
changing as individuals rise and fall, creating ambiguity on who the elites are (Leftwich, 2009). However, 
Reis and Moore’s (2005) definition of elites enables a recognition of the variety of elites in Malawian 
society and assists in identifying  the small group of individuals,  occupying  commandingpositions 
who have the highest potential to influence national policy-making (Reis and Moore, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
Studying elites is important because it provides the basis for exploring the politics of poverty in Malawi, 
the discourses and ideologies concerning the nature of poverty, the solutions to poverty, and the 
challenges and concerns that may or may not motivate action towards poverty. However, an assumption 
borne out in most of the social sciences literature on public policy in developing countries tends to 
discuss elites in predominantly negative terms. In particular, the literature on poverty has tended to view 
the role of elites negatively, assuming that elites are unable to act in a developmental manner (Fritzen, 
2007; Platteau, 2004; Dasgupta and Beard, 2007; see also Moore, 1999; Toye, 1999). Yet many 
developing countries like Malawi are dominated by elites who have control over productive 
 
1 
In Chapter 3, various definitions of elites are discussed and a case made for adopting the definition here-in. According to Reis and Moore  (2005) elites 
are:  ministers and legislators; owners and controllers of TV and radio stations and major business enterprises and activities; large property owners; upper- 
level public servants; senior members of the armed forces, police and intelligence services; editors of major newspapers; publicly prominent individuals, 
lawyers and doctors; and influential socialites and heads of large trade unions, religious establishments and movements, universities and NGOs. 
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assets and institutions that enable them to influence, positively or negatively, the allocation of resources 
and authority (see Booth et al, 2006; Amsden et al, 2009, Rustow, 1966). 
 
 
 
Attempts at poverty reduction, by the international development community, have been based on the 
assumption that having the right institutions or policies will lead to more effective, accountable and 
responsive governments, and that redistributive powers will emerge. However, evidence from 
successful economies like Botswana and Mauritius show that success in those countries was the result 
of the elite’s ability and willingness to redistribute resources efficiently, not merely the result of having 
the right institutions and policies (Sebudubudu and Molutsi, 2009; Brautigam and Diolle, 2009). 
Therefore, an emerging argument is that the extent to which policies can be said to determine 
development, growth and poverty reduction is dependent on the manner in which elites choose to 
implement them in the interests of the poor (Leftwich, 2008). If this is the case, it is essential to 
understand how and why elites make decisions and, specifically, what induces elites to be 
developmental and ultimately to reduce poverty. 
 
 
 
The conception of elites as those who make choices and take decisions has been an important aspect 
of the study of policy-making. Therefore, policy studies have explored those ideas that policy actors 
hold that have a significant effect on their decision-making. In many studies, these ideas have been 
reduced to self-interest (Hill, 2009; Booth et al, 2006); and a review of the literature shows that the 
capacity of elites to act in a developmental manner has often been ignored. Instead, many studies are 
based on the assumption that institutions are the sole explanatory variable of socio-economic and 
political behaviour or action, as will be seen in Chapter 2. 
 
 
 
This raises an important question: if developing countries like Malawi are dominated by elites, but elites 
are believed to pursue non-developmental aims, should pro-poor policy-making be seen as a zero-sum 
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game that leads to the capture of resources, with well defined winners and losers (Pasha, 2002; Bird, 
 
2008; Afsar, 2010)? What follows from this view is a pessimism that suggests that it is “difficult to do 
anything for the poor because this means depriving the rich and powerful” (Moore and Putzel, 2001: 5); 
or it becomes “a case either for giving up hope, for by-passing elites in assistance policy or for designing 
ways of strong-arming them into submission in relation to anti-poverty policy” (Hossain and Moore, 
2002: 3). This postulation about elite behaviour is not unique to development and policy studies but it 
has been challenged in the broader literature of political sociology: 
 
 
 
.... to leap from some knowledge of the social backgrounds of national politicians to inferences 
about the power structure of the society is quite dangerous. Even to proceed from such 
knowledge to judgements about political behaviour of these same political elites can be 
treacherous... (Frey, 1965:157) 
 
 
The social status of individuals or groups does not determine their political behaviour.... 
nevertheless this assumption of determinism is implicit in the many studies which have 
analysed the political process in terms of who the leading contenders are, rather than in terms 
of what they do. To know who these power-wielding individuals are is thought to be sufficient; it 
is a secondary matter to enquire into how they use their power. That they will do so in their own 
interest is considered self-evident, and the nature of that interest is inferred from the status 
which they occupy (Bendix and Lipset, 1957:84-85). 
 
 
 
However, there is acknowledgement in development studies that pro-poor policy-making is not just about 
self-interest, conflict and contestation, but is also about bargaining, political settlements, 
accommodation, compromise and joint gains (Moore and Putzel, 2001). Other studies (Olson, 1965; 
Hill, 2009; North 1993) argue that assumptions about self-interest ignore the logic of collective action, 
because when individuals act within groups or organizations, they face collective action problems that 
make self-interest problematical, especially under conditions of uncertainty. Conversely, it is argued 
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that, “because all of the individuals in a group would gain if they achieved their group objective ... they 
would act to achieve that objective, even if they were all rational and self-interested” (Olson, 1965: 2). 
 
Therefore, even if elites are motivated by self-interest, this does not automatically translate into an 
aversion to pro-poor policy activities.  There might be mutual dependencies, for example between elites 
and the poor, that lead elites to act positively in enacting pro-poor policies (Kalebe-Nyamongo, 2010). 
Various studies have shown how elites in developed countries enact welfare policies because they 
believe that action is in their own interests. Some important studies in this area are those of Reis and 
Moore (2005), Hossain (1999), De Swaan (1988), Squires (1990), and Slack (1988), all of whom 
conclude that elite perceptions and interests coincide, at times, with those of the poor, which leads 
them to implement pro-poor policy. In addition, in economies like Botswana and Mauritius, success 
came about through the formation of “developmental, growth or reform coalitions [amongst elites], 
capable of devising and reforming institutions which promoted economic growth and social developments 
across a range of sectors and challenges” (Leftwich and Hogg, 2007:5; see also Leftwich, 2008). With 
few exceptions3, very little is known about the perception of poverty held by elites in developing 
countries like Malawi, let alone how these perceptions may or may not impact on pro-poor policy-
making. 
 
 
 
 
The reasons for this oversight are multiple: first, policy-making studies have emphasised the analysis of 
social, economic and political institutions (rules of the game) in explaining policy outputs or outcomes. 
Oyen (1999) considers this to be a shortcoming resulting from an overemphasis on the technical aspects 
of poverty. Hence there is more emphasis on measurement and definition, as well as a tendency to 
study the poor in isolation from society and a neglect of the motivations of the non-poor in enacting or 
blocking effective anti-poverty policy. Consequently, the individuals or organizations 
 
3 
See these authors - De Swaan, 1988; Slack, 1988; Kreidl, 2000; Briggs, 1961; Geremek, 1994; Himmelfarb, 1984; Squires, 1990 and 2008 - for 
accounts of poverty, elite attitudes, perceptions, the deserving and undeserving poor, the impact of disease, crime and social unrest and pro-poor policy. 
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(players/actors) that generate or sustain institutions have been ignored, thereby ruling out an 
understanding of individual or shared interests or ideas that are promoted through organizations (Leftwich 
and Sen, 2010: 12). As argued by Parry (1969), elite control depends upon organization, for instance 
through political parties, bureaucracies, unions and so on. In studying organizations, we begin to 
understand human agency, particularly individual cognition and preferences that affect behaviour, 
because organizations act and make choices (North et al, 2006; March and Olsen, 1976). Second, 
other authors (Reis, 1999; Reis, 2010; Reis and Moore, 2005; de Swaan et al, 2000) have noted that 
an examination of elite perceptions is equated by some with a disregard for the perceptions that poor 
people themselves have about their poverty and its solution, because it focuses on the perceptions of 
those who have never experienced poverty. The third argument is that the very recognition that elites 
exist is contrary to a belief in democracy and in majority rule. As argued by Michels (1962), the existence 
of elites means that the majority will never rule, despite the formal apparatus of universal suffrage and 
myths of majority will. Hence, democracy in the sense of the rule of the whole people or the majority is 
impossible: “the mass will never rule except in abstracto” (Michels, 1962:366). Parry (1969) notes that the 
very belief that majority rule is the best means of political decision-making blinds people to the fact that 
there are those who rule and those who are ruled. Recognising this fact makes the study of elites, their 
ideas, interests and decisions, essential to understanding developmental outcomes. 
 
 
 
Some authors (Reis and Moore, 2005; De Swaan et al, 2000; Hossain and Martin, 2007) argue that 
studying elites results in a better understanding of their perceptions of the condition of the poor and the 
context in which anti-poverty policies are implemented. This thesis adopts a similar position to that 
taken by Reis: “the ways elites conceive of poverty are important elements to be taken into account 
because major policy decisions as well as non-decisions are formed by those who control power 
resources” (1999:1). The thesis thus contributes to the literature regarding the identification of elite 
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perceptions that shape pro-poor policy and draws lessons that may prove useful to the understanding 
of the policy process and the politics of poverty in developing countries. 
 
 
 
A study of elites and poverty requires an understanding of the politics within countries, mainly because 
the study of the policy process focuses on how policy decisions are made and how policies are shaped 
in action. Making decisions and shaping policy is political, and politics is the art and science of who gets 
what in society, when, how and why (Lasswell, 1958). In this process of allocating resources disputes 
ensue amongst individuals and groups in society as to who wins or loses (Leftwich, 2000). In these 
disputes it is the more dominant groups or individuals that are able to push their agenda onto the policy 
process, while the poor are inadequately placed to influence the ways in which the state allocates rights 
and resources (Johnson and Start, 2001). Those dominant groups are elites and they are able to exert 
influence on how resources are mobilized and distributed in society. This makes politics a study of how 
power is used; and studies of the policy process should be grounded in an extensive consideration of 
the nature of power in the state and should involve propositions about who dominates. Unlike pluralist 
perspectives that consider power in society to be evenly spread and openly contested, the incorporation 
into the analysis of policy of the question of who dominates draws on elite theories that see power as 
very distinctively structured, or that suggest that dominance is very much embedded in the nature of the 
machinery of the state itself (Hill, 2009: 8). This point is further addressed in Chapter 3. 
 
 
 
 
Focusing on elite perceptions can therefore help define which issues are to be taken up as political and 
policy problems and which are to be ignored or sidelined; how these issues are to be tackled; and what 
policy options count as legitimate or feasible. In most developing countries, elites tend to be very 
powerful. They often command a particularly large slice of the national income and the influence that 
goes with it (Hossain and Moore, 2002:7).  Less directly, elites exercise great influence over how their 
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fellow citizens understand their own country. Focusing attention on elites enables an analysis of their 
power, their control over resources and their influence over political, social and economic decisions as 
well as over institutions and practices. 
 
 
 
There are, however, differing views on how elites use their power and influence. Authors like Mbeki 
(2005) view the power held by elites as the cause of the development crisis and increased poverty in 
Southern Africa, arguing that Africa’s history shows that the political elites that took over from the 
colonizers sought to enrich themselves at the expense of the non-elite.  For instance, despite the 
Drivers of Change and Development in Malawi (Booth et al, 2006) report produced for DFID, which 
recognizes that elites are central to pro-poor development policy success, their role is considered to be 
anti-developmental. The Drivers of Change report argues that an extremely small elite generally controls 
both the economic and the political spheres in Malawi, as well as taking formal political processes and 
decision-making away from formal/public spaces to informal spaces from which the poor are excluded. 
In its most simplistic form, “real” political deals (the selection of candidates, lobbying for allocation of 
funds, and so on) are made in bars, football/golf clubs and so on – spaces that tend to exclude the 
poor and where exclusion is subject to less scrutiny by equal opportunity measures and the protection 
offered by formal laws and policies (Booth et al, 2006). 
 
 
 
Consequently, elites in Malawi are seen as having greatly influenced the success and/or failure of pro- 
poor policies, and Malawi’s neopatrimonial nature is such that control over state resources, bureaucratic 
positions and the power to allocate rents, provide services and determine policies and their 
beneficiaries are effectively in the hands of personal or private networks controlled by a small group of 
elites. Thus it has been argued that the state has become an apparatus serving the interests of the 
few (Booth et al, 2006). 
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In contrast, Grant et al (2006) state that the power that elites have makes them an important group in 
the reduction of poverty because it allows them to influence decision-making in society. Elites are also 
central to state formation, stable democratic processes, good governance and empowerment. It can be 
argued that institutions that are intended to promote economic growth, accountability and 
responsiveness produce nothing without elites – that the rules of the game established by these 
institutions are meaningless without the elites needed to operate, maintain, undermine or change them 
(Leftwich, 2009: 4). This view on the essential role of elites in ensuring developmental outcomes through 
institutions is a response to the limited attention paid to this process in the literature on public policy, 
which fails to distinguish institutions from organizations, and especially fails to engage with the 
interaction between the two, which is the main determinant of developmental outcomes. This omission 
results in a failure to account for the role played by human agency in shaping, maintaining, undermining, 
avoiding or changing the institutional arrangements (Leftwich and Sen, 2010: 18) that lead to 
development and poverty reduction. 
 
 
 
 
Those authors who have analyzed elite behaviour often make the following assumptions: that elite 
behaviour is constrained by values, attitudes and cognitive limitations; that elites are constrained 
externally by environmental forces, such as intra-elite conflict, institutional factors and public 
expectations (Bunce, 1984); that ideas and interests can constrain policy-making, as well as how elites 
deliberately package and frame policy ideas to ensure acceptability and implementation; and that these 
ideas or interests can be normative or cognitive, whilst some ideas are taken for granted as they reside 
in the background of policy debates and others are explicitly articulated by the policy-making elites 
(Campbell, 1998: 380). Although these views help us to understand a range of assumptions concerning 
the constraints on elite action and the impact of these on broader policy processes, they do not assist 
us to understand what these ideas, interests, motivations and perceptions are and, particularly, how 
these ideas, attitudes and perceptions determine elite behaviour in relation to pro-poor policy. 
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In studying elite perceptions this thesis will contribute to debates regarding the resurgence of the role of 
ideas in political science in the last fifteen years (Lieberman, 2002). Ideas are important in explaining 
how beliefs and understandings lead actors to connect demands with particular policy solutions. These 
beliefs and understandings create the goals and desires that people bring to the political world. Hence 
the ways in which actors define and express their interests, the meanings, interpretations and 
judgments they attach to events and conditions, suggest that human agency can defy the constraints of 
political and social structures and create new political possibilities (Lieberman, 2002: 698; see also 
Smith, 1992). 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter is divided into four sections: the section that follows this introduction sets out the aims and 
objectives of the study, the research questions, and scope of the study; the sections following that 
discuss the context and the framework of the study; and the chapter concludes with an outline of the 
structure of the thesis. 
 
1.1.1 Aims and Objectives of the Study 
 
 
 
This section discusses the aims and objectives of the thesis. This thesis aims to employ De Swaan’s 
theory of social consciousness to examine elite perceptions of poverty and the poor in Malawi, and to 
further determine their influence on poverty policies. Based on semi-structured interviews, questionnaire 
responses, and textual analysis of speeches, parliamentary hearings, newspaper accounts, academic 
literature, and policy documents,the objectives of this thesis are: 
 
 
 
(i)To investigate elites’ explanations of the causes of poverty in Malawi and how these perceived causal 
 
explanations influence policy choices. 
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This objective is achieved first by examining the perceptions elites have of poor people and poverty in 
Malawi in a manner that leads to an understanding of their assessments of the extent, nature, character 
and location of poverty in Malawi. This examination should demonstrate how such perceptions lead to 
action or inaction in the face of poverty, as well as capturing attitudes towards issues of inequality and 
the categorisation of the poor. The second strategy employed is an exploration of elite views of the 
causes of, and solutions to, poverty, and this facilitates an analysis of the elite’s moral evaluation of 
their role in the reduction or perpetuation of poverty in Malawi. 
 
 
 
(ii) To explore elements of ‘social consciousness’ among Malawian elites and how these influence pro- 
poor policies. 
 
 
 
Drawing on the elites’ assessment of poverty, the poor, and the causes of and solutions to poverty, this 
objective is achieved in three ways. First, the thesis examines the extent to which elites feel that their 
welfare is interdependent with that of the poor. Here, the aim is to understand elite perceptions of the 
threat or challenge they face from the presence of poverty. Second, is an examination of the elites’ 
beliefs as to whether poverty in Malawi results from perceived characteristics of the poor, such as a 
reluctance to work hard, or whether the elites acknowledge failures of the economic system or unequal 
opportunities that have led to poverty. Here, the aim is to explore the elites’ sense of responsibility 
towards the poor and poverty, thereby determining whether poverty reduction is a priority for elites in 
Malawi. Third, in terms of the elites’ perceptions of interdependence and their sense of responsibility, 
this thesis examines the extent to which collective action among the elites in implementing pro-poor 
policy has emerged. 
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1.1.2     Research Questions 
 
 
 
 
The central question of this study is: How do elites’ perceptions of the poor, and of the extent and 
causes of poverty, relate to their preferred policy tools for reducing poverty in Malawi? In order to deal 
with this central question effectively, the following key research questions are asked: 
 
 
1.   What are elites’ explanations for the causes of poverty in Malawi and how do these perceived 
 
causal explanations influence policy choices? 
 
This research question is answered by asking the following sub-research questions: How do Malawian 
elites perceive poverty and poor people in their society? What does poverty mean to elites? What do 
elites believe causes poverty? What reasons do elites give for the presence of poor and wealthy people 
in Malawi? What do Malawian elites see as the main means of reducing poverty? Which policies do the 
elites consider a viable and desirable means of tackling poverty? 
 
 
2.   What elements of ‘social consciousness’ are present among Malawian elites and how do these 
 
influence action or inaction in the face of poverty in Malawi? 
 
 
 
This research question is answered by asking the following sub-questions: Why and how does poverty 
represent a problem to elites in Malawi, if at all? What do elites believe the consequences of the 
prevalence of poverty are in Malawi? Do Malawian elites fear the impact of the prevalence of poverty 
on their own welfare? Do Malawian elites see opportunities arising from the eradication of poverty? 
Why and how do the threats, challenges and opportunities posed by the presence of poverty lead to 
collective action towards poverty reduction amongst elites, if at all? Do elites believe that feasible 
means for reducing poverty exist? Do elites believe that poverty reduction is or should be a priority in 
Malawi? What kinds of arguments about the causes and character of, and the solutions to, poverty are 
likely to engage the interest of Malawian elites? 
 
 
 
1.1.3     Scope of the Study 
 
 
 
The conceptualisation of elites has varied, and there has been equally varied research into elite 
backgrounds, attitudes and behaviour. In addition, different disciplines have studied elites at different 
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levels and within different contexts: national, local, and global; or within institutions. Thus, elites have 
been considered as a ‘power elite’, which includes an ‘inner core’ that makes decisions and an ‘outer 
core’ who count even if they do not directly make decisions  (Mills, 1956: 288 - 290); a ‘social elite’, 
which is divided between a governing and a non-governing elite (Pareto, 1935); an ‘oligarchy’, which is 
made up of those who control a society or an organization at the top (Michels, 1915; 1962); and a 
‘ruling class’, which includes those who influence government decisions and those who formally decide 
policies (Mosca, 1939). Although these types show some of the differences between the theorists who 
consider elites, particularly at the level of, and in the context of, analysis, there is agreement that elites 
are those with power4 or influence or the capacity to make decisions. Thus power or influence is 
dependent on an elite’s position or location within institutional structures – an idea that is useful in the 
study of social policy. In analysing elite perceptions of poverty in Malawi, Mills’ (1956) conceptualisation 
of elites as those whose positions enable them to make decisions that have major consequences was 
used to focus this thesis (this is discussed further in Chapter 4). This also assisted the thesis in widening 
the scope for analysing elites, taking into account the view of Hill that, “In modern states the position of 
elites is related to the development of large-scale organisations in many areas of life with the result that 
there are different kinds of elites, not just those holding formal power” (Hill, 2009:38). This also 
enabled a focus on non-Malawian elites, particularly those working within donor agencies. This is 
important because donors have an influence on the domestic activities of elites, for instance on the 
implementation of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG) (Amsden et al, 2009). 
 
The policy process is seen as occurring in organised contexts where there are established norms, 
values, relationships, power structures and standard operating procedures (Hill, 2009). This brings to 
 
 
4 The concept of power, its use and its pattern of distribution in society is of course highly contested: for instance, power as 
determined by organizational ability, psychological make-up, economic resources and positions of power (Mosca, 1939; 
Michels, 1959, Pareto, 1935; Burnham, 1941; and Mills, 1956). This is also compounded by the fact that there are different 
structures of power within different political systems. Despite this lack of agreement on the nature of power, the different 
representations of elites’ powers are useful in identifying elites. 
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the fore the importance of those who dominate, hence the importance of agency, ideas and interests. 
Therefore the focus of this study is on those elites who influence, or have the capacity to act in relation 
to, pro-poor policy processes: not informal opinion leaders, but individuals occupying significant positions 
at the head of organizations. Given this definition of elites, the variables of wealth and status become 
less important for this study, although they are at times intertwined with that of power. In this context, 
Chapter 4 will discuss the thesis’ sampling methods in detail. 
 
 
 
1.2     Socio-political and Economic Context of Malawi 
 
 
 
Malawi offers an interesting case study for understanding the importance of elites in the politics of pro- 
poor policy, given its unsuccessful attempts at reducing poverty over the past eighteen years, following 
the transition to democracy. In Malawi, democracy has had minimal impact on poverty and has not 
empowered the poor; nor is it believed to have resulted in accountable or responsive government. 
Instead, the neopatrimonial practices of the one-party system have continued into multiparty democracy, 
and democracy has not changed the nature of Malawi’s traditional society. Thus social relationships are 
still characterized by inequality and a large power distance. Citizens gladly defer to authority, which 
makes it difficult or impossible for the poor to hold elites to account. This explains why abuses by ‘big 
men’ are tolerated even when few benefits trickle down to poor people (Booth et al., 2006). 
 
 
 
 
Malawi’s transition from an authoritarian one-party state to a democratic form of government in 1994 
has been considered a ‘transition without transformation’, because many structures, systems and 
personalities have remained the same (Cammack 2004). Most importantly, the expected impact of 
democracy on poverty reduction has been minimal at best. Since 1994, despite the implementation of 
various pro-poor policies, the level of poverty has continued to be high, with 52.4% of the population 
poor and 22.3% ultra-poor (National Statistics Office, 2005), whilst inequality is even higher, with a gini- 
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coefficient of 0.39 (Human Development Report, 2009). Three years into democratic rule, Malawi faced 
two food crises, fiscal instability and political intimidation similar to that of the one-party era, resulting in 
the withdrawal of aid by donors. The rhetoric that democracy will result in development, equitable 
distribution of resources and good governance is not consistent with the reality in Malawi. This is typical 
of many African countries; despite political changes and the adoption of better governance institutions, 
there is little evidence that these changes have resulted in more effective, accountable and responsive 
governments (Chabal 2002). 
 
 
 
These shortcomings show that developmental outcomes are not only dependent on the right institutions. 
These institutions might be formal institutions (statute law, common law or regulations) or informal 
institutions (conventions, norms or behaviour) (North, 1990:8). The welfare impact of these institutions is 
a result of how elites choose to exercise their influence or power. Therefore, the experience in Malawi 
indicates that ‘understanding of institutions is not sufficient if it ignores well- organised and influential 
vested interests, which may or may not support pro-poor initiatives’ (Leftwich, 2010:44). 
 
 
 
 
The persistence of poverty may reflect its institutionalization within social and political norms and its 
acceptance within political discourse and by political elites (Hickey and Bracking, 2005:851). Therefore, 
the answer lies in the reallocation of resources and a shifting of the power relations within which 
poverty is embedded and tolerated. ‘The inclusion of the poor in participatory poverty assessments may 
have little weight compared to the ways in which poverty and the poor are represented within elite 
political discourse’ (Hickey and Bracking 2005: 854). Nevertheless, there are many studies on the 
perceptions of poverty held by the poor (Narayan et al, 2000; Murkhujee, 1992; Poole et al, 2007) that 
have had a significant influence on developing solutions to poverty. In contrast, very little is known 
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about the perceptions of poverty held by elites, “as if the poor and non-poor belonged to different 
 
worlds” (Reis, 2010: 1). 
 
 
 
 
A cursory look at some literature on Malawi shows that the manner in which various institutions, both 
formal (a constitution that enabled multiparty democracy) and informal (patronage or clientelism), were 
adopted was dependent on the choices and decisions of elites. For instance, leaders in Malawi have 
continued to use patronage and clientelism to retain power and legitimacy, despite the transition to 
democracy (Cammack et al. 2007; O’Neil 2007). The only difference was that the one-party state led by 
Kamuzu Banda (1964 – 1994) did not practice a “free for all” patronage. Banda retained tight control 
over the allocation of power and wealth, which had a positive impact on socio-economic development. 
For instance, “infant mortality declined from 200 per 1000 in 1964 to 130, and per capita daily calorie 
intake increased from 2,250 in 1964 to 2,400 in 1975” (AFRODAD 2007a:18; also see Booth et al, 
2006). Malawi’s economic performance was impressive, with GDP growing by an average of eight 
percent between 1965 and 1973 (World Bank, 1975). In contrast, the democratic rule of Bakili Muluzi 
(1994 – 2004) lost control of the patronage system, leading to an increase in corruption at all levels 
within the civil service. As a result, at least in part, of this change, growth declined and poverty grew. 
Muluzi’s two terms in office were described as “the lost decade”, where no real economic growth took 
place. Between 1995 and 1998 Malawi’s growth rate averaged 4.6 percent per annum; this dropped to 
1.4 percent per annum between 1998 and 2001; and the percentage became negative between 2001 
and  2002  (Conroy,  2006).  The  second  democratic  president,  Bingu  Wa  Mutharika  (2004  to  the 
present), also employed a neopatrimonial style of leadership akin to that of both Muluzi and Banda. 
Bingu reached out to civil society and the media and took a zero-tolerance stand on corruption; but at 
the same time he adopted populist policies such as input subsidies and road building to gain support. 
He has also used patronage, especially the promise of public office appointments, to encourage 
opposition politicians to join his party (Cammack et al. 2007). However, under his rule there have been 
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more positive development outcomes as growth has averaged 7.5 percent since 2006 (Government of 
 
Malawi, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
What this may suggest is that institutions may matter less than the particular choices and decisions 
elites in Malawi have made. Some recent studies (Sebudubudu and Molutsi, 2009; Leftwich, 2009; 
Leftwich and Hogg, 2007 and 2008; Laws, 2010) have illustrated this possibility by going beyond the 
analysis of institutions and policy and identifying elite and coalitional strategies, behaviours and 
decisions that have impacted on development policy in different contexts. Understanding how and why 
elites make choices and decisions regarding the reduction of poverty is an important focus of this 
thesis. What explains the persistence of poverty in Malawi? What role do elites play in reducing or 
perpetuating poverty in Malawi? How do elites perceive poverty and the poor, and how do these 
perceptions impact on their policy choices? As argued by Selee (2005), perceptions dictate behaviour, 
therefore elite perceptions should be reflected in pro-poor policies. Perceptions provide the fabric into 
which public initiatives can be sewn and in which they can become entangled. They shape or constrain 
leaders’ decisions by creating the space for addressing issues, the nature of the approach used to deal 
with them and a set of solutions to be considered (Selee, 2005:7). 
 
 
 
It is important to note that such perceptions have not yet been studied in many developing countries, 
including Malawi. In the course of my research, I did not come across any specific studies that tried to 
understand elite perceptions of poverty and the poor in Malawi. Apart from an article by Schou (2007) 
on ‘Demand-driven Poverty Programmes and Elite Capture in Malawi: Between Prebendalism and 
Benevolence’, elites have barely featured in studies of the country. Hence this thesis is significant and 
timely, filling an important gap in the field of elite perceptions and policy-making. During the fieldwork 
for this study, a prominent MP expressed himself thus: “Poverty is a serious concern for me and that is 
why I could not wait to see you. I do place important value on your research, otherwise I would have 
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made you go through rigid formalities to get an interview. That is why I have invited other people to sit 
 
in on this interview, because I want them to start worrying about poverty” (Interview, 8/4/08). 
 
 
 
1.3      Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 
The theoretical framework for this study was devised by drawing on De Swaan’s (1988) theory of “social 
consciousness”, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. De Swaan (1988) argues that the 
evolution of welfare systems in Europe and the USA occurred following elites’ development of “social 
consciousness” – a set of perceptions that paved the way for collective action and were conducive to the 
adoption of measures to reduce poverty (Reis, 2010; Hossain, 1999). Firstly, these perceptions include 
recognition by elites of the interdependence of social groups in society and the potential impact poverty 
might have on elite welfare – an impact from which they might be unable to insulate themselves. 
Secondly, there is a moral dimension that involves elites feeling a sense of responsibility for the 
existence of poverty and for tackling poverty. Lastly, there may be a belief that effective means are 
available to tackle the problems of poverty (De Swaan 2005; Hossain, 1999; Toye, 1999). For 
example, European elites were seen to develop a greater sense of their interdependence with the 
poor when they began to consider the causes of threats such as crime, disease and insurrection, and 
also when they perceived the mutual or collective benefits that the reduction of poverty represented 
for the community as a whole, such as an improved competitive economic and military capacity 
(Reis, 2010; Searle 1971; Hossain and Moore, 2002). Elite responses to these threats and opportunities 
ranged from repression of the “dangerous poor” to charity and public provision for the “deserving”  or  
“respectable  poor”  (Woolf,  1986;  Slack,  1988;  Himmelfarb,  1984;  Daunton,  1986). 
 
Hossain (1999) notes that by using the framework of “the logic of collective action”5, De Swaan is able 
 
 
 
5 According to Sandler (1992), collective action occurs when the efforts of two or more individuals are needed to accomplish an outcome. Collective action is required 
where individual rationality is not sufficient to produce collective rationality (Olson, 1965). For example, where “individual members of the elite are unable on their own 
to ward off the threats, or to exploit the opportunities, that the presence of the poor holds for them, and since they are incapable of alleviating poverty individually , the 
presence of the poor in their midst confronts the elites with a problem of collective action: to coordinate their efforts, 
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to show how charitable assistance developed into broader municipal systems of assistance. Gradually 
elites came to believe that in order to reduce poverty and address the “free rider” problem, welfare 
provision should be state sponsored and administered, rather than the result of private charity. 
 
 
 
 
De Swaan (1988) argues that individuals came to develop collective, nation-wide and compulsory 
arrangements to cope with poverty by possessing a “social consciousness”. Through the use of negative 
drivers (i.e., narrow appeals to the self-interest of elites, for instance, a fear of disease) and positive 
drivers (i.e., an appeal to common interest and common gain from the reduction of poverty, or altruistic 
national arguments), elites can be usefully engaged in defining and supporting national anti- poverty 
strategies (Hossain and Moore, 2002). 
 
 
 
These arguments show that motives for supporting the poor vary. For instance, Cavallo (1995) notes 
that the motivation of the elite to implement pro-poor policy in early modern Turin was not driven by the 
presence of poverty or the actual situation of the poor. Rather, intra-elite conflict and discourse about 
the plight of widows played a crucial role in shaping responses to poverty on the part of the municipality 
and individual donors.  A focus on the situation of poor widows emerged out of intra-elite debates about 
patterns of inheritance that adversely affected aristocratic women, rather than any direct concern over 
poor women. But this focus subsequently had a positive impact on the poor (Cavallo, 1995).  On the 
other hand, Himmelfarb (1984) explains that ideas about what poverty was in Britain – which groups 
deserved support or were worthy, and which ones were “undeserving” – played a role in the provision of 
public goods to the poor. As we will see in Chapter 2, the works of individuals such as Charles Booth in 
Victorian Britain are considered to have highlighted the scandalous and immoral conditions in which the 
poor were living and successfully attracted the attention of reform-minded elites (Himmelfarb, 1984). 
What are considered important are not the facts of poverty but the ideas brought to bear on these facts: 
 
either through voluntary agreement or by seeking a compulsory arrangement, namely public action” (De Swaan et al, 2000: 
2). 
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re-moralising the poor by relieving their pauperised situation – psychologically, morally and culturally 
(Himmelfarb, 1984: 530). This shows that policy on poverty may not necessarily be driven by the actual 
extent of the poverty in question, but by the ideas regarding poverty that determine the role that elites 
play (Hossain, 1999). 
 
 
 
In developing De Swaan’s (1988) theory of “social consciousness” for this study, there was recognition 
that the context of contemporary Malawi is different to that of Victorian Britain; therefore the perceptions 
that existed amongst elites in Britain and influenced their policy choices might not exist in Malawi. 
However, the theory of “social consciousness” is useful in examining Malawian elites’ motivations and 
the debates around poverty – for example whether elite perceptions affected pro-poor policy choices, 
and whether similar assumptions to those of 19th Century European elites, held. Therefore, this study 
not only focused its attention on studying whether Malawian elites possess signs of the elements of 
“social consciousness”, but also on these elites’ own discourses on poverty. This enabled an 
examination of alternative perceptions, fears and opportunities that might motivate action towards 
poverty reduction, and that might have been missed if similar perceptions to those that triggered action 
in Europe and USA were not present in Malawi. 
 
 
 
This thesis adopted a mixed-methods research approach to data collection. This involved, for example, 
semi-structured interviews, questionnaires and observations. This is fully discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
 
 
1.4     Organization of the Thesis 
 
 
 
 
This  first  chapter  has  presented  the  context  of  the  problem  under  investigation,  and  has  briefly 
reviewed recent studies on the problem. The main aims, questions and significance of the study have 
been presented, culminating in this section on the organisation of the chapters. 
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Chapter 2 discusses the main theoretical and conceptual ideas relevant to the study. Clarification of 
these concepts will show that the problem of poverty is multifaceted. The chapter establishes that 
poverty should be understood as a political as well as a social and economic problem, with differing 
definitions and no single agreed cause or solution.  The chapter asserts that the political dimension of 
poverty makes the exploration of elite views an indispensable undertaking in establishing why particular 
solutions to poverty are preferred to others. 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the theory of “social consciousness”’, which is used to analyse elite 
perceptions of poverty in a way that offers a fuller picture of what drives elites to act than can be offered 
by general public choice theory arguments about elite behaviour. The chapter also considers how 
explanations of elite perceptions have been developed to explain the evolution of welfare in developed 
countries, while there is only one major study situated in a developing country that uses these (Reis and 
Moore, 2005). The study of elite perceptions is important, especially in a country like Malawi, where 
widespread poverty persists despite the transition to democracy, the adoption of good governance 
institutions, and the implementation of specific pro-poor policies. 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 outlines the methodology and data-collection techniques adopted for this study. The design 
of the research is primarily based on qualitative data, including semi-structured interviews, documentary 
analysis and observations, and these are complemented by a limited use of quantitative data. The 
chapter explains the links between key research questions, the framework of analysis, and the 
techniques for data analysis. The chapter also discusses the ethics and values underpinning the 
research. 
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Chapter 5 explains the contextual background of the research. It examines the political and socio- 
economic background of Malawi and describes the various pro-poor policies that have been 
implemented, as well as the success or failure of their impact on poverty levels. It also describes the 
political development of Malawi, dwelling on its transition to democracy and the various good 
governance institutions adopted. The chapter argues that these structures have not had the desired 
impact on poverty in Malawi; instead of decreasing, poverty is seen to have deepened and more people 
have become vulnerable to it. The chapter also discusses the features of Malawi’s social structure and 
the rise and transformation of elites in relation to social, economic and political changes from the colonial 
period to the present. 
 
 
 
Chapters 6 to 8 are the analysis chapters of this study, and they present the evidence in relation to the 
analytical framework outlined in Chapter 4. Chapter 6 examines elite assessments of poverty in Malawi. 
The aim is to understand elites’ views on the level, extent and experience of poverty in Malawi. These 
provide the foundation for understanding elites’ links with the poor and the causal chain that leads to 
their inaction or action in relation to poverty reduction. This analysis is carried out in Chapter 7 and 
examines the extent to which elites attribute poverty to their own inaction and to the   inaction of the 
poor. This is followed by Chapter 8, which discusses elites’ preferred solutions, linking these back to 
their perception of the causes of poverty. These three chapters bring into focus the three variables of 
the analytical framework: interdependence, responsibility and feasibility. These are essential for the 
development of the social consciousness that is necessary for reducing poverty. 
 
 
 
Finally, Chapter 9 outlines the conclusions drawn from this research and highlights their implications. 
This enables an identification of the thesis with existing knowledge on poverty and its solutions in 
Malawi. This chapter also outlines some limitations of the study and areas for further study. 
22  
CHAPTER TWO 
POVERTY, POLITICS AND PRO-POOR POLICY 
 
2.1     Introduction 
 
 
 
 
This chapter reviews the literature on poverty, politics and pro-poor policy in order to identify the gap in 
previous research on public policy in this area. The review observes that the various policies aimed at 
rapid development pursued by developing countries since independence have had varying degrees of 
success. Whilst countries like Botswana, Malaysia and Sri Lanka have managed to translate economic 
growth into poverty reduction, others, like Malawi, have failed and poverty has grown. The review 
shows that academics and practitioners agree that policy failures, particularly the failure of policy devised 
to be pro-poor, can be attributed to a country’s politics. It recognizes that policies are not the product 
of rational decision-makers; rather they are a product of interactions and bargaining between various 
actors in the policy process, who bring to the process different ideas and interests (Mooij, 2003). 
For instance, the nature of pro-poor policies, as a tool aimed at providing support to under- represented 
individuals or regions and redressing imbalances by redistributing resources from one group to another, 
makes them fundamentally political. 
 
 
 
Pro-poor policies are political because their implementation involves disputes amongst individuals and 
groups in society as to who wins or loses in the process of organization, mobilization, combination, and 
distribution of these resources, whether they be capital, land, human beings or any combination of 
these. Unfortunately, in this dispute poor people are mostly disadvantaged when it comes to influencing 
policy and are poorly placed to influence the way states allocate resources and distribute rights 
(Leftwich, 2005a:5). Academics (Leftwich, 2009; Reis and Moore, 2005, Booth et al, 2006, for example) 
and practitioners (DFID in their Drivers of Change Studies) argue that dominant individuals or groups 
within society, mainly the elite, are able to push their concerns onto the agenda for policy discussions 
and then have the power to influence policy outcomes. These elites, normally a very small number of 
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people (usually three percent of the population), control the key material, symbolic and political 
resources within a country (Reis and Moore, 2005). 
 
 
 
Although the literature offers valuable insights into the engagement of politics with poverty, this is limited  
to  discussions  of  good  governance  or  institutions  that  are  associated  with  empowerment, 
accountability and responsiveness (Hickey, 2004; Leftwich, 2010). This is because elites are seen as 
self-interested individuals who respond to incentives and disincentives, and who therefore do not make 
policies that would reduce their power and influence (Mooij, 2003). In relation to pro-poor policies, 
social scientists argue that elites are beneficiaries (materially, culturally and psychologically) of poverty 
and inequality, and will therefore resist attempts to overcome them (Hossain and Moore, 2002). 
However, I argue that these analyses do not accord a big enough role to elite discourses on poverty, 
their values, attitudes and norms, resulting in a lack of understanding on how these shape elites’ policy 
decisions or motivate them to act. 
 
 
 
This chapter is divided into four main sections: the first section of the review looks at the poverty agenda, 
tracing the emerging poverty discourse in development policy and the influence of this discourse on 
strategies for poverty reduction. This also involves a discussion of how development discourse has 
depoliticised poverty and pro-poor policy by ignoring issues of power and its impact on policy 
processes and outcomes. This will be important for Chapter 5, in which the Malawian sequence of pro-
poor policy initiatives and the adoption of various strategies are contextualized, as well as for Chapters 6 
and 7, in which elite views of poverty are analyzed. The second section reviews the literature on models 
of policy-making, including a discussion of the ideal nature of these models vis-à- vis the interactive 
reality of policy-making. The third section relates these models to regime type and the neopatrimonial 
reality of developing countries, further highlighting the politics of policy-making. This section observes 
that models of policy-making deal with the abstract and the ideal, but in the ‘real 
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world’ of Malawian politics and policy-making, where neopatrimonial practices cut across the social, 
economic and political spheres, ideal models fail to explain development outcomes. Thus this review 
looks at the development community’s thinking on how pro-poor policies emerge and are implemented 
in the context of an environment where ideal models do not make sense. A glaring gap in this thinking 
is the exclusion, or near exclusion, of elites from these models, and the assumption that 
neopatrimonialism and regime type fully explain elites’ decision-making and outcomes. This is taken up 
in the last section, which offers an alternative view of pro-poor policy-making that incorporates the role 
of elites and their impact on policy decisions and outcomes. 
 
 
 
2.2     Discourses on Poverty and their Impact on Policy-Making 
 
 
 
Current (see UNDP, 2010; Ravallion, 2011) discussions on poverty have come to accept its 
multidimensional nature, which includes economic, social and political dimensions, and goes beyond an 
earlier ‘income and consumption’ conceptualization of poverty. According to Bartelink (2004), in 
economic terms, poverty refers to the effects of unequal distribution of resources, such as capital and 
land, and the inadequate exploitation of these resources. In social terms, it refers to inadequate access 
to the amenities that determine people’s living conditions, such as drinking water, education and health 
facilities. And in political terms, it refers to the restriction of the poor’s involvement in decision-making to 
the policy spaces created by powerful institutions and actors. Although these dimensions are inter- 
related and mutually reinforcing (Bartelink, 2004:27), policies for poverty reduction have concentrated 
on the economic and social dimensions, overlooking the political dimension.  In the 1960s, poverty was 
seen as resulting from a situation of underdevelopment:  individuals were not poor; whole countries 
were poor. The solution was economic growth, facilitated by capital transfers that underpinned the aid 
infrastructure that came to dominate development (Bartelink, 2004; Brock et al, 2001). Thus, if politics 
entered into poverty discourse, it was in terms of its destructive nature, and the ruling elites responsible 
for planning and implementing policy were characterised as ‘rational, calculating and Machiavellian’ 
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(Robinson, 2003:4) individuals bent on blocking pro-poor policy or using available resources for personal 
gain.  Generally, the interests of elites in developing countries were seen to differ from those of donors 
in relation to economic development and poverty reduction. 
 
 
 
Therefore, many of the solutions advocated by the donor community, particularly the World Bank, have 
been meant to be ‘politician proof’, thus, limiting the role of elites in policy-making so as to reduce the 
scope for inefficiencies and patronage (WDR, 2004; Robinson, 2003). Attempts have been made to 
bypass ruling elites by using nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) to deliver services directly to the 
poor; and policies have been implemented by donors in ways that ensure poor people have the power 
to influence them. However, Robinson (2003) argues that instead of aiming to ‘politician-proof’ pro-poor 
policies, a better approach is to change the incentives of ruling elites so as to change the qualitative 
nature of the political equilibrium that delivers pro-poor services’ (p.4). As Toye (1999) argues, 
international agendas on poverty reduction can be made effective only by influencing internal political 
agendas (p.6). 
 
 
 
However, before discussing how politics has emerged on the agendas of international organisations 
and scholars, it is important to understand what has driven concern with pro-poor policies. Pasha 
(2002) observes that the international development community’s concern with pro-poor policies is a 
consequence of a deep-rooted disillusionment with a development paradigm that understood 
development as economic growth without direct consideration for poverty reduction. The notion that 
development has to be pro-poor was not considered in development thinking, especially among donors, 
pre-19806: pro-poor growth was to be a trickle down process of economic growth (Remenyi, 2004:33). 
Therefore, the promotion of economic growth was paramount:  its effects would trickle down to all 
 
 
6 However, the framing of development in terms of poverty has roots in the socio-political challenges of governing the poor 
in 19th and 20th century Eu rop e  (Brock et al, 2001:9). The conceptual roots of poverty lines can be traced to the work of 
Rowntree and Booth in the 1880s (Slack, 1988; Kanbur and Squires, 1999; Hossain and Moore, 1999; and Holman, 
1978).  Then again, in the 1970s, there was a brief concern with poverty by the World Bank, but this was eclipsed by the rise 
of neoliberal orthodoxy in the 1980s (Brock et al, 2001). 
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segments  of  the  population  and  poverty  would  gradually  disappear  (Bartelink,  2004:27;  see  also 
 
Wharton, 1990). 
 
 
 
 
Consequently, poverty was defined by early development thinkers (Rostow, 1960; Parsons, 1937) in 
material terms and framed as an economic problem of private consumption. The material definition of 
poverty was bolstered by the idea that poverty can be measured in monetary terms. Thus, income- 
based measures such as the poverty line became key indicators of poverty, and pro-poor solutions 
were to be facilitated by capital investments in the form of development aid. Development aid supported 
economic growth and the implementation of policies that emphasised the construction of physical 
infrastructure, such as hospitals, universities and state-owned companies. As a result, although 
development aid might have been concerned with poverty reduction, modernisation became the route 
through which poverty would be overcome (Brock et al, 2001, Toye, 1999, Pasha, 2002; Kanbur and 
Squires, 1999). 
 
 
 
However, by the 1970s, it was evident that the impressive aggregate growth7  in developing countries 
had not reached the poor, even in countries that had experienced higher than average growth, such as 
Botswana, Mauritius (see Robinson, 2003; Good, 1999); the Asian Tigers (see Craig and Potter, 2003), 
and Nigeria (see Nafziger, 1988). In 1978, the World Bank observed that 800 million people in 
developing countries were still poor, with inadequate shelter, food, education and health care, especially 
in rural areas (WDR, 1978:1). Clearly, the benefits of growth had not trickled down to the poor; 
hence the 1970s saw development strategy shift towards advocating economic growth which was pro-
poor. Accordingly, the WB and the UN began to angle their lending and support towards rural 
development for small farmers, urban infrastructure and service provision in the health and education 
sectors. The 1970s emphasised a basic needs and participatory approach to development, with aid 
 
 
7    GNP grew by 3% annually from the 1950s and GDP grew from 2% in 1950 to 3.4% in 1960. Economic growth was 
accompanied by rapid expansion in education systems, growing literacy, improvements in health and nutrition, increasing 
technological sophistication, and industrialisation (WDR, 1978; HDR, 1990). 
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shifting from capital investments to human resource development (Brock et al, 2001; WDR, 1978). The 
interest in poverty and inequality was brief, as it was overshadowed by the resurgence of a neoliberal 
orthodoxy that grew in response to the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 as well as the ensuing debt crisis. 
Cornwall and Brock (2005) argue that this shift in strategy gave substantive powers to the World Bank 
and IMF to resurrect technical and economic policy solutions to underdevelopment through structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs). The conditions8 imposed through SAPs affected the provision of 
services to the poor, agriculture production and food security in many developing countries (AFRODAD, 
2007a, Riddell, 1992). 
 
 
 
 
These negative effects of SAPs on the most vulnerable members of society were criticised (Cornia et 
al, 1987 and 1988; Anyinam, 1989; Longhurst et al, 1988) and, by the late 1980s, ‘adjustment with a 
human  face’ (UNICEF,  1987)  was being  advocated  by UNICEF, leading  to the implementation  of 
various social safety nets and social funds to reach groups excluded or marginalized in the process of 
growth (Pasha, 2002; Cornia et al, 1987; Brock et al, 2001). The views of UNICEF appear to have 
influenced the World Bank, as issues of safety nets appear in the 1990 World Development Report 
(WDR), which advocated a pattern of development whose policies would successfully reduce poverty, 
provide opportunities for the poor and enable them to participate in growth (WDR, 1990: 103; see also 
Bartelink, 2004; Cornwall and Brock, 2005). 
 
 
 
Thus to ensure that development reached the poor and provided opportunities that would enable them 
to participate in growth, the 1990 WDR supported policies that: encouraged rural development and 
urban employment through lower taxation of agriculture, market liberalisation and public provision of 
infrastructure; increased access of the poor to land, credit and public infrastructure and services; and 
targeted  resource-poor  regions  by  facilitating  out-migration  to  reduce  population  pressure  and 
8  
The basic elements of SAPs have differed across the various countries, but four basic elements are always present: 
currency devaluation, the removal/reduction of the state from the workings of the economy, the elimination of subsidies in an 
attempt to reduce expenditures, and trade liberalisation (Riddell, 1992:53). 
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additional investments to meet basic needs and maintain or increase yield levels (Bartelink, 2004:28). 
The 1990 WDR included references to poverty also being caused by poor economic governance, corrupt 
officials and institutions, and a policy environment that was not favourable to economic growth. This 
made it possible for questions to be raised concerning governance, the role of the state, the 
empowerment of the poor, and the role of institutions (Brock et al, 2001). 
 
 
 
Consequently, during the 1990s, the poverty agenda broadened to encompass gender inequality (see 
Dollar and Gatti, 1999; World Bank, 2003b); good governance and institutions (see World Bank, 1998; 
Grindle, 2007); decentralised governance (Manor, 2004; Cornwall and Gaventa, 2001a; 2001b); and 
freedom or capabilities (Sen, 1999) as pre-conditions for successful poverty reduction. The view of 
poverty as freedom equated poverty eradication with the removal of systems in which individuals were 
deprived of basic capabilities. According to Hickey (2009), a capabilities approach (the ability or potential 
to do or to be, for example, having the social opportunities to participate in development) to poverty 
reduction offers a superior way of thinking about strategies for promoting political inclusiveness (p.144). 
By 2000-2001, the discourse of the WDR had acquired a moral tone with ‘the voices of the poor’9  
incorporated into the report; it presented poverty as a multidimensional phenomenon, situating the 
issue of poverty within social and political processes; and it emphasised issues of power, ownership and 
participation (Cornwall and Brock, 2005:16). Therefore, the policy focus was on building up assets for the 
poor and improving marketing mechanisms, making institutions more accountable and responsive to 
the poor, ensuring participation, and reducing the vulnerability of the poor to ill health, economic 
shocks and dislocations (Bartelink, 2004). 
 
Looking forward two decades from the 1990 WDR, discourses on development and poverty during this 
period have centred on different aspects of good governance, particularly its impact on the poverty 
 
 
 
9  These were studies carried out under the World Bank in forty-seven countries. They aimed to understand the poor’s 
perceptions of poverty: their problems, concerns and priorities (Narayan, 2000). 
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agenda in terms of achieving opportunity, security and empowerment for all, and on accompanying 
policies as embodied in the poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) and millennium development 
goals (MGDs) (Hickey, 2008; Cornwall and Brock, 2005). In relation to governance, debates have 
ensued on two main issues. First, there is the definition of good governance10, especially on whether 
good governance implies specific policies or policy outcomes, such as macroeconomic policy, poverty 
reduction, and openness of trade or decentralisation or participatory politics and development (Grindle, 
2007: 555; see also IMF, 2005; DFID, 2001; Hyden et al, 2004; USAID, 2005; Kaufmann, 2003; UNDP, 
 
1997; World Bank, 1989 and 2000). Second, there have been debates on measurement, indicators and 
inferences of good governance, for instance on determining how characteristics such as transparency, 
accountability, or rule of law, can be operationalised (Hyden et al, 2004; Knack et al, 2003; Van de 
Walle, 2006; Andrews, 2008; Grindle, 2002). 
 
 
 
This period also saw a growing number of studies aimed at analysing countries’ specific historical and 
political contexts and how they relate to poverty reduction – studies such as DFID’s Drivers of Change 
studies; SIDA’s power analysis; Grindle’s (2007) suggestion for ‘good enough’ governance, and 
Moore’s (2001) typology of political systems. According to Hickey (2005), the good governance agenda 
was one way in which the international development community attempted to engage with the politics of 
poverty and its reduction. However, the good governance agenda failed to show how politics relates to 
poverty specifically and was more concerned with modifying or disciplining politics. Thus the good 
governance agenda is technocratic in its approach, believing that an administrative or managerial 
solution exists for development problems such as poverty (Leftwich, 2008). For instance, in discussing 
institution-building, the good governance agenda ‘remained couched in a highly technocratic, managerial 
and administrative language and was profoundly and almost determinedly non-political or even anti-
political in its implications and tone’ (Leftwich, 2005a:584). As a result, development policies 
 
 
10  For example: institutional forms and processes, democracy, widespread participation in development, decision-making 
and strong legislature (Grindle, 2007). 
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such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
have been intent on measuring and meeting targets rather than understanding the forces that produce 
or reduce poverty (Cornwall and Brock, 2005). 
 
 
 
The discourses on poverty discussed above illuminate how poverty research has neglected the 
underlying problems of the distribution of resources in society, and the issues of unequal power relations, 
through its ‘failure to rigorously study and understand how politics relates to poverty and poverty 
reduction’ (Hickey, 2008: 353; see also Hickey 2005), and in particular to understand ‘the political 
character and class basis11 of the state, the uses of official positions and state power by bureaucratic 
elites as well as other individuals’ (Ferguson, 1994:178). Thus, studies (Grootaert et al, 1995; 
Chambers, 1988; Narayan et al, 2000) on poverty have established a link between the existence of 
poverty and factors such as assets, education, occupation, ethnicity and geography, but fail to explain 
how and why these factors are reflected in poverty, as these studies ignore the processes of 
accumulation, economic distribution and political power. As a result, donor solutions to Africa’s problems 
have ignored politics, the power of elites, and asset distribution; and when the poverty problem is 
extracted from power-relation issues, this has the effect of depoliticising it (Harris, 2007; Riddell, 1999). 
 
 
 
Commenting on the non-political nature the discourse on poverty has taken, Riddell (1999) notes that 
the poverty-reducing effects of aid seem to be based on the assumption that development is conflict 
free. This assumption relates to the linear view of development held in the 1950s, which believed that a 
massive injection of funds would lead to an economy of high mass consumption (Rostow, 1960). As 
Riddell (1999) points out, many of the donor strategies and policies (i.e. SAPs, DFID’s 1997 White 
 
 
 
11 The state is considered class-based because the ruling classes are seen to control the state and use it as a political and 
material apparatus to further their narrow interests, especially in Africa. Therefore, to be absent from the state is to be 
condemned to a subordinate and inferior status. Consequently, class power is state power: the two are fused and inseparable 
(Fatton, 1988; see also Miliband, 1983). 
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Paper on aid; OECD, 1996) seem to suggest that all that appears to be necessary is for countries to 
subscribe to the worthy objectives of donor agencies. Donors will then provide funds to meet these 
objectives and growth will occur, eliminating poverty in the process (Riddell, 1999: 327). Therefore, the 
state is seen as an ‘impartial instrument for implementing plans and the government as a machine for 
providing social services and economic growth’ (Ferguson, 1994:178). 
 
 
 
Fergusson (1994) argues that such apparent donor naivety is not a ruse but a refusal to face local 
politics. For some donors, like the World Bank, engagement with political situations is prohibited by their 
articles of agreement: they are not allowed to become involved in the politics of aid recipient countries 
(Marquette, 2003: 413). In other aid and development agencies, politics is ignored in development 
planning because it is considered messy, and a reason why desirable things do not happen (Moore and 
Putzel, 2001).  An important aspect of the present study is the recognition that a better understanding 
of politics helps to create and nurture opportunities for pro-poor change, and that an understanding of 
political actors and policy processes is vital for pro-poor outcomes. As DFID (2010) has noted in its 
paper The Politics of Poverty: Elites, Citizens and States, politics, decision-making and political 
settlements are central to poverty reduction. This highlights the role of contestation and bargaining 
between the state, elites and citizens in building public institutions that deliver growth and ensure poverty 
reduction (p. 4). 
 
 
 
In understanding the politics of development, we begin to identify: coalitions and alliances that benefit 
the poor, or areas where there are common interests between the poor and the non-poor (Moore and 
Putzel, 2001:5); a social compact between elites and the poor that motivates elites to act (Toye, 1999); 
and a conceptualisation of poverty and the poor by policymaking elites which may be linked to poverty 
reduction policies that are aimed at disciplining the poor or at supporting only the deserving poor (Hickey, 
2008). For instance, poverty may be seen as an outcome of the behaviour of those affected by 
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it and a kind of social aberration which has to be eliminated to maintain social functionality (Harris, 
 
2007: 3; see also Gooptu, 1996), thus ‘elites might use poverty reduction programmes to discipline and 
govern the poor into particular types of subjects, as witnessed in the current popularity of conditional 
cash transfers, or food/cash-for-work programmes, involving efforts to transform poor people into better, 
more productive members of society’ (Hickey, 2008:353). 
 
 
 
The key question is no longer whether elites are important, but a determination of the conditions under 
which elites’ interests are aligned with their countries’ development objectives, or how they coincide 
with the interests of the poor. The answer lies in understanding elites’ capability, interest and 
commitment to propose and implement policies that are consistent with a pro-poor agenda (Rakner et 
al, 2004: 2-3). In the context of Malawi, this involves the will and commitment of the elite to execute and 
follow through a range of policies needed to assist the poor – policies that reduce the benefits elites 
have derived and continue to derive from prevailing social-economic processes, and challenge their 
power and power base, or are perceived by these elites to have these effects (Riddell, 1999:327). 
 
 
 
 
2.2.1 Situating Elites in the Discourse on Poverty 
 
 
 
The discourse on the importance and influence of elites in development has undergone several changes 
in the past 60 years. During the 1950s and 1960s, the state-led model of development believed that 
developing countries’ elites would deliver economic growth and social progress (Fritz and Menocal, 
2006). The postcolonial elite’s ability to plan and implement development policies was seen as 
limitless: they were ‘entrusted not only with economic growth, but also poverty reduction and democracy. 
The focused and deliberate promotion of national development became a distinctive and pervasive 
feature, with most elites promising a new dawn of progressive development on the eve of 
independence’ (Leftwich, 2005a: 576). 
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However, there were no explicit theories on the role of elites in development. Shapiro and Taylor (1990) 
observe that this omission was flawed, as state actors were relied on as agents of change to allocate 
resources effectively and efficiently. Surprisingly, explanations for poor economic performance and 
growing poverty in developing countries in the 1970s came from non-economic factors: primarily from 
politics, which questioned the centrality of elites in development (Shapiro and Taylor, 1990; Leftwich, 
2005a). These political explanations indicated recognition of the importance of power and elites in 
development and poverty reduction (Riddell, 1999). An example of this recognition is the 1974 World 
Bank paper, Redistribution with Growth (Chenery et al, 1974), which recognized that increasing 
inequality in developing countries, despite considerable growth during the modernization period, could 
be attributed to elites and their failure to use their power to redistribute assets to the poor. Redistribution 
with Growth argued that political resistance to policies of asset redistribution (i.e. land, capital, access 
to public goods, human capital) would make them unlikely to succeed, because elites would not 
execute policies and reforms which assisted the poor when their own interests were challenged, thus, 
elites would act first and foremost to further their own interests: 
Redistribution  is  only  possible  in  some  regimes  but  not  under  regimes  dominated  by 
entrenched elites who will relinquish nothing to the underprivileged’ (p.71). 
 
Governments are not ‘above’ the political process, in the sense of needing merely to muster the 
‘will’ to do what is just or desirable. Irrespective of political system, they have to further the 
interests of those groups on which they are dependent for support, interests that may well 
require the maintenance of the status quo (p.52). 
 
 
 
A key to ensuring that economic growth in developing countries leads to a distribution of assets to the 
poor is ‘the emergence of a coalition of interests able to grasp power which sees some advantage in 
implementing a redistributive strategy, despite the fact that some sections of it stand to lose. Thereby, 
to survive in the long run, in a changing society, elites must make occasional well-timed concessions 
and some of them are aware of the fact’ (Chenery et al, 1974). 
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However, this recognition that something needed to be done about the political aspect of development 
was eclipsed by the rise and hegemony of the neoclassical orthodoxy, which denounced the role of 
ruling elites in development (Leftwich, 2005a). At the core of neoclassical thinking was the call to 
abandon state-led development and instead rely on markets as the effective mechanism for allocating 
resources and promoting economic growth (Fritz and Menocal, 2006; Leftwich, 2005a). Experience in 
many developing countries shows that market-led development impacted negatively on the state’s 
capacity to provide and deliver basic services, leading to an impact on the welfare of the poor in 
particular (Fritz and Menocal, 2006). Measures such as the reduction in the size of public services, 
withdrawal of subsidies, and the establishment of open markets meant that the poor lost the most 
(Leftwich, 1993). 
 
 
 
This led to a reconsideration of the centrality of ruling elites in development in the 1990s, which was 
underscored by a growing awareness amongst development practitioners and academics that this was 
the critical variable in explaining why some countries succeeded whilst others failed in meeting 
development goals (Fritz and Menocal, 2006). A major rethink on the role of ruling elites occurred around 
the concept of developmental states (Wade, 1990; Haggard, 1990; Evans, 1995; Leftwich, 1995; 
Doner et al, 2005; Fritz and Menocal, 2006), which suggested that one of the factors of economic 
success in East Asia was a developmental elite that was able to form broad coalitions for the provision 
of collective goods. One of the motivations for the emergence of developmental states and elites was 
the presence of internal and external threats, that ‘provided very powerful incentives for concerted policy, 
elite unity and commonly the encouragement of a nationalistic ideology’ (Leftwich, 2007:20).12 This 
thinking on elites suggests that patterns of development, whether economic, social or political, are 
 
 
12 For example: Japan in the late 1860s was threatened by the intrusion of western powers in eastern waters, and later by 
the danger of sinking economically after the second world war; South Korea was not only under constant threat, but was 
attacked by its northern neighbour; Singapore saw itself as sandwiched between Islamic Malaysia and Indonesia; and Taiwan 
had the people’s Republic of China across the straits (Leftwich, 2007:20). Internally there was, ‘the credible threat that any 
deterioration in the living standards of popular sectors could trigger unmanageable mass unrest’ (Doner et al, 2005: 
328). 
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shaped by the character of elites and their ability to ‘steer, push, cajole, persuade, entice, coordinate 
and at times instruct the wide range of economic agents and their groupings to go this way instead of 
that, to do this and not that’ (Weiss and Hobson, 1995:2). Thus, realisation emerged that what mattered 
less was regime type (democratic or autocratic) or institutional form (union or federation), but rather the 
character and capacity of the regime, its political will, developmental determination and bureaucratic 
capacity (Leftwich, 2005b). 
 
 
 
Since the 1950s there have been some studies13 that have identified the importance of politics and 
elites; but the discussion in this section shows that the implication of these studies on emerging social, 
economic and political patterns were sidelined, or at times missed the point entirely, focusing more on 
the nature of elites and less on the implication of this for development in various states (Leftwich, 
2005a). For instance, discussions of the comprador states have noted that developing countries’ elites’ 
interests were intertwined with those of developed countries’ elites, to the detriment of the needs of 
their citizens, and were characterised by waste and corruption in their quest to retain power. Conversely, 
developing countries were also considered to be in a dependent relationship with developed  countries,  
whose  own  development  led  to  underdevelopment  in  developing  countries (Baran, 1957; Gunder 
Frank, 1969; see also Leftwich, 2005a; Foster, 2007; Bowles, 1989). Then again, the World Bank (1989) 
noted that in many developing countries, state officials had served their own interests and built up 
personal networks of influence; therefore, politics had become personalized, and patronage had 
become essential to maintain power (pp.60-61). But as earlier indicated (see Section 2.2), the way 
these issues were included in development theory and policy tended to be in narrow terms that 
emphasised technocratic solutions to building institutions, governance and democratisation, 
 
 
 
 
13  For example: Baran (1957) on the comprador states run by ruling elites installed and supported by imperialist countries; 
Gunder Frank (1969) on the development of underdevelopment; Huntington (1968) on political development; Johnson 
(1987) on the developmental state; Grindle (1980) on the politics of policy implementation and various other contributions on 
politics, ruling elites, good governance and development (World Bank 1997; Hyden and Bratton, 1992; Sandbrook, 1993; 
Grindle, 1999; Lewis, 1996; Ferguson, 1990, Haggard and Kaufman, 1992) 
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with no real understanding of why elites in one country were able to ensure growth and poverty reduction 
and those in another country were not able to do this (see Hickey, 2008; Leftwich, 2005a). 
 
 
 
The various discourses on poverty, development and politics suggest that social and economic 
development are shaped by ‘the political process underlying the formation, endurance and change of 
developmental institutions, or the structures of power, patterns of culture and the kinds of coalition of 
interests which might resist or promote change in existing institutional configurations, or establish new 
ones, whether for good or for bad’ (Leftwich, 2005a: 584). Thus, issues like poverty ‘cannot be 
understood or studied separately from affluence, nor is it likely that poverty can be combated without 
affecting those holding higher positions in a stratified society’ (Holman, 1978:203). Consequently, 
poverty reduction policies need to address those sections of the population that have strong interests 
vested in both sustaining certain kinds of poverty and in not paying the price in economic and symbolic 
terms that an efficient poverty-reducing strategy demands (Brock et al, 2001). This makes the link 
between policy and politics important for understanding elite views of poverty. This is the focus of 
Section 2.4 below. 
 
 
 
2.3     The Politics of Policy-Making 
 
 
 
Thus far, attention in this literature review has been on the various discourses of poverty and 
development policy, and how they have changed over time amongst the development community to 
accommodate a political focus. This section briefly examines models of policy-making, leading to an 
understanding that decisions involving the mobilization, allocation, distribution and redistribution of 
resources make policy-making inherently political. Of relevance to this study is the role of elites in 
shaping policy and its outcomes. 
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Policies are the expressions of a political system’s goal and the means with which it pursues them 
(Kolb, 1978). These goals, such as the provision of health, education, job opportunities, economic 
growth and personal safety, are the main tasks of government (Turner and Hulme, 1997:44). Lowi (1964: 
690–691; see also Kjellberg, 1977) distinguishes between the following three major types of policy, which 
he argues determine politics: distributive, regulatory and redistributive14. First, distributive policies are 
considered synonymous with patronage, as they are highly individualised decisions that only by 
accumulation come to be called policy. In essence, they involve piecemeal allocations to particular 
groups or individuals with unrelated interests. Second, regulatory policies involve the establishment of 
rules and standards under which future individual allocations would be contemplated. In the short run, 
they involve a direct choice between who is provided with goods and services and who is deprived of 
these. Regulatory policies are identified with more pluralist politics, as the regulatory arena is 
composed of a multiplicity of groups organised around particular interests or shared attitudes. Therefore, 
policy tends to be the residue of the interplay of conflict amongst different groups in society. Finally, 
redistributive policies are similar to regulatory policies, in that groups are organised around shared 
interests; but different, because in the redistributive arena, these interests are activated along class lines 
and ‘shared interests are sufficiently stable and clear and consistent to provide the foundation for 
ideologies’ (Lowi, 1964: 707). Redistributive policies raise issues of resource mobilization and allocation 
and are identified with an elitist view of policy-making and the political process. 
 
 
 
However, Kjellberg (1977) considers Lowi’s policy distinction too general, and suggests that a distinction 
be made between policies that deal with individual and those that deal with collective goods. Therefore 
an important characterisation of these goods concerns their indivisibility (equal potential availability of 
goods) and their non-excludability from consumption, which brings to the fore the free- 
rider problem (the fact that an individual can benefit from a public good without necessarily having to 
 
 
14 Examples of these policies are: distributive (i.e. subsidies, land policies); regulatory (i.e. elimination of substandard goods, 
unfair competition); and redistributive (i.e. progressive income tax and social protection) (Lowi, 1972: 300). 
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share in its costs) that has political consequences (Kjellberg, 1977: 560; see also Olson, 1965; 1969 on 
the free-rider problem). 
 
 
 
However, what is common to both Lowi (1964) and Kjellberg (1977) is their agreement that these policies 
are distinguishable as ‘arenas of power’, and each arena develops ‘its own characteristic political 
structure, political process, elites and group relations’, (Lowi, 1964: 689). Accordingly, policy 
characteristics (such as the distribution of costs and benefits, technical complexity, short and long-term 
impacts and resource requirements) determine the type of conflict, opposition, bargaining, settlement, 
coalitions or agreements that surround policy choices and implementation (Grindle and Thomas, 1989). 
Tornquist (1999) adds that the scope, forms and context of politics constitute, as well as limit, the arena 
where politics occurs and the political processes that might take place. Scope, form and context refer to 
the issues that have been politicized, the political structures, institutions, and organizations, and the 
predominant ideas and strategies (Tornquist, 1999:19). Therefore, the politics that affect policy differ, 
depending on the type of policy being pursued, whether the policy is for individual or collective benefits 
or burdens, and the manner in which these policies contribute to socializing conflict that is built into 
various issues (Kjellberg, 1977). For instance, the nature of pro-poor policies as tools aimed at 
transferring resources to under-represented individuals or regions and redressing imbalances by 
transferring resources from one group to another makes them fundamentally political.  This is because 
there are always disputes amongst individuals and groups in society as to who wins or loses in the 
organization,  mobilization,  combination,  use  and  distribution  of  these  resources,  whether  they  be 
capital, land, human beings or a combination of these (Leftwich, 2000:5). The process always involves 
change, and change must inevitably challenge established interests and prevailing structures of power, 
and hence the dominant institutional arrangements (or rules of the game) (Leftwich, 2006:2). 
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Consequently, policy-making becomes more than a concern with mobilization and the allocation of 
resources, and includes choices, decision-making and – particularly on who gets what, when and how 
(Lasswell,  1958)  – and the politics  that  sustain,  implement  and extend  these  decisions  (Leftwich, 
2006:13). Therefore, the study of policy-making may involve an analysis of who makes the decisions; 
the processes of choice and interaction; the issues or aims of policies; and policy innovation and the 
consequences of policy efforts (Mitchell and Mitchell, 1969). This highlights issues of influence, power 
and the influential who, according to Lasswell (1958) get the most of what there is to be got in society. 
 
 
 
The stages, or linear, model of the policy-making process as articulated by Lasswell (1951) Easton 
(1957) and Kolb (1978), fails to account for this complex interplay of power, knowledge and agency in 
policy-making. This model attempts to manage the interplay of social, economic and political factors by 
stating that the policy process follows a logical sequence, from identification, through formulation and 
implementation, to evaluation (Brock et al, 2001:2; see also Shore and Wright, 1997). Hence, policy- 
making is characterised as an objective analysis of options that involves the selection of goals, priority 
ordering among several goals, the extracting and mobilization of resources so that goals may be 
pursued, and, finally, the implementation of goals (Kolb, 1978:286). Johnson and Start (2001) simplify 
this by identifying two core components of policy-making: planning, which involves information- 
gathering, analysis and decision-making; and implementation, where individuals and organizations act 
on these variables to achieve a particular set of goals (p.7). The stages, or linear, model of policy- 
making takes decision to be key, whilst implementation is ignored or sidelined. Thus unsuccessful 
implementation is blamed on lack of capacity, political will, bottlenecks, or interference in the policy 
process, rather than on the policy itself (Grindle and Thomas, 1990; Mooij, 2003b). Conversely, Lindlom 
(1980; 1959) suggests that the policy-making process should be understood as consisting of incremental 
decisions that are based on existing policies. Thus policy-making involves small adjustments that differ 
slightly from existing options – or simply muddling through. 
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Critics (Mooij, 2003; Gordon et al, 1993; Sabatier 1991; Thomas and Grindle, 1990) of the stages or 
linear model of policy-making argue that the importance of this model to actual policy processes should 
not be underestimated as it continues to survive despite being undermined by empirical studies of the 
policy process. Thomas and Grindle (1990) note that donor agencies provide technical assistance to 
build capacity in planning and policy analysis in developing countries, in the belief that good analysis 
will lead to good decision-making and finally result in good policies (p.1164). Therefore, donors believe 
that ‘once a decision to change policy is made by the recipient government, donors tend to consider 
that their job is largely accomplished. They may check on compliance at intervals, but in general, decision 
is expected to lead to implementation’ (Thomas and Grindle, 1990:1165). The main explanation for the 
continuing power and survival of the stages or linear model lies in its status as an ideal/normative 
model of policy-making and a ‘dignified myth’ which is often shared by the policy- makers themselves 
(Gordon et al, 1993:7). Thus, ‘as a normative representation of how things ought to be, a stages or linear 
model of policy-making works to mask the management of uncertainty and the politics of interactions 
between different agents, positions and interests in the shaping of policy in practice’ (Brock et al, 2001:9). 
Conversely, the separation of decision-making from implementation enables policy-making elites to 
escape responsibility for policy failure (Clay and Schaffer, 1984; see also Sutton, 1999; Mooij, 2003). 
 
 
 
Referring specifically to pro-poor policy, Brock et al argue that, ‘Policy is not shaped simply on the basis 
of good research or information, nor does it emerge simply from bargaining amongst actors on clearly 
defined options and choices. Rather, it is a more complex process through which particular versions of 
poverty come to frame what counts as knowledge and whose voices count in policy deliberations, in 
particular political and institutional contexts’ (Brock et al, 2001:1).   Even when policies are being 
implemented, political intervention should be expected and we should not assume that policy-making is 
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a  rational  process  with  a  beginning,  a  middle  and  an  end.  Put simply, policy-making should  be 
 
understood as ‘chaos of purposes and accidents’ (Sutton, 1999:5; see also Clay and Schaffer, 1984). 
 
 
 
 
An alternative to the stages or linear model of policy-making is the interactive model. This model is 
proposed by Grindle and Thomas (1990), who view policy as a process in which actors interact and 
bargain with each other, in order to reach a particular policy outcome. A major assumption of this model 
is that policy may be altered or reversed at any stage in the policy-process by those who oppose the 
policy. When policy-making is viewed in this way, policy outcomes cease to be a product of rational 
decision-makers, but are shaped through the interactions of a variety of actors, who may pursue 
individual or collective interests. However, the common conceptualisation of interests has been 
influenced by public-choice approaches to policy analysis, which convey negative messages about the 
political feasibility of redistributive policies, thus seeing redistribution policies as imbued with conflict 
and having clear winners and losers (Moore, 1999, see also Dunleavy; 1991).  Consequently, policy 
actors are considered to pursue their own short-term self-interest, and they may either: ‘make deals that 
keep them in power and maintain revenue, votes or whatever underlies their power’ (Levi, 1988:201); or 
‘they may not undertake policies that are generally unpopular or will lose them power’ (Mooij, 2003:15). 
However, Moore (1999) views this as pessimistic ‘interest group economism’ that exaggerates the 
possibility of a pro-poor-policy propensity to opposition and underestimates elites’ inclination towards 
distribution. He argues that there is scope for elites to gain, or believe they gain, from making the poor 
better off (p.38). These views are discussed further, in Chapter 3. 
 
 
 
What the interactive model shows is that policy results from conflict, bargaining and coalition-formation 
amongst groups in society. The policy-making process is therefore a highly political process, ‘an arena 
where those with interests in a policy engage in negotiations over the goals of the policy and conflict 
over the allocation of resources’ (Turner and Hulme, 1997: 77; see also Wallis, 1987:21). For instance, 
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embarking on an agricultural development program is political. Politicians know that such programs can 
favour some groups or regions within the country more than others, and will therefore bring pressure on 
the policy process to ensure that their own political supporters benefit as much as possible’ (Wallis, 
1987:21). Therefore, in analysing  pro-poor policy, an interactive model that highlights cause and effect 
relationships within and across policy stages (Sabatier, 2007) and the actors and processes of 
negotiation, contestation, alliance and coalition, provides a better explanation of poverty processes 
(Brock et al, 2001), especially when considering the poverty paradox which is the failure to alleviate 
poverty (Appelbaum, 2001). 
 
 
 
 
There are different views of what politics is and these determine its analysis. Politics has been 
conceptualised as: governing by involving rule-making and its application (Moodie, 1984); wielding 
influence, power and authority (Lasswell, 1958); entering into class struggle that arises out of social 
relations in the course of production (Callinicos, 1984); and ‘interest group economism’ that generates 
opposition, conflict and polarisation (Moore, 1999). According to Leftwich (1984) these views of politics 
limit their focus to the official or public realm, which in turn excludes an understanding of non-public 
realms such as churches, businesses or any other organizations. Therefore, in this thesis, politics is 
conceptualised, in terms prescribed by Leftwich (2006), as an essential and unavoidable process (or 
set of processes) in all human collectivities, formal and informal, public and private, concerned with 
decisions about the use, production and distribution of resources. This broad view of politics enables an 
analysis of political processes at the national, sub-national and local levels as well as across sectors 
(education, agriculture or health) or in organizations (firms, factories, or colleges) (Leftwich, 2006:.9). 
 
 
 
Leftwich (2006) identifies two levels of politics that are significant in understanding development and 
that are also essential for policy-making. The first level consists of the ‘rules of the game’ – the 
procedures and processes that underpin and structure political life, that distribute power and authorise 
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its use in particular ways. These are either formal (statute law, common law or regulations) or informal 
(conventions, norms or behaviour) (North, 1990: 8). The second level consists of the ‘games within the 
rules’ – the normal contestations over policy and power that occur where the rules of the game are 
established and consolidated (Leftwich, 2006: 3). In stable polities there is consensus on the ‘rules of 
the game’, and this is not easily altered, even when the rules change, which makes the predictability of 
behaviour relatively high. In developing countries, however, the rules are not well established, and at 
times they induce unpredictable, incoherent and inconsistent policy (Leftwich, 2006; Mitchell and Mitchell, 
1969). Regardless of the setting, the rules of the game are key to the ‘formation, maintenance and 
enforcement of the institutions and standard procedures for conducting politics, for setting socio- 
economic goals, and for establishing the economic, administrative and judicial institutions which facilitate 
growth and development’ (Leftwich, 2006: 12). 
 
 
 
This has important implications for the politics of policy-making, particularly pro-poor policy. As observed 
by Mitchell and Mitchell (1969), policies are made because policy actors expect to alter the human 
situation in predictable and desirable ways. To borrow Leftwich’s (2006:2) notion of ‘transformative 
process’, policy-making concerns the mobilisation and distribution of resources in new ways that also 
change structures, use of wealth and power. It is also about deliberate choice of collective goals and 
decision-making, which involves interaction between different actors and competing interests. These 
policy interactions also involve bargaining, compromises, negotiations, losers and winners, and this is 
what makes policy a political activity. Therefore, policy outcomes depend on the interactions and 
strengths of groups (Mooij, 2003). 
 
 
 
2.4 Regimes, Institutions and Pro-Poor Policy 
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This section seeks to explore the nature of regimes and institutions prevailing in developing countries in 
order to understand the distinct character to policy-making in developing countries (Horowitz, 1989: 
197). This is of relevance for this thesis because these are areas which have been identified in the 
literature as undermining policy, in particular pro-poor policy, and which have been argued as important 
for identifying instances where pro-poor coalitions or alliances have been formed, thus becoming part of 
the solution (Moore and Putzel, 2001; Moore, 2010).. According to Potter (2000) regimes refer to the 
institutional relationships between and within the state that specify forms of political accountability and 
the manner by which political leaders come to occupy the positions of political authority (p. 365). 
Therefore, differences in institutions or ‘rules of the game’, norms and patterns of behaviour amongst 
different regimes will determine not only the states relationship with citizens, interactions between social 
groups and state organs, the exercise of power including its legitimation, but also whether a particular 
regime will support or not support pro-poor policy (Potter, 2000). 
 
 
 
According to Horowitz (1989) policy-making in developing countries contains eight foundational 
elements: lack of legitimacy, which means that policies are meant to enhance state or regime legitimacy; 
policy concerns, which are different from those in the West; state structures which, whatever their 
weaknesses, are relatively powerful in relation to society; low capacity to make or implement 
policy; fewer participants in the policy process; channels for participation that are neither established nor 
clearly prescribed; policy elites that rarely rely on information or research for policy-making; and 
policy elites that rely on foreign models of policy-making (see also Mooij, 2003). 
 
 
 
In 1958, Pye noted that the political sphere in developing countries is not sharply differentiated from the 
spheres of social and personal relations; thus the fundamental framework of their politics is based on 
communal identification along regional, ethnic and religious lines. Hence, the structure of decision- 
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making tends to be based on personal relationships and, ‘Policy is limited to providing minimum social 
and economic functions and maintaining the way of life of the elite’ (p.484)15. 
 
 
 
 
2.4.1     Political Regimes and their Impact on Pro-Poor Policy 
 
 
 
Generally, regimes are distinguished as liberal democracies, partial democracies or authoritarian.  A 
liberal democracy has an accountable government and free and fair elections. These attributes are 
limited in a partial democracy; and they are absent in an authoritarian state.  The assumption has been 
that these attributes determine the extent to which states are pro-poor and elites respond to the needs 
of the poor (Allen and Thomas, 2000). 
 
 
 
In most developing countries, the post-colonial years were dominated by the centralizing of power in 
order to gain control, which in turn led to the personalization of power and a reliance on the bureaucracy. 
Sandbrook (2000:3) highlights the fact that the single party became the unique voice of the people; 
and the unique voice became the exclusive voice of the ruling group; and soon the voice of the ruling 
group became the voice of a unique individual; all of which led to authoritarian governments and 
dictators. Through this process, decision-making was centralized around the head of state and those 
surrounding him. ‘Leadership became a substitute for regularized channels of policy-making and the 
president had the final say’ (Chazan et al, 1999:53; see also Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2002; Bratton 
and De Walle, 1997). Experience from Malawi, for example, shows that parliament and the civil service 
were seemingly there to express support for the president, but never really engaged in policy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 This view of a non-western political process was criticised by Diamant (1959), who believed that developing countries 
would benefit from an ideal type approach that had been useful in developed countries. However, articles on the 
distinctiveness of policy and political processes in developing countries have increased in number (Sartori, 1976; Van De 
Walle 2001; Bratton and Van De Walle, 1997; Cromwell and Chintedza, 2005; Bird et al, 2003; Thomas and Grindle, 1990). 
All these argue that an ideal model of policy-making in developing countries is not sufficient to explain policy outcomes; thus 
the impact of politics on the policy-making process should be explicitly acknowledged. 
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formulation, nor in policy implementation. Instead, their role was to rubber-stamp and rationalise top- 
down policies (Ihonvbere, 1997). 
 
 
 
By the 1990s, authoritarian regimes in developing countries had become vilified as detrimental to the 
development prospects of these countries. Thus, the development community supported a transition 
from authoritarian to democratic states: democratic states were considered a prerequisite for 
development, and as being essential for ensuring participation and social and political rights (Edigheji, 
2005; Leftwich, 2000). 
 
 
 
 
However, experiences in Asia and some African countries have shown that although regime type might 
have a bearing on policy processes (Horowitz, 1989), there is no systematic relationship between regime 
type and development success, or between inter-party competition and the welfare orientation of 
public policy (Hofferbert, 1970). Leftwich (2000) observes that whether democratic or non- democratic, 
some third world countries have been successful in ensuring social and economic development and 
have lifted many of their citizens out of poverty through a developmental state where, ‘the elites are 
driven by a developmental ideology and have the capacity to effectively implement policies’ 
(Mkandawire, 2001: 290). As highlighted in Chapter 1, Malawi is an example of the paradox of the 
political system argument in explaining pro-poor policy success or failure, as democracy has not had the 
expected impact on development or poverty reduction. In many ways, the adoption of democratic 
institutions has been based on an ideal model by emphasising the role of elections in promoting social, 
political and economic development (Edigheji, 2005; Abrahamsen, 2000; Leftwich, 2002). 
Consequently, the politics and policy actors required to adopt, adapt and implement these democratic 
institutions have been ignored (Moore and Putzel, 2001; Leftwich and Hogg, 2008). 
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What is of interest in looking at the issue of regimes in relation to pro-poor policy is the recognition that 
regime types are not necessarily the determining factor in the success of pro-poor policies. Varshney 
(1999) notes that many democracies still have a large number of their populations stuck below the 
poverty line, despite the poor constituting a majority of the population.  Theoretically, due to their large 
numbers, the poor should be better able to exert influence on government policies. In contrast, some 
authoritarian states like Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan have largely reduced poverty, whilst 
others, in Latin America, for example, have been unresponsive to the needs of the poor. What is 
important is the recognition that it is the developmental character of elites, their commitment to reducing 
poverty that provides part of the explanation for pro-poor policy success (Leftwich, 2008; Hossain and 
Moore, 2005). Therefore, in formulating effective, responsive and comprehensive strategies for poverty 
reduction, it is essential to take account of the role of elites. The answer lies in understanding the way 
the poor are perceived within the politics that determine the nature of pro-poor policies: ‘The inclusion 
of the poor in participatory poverty assessments may have little weight compared to the ways in which 
poverty and the poor are represented within elite political discourse’ (Hickey and Bracking, 2005:854). 
 
 
 
 
2.4.2     Formal and Informal Institutions and Pro-Poor Policy 
 
 
 
The primacy of institutions is reasserted by Huntington (1968) when he argues that political institutions 
are not just the passive consequences of social and economic change but can themselves be a 
determinant of such change (see also Randall and Theobald, 1998). Immergut (1992) adds that 
institutions can explain both policy stability and policy change. By comparing the outcomes of a 
proposal for health insurance in France, Sweden and Switzerland, she explains the rejection and 
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success of policy by pointing to the importance of institutions16 in establishing different rules of the 
game for politicians and interest groups seeking to enact or block policies. 
 
 
 
 
Huntington (1968) observes that adherents to institutionalism explain policy choices and implementation 
outcomes, first, in terms of the degree to which states are permeated by informal institutions such as 
patronage and clientelistic systems rather than by formal decision-making structures and the way in 
which the relationship between parliament and the executive affect the ability to produce policy. 
Second, they emphasise the way institutions shape access to decision-making structures, giving some 
groups greater influence over the policy making process. Thus, ‘Institutions explain the differences in the 
ability of interest groups to obtain favourable policy outcomes and in the ability of executive 
governments to enact their legislative programs’ (Immergut, 1992: 63).   Johnson and Start (2001) 
argue that it is these institutions that put poor people at a disadvantage and prevent them from 
meaningfully engaging in the policy process, as well as influencing the ‘range of societal interests that 
are represented in the policy’ (Haggard and Kaufman, 1992:18). 
 
 
 
In an ideal situation, formal institutions are meant to guide and shape people’s strategies, their 
preferences and their power. However, in developing countries, these have been guided by the logic of 
neopatrimonialism, which is a hybrid system composed of formal and informal institutions. It is argued 
that elites in developing countries have manipulated the legal-rational basis, infusing it with patrimonial 
tendencies such as clientelism, patronage and prebendalism, thereby having a detrimental effect on 
pro-poor policy. For instance, Bird et al (2003: 19) use agricultural policies as an example of how 
institutions impact on policy outcomes in developing countries: first, the political interests of ruling elites 
 
 
 
 
16 
‘De jure rules of institutional design provide procedural advantages and impediments for translating political power into 
concrete policies. De facto rules arising from electoral results and party systems change the ways in which these formal 
institutions work in practice. Together these institutional rules establish distinct logics of decision-making that set the 
parameters both for executive action and interest group influence’ (Immergut, 1992: 59). 
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are defined in a way that systematically conflicts with the principle of maximizing the welfare of citizens. 
Hence, agricultural policies have been formulated as a means of guaranteeing political support, 
favouring large symbolic gestures, the distribution of largesse and promises of favours, but no promise 
to resolve structural problems. Second, policies are pursued that allocate resources inefficiently, hence 
state intervention in the supply of agricultural inputs, pricing and food distribution persists for political 
reasons. Finally, state resources are diverted unofficially for personal gain, through corruption and 
nepotism. Civil society, the media and parliaments face serious difficulties in holding leaders to account, 
despite the existence of multi-party politics, and neopatrimonialism diverts political discourse from 
issue-based political competition in general. Therefore, the distinctiveness of neopatrimonialism in 
developing countries structures policy-making processes in ways that systematically divert public 
resources for private gain (Cromwell and Chintedza, 2005:3). 
 
 
 
Specifically, in Malawi, neopatrimonialism has seriously impacted on coherent policy-making and long- 
term development planning. Policy is driven by the pressure to win elections and retain legitimacy, 
which seriously undermines the effectiveness of policies, for instance policies on health and food 
security, resulting in unnecessary HIV/Aids deaths and starvation. There is a multiplication of policy 
documents and an absence of implementation. Key policies such as the subsidy programme are 
adopted on the campaign trail with little attention paid to their viability (O’Neil, 2007; Booth et al, 2006; 
Bird et al, 2003; Cammack. et al, 2007). The budget has been circumvented by informal incentives and 
bargaining structures, and therefore does not produce spending on planned allocations, but hides real 
expenditures that further political interests (Rakner et al, 2004). In addition, neopatrimonialism has 
impacted on policy-making capacity by disempowering and politicising the civil service, leaving them 
unable to generate coherent, technically-grounded policy. Ruling elites have maintained tight control 
over policy-making to ensure that policies can be used for patronage. As a result, the civil service has 
experienced a loss of professional work ethic and individual performance (Booth et al, 2006). 
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However, Kelsall (2011) argues that neopatrimonialism can be developmental if economic rents are 
centralised with a long-term developmental goal. Leftwich (2006) observes that it is possible that 
successful countries like Botswana, Mauritius, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore used patronage to 
‘promote, monitor, discipline and reward economic agents’ (p.25). The Asian tigers did not develop by 
adopting in totality the prescriptions of the good governance agenda. They adopted particular elements 
of democracy and combined it with their indigenous institutions and developed a new model of 
development that is effectively reducing poverty. They have intervened in the market, got prices wrong, 
engaged in rent-seeking and corruption, used clientelist politics, and eschewed multiparty democracy 
(Kelsall, 2008). On the other hand, neopatrimonialism is not unique to authoritarian regimes: it can be 
found in any society and political system (Erdmann and Engel, 2006; Van de Walle, 2007). Therefore, 
Kelsall et al (2010) argue that there is evidence of developmental and non-developmental patrimonialism 
in countries like Malawi, such that Malawi was considered a developmental state between 1964 and 
1980 (see also Pryor, 1990).   This shows that policy-making is not the rational, linear or incremental 
process that earlier models of policy-making assume. 
 
 
 
The interaction between informal and formal institutions can be complementary, accommodating, 
competitive or substitutive, leading to different development outcomes. The key is in the control and 
discretionary power state actors have in controlling and allocating public resources (Jutting et al, 2007). 
An important point that this discussion leads to is that institutions alone do not produce development 
outcomes: it is through their interaction with elites that development is realised. This suggests that a 
more fruitful endeavour is to try to understand how and why decision are made by building on existing 
interests, and to determine what shapes elite interests and actions (Moore, 2010). This raises the 
question of how elite interests may be aligned with those of the poor, thus enabling the implementation 
of pro-poor policy. 
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2.5 An Alternative Perspective on the Study of Pro-Poor Policy-Making: the 
 
Role of Elites 
 
 
 
 
This perspective points to shortcomings in studies of policy-making that have failed to focus on elites 
and their role in determining policy outcomes, despite acknowledging that the politics of poverty are 
about choice, decision-making, collective goals, interests, ideas and actors. It has been assumed that 
institutions (the rules of the game) are the sole explanatory variable of socio-economic and political 
behaviour or action (Leftwich, 2010). However, there are studies emerging that argue that the extent to 
which institutions can be said to determine development, growth and poverty reduction is dependent on 
the manner in which institutions and organizations interact (see Hodes et al, 2011; Tadros, 2011; 
Sebudubudu and Molutsi, 2009 and Leftwich, 2009). Organizations, in this case, are players consisting 
of individuals who make choices and decisions that are influenced by their perceptions (North, 1990). 
The distinction between institutions and organizations in this study is important, as it helps to situate 
elites and brings to the fore the role played by organized human agency in influencing developmental 
outcomes (Leftwich, 2010). As noted by North et al (2006), elites are able to form organizations, and 
thus enjoy tremendous economic and political advantage as compared with unorganized non-elites 
(North et al, 2006). This shows that the social world is organized politically, in that issues of power, 
legitimacy and authority are political in nature, as well as resource use and distribution, so that pro-poor 
policy reflects the distribution of power and patterns of decision-making, the structure of social 
organizations, and the system of culture and ideology in society or in groups within it (Leftwich, 1984; 
Chazan et al, 1999). 
 
 
 
Various studies (Burton and Higley, 1987a, 1998; Sebudubudu and Molutsi, 2009; Di John and Putzel, 
 
2009) have shown that, in order for development or change to occur; be it political, social, or economic 
elites within different organizations must reach a consensus regarding development. Even though these 
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studies use different terms and have quite different focuses, they all help with understanding how 
development and pro-poor outcomes emerge. Burton and Higley (1987b) use the concept of ‘elite 
settlements’, which are relatively rare events in which warring national elite factions suddenly and 
deliberately reorganize their relations by negotiating compromises on their most basic disagreements 
(p.295), to argue that broad compromises amongst elites provide a necessary precondition for the 
sustained practice of representative democracy in countries such as England, Sweden and Venezuela. 
As a result, ‘elite settlements’ lead to negotiations and to compromise amongst opposed elite groups, 
and are thus, considered necessary for moderating political activities so that they are no longer viewed 
as a ‘winner-takes-all’ situation. 
 
 
 
Leftwich and Hogg (2007), Beall and Ngonyama (2009) and Sebudubudu and Molutsi (2009) use the 
concept of ‘elite coalitions’ to argue that, ‘‘Successful development depends largely on political 
processes which involve diverse leaders and elites, representing different groups, interests and 
organizations, tackling a series of collective action problems in locally appropriate and feasible ways’ 
(Leftwich and Hogg, 2007: 1), or that inclusive elite coalitions are attuned to the needs and aspirations 
of significant constituencies (Beall and Ngonyama, 2009:25). These elite coalitions are formed when 
elites are faced with collective action problems that cannot be resolved by the individual members of 
the coalition. The experience in Botswana shows that these elite coalitions were most effective when 
formed across ‘the traditional modern divide, across political parties, across ethnic-racial cleavages, 
across the public and private sectors, and across employer and employee divisions, as well as state 
and non-state actors in business and non-governmental sectors’ (Sebudubudu and Molutsi, 2009: 26). 
 
 
 
DFID (2010), Khan (2010), and Di John and Putzel (2009) use the concept of ‘political settlement’, 
mainly in relation to state-building, to describe the types of informal as well as formal political bargains 
that can end conflict, bring sustainable peace, and promote reform, development and poverty reduction 
53  
– or that may fail to achieve any progress that has significant impact on development outcomes (DFID, 
 
2010: 11). Di John and Putzel (2009) stress that political settlements are the outcomes of bargaining 
among contending elites and provide a route into understanding ‘why very similar sets of formal 
institutions, like democratic rule or rules governing macro-economic management [or pro-poor policies 
such as the MDGs or PRSPs], can have extremely divergent outcomes’ (Di John and Putzel, 2009:18). 
One explanation for these divergent outcomes may be that an institutional structure does not provide 
an acceptable distribution of benefits to powerful groups, so the powerful groups strive to change it. 
Thus, political settlements should have a combination of power and institutions that are mutually 
compatible and also sustainable in terms of economic and political viability (Khan, 2010:4). 
 
 
 
Moore and Putzel (2001) discuss the idea of ‘political alliances’ to explain pro-poor outcomes. What is 
common amongst these studies is the agreement that development outcomes are predicated on 
inclusive and collective action that includes a variety of interest groups and organizations. As well as 
showing us how critical junctures, crises or development challenges can be the trigger for development, 
these studies also explain that elite coalitions can be distributional, collusive or developmental, and that 
they establish the political conditions and rules of the game necessary for growth and development 
(Leftwich and Hogg, 2007; Sebudubudu and Molutsi, 2009). 
 
 
 
However, these studies do not tell us what collective development challenges lead elites to form 
coalitions or take collective action for the reduction of poverty, and how these occur. As Brock et al 
(2001) note, in making sense of poverty policy outcomes, an understanding of how particular ways of 
thinking about poverty have gained ascendancy, and have come to determine the frame through which 
poverty is defined, measured and tackled, needs to be achieved. 
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2.6     Conclusion 
 
 
 
This chapter has revealed the centrality of politics to the policy-making process and its impact on the 
policy outcomes. The different conceptualisations of development and poverty have been discussed 
and the link between politics and poverty made. The literature suggests that the mobilisation and 
distribution of resources in society, a critical undertaking of pro-poor policy, is inherently political, as it 
involves contestation, bargaining, negotiation, alliances and coalitions amongst various actors. In 
addition, the neopatrimonial environment of most developing countries provides a distinct context for 
policy-making, which makes the political analysis of policy-making processes more important. The 
literature further suggests that regime type (democratic or autocratic) and the neopatrimonial character 
of developing countries are not the sole determinants of development or pro-poor outcomes. The latter 
are dependent on developmental elites being able to form coalitions across public and private sectors, 
and on the coalitions being able to effectively address collective problems, such as the provision of 
welfare or public services (Leftwich and Hogg, 2007). Thus, the literature reflects that whether countries 
are democratic or autocratic, development and pro-poor outcomes will depend on the nature of elites 
and the norms, values, attitudes, and behaviour that guide their decisions concerning poverty. 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, the literature does not explicitly address the perceptions of elites that motivate them to 
coordinate their activities to better their collective well-being (Sandler, 1992: 19), especially where 
‘individual rationality is not sufficient for collective rationality’ (Olson, 1965). In addition, the literature 
does not deal with the issue of the mutual interdependencies that develop amongst people who live in a 
common territory and that characterise collective action problems. Consequently, there is no real 
acknowledgement that the welfare of elites is affected by the existence of poverty and the presence of 
the poor, who present a challenge to elites in terms of crime, disease and potential social uprisings (De 
Swaan et al, 2000). Nor is there a recognition that collective action is guided by various other kinds of 
belief, as well as the belief that consequences such as the above-mentioned threats will follow if social 
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 action is unsuccessful (Smelser, 1962: 8). It is therefore important to understand that as a political 
problem, poverty reflects not only its institutionalization within social and political norms and institutions, 
but also its legitimation within the political discourse (Hickey and Bracking, 2005), hence the need to 
understand how perceptions of poverty and the poor lead to collective and public arrangements for 
reducing poverty. The next chapter discusses the various conceptualisations of poverty produced by 
elites, typologies, and the various ways elites have been seen to affect the policy-making process. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
3.1     Introduction 
 
 
 
 
This chapter outlines the conceptual and analytical framework of the thesis.  The main objectives of this 
thesis, as set out in Chapter 1, are to investigate elites’ explanations of the causes of poverty in Malawi, 
how these perceived explanations influence policy choices, and what elements of ‘social consciousness’ 
exist amongst Malawian elites. Theoretically, de Swaan’s theory of ‘social consciousness’ guides this 
thesis and will be used to assist our understanding of how Malawian elites come to support some 
policies rather than others. 
 
 
 
The chapter has three main sections. Section 3.2 outlines the conceptual framework of the thesis and 
discusses the contested history of the concept of elites, including the major arguments, differences and 
critiques of classical elite theorists, which leads us to identify the definition of elites that will be employed 
in this thesis. This discussion sheds light on how societies are stratified: how rewards are shared 
out; on which criteria privilege is accorded; and how power is exercised, and by whom. Section 3.3 
explores elite structures and elite behaviour. This exploration brings to the fore the importance of elite 
values, attitudes and norms in creating the elite settlements, coalitions and collective action that 
determine development outcomes. A relevant area for this thesis, identified by Moyser & Wagstaffe 
(1987), is the role elites’ play in what these scholars term social engineering. This position recognizes 
the important role played by elites in addressing issues of peace and war, human rights and, most 
important and relevant to this thesis, poverty. This discussion leads to a focus on de Swaan’s (1988) 
theory of ‘social consciousness’, which is employed in the thesis to understand the role of elites in the 
policy process. Thus, Section 3.3 outlines and discusses the analytical framework of this thesis and the 
challenges of applying de Swaan’s theory in a context different to that of his own study – nineteenth 
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century Europe – in a way that still assists our understanding of elite motivations and debates around 
poverty reduction in Malawi. 
 
 
 
3.2     Historical Overview of the Study of Elites 
 
 
 
 
The idea of elites is highly contested and deeply-rooted in political and sociological thought. Therefore, 
the study of elites cannot begin with a definition of the term. Instead, it is important to understand how 
the concept of ‘elite’ has been used over time and how it relates to terms such as ‘power elite’, ‘social 
elite’, ‘oligarchy’, and ‘ruling class’ (Parry, 1969). It is not the intention of this section to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of all historical concepts of elites, but rather to provide a brief overview in order 
to inform the analytical and methodological framework. Historically, views on elites have been concerned 
with whether power in society is concentrated in the hands of a cohesive minority, whether this is 
inevitable, or whether power is widely distributed between various rival groups which are representative 
of a society (Parry, 1969). 
 
 
 
The study of elites was articulated within the social sciences in the nineteenth century, following the 
work of classical elite theorists such as Mosca (1939), Pareto (1935) and Michels (1962), who sought to 
understand the structure of politics through the relationship between elites and the masses (Hartmann, 
2007; Parry, 1969). The main aim of classical elite theorists was to counter democratic and Marxist ideas 
about majority rule and argue that elites have a decisive influence on the development of their 
countries. Other authors, such as Burnham (1941), with his discussion of the theory of the managerial 
revolution, and Mills (1956), with his discussion of the ‘power elite’, can be added to the list of classical 
elite theorists, mainly because they display continuity with the earlier classical theorists in their drive to 
examine the existence and nature of a cohesive elite who dominate the affairs of their society. This is in 
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contrast to later studies (e.g. Dahl, 1984) that advocate a pluralist version of elitist thought, suggesting 
that leadership in society is aimed at by a number of elites who compete for influence (Parry, 1969: 30). 
 
 
 
However, the work of classical elite theorists was revived in the 1980s, in an attempt to create a new 
elite paradigm, by authors such as Field and Higley (1980) and Burton and Higley (1987a). They 
introduced the concept of unified and dis-unified elites, which is an improvement on prior theories 
because it accounts for variations in development outcomes and brings us back to earlier arguments 
that elite settlements, alliances or coalitions are essential for collective outcomes (see Chapter 2). 
Dealing specifically with democratic transitions, Higley and Burton (1989) argue that for stable political 
regimes to emerge, unity, consensus and accommodation amongst elites on the rules of the game are 
necessary (see also Higley et al, 1990). As argued by Moore and Putzel (2001), stable political regimes 
are essential for development, and particularly for the provision of basic and welfare services to the 
poor. Of relevance to this study is how an elite’s unity comes about, and is sustained, in an effort to 
provide basic and welfare services to the poor. As argued in Chapter 2, unity is not produced by a 
democratic political culture or institutions; rather it ‘originates in consensual unification of the most 
powerful elite factions’ (Higley et al, 1990:423) around problems that require collective action. This will 
be discussed further in Section 3.3. 
 
 
 
 
3.2.1 Major Arguments of Classical Elite Theorists 
 
 
 
The major argument of classical elite theorists focuses on three main issues. The first of these issues is 
the inevitability of elites in all societies, whether democratic or non-democratic. The reason for this, 
according to Michels (1962: 71), is that any organization – whether democratic state, political party, or 
social movement – ultimately develops differentiated organs and functions that create oligarchies. 
Similarly, Mosca (1939) contends that the elite’s ability to organise over the majority in society makes 
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their rule over the masses inevitable; and Pareto (1935) points to the unequal individual endowments 
(education, skills) in society that distinguish between the governed and the masses. The pervasiveness 
of elites in society, as stipulated by Michels, Mosca and Pareto, has held true, as there is no society 
today that does not have elites. According to Moore, M. (2001) and Mbeki (2005), contemporary elites 
exercise a great deal of influence on the political and governmental agenda, as well as control over the 
material, symbolic and political resources of a country. Thus, ‘The elite minority is able to not only 
create or execute policy, but also to define its objectives and how issues are framed within the national 
discourse’ (DiCaprio, 2011: 2). Therefore, the ‘fundamental argument of the classical elite theorists that 
every society has been divided into two strata, a ruling minority and a majority that is ruled, and that all 
societies must be so divided’ (Bottomore, 1964:19) is still relevant today. 
 
 
 
The second argument raised by classical elite theorists is that variations in elite structure (the extent of 
structural integration) and functioning (the extent to which there is value consensus) have an impact on 
political outcomes. Thus, structural integration involves the relative inclusiveness of formal and informal 
networks of communication and influence among elite persons, groups and factions; whereas value 
consensus involves relative agreement among elites on formal and informal rules and codes of political 
conduct and on the legitimacy of existing institutions (Higley and Gunther, 1995). This view raises 
questions as to how elites vary and which variation produces what political, economic and social 
outcomes. The answer lies in the distinction between relatively integrated or fragmented intra-elite 
relations and the relative consensus or dissensus in elite beliefs and attitudes (Burton and Higley, 
1987). This is further discussed in Section 3.3. 
 
 
 
 
The third argument is that despite elites’ influence on political outcomes, their action is limited by the 
interdependent nature of their relationship with the non-elite (Burton and Higley, 1987:220). In Michel’s 
(1962: 167 - 168) discussion of the struggle between elites and the masses, he observes that the 
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masses do revolt from time to time against a violation of their right to economic, social and political 
development. However, Michels (1962) argues that even when masses form movements against elites, 
an oligarchic structure emerges within the movement such that the masses still remain under the 
command of the elites. Therefore, the impact this interdependent relationship has on elite domination is 
minimal, as elites are able to use their power, ability to organize, and skills to exploit and maintain 
domination (Parry, 1969). Nonetheless, Pareto (1935) recognises that the pattern of the relationship 
between elites and non-elites determines the likelihood of revolutions and other political events. He 
observes that in order to govern effectively, elites must appeal to and mobilize non-elite support (see 
also Burton and Higley, 1987). Mosca (1939: 51) concurs, observing that the ‘pressures arising from 
the discontent of the masses who are governed exert a certain amount of influence on the policies of 
the ruling class’. 
 
 
 
 
3.2.2 Differences amongst Classical Elite Theorists 
 
 
 
 
The main difference amongst classical elite theorists relates to their views on the channels of elite 
influence; that is, the qualities and social opportunities a group needs to possess in order to gain an 
elite position (Parry, 1969). The classical elite theorists identify four channels of elite influence: 
organizational, psychological, managerial and institutional. 
 
 
 
Mosca (1939) and Michels (1962) employ the organizational approach to understand how groups gain 
an elite position in society. According to Mosca, in any society two classes emerge: a class that rules, 
despite being few in number, performing all political functions, monopolizing power and enjoying the 
advantages that power brings; and a class that is ruled, directed and controlled by the first class, 
despite existing in greater numbers (1939:50). This does not imply that elites are by necessity only 
those that perform political functions; but because the decisions they take affect all aspects of society 
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and all human activities, these decisions ‘are regarded as political decisions even where the minority 
taking them are not politicians’ (Parry, 1969: 30). Mosca argues that the conceptualisation of elites as 
the ‘ruling or political class’ should be the ‘guiding thread that must steer us as we go looking into the 
causes that mature and produce the effects which at times lift societies to prosperity and power and at 
other times engulf them in anarchy and ruin’ (1939: 333). The ruling or political class is divided between 
the upper stratum (those who take decisions) and lower stratum (those who influence decisions), without 
whom the upper stratum cannot effectively implement decisions or policies. Thus, for the ruling class to 
exert any influence and succeed, they have to act ‘uniformly in concert, with a common understanding’ 
(Mosca, 1939: 53). Therefore, the fundamental basis for elite control includes the elite’s ability to 
organize, and their possession of particular attributes, such as wealth, military power, good education, 
concern for the public good, and status. For Mosca, it is the fact that the ruling class is small in number 
that makes it easier for them to organize, obeying a single impulse, whereas the unorganized majority do 
not have a common purpose (Mosca, 1939: 53, 57; see also Parry, 1969; Haralambos and Holborn, 
2000). 
 
 
 
Michels also argues that organization leads to the domination of ‘the elected over the electors, the 
mandataries over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization, says 
oligarchy’ (1962: 365). As a result, any organisation – be it a nation state, a trade union, a political party 
or a church – assumes an oligarchic governing structure. In essence, the organization cannot exist 
without turning over power to the few at the helm of these organizations (Michel, 1962; see also Lipset, 
1961). The powerful have superior knowledge, control over the means of communication, and skill in 
the art of politics which is strengthened by the incompetence of the masses (Lipset, 1961; Michels, 
1962). Therefore, the nature of organization gives power to leaders who remain unchecked by their 
followers, who in turn have a psychological need for guidance that leads to apathy, submissiveness and 
deference  (Parry,  1969:44).  Inherent in Michel’s argument is the notion that the behaviour of the 
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oligarchy follows a logic of self-interest, of exploiting the masses to maintain or extend their own privilege 
and power (Lipset, 1961). 
 
 
 
By contrast, Pareto (1935) employs a psychological approach to understand how elites gain their 
position. Elites are seen as a product of human attributes and their behaviour is explained by 
sentiments, or what Pareto terms ‘residues’ (1935). A ‘class one’ residue is the ‘instinct of combination’, 
which is the impulse to put together ideas, by using the imagination, that might lead to political coalitions 
or manoeuvrings (Parry, 1969: 46). A ‘class two’ residue refers to ‘group persistence’, which is 
conservative in that it manifests an instinctive desire for permanence, stability and order. These residues 
determine the style of governing that will emerge in a society, and Pareto also uses these to distinguish 
between the governing elite, which include members of the government, opposition parties, 
industrialists, labour leaders and military personnel, and the non-governing elite. Thus, if the governing 
elite is dominated by ‘class one’ residues, then they will strive to attract the masses through ideological 
stances and ensure the implementation of policies to meet various development challenges. A 
predominance of ‘class two’ residues, however, will lead to slower development as the governing elite 
uses force to suppress opposition. Essential to Pareto’s arguments is the idea that, in a democracy, the 
concept of elite is broadened to include the leaders of opposition political parties (Pareto, 1935; Parry, 
1969). 
 
 
 
 
In 1941, Burnham combined a Marxian and an elitist approach in his book entitled The Managerial 
Revolution, in which he argues that there is a transition from a capitalist society to a society controlled 
politically, socially, economically and culturally by a managerial elite (p.71). A managerial class is a 
skilled technical elite that has counterparts in the state bureaucracy, and whose position is dependent 
on the technical nature of modern production (Parry, 1969: 51). The managers gain dominance and 
become part of the ruling class through their control over the modes of production and distribution of 
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products, ‘not directly, through property rights vested in them as individuals, but indirectly, through their 
control of the institutions which comprise the state’ (Burnham, 1941:72).Their control over resources 
gives rise to political power, social prestige and wealth, thus making it essential for them to retain 
control over production (Parry, 1969). 
 
 
 
Mills’ (1956) argument accords with Burnham’s view that elites must be studied on the basis of their 
positions and roles in society.  The elite’s power is based on their role in pivotal institutions, such as the 
military, big corporations and the executive. Through these institutions, elites gain power, wealth and 
prestige; thus the ‘power elite’ is ‘composed of men whose positions enable them to transcend the 
ordinary environments of ordinary men; they are in positions to make decisions having major 
consequences’ (Mills, 1956: 3-4). Mills divides the elite into the ‘inner core’, which takes major decisions, 
and the ‘outer fringes’, which consist of those who are taken into account in the decisions of, the ‘inner 
core’ (1956; see also Parry, 1969). The ability of elites to work collectively is determined by common 
interests that lead to consensus in policies and values. In addition, elites’ shared lifestyle and 
interconnections, for example due to similar education, provide a psychological and social basis for 
their unity, thus forming a coherent group. However, the unity of elites should not be seen as a 
reflection of the unity of institutions, but as the result of the relationship between elites and institutions 
(Mills, 1956:19). This demonstrates the importance of elite interests and the elite’s ability to coordinate 
these interests. As Mills (1956) argues, elite unity is based on a more explicit co-ordination that is 
decisive (p.19-20). 
 
 
 
Emerging from the work of these classical elite theorists is the idea that there is no society that does 
not have elites, or a distinct ruling class or governing elite that dominate (Burton and Higley, 1987:220). 
The elite’s power, organization, political skill and personal qualities enable them to remain dominant; 
thus, the elite are considered a coherent, united and self-conscious group (Parry, 1969: 31). These 
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sources of power may derive from the elite’s organizational abilities, psychological make-up, control 
over economic resources, or institutional positions. Importantly, classical elite theorists’ division of elites 
into two levels – governing and non-governing elite (Pareto, 1935); ruling class and those who discharge 
the function of supreme control (Mosca, 1939); and inner and outer core (Mills, 1956) – takes into 
account the ‘difference both in the degree and type of influence which the various members of the elite 
may possess’ (Parry, 1969: 33). 
 
3.2.3 Critiques of Classical Elite Theories 
 
 
 
Classical elite theorists’ belief in a powerful minority group (elites) has not gone unchallenged. Pluralist 
arguments, especially those espoused by Dahl (1961), note that as societies become more differentiated 
according to the division of labour, men become specialists in their field, leading to power becoming 
diffuse. In response, interest groups with differing values form, according to their specialist area, to 
exert pressure on government (Parry, 1969). Dahl (1961) argues that there has been a move from 
oligarchy to pluralism, and that no one power group can control a society (see also Olsen and 
Marger, 1993). Although Dahl argues that power is dispersed in society, he acknowledges that there is 
inequality in the distribution between interest groups of the resources necessary for influencing policy 
(1961:4). Pluralist ideas about political or policy influence in society suggest that this influence is 
dispersed among different social, economic and political elites who are driven by diverse interests, 
rather than accruing to a single elite (Parry, 1969).  This dispersion is considered so essential to 
democracy that to think of ‘power elites’ is a contradiction, and an acceptance of inequality (Haralambos 
and Holborn, 2000). However, what pluralist arguments add to classical elite theory is that there are 
many elite categories whose influence on political decisions is dependent on their access to 
resources. 
65  
On the other hand, Dahl (1958) argues that the classical elite theorists have failed to delineate the 
scope of the influence elites wield; in particular, with regard to the policy areas or activities they are 
able to influence. As Parry (1969) notes, an elite may influence transport policy but not agricultural 
policy; thus influence may be limited to a single issue or may span an array of issues. Classical elite 
theorists have tended to present elites as a cohesive group of people who can exercise power in all 
matters (p.121). As a result, there has not been agreement on the composition of elites (Dahl, 1958). 
 
 
 
Critics (Dahl, 1958, 1961; Zuckerman, 1977; Scott, 2008; Giddens, 1974) thus argue that classical elite 
theorists have defined elites17 in too broad a manner, including all elite individuals regardless of 
occupation, which makes the study of elites an enormous undertaking (Moyser and Higley, 1987). In 
addition, the concept of an elite has been used indiscriminately to describe any powerful, advantaged, 
qualified, privileged or superior group, such as politicians, bishops, intellectuals, aristocrats, lawyers 
and successful criminals, which has rendered the term meaningless (Scott, 2008:27). These definitions 
become even more problematic when the issue of power is introduced, as this is a term that has 
remained elusive over the years (Moyser and Wagstaffe, 1987). As Giddens notes (1974): 
No field of sociology has been more subject to vagaries of usage and to nebulous and shifting 
conceptualizations. Terms are legion: 'ruling class,' 'political class,' 'elite,' 'power elite,' and 
leadership group' vie with each other for supremacy in the literature. Sometimes they are 
applied as synonyms, some-times they are deliberately opposed to one another. In some cases 
terminological usage is merely careless; in other instances variations conceal ambiguities in 
conceptual formulation (p.2). 
 
 
 
However, there have been other definitions of elites since the classical elite theorists put forward their 
own definitions (see Table 3.1). Burton and Higley (1987b) argue that these definitions show an 
inclination towards ‘minimal definitions of elites that leave group consciousness, cohesion, conspiracy 
and other variables open for empirical investigation. They also show that the elite concept is now being 
 
 
 
17 These definitions of elites have been outlined in Section 3.2.2. Some of these definitions are: ‘the power elite is composed 
of men . . . in positions to make decisions having major consequences. (Mills, 1956:3-4); ‘the ruling class is the less numerous 
group that performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings’ (Mosca, 
1939:50). 
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applied quite inclusively to a wide variety of “established” and “dissident” groups’ (p.222). Furthermore, 
these definitions seem to be inclined towards the understanding of elite status as based on institutional 
position, which is narrower than the idea of elites as any group able to organise espoused by Mosca 
and Michels (Higley and Burton, 1989; Parry, 1969). 
 
 
 
Table 3.1 Some Definitions of Elites 
 
 
 
 
Authors Definition Elites Specified 
Dye (1983: 7) Individuals  who  occupy  positions  of  authority  in 
large institutions 
Business, media, legal, educational, 
governmental, civil, and cultural, military 
Giddens (1974:40 Individuals who occupy formally defined positions of 
authority at the head of a social organization or 
institution 
Political, economic, judicial, media, civil 
service, military, trade union, church, media, 
educational 
Field and Higley (1985:6) Persons who are able, by virtue of their positions in 
powerful organizations, to affect national political 
outcomes individually, regularly and seriously 
Governmental, political party, military, 
business, trade union, media, religious, 
educational, dissident or radical elites 
Marger (1981:29) Those who occupy a society’s top positions of power 
and wealth…[and] who exercise authority, influence, 
and control of resources within the society’s 
important organizations 
Governmental,  corporate,  educational  and 
others 
Moore (1979:674) Persons who by virtue of their institutional positions 
have a high potential ability to influence national 
policy making 
Political,   civil   service,   business,   trade 
union, media, voluntary organization 
Ornstein and Stevenson 
(1981:752) 
Individuals occupying the highest official positions in 
various institutions in society 
Business,  legal,  civil service, trade union, 
farming 
Putman (1976:14) People at or near the top of the pyramid of power Political, civil service, economic, mass 
organization leaders, military, professionals, 
intellectual, religious 
Suleiman (1978:4) All those who occupy positions of authority are part 
of the elite 
Administrative, political, industrial, financial 
Zartman (1982:1) Core elite: those few individuals who occupy the top 
political  positions…plus  any other individual’s  with 
an equivalent role in decision making 
General elite: those, in whatever institutional position, 
who are regularly in contact with the core 
elite and therefore in a position to provide policy input 
on a regular basis 
Political, military, economic, social, religious, 
professionals, journalists, large landowners 
*Source: Burton and Higley (1987: 223) Invitation to elite theory: The basic contentions considered, Sage Ltd 
 
 
 
 
 
According to Scott (2008), a focus on power can be useful in narrowing down and refining the concept 
of an elite to encompass a very small group of people who have a degree of power. To this end Scott 
identifies four types of elites: ‘coercive elites’ are those able to coerce others into conformity or to act 
against their wishes, desires and interests, through their access to the means of violence; ‘inducing 
elites’  are  those  able  to  induce  others  to  conform  by  influencing  their  rational,  self-interested 
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calculations of personal or group advantage through their control over financial and industrial resources; 
‘commanding elites’ are those who legitimately occupy the top administrative positions in institutional  
hierarchies of management  and control, such as bureaucracies;  and ‘expert elites’ are those 
whose specialized bodies of technical knowledge are organized into ‘professional’ structures and 
practices, such as lawyers, doctors, and investment advisers. These four groups overlap with each 
other in the implementation of particular policies, so that, for example, commanding elites may also 
have coercive powers. Therefore, Scott argues that a meaningful and useful definition of elites includes 
those holding and exercising power and occupying the most powerful positions in structures of 
domination, which makes elites distinguishable from social classes and status groups (Scott, 2008: 33). 
 
 
 
 
The above definition is similar to that of authors such as Higley and Gunther (1995) and Reis and 
Moore (2005), who define elites in institutional terms as those in strategic positions in powerful 
organisations.   These powerful organisations are identified as political, governmental, economic, 
military, professional, communications and cultural organisations, and social movements (informal or 
organized groups of individuals focused on specific social, economic or political issues), in society. 
These strategic positions enable elites to have an important effect on policies and an ability to influence 
or shape political and economic decisions (Higley & Gunther, 1995; Hossain and Moore, 1999). Although 
elites represent a very small percentage of the population, usually three to four per cent, they exercise a 
great deal of influence on the political and governmental agenda, as well as control over the material, 
symbolic and political resources within a country. Thus, elites can help define which issues are to be 
taken up and which are to be ignored as political and policy options, as well as how these are 
tackled (Hossain & Moore, 2001). It has been argued that elites in developing countries are more 
powerful than those in developed countries, because they have control over the national income and 
the influence that goes with it (Mbeki, 2005; Hossain and Moore, 2001). Leftwich (2010) defines elites 
as consisting of a small group of leaders – rarely more than three per cent in any unit of analysis – 
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occupying formal or informal positions of authority and power in public and private organizations or 
sectors and who take or influence key economic, political, social and administrative decisions (p.104). 
These definitions move us beyond the conceptualisation of elites as a ruling or political class (Mosca, 
1939) or power elite (Mills, 1956) or governing elite (Pareto, 1935), to include those elites (e.g. business, 
the professions, trade unions) in formal or informal policy networks or communities involved in shaping 
policy in their sectors (Leftwich, 2010). This thesis adopts Hossain and Moore’s (2001) definition of 
elites, which enables a clear identification of elites pertinent to this study based on their position and 
their influence on pro-poor policy in Malawi. Thus we begin to identify elites along the lines prescribed by 
Hossain and Moore (2001), taking in people such as ministers, legislators, owners and controllers of 
mass media and businesses, senior civil and military officials, newspaper editors, prominent 
professionals, socialites and leaders of trades unions, religious establishments, movements, universities 
and non-governmental organisations (see also Brezis and Temin, 2008). 
 
 
 
3.3     Elite Structure, Variations, and Behaviour 
 
 
 
 
Burton and Higley (1987b) build on classical elite arguments to develop a schema of elite variations 
and outcomes. They identify two dimensions along which elites can be classified: first, in relation to the 
relative integration or fragmentation of intra-elite relations; and second, in relation to the relative 
consensus or dissensus in elite beliefs and attitudes (Burton and Higley, 1987a: 229). Thus, integration 
involves relative inclusiveness of formal and informal networks of communication and influence among 
elite persons, groups and factions; whereas value consensus involves relative agreement among elites 
on formal and informal rules and codes of political conduct and on the legitimacy of existing institutions 
(Higley and Gunther, 1995). 
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Thus there emerge three basic structures of elites, which are: the consensually unified, the disunified, 
and the ideologically unified elites. In this case ‘structure’ is the fusion of attitudes, values and 
interpersonal relations amongst different elites (Burton and Higley, 1987b; Field and Higley, 1980). 
Where consensually unified elites exist, there is structural integration and value consensus, especially 
regarding the rules of the political game. This type of elite is relatively inclusive, with communication 
and influence networks encompassing all or most elite factions, and with no single faction dominating 
these networks. In addition to this, elites are able to participate in, and have access to, decision- making, 
and are able to have access to each other (Higley and Gunther, 1995). Therefore, ‘This combination of 
tacit consensus on rules of the game and comprehensive integration disposes elite members to view 
decisional outcomes as a positive-sum or politics-as-bargaining game rather than a zero-sum or politics-
as-war game’ (Sartori, 1987:229). Agreements on the rules of the game and equal access to decision-
making ensure unity amongst diverse and heterogeneous elite, which is essential for collective action. 
 
 
 
Disunified elites exist where there is minimal structural integration and value consensus. There is no 
agreement on the rules of the political game, and communication and influence networks are, typically, 
under the control of one faction of the elite. Because there are high levels of mistrust of one another, 
elites engage in unrestricted, often violent, struggles for dominance. There is a fear of losing their 
influence and power in society if another faction takes over power; hence there is a tendency to protect 
themselves and their own interests (Higley and Gunther, 1995). 
 
 
 
Finally, ideologically unified elites exist where structural integration and value consensus seem to be 
monolithic and highly centralized.  Elites express only one ideology, which accords with a dominant 
faction, party or movement belief. Hence, communication and influence networks encompass all elite 
factions  (Higley  and  Gunther,  1995;  Higley  and  Burton,  1989).    According to the literature on 
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developmental states, unified elites, nationalistic sentiments, shared norms and a commitment to 
development have been instrumental in bringing about poverty reduction. Development has been viewed 
in these developmental states as a national project and political power-holders have been motivated to 
support the collective achievement of this goal (Jervis, 2002:15). 
 
 
 
What the above discussion suggests is that elite settlements or coalitions determine political outcomes 
in terms of the policies that are adopted. It leads us to the question of how the exercise of power 
structures the way state resources are distributed, and to the circumstances that bring about collective 
action amongst elites. Burton and Higley (1987b) observe that elite settlements are created following 
struggles between major elite factions, or when elites face a major crisis such as that resulting from 
policy failure (Burton and Higley, 1987b: 298). This latter situation, also discussed in Section 3.2.2, 
points to an interdependent relationship between elites and non-elites. Classical elite theorists, 
particularly Pareto (1935), note that the issue of interdependence between elites and non-elites can be 
linked to the occurrence or non-occurrence of revolutions and other important events, especially when 
non-elites’ grievances and interests are not met by elites. Despite this, research has tended to 
concentrate on the power elites have over non-elites, while mostly ignoring the patterns and 
consequences of their interdependence (Burton and Higley, 1987b: 231-232). 
 
 
 
The identification of the interdependence between elites and non-elites, and the recognition that there 
is a link between elite structures (unified or disunified) and associated political or social outcomes, 
leads to a re-evaluation of what drives elites to support or not support development policies, particularly 
pro-poor policy, and how elite interests can be aligned to a country’s development goals. Arguments 
have been put forward by various authors on what drives elites to take action to ensure developmental 
outcomes. Some (Varshney, 2005; Moore and Putzel, 2001) argue that democracy imposes control on 
the behaviour of elites because the poor’s ability to elect a country’s leaders gives them power to push 
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elites to implement pro-poor policies, thus combining with the pressure that ruling elites will receive 
from opposition parties and civil society. However, these same authors and others (Hofferbert, 1970; 
Moore et al, 1999) argue that there is no correlation between democracy and the level of state and local 
expenditure on welfare related policies. Hofferbert (1970) examines several studies on American policy- 
making and the way these change from putting an emphasis on political systems to recognizing that 
public policies are a result of deliberate action by policy-making elites. Moore et al (1999) investigate 
sixty-one countries to determine the extent to which their national political systems have converted a 
given volume of material resources into human development (e.g. education, literacy, life expectancy). 
Varshney (2005) examines the records of both democratic and authoritarian regimes in reducing poverty; 
and Moore and Putzel (2001) also examine countries’ poverty reduction performance in relation to the 
degree of democracy they demonstrate. All conclude that there is no connection between development 
or pro-poorness and democracy (see also Chapter 2). Thus, pressure from the poor, opposition parties 
and civil society through democratic processes, is not enough to produce policies that will serve the 
needs of the poor. 
 
 
 
Another argument (Gelbach and Pritchett, 1997; Dunleavy, 1991; Moore, 1999) about elite behaviour 
centres on a view of elites as individuals primarily motivated by instrumental pursuit of material gain to 
the detriment of welfare. As a result of this view, it has been the elite’s attraction to power, and the 
rewards and influence they derive from their position, that have dominated frameworks for analysing 
elite action or inaction. Elite interests have been perceived as ensuring that the context from which the 
elite derives its power remains unchanged, so that the elite will not support an equal distribution of 
goods or resources in society. The perceived solution has been to remove the rewards and material 
advantages from which elites derive their power, in order to make elites more responsive to society or 
to reduce their influence on policy (Higley et al, 1976). 
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However, Putman (1976) notes that elite behaviour is motivated by a diverse range of interests, such 
as status, socially defined success, sense of civic duty, and adherence to an ideology; or that elites 
may be interested in finding solutions to policy problems. One explanation pertinent to this study has 
been provided by de Swaan (1988), who argues that elites are moved to action when their welfare is 
affected by the presence of poverty and the poor, who present a challenge to elites in terms of crime, 
disease and potential social unrest. It can be argued that elite behaviour may be influenced by some 
independent facets of their perceptions, and we need, therefore, to account for the impact on 
development policy of ‘ideology, leadership, inertia, actions and attitudes broadly included under the 
label of “elite behaviour”’ (Hofferbert, 1970:325). This possibility is based on Lasswell’s (1948) view that 
an elite’s behaviour is derived from its unconscious emotional needs, not its conscious political values. 
In order to understand elite behaviour, inquiry should be directed towards the elite’s private psycho- 
logic rather than towards the logic of the situation. 
 
 
 
Therefore, there is a need to understand the fundamental orientations that underlie elite perceptions 
and actions. Putman (1976) identifies four orientations that underlie elite perceptions or attitudes: 
cognitive, normative, interpersonal and stylistic. Cognitive orientations refer to the predispositions that 
lead elites to see and interpret reality in a particular way. For instance, assumptions have been made 
by policy-makers in developing countries that politics is a zero-sum game, so conflict in the distribution 
of the ‘national pie’ is inevitable, and social or economic policy must favour some groups in society over 
others. However, others believe that there are common interests in society which can be drawn on in 
making policy, thus making the pie bigger and ensuring that there are no losers. It is the task of policy- 
makers to develop and implement policy in a way that satisfies everyone in society. These assumptions 
are what guide the everyday perceptions and behaviour of elites (Putman, 1976: 80 – 81). 
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Normative orientations are views about how society ought to work, and they refer to fundamental 
values that elites hold about individual self-reliance, social justice, national independence and material 
progression. It is these values that guide elites’ policy preferences. For instance, elites’ attitudes to 
political and socio-economic equality determine the extent to which they support both pro-poor policy 
and a liberal democracy in which citizens can fully participate in the development process. 
 
 
 
Interpersonal  orientations  refer  to  elite  attitudes  towards  other  players  in  the  political  game,  for 
example, suspicion or cynicism. In this view, politics is considered to be a moral game between good 
and evil, where trust and tolerance are extended only to one’s colleagues or there is a risk of betraying 
one’s side. However, if trust and tolerance exist across party boundaries, then elites view each other as 
legitimate contestants in a mutually beneficial game. Therefore, cooperation and reciprocal concession 
allow public problems to be confronted and social conflicts to be accommodated (Putman, 1976:86). 
 
 
 
Lastly, stylistic orientations are the structural characteristics of elite belief systems and style of policy 
analysis. These structural characteristics include elites having more information about politics and 
society, as well as ways of interpreting, storing and using this information. Their perceptions are intensely 
held and stable over time, and their belief system is coherent, to the extent that their views on one issue 
are likely to predict their views on many other issues.  Elite perceptions and beliefs are usually 
structured by partisan ideological commitments which are put out by the elite to their supporters in their 
programmes and statements (Putman, 1976). 
 
 
 
An important theme that emerges from Putman’s (1976) four orientations is that elite perceptions make 
possible an explanation of the variance between stated objectives and policy outcomes. For instance, 
choices made between investing more in the education of the rural poor or in improved urban 
transportation  (Wharton, 1990) can be explained by elite perceptions  of these issues. This makes 
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possible an understanding of why some public policy initiatives are preferred over others. Perceptions 
are an important input in decision-making processes, and all decision-makers may be said to possess a 
set of views and to be governed by them in their response to policy problems (Brecher, 1968). 
Consequently, the perceptions that elites have of poor people and poverty play a powerful role in shaping 
public policy as well as its outcome (Heroles, 2004). 
 
 
 
3.4     De  Swaan’s  Theory  of  ‘Social  Consciousness’:  the  Framework  of 
 
Analysis 
 
 
 
 
According to de Swaan (1988; 2005), an interpretation of the extent to which an elite’s ‘social 
consciousness’ (i.e. a set of perceptions) is developed can determine the extent to which the elite is 
likely to support pro-poor policy.  Therefore, the analytical framework developed for this study is based on 
the concept of ‘social consciousness’ (see Figure 3.1) as utilised as well in Reis and Moore’s (2005) study 
on elite perceptions of poverty and inequality. 
Figure 3.1               Analytical Framework 
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The framework is based on an analysis of the link between macro-historical processes (such as state 
formation, the development of capitalism, and urbanization) and micro-based approaches to policy 
decisions, with an emphasis on the processes that have driven elites to engage collectively in countering 
poverty and deprivation. Thus ‘social consciousness’ refers to a set of perceptions which de Swaan 
(1988; 2000) uses to analyze the ways in which poverty affects elites and to interpret their efforts 
to control it in the evolution of welfare systems in Europe and the USA. 
 
 
 
In his book In Care of the State, de Swaan argues that it is elite initiatives and elite consent that are 
pivotal in bringing about collective and public arrangements for remedying ignorance, disease, 
deprivation and poverty. He emphasises that a pre-condition for state action is the development of a 
‘social consciousness’ among elites, and this develops following recognition by elites that the negative 
externalities of poverty have an impact on their welfare. These external effects refer to the indirect 
consequences that one person’s deficiency or adversity has for others not immediately afflicted 
themselves. De Swaan terms this the ‘mutual dependency’ of human beings, which helps to explain 
standards of behaviour and modes of experience in terms of major, long-term social transformations 
(1988:2). The concept of mutual dependency leads de Swaan to outline three conditions under which 
the elite consider it in their interest to reduce poverty. 
 
 
 
Firstly, elites are aware of the interdependence among social groups in society and, most relevantly, of 
the external effects of poverty on people such as themselves, which they may perceive either as 
threatening or as promising opportunities. Therefore, elites perceive the poor to be a threat to social 
order through riots, revolts or social uprisings, or to public health by spreading contagious diseases, or 
a threat to private property through criminal activities. Secondly, elites realize that as members of the 
elite they bear some responsibility for the condition of the poor; thus, they develop a sense of social 
responsibility that leads them to come up with solutions to poverty. Finally, elites believe that feasible 
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and efficacious means of improving the lot of the poor exist or may be created. Reis (2010), also 
observes that if the means are not identified, or elites feel powerless to act, they will not respond to the 
negative externalities of poverty (p3). 
 
 
 
De Swaan (2005) points out that the three elements of ‘social consciousness’ refer to three different 
types of thinking by elites. The first entails a factual assessment of the condition of the society in which 
the elites live; the second entails both factual assessments (the identification of a causal chain linking 
their (in) action to the living conditions of the poor) and moral evaluations; and the last requires the 
elites to accept the power of collective or public agency to change the prevailing situation. Hence, it is 
argued that, ‘to the degree that elites possess a social consciousness, in all three respects, and if that 
awareness resonates with personal and societal moral concerns, it should facilitate voluntary and public 
action to tackle poverty’ (de Swaan, 2000:45). Thus mutual interdependence between the rich and poor, 
the strong and the powerless is central to the collectivizing process. 
 
 
 
In order to illustrate the nature of mutual interdependence, de Swaan (1988) uses the example of the 
mass outbreaks of cholera in nineteenth century Europe and the recognition by elites that this was a 
result of the living conditions of the urban poor. At the time, the non-poor moved to healthier areas, 
which led to the creation of slums. It was soon recognised that in order to prevent the spread of 
diseases beyond the slums, collective action was required. Elites used taxpayers’ money to provide 
fresh water and sewerage connections to slums, in order to protect themselves from disease.   De 
Swaan shows that when people  settle in communal  territory, when they develop  shared resources  
and build up shared stocks (for example, in granaries), they develop mutual dependencies. Thus ‘the 
main impetus for collective action came from the struggles between elites, which sought to ward off the 
threats arising from the presence of the poor among them’ (de Swaan, 1988: 218). As Reis (2010) 
argues, the detailed historical analysis carried out by De Swaan shows that the elites’ activities followed 
from their belief that 
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they were responsible for the plight of the poor, that the means to reduce poverty were present, and 
that poverty had an impact on their own welfare. De Swaan’s framework explains the implementation of 
pro-poor policies as motivated largely by self-interest. This conceptualisation of the emergence of pro- 
poor policy is a departure from the view put forward by Hochman and Rodgers (1969) that altruism, 
compassion and mutual benefit can explain pro-poor policies.   However, this self-interest is not 
conceived simply in narrow economistic terms, but is combined with elite perceptions of moral obligation 
towards poverty alleviation and the resultant benefits they themselves will reap. Therefore policy, 
particularly pro-poor policy, is not always a result of the actual conditions of the poor, or an expression of 
pure humanitarian impulse (Toye, 1999:525): appeals to elite moral responsibility for the poor are very 
powerful when consistent with self-interest; moral responsibility and self-interest are not contradictory 
principles (Moore, 1999; Hossain and Moore, 2002; Reis, 2010). 
 
 
 
This thesis uses de Swaan’s (1988) theory of social consciousness to ascertain whether similar 
perceptions to those identified in his study of European and American elites are present in Malawi. In 
the thesis, the analytical framework (see Figure 3.1) derived from de Swaan’s work, will be applied as 
follows: firstly the framework will apply the interdependence variable to an analysis of factual 
assessments made by elites concerning the link between themselves and the poor. This analysis will 
assist in identifying how elites in Malawi understand poverty and the poor within their society, their 
understanding of the nature and extent of poverty, and the causes of poverty, and the anti-poverty 
solutions they offer. It will help us appreciate the extent to which Malawian elites feel threatened by 
poverty and the extent to which they feel the poor represent opportunities for them. The factors that will 
determine this external impact of poverty are the threat of disease, crime and social unrest that elites 
face from the poor. The discussion of the external impact of poverty helps us to appreciate alternative 
types of threat to Malawian elites that emanate from the presence of poverty – types of threat that might 
be different from those experienced in the West.  Secondly, the variable of responsibility is applied to 
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understand the extent to which elites identify causal chains between their action or inaction and the 
level of poverty. This variable emphasises a moral evaluation by elites of their own behaviour. It aims to 
link the factual assessments made by elites about poverty in Malawi to the elites’ willingness to consider 
improvement in the living conditions of the poor that leads to the implementation of reforms that are 
pro-poor in nature. 
 
 
 
Finally, the variable of feasibility is applied to the factual assessments to explore the extent to which 
Malawian elites perceive that something can and should be done about poverty. It probes the views of 
elites on the existence of available policies or instruments to alleviate poverty in Malawi, and their own 
preferred anti-poverty solutions. This leads to a discussion of the ways in which elites’ policy choices 
are influenced by their perception of the causes of poverty in Malawi. 
 
 
 
There are problems that might be raised here concerning the applicability of a theory developed in a 
different historical and global context. According to de Swaan (2005), the history of the welfare state in 
western countries is closely connected to the emergence of the nation-state. For instance, the industrial 
revolution (from 1700s) that occurred in the west produced political and welfare consequences that were 
national. These consequences tended to produce pro-poor attitudes, policies, outcomes and national 
identity (Hossain and Moore, 2002). However, in most non-western countries, national identity is 
eclipsed by neopatrimonialism that emphasises loyalties based on ethnicity, class or region, thus failing 
to produce a sense of interdependence among different groups in society. Then again, the development 
of western nation-states into welfare states was something state elites strove for, and was under their 
control which increased their sense of ownership and accountability. By contrast, elites in developing 
countries have inherited their states from colonial masters; their industrialisation has occurred in the 
shadow of established industrial nations, leaving them heavily reliant on developed countries for trade, 
access to technology and machinery; and they are dependent on donor aid, which 
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limits their control over the development of their states. Hence they have less ownership and 
accountability (De Swaan, 2005:188-189). For instance, Malawi is heavily dependent on international 
aid, with 80 per cent of her development aid coming from donors (AFRODAD, 2007b; Sahley et al, 
2005), which means that the external influence on policy choices in Malawi is quite significant. In 
addition to this, donors are part of the technocracy that manages the processes necessary for the 
implementation of various policies in Malawi (Sahley et al, 2005; Rubin, 2008). 
 
 
 
It is evident that there are major differences in the political, economic and cultural conditions of western 
and non-western countries. In relation to this, some authors (Skinner 1969; Bellamy, 1987) argue that 
the ideas, questions and philosophies of the past cannot transcend the historical and social context in 
which they were developed. It is therefore plausible that de Swaan’s (1988) framework of ‘social 
consciousness’ might be seen to have relevance only to a distinct European socio-economic or political 
tradition. Morton (2003) argues, however, that limiting ideas, questions and philosophies in this way 
‘smothers a concrete sense of how these thoughts and actions may help us understand alternative 
historical and present-day conditions’ (p.128). As Femia explains, ‘All theory is certainly linked to the 
social relations of a particular epoch, [however] some problems are perennial because underlying 
thoughts  about  a  range  of  concrete  particulars  do  recur  as  explicit  focuses  of  concern’  (Femia, 
1981:122-123). Accordingly, the experiences of the West of reducing poverty in times past may 
contribute to the clarification of present day challenges and suggest the formulation of alternative 
hypotheses. For instance, ‘Assuming that the more privileged sectors of society always confront the need 
for solutions to negative externalities of poverty, it follows that the preferred solutions derive from the 
perceptions the elites have of their own position in the market; the state regulatory capacity; and the 
strategies and tactics of the underprivileged’ (Reis, 2010:3).   Thus the application of the theory of 
‘social consciousness’ to non-western countries does not imply that these countries should follow the 
same path as that followed by western countries, and it would be ‘a great loss for social science if the 
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extensive knowledge that has been assembled about Europe and the USA were not brought to bear 
upon the study of Southern and Eastern societies’ (de Swaan, 2005:188). Then again, examples (see 
Section 3.4.2) of different contexts (post-communist countries, South Africa, Bangladesh) where elite 
perceptions have been studied demonstrate the utility of de Swaan’s framework to different contexts. 
Hence, a true test of any framework is whether it can be applied outside of its original context. 
 
 
 
 
3.4.1     Clarifying the Concept of Perception 
 
 
 
Perceptions refer to three things: cognition (non-evaluative understanding); norms (internalized ideas 
about appropriate roles); and values (ideals about what might be) (Reis and Moore, 2005).  Norms are 
a shared expectation of behaviour that connotes what is considered desirable and appropriate (Marshall, 
1994), and a society’s norms determine poor people’s interaction with various groups in that society. 
So, poor people’s interactions with elites in their society are not governed primarily by the laws of the 
land, but by the norms that dictate who has what value in each interaction. For instance, domestic abuse 
in India persists, despite changes in the law, because social norms support these practices (Narayan et 
al, 2000:278). 
 
 
 
Although laws create the space for change, social practice does not change without the support of 
changes in social norms; and changing social norms requires a change in mindsets. Otherwise, the 
persistence of an ‘untouchable’ class in India, of female genital mutilation in Africa, and of the theft of 
state resources with impunity in many countries all suggest that technocratic fixes will continue to be 
defeated by social norms. If elites commonly believe poor people to be lazy, stupid, undeserving and 
pampered, pro-poor policies are unlikely to be formulated and implemented in ways that serve poor 
people (Narayan et al, 2000:279). 
81  
The role of ideas has become central to political analysis, especially the question of how these ideas 
influence political outcomes. Berman’s (2001) concern with ideas leads him to suggest how they can be 
used as weapons, embraced and deployed by political actors to justify and further self-interested 
agendas. Ideas can influence political behaviour by shaping motivation, interests and preferences. 
Hence, perceptions are important inputs in decision-making processes, and decision-makers act in 
accordance with their perception of reality, not in response to reality itself. In any event, all decision- 
makers may be said to possess a set of images and to be governed by them in their response to policy 
problems (Brecher 1968).  Consequently, the perceptions that elites have of poor people and poverty 
play a powerful role in shaping public policy as well as its outcome (Heroles, 2004). 
 
 
 
As noted by Hickey and Bracking (2005), the range of possible political responses to poverty and to 
different categories of poor people is closely shaped by the ways in which political discourse frames 
issues of poverty and responsibility for poverty reduction. It is about how people talk about and visualize 
poverty, hence the discourses of poverty as articulated through language and images’ (Lister, 2004:4). 
Jervis (2002) argues that perceptions matter for policy-making. First, in order to understand human 
behaviour, we have to understand how people think, interpret their environments and reach decisions. In 
addition, we need to look inside the black box of the state and study the goals, beliefs and perceptions 
of the decision-makers. Second, a study of decision-makers reveals both common patterns and 
idiosyncrasies, as there are common strands in the way that most leaders think and perceive. Lastly, 
behaviour is related to the self-images and identities which are so important to people: for instance, 
people define themselves as different from, and usually better than, others; and they see their own 
behaviour as rational and consistent (Jervis, 2002:2). In this thesis, I have attempted to separate 
short-term opinions that are usually driven by current events from stable, long-term perceptions. Thus I 
have examined elite perceptions of poverty and the poor for relatively stable values and beliefs (Reis 
and Moore, 2005). 
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3.4.2 Historical Perspectives on Elite Perceptions of Poverty and the Poor 
 
 
 
As noted in Section 3.4, the utility of a theory rests on its generalisability and universal applicability. To 
ascertain utility, it is necessary to review the theory, its insights and limitations (Ncube, 2010), which is 
what this chapter sets out to achieve. It is also important to analyse the past in order to understand the 
present, paying attention to historical conditions whilst adopting and adapting de Swaan’s insights and 
concepts (Morton, 2003). Therefore, this section seeks to understand the historical context of elite 
perceptions of poverty in nineteenth century Europe and the USA. 
 
 
 
How elites perceived poverty and the poor powerfully influenced policies and practices for tackling 
poverty and for neglecting or repressing the poor in nineteenth century Europe and the USA. Welfare 
policies were implemented in such a way that they distributed advantages and disadvantages, benefits 
and sanctions; thus they could be disciplinary, punitive and coercive in character (Squire, 1990), as well 
as positive. The literature on elite perceptions of poverty and the poor in developed countries shows 
that classification of the poor, which involved judgements of their worthiness, meant that resources 
went towards assisting the deserving18 poor whilst the undeserving poor were relegated to the poor 
house or subjected to onerous conditions for relief (Sher, 1983:2; see also Hossain, 2005). The 
perceptions of poverty and the poor held by elites resulted in a phenomenon called ‘othering’: a dualistic 
process of differentiation and demarcation whereby a line was drawn between ‘us’ and ‘them’; between 
the ‘more’ and the ‘less’; and, most commonly, between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’. This line was 
constructed out of negative value judgements that presented the poor, variously, as a source of  moral 
contamination,  a  threat,  an  undeserving  economic  burden,  and  objects  of  pity  (Lister, 
2004:101). Therefore, elites in nineteenth century England and the USA developed ideologies that 
justified the presence of the poor and held the poor responsible for their unfavourable situation. 
18 
The deserving poor are those who are poor through no fault of their own; and the undeserving poor are those whose 
poverty is due to character defects such as laziness, drunkenness  and immorality (Berthoud et al, 1981; Lister, 2004; 
Hossain, 2005) 
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These perceptions of poverty and the poor are reflected in dominant conceptualizations of poverty and 
pro-poor policy. For instance, unfavourable images of the poor in the USA reinforced a belief in self- 
help and the American dream that saw poverty as the result of personal failure (Lister 2004). Elites 
believed that income, wealth and social position depended wholly on hard work, ability, honesty and 
responsibility. Similarly, in early nineteenth century Britain, a distinction was made between the 
dependent and the independent poor; paupers and the labouring poor; the deserving and the 
undeserving poor. This distinction had obvious ‘moral implications as well as social and political ones’ 
(Himmelfarb, 1991:122), which served to protect the respectable from the morally undesirable and to 
facilitate a vast machinery of disciplinary social intervention aimed at remoralization (Squires 1990). 
 
 
 
The images held by elites in the nineteenth century USA and UK characterised the causes of poverty 
as individual or group deficiencies. There was a belief that the exercise of the virtues of diligence, 
prudence, sobriety, thrift and initiative was the pathway to affluence. Therefore, poverty was caused by 
idleness, improvidence, intemperance, and defects of character which the individual could overcome if 
she or he chose. Although the ‘hazards of life such as unemployment, sickness, old age, and death of 
the breadwinner were acknowledged, it was the mark of a provident man that he set aside savings to 
cover these risks’ (Berthoud et al, 1981:7). However, it was also recognized that among those in 
poverty were people believed to be decent, hard working, clean living and provident, who in spite of 
personal effort were defeated by successive and prolonged crises beyond their control. This led to the 
categorisation of poor people as either ‘deserving poor’ or ‘undeserving poor’. Similarly, Kreidl’s (2000) 
study of elite perceptions of poverty and wealth in western and post-communist countries concludes 
that the elite’s lack of concern with inequality might be a result of distinctions made in characterising the 
poor: ‘merited poverty’, brought on by an individual’s own actions; ‘unmerited poverty’, external to the 
individual; and ‘fatalistic poverty’, which elites ascribe to the characteristics or mindset of the individual. 
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In addition, Lister (2004) outlines three ways in which distinctions were made in categorising the poor: 
first, the distinction between pauperism and poverty, whose dividing line was thin and permeable as 
individuals slipped between the two but also led to the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Hence 
welfare policy (i.e. better parenting, education) attempted to prevent the poor from lapsing into 
pauperism and to break the cycle of poverty. Second, the distinction between the undeserving able- 
bodied and the deserving, impotent/incapable paupers resulted in relief that was restricted to absolute 
necessities and was provided in a form that deterred the recipients from remaining dependent on it, as 
well as deterring others from conduct that would result in destitution (e.g. the ‘less-eligibility’ law of the 
workhouse19). The third differentiation was aimed at identifying and containing the dangerous and 
criminal classes who provoked fears of criminality, vice, sexual immorality and other threats to the 
social order (Lister, 2004:104-106; see also Himmelfarb, 1984). Therefore, the poor were to be kept at 
a distance, contained or socially and economically ‘engineered’, as they were feared as a source of 
both physical and moral filth and contamination (Berthoud et al, 1981). 
 
 
 
Thus, welfare policies in the USA and UK were implemented either to prevent the deserving poor from 
becoming destitute, or to deter the undeserving from staying on welfare, or to protect the elites from 
crime and disease (Hossain and Moore, 2000). These classifications of the poor are politically significant, 
as they lead to a pre-policy-making arrangement that enables elites to prioritise policies towards the 
deserving poor and provides them with justification for ignoring the chronically poor (Hossain, 2005). For 
instance, in Botswana the official policy and inherent strategy is to support those who make the biggest 
contribution to the growth of the economy, enabling the leadership to ignore the already impoverished 
and vulnerable poor who have nothing to contribute (Good, 1999:199). Similarly, a study on elites and 
poverty in Bangladesh found that despite a public discourse treating the poor as 
 
 
19 The less-eligibility principle enforced in the workhouse meant that relief given to the able-bodied poor was more meagre and the work more 
onerous than would have bee achieved by paid labour. Relief was to be provided within the confines of the workhouses in conditions – food, shelter, 
work, discipline – that enforced the status of ‘able-bodied poor’.The harshness of workhouse conditions ensured that only real destitution would induce 
an individual to enter it and the habits of industry would be preferred (Himmelfarb, 1984; Lister, 2004; Squires, 1990). 
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homogenous and equally deserving of government support, social policy targeted the economically 
active rather than those who lacked such potential (Hossain, 2005). 
 
 
 
Notions of the ‘poor’ might also include the slightly or temporarily poor, who attracted more sympathy 
from policy makers; for instance, members of the upper caste during the 1943 Bengal famine 
(Greenough, 1983) or Victorian Londoners threatened with descent into the ranks of the unrespectable 
(Himmelfarb, 1991; Hossain, 2005). In seventeenth century Italy, intra-elite conflicts over power and 
gender issues relating to patterns of inheritance affecting aristocratic women stimulated action towards 
poverty generally and towards poor widows in particular (Cavallo, 1991). In twenty-first century 
Bangladesh, similar examples exist, as Hossain (1999b) indicates: compared to attitudes towards the 
chronically poor, the sudden downward mobility of a household receives more sympathy. Similarly, in 
Ghana, which is lauded as a success in the fight against poverty, research has found there is a strong 
bias towards the economically active, leaving the poorest excluded from poverty programmes (Hickey, 
2005; Hossain, 2005). These examples show that ideas or perceptions of poverty vary in different 
contexts; thus understanding these ideas leads to an understanding of elite motivations to enact anti- 
poverty initiatives and the character of these initiatives (Hossain, 1999). 
 
 
 
Research carried out in the UK and USA has underlined the impact these perceptions or images of the 
poor have had on the development of punitive attitudes and policies towards recipients of welfare (Lister, 
2004). These studies have underscored the important links that exist, not only between politics and pro-
poor policy, but also among those with power within the policy-making process, their perceptions, and 
the outcome of such policies. They have also particularly underscored elites’ ‘ideas about how to 
mitigate or solve the problem of poverty, and ideas about what constitutes poverty and what makes it a 
problem requiring remedy or solution’ (Himmelfarb, 1984:7). Hence Lister (2004) notes that explanations 
that focus on what people in poverty do or do not do are inadequate for dealing with 
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poverty, preferring explanations that focus on what powerful people do or do not do and the impact of 
their actions.   ‘While the actions of individuals in poverty can be a contributory factor, the underlying 
causes of poverty are to be found in the wider society. We need to pay more attention to the exercise of 
agency of poor people, but this cannot be divorced from their severely disadvantaged structural position 
or from the exercise of agency by more powerful actors, which helps to perpetuate that structural 
position’ (Lister 2004:178). 
 
 
 
 
3.4.3     The Role of Elites in Poverty Reduction 
 
 
 
Drawing on arguments earlier presented, we can conclude that elites play a significant role in 
influencing policy processes, particularly those pertaining to poverty reduction. This is because of their 
control over resources as well as their positions in institutions that are important to national political 
influence and policy-making (Reis and Moore, 2005). But are elites likely to engage constructively in 
poverty reduction activities, or to reinforce poverty?  Two competing arguments exist: first, is that elites 
can reinforce poverty by structuring policies, programmes and institutions in their own favour or by 
skimming the benefits that are intended for the poor. Second, elites may speak on behalf of poor 
people and implement policies that effectively reduce poverty (Bird et al, 2004). Hossain and Moore 
(2005) set out reasons that might entice elites into supporting pro-poor policies: first, relatively specific 
arguments linking policies, whether in education, health, sanitation or social insurance, to the 
advancement of a widely accepted (human resource based) conception of development, such as the 
argument that girl’s education is the best means of fertility control. Second, is a more general assertion 
about  the essential  incompatibility  of poverty  and destitution  with the achievement  or condition  of 
‘development’,  or some other urgent  goal, such as ‘national  unity’. Third, is an appeal, explicit or 
implicit, to a sense of rivalry with other similar countries, especially neighbouring countries, and to a 
sense of national pride that might be invoked through the belief that one is doing better than one’s 
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neighbours. Fourth, are persuasive narratives, totally lacking visible instrumental content, that have a 
moral, or a sense of altruism: for instance, doing what is right for the people. And last come persuasive 
narratives that demonstrate that feasible solutions exist to alleviate poverty (pp.206-207). 
 
 
 
As argued by Hossain and Moore (1999), there is considerable potential for presenting the character, 
causes and solution to poverty in ways that mobilise elites to want to do something about poverty 
(Hossain & Moore, 1999). In no way does the study of elite perceptions of poverty devalue the 
experiences of the poor themselves about their condition. Perceptions offer an understanding of ways 
in which we can ‘begin to prick the conscience of elites so that they put a premium on poverty’ (MP, 
8/04/2008). 
 
 
 
 
3.5     Conclusion 
 
 
 
This chapter has discussed the conceptual and analytical framework of this thesis. The aim of the 
chapter has been to understand elites and their role in social policy in relation to their perceptions of 
poverty and the nature of the solutions they support. In order to understand the conditions that motivate 
elites to reduce poverty, de Swaan’s theory of social consciousness is employed to reveal elite 
perceptions of the problem and the elite’s support for particular pro-poor policies. The chapter has 
demonstrated that elite perceptions were crucial in the priority nineteenth century European elites 
accorded to poverty reduction and the policies they supported. These perceptions included elites’ fear 
of crime, disease and social unrest that emanated from the presence of poverty and the poor. 
Perceptions therefore provide the fabric in which public initiatives can be sewn and become entangled, 
and they shape or constrain leaders’ decisions by creating a space for addressing issues, and 
suggesting the nature of the approach needed to deal with them and a set of solutions to be considered 
(Selee, 2005). Thus, elite perceptions can be changed by presenting poverty in such a way that it 
becomes an issue that needs urgent action, that it is in elites’ own interest that something is done, and 
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that there are effective instruments available, making action feasible. In studying elite perceptions, it is 
not possible to say that these perceptions are homogenous amongst various categories of elites. Elites’ 
perceptions of poverty and the poor may differ and these differences can be crucial for understanding 
how to formulate effective policies. 
 
 
 
The chapter has also discussed the concept of an elite, the different definitions of elites, relating this to 
the identification of elites, and elite influence on development outcomes. Insights from various classical 
elite theorists show that the term elite has been used variously to refer to a ‘power elite’, ‘social elite’, 
‘olirgachy’, ‘ruling class’, and ‘managerial elite’. These different conceptualisations of elites have had a 
bearing on the identification of who elites are, with some classical thinkers limiting this category to the 
bureaucracy, and others limiting it to the political arena or the ruling elite. The conceptualisation of 
elites for this thesis has drawn on these distinctions to identify a suitable definition of elites that will 
capture the array of elites involved in policy making. This understanding of elites accepts that not all 
elites are decision-makers, but that some instead influence decision-makers, form public opinion or 
have the resources to ensure the effective implementation of policy. Despite these differences, various 
authors discussed in this chapter agree that elites control material and symbolic resources in different 
countries, thus they have a decisive role to play in policy decisions. Therefore, the role of elites in 
developing countries like Malawi is crucial because after fifty years of development assistance, it is clear 
that policies are not created in a vacuum: they are formulated by elites with a particular mindset, in a 
particular culture, and with particular social norms. 
 
 
 
The next chapter discusses the methodological framework adopted in this thesis in order to understand 
elite attitudes towards the poor and pro-poor policies in Malawi. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
This chapter outlines the methodological framework employed in this study to understand Malawian 
elites’ perceptions of poverty and the poor: whether elites blame the poor for the persistence of poverty, 
or feel that it is their responsibility to reduce poverty; the solutions they offer for reducing poverty; and 
whether they believe there is mutual dependency between elites and the poor such that the presence of 
poverty and the poor among them has a negative impact on their own welfare. The chapter is organised 
as follows: Section 4.2 presents the philosophical perspectives and research design of the study and a 
justification for the approach adopted; Section 4.3 sets out the across-method triangulation approach 
employed to collect data; Section 4.4 sets out the logic and procedures that guided the analysis of data; 
Section 4.5 discusses some issues that emerged in the collection of data and other methodological 
limitations; Section 4.6 outlines the study’s ethical considerations; and Section 4.7 concludes the 
chapter. 
 
 
 
4.2 Philosophical Perspectives 
 
 
 
 
C. Wright Mills argues, in his 1970 work, The Sociological Imagination, that the confusion prevailing in 
the social sciences is a result of the long-running controversy about the nature of science. This 
controversy is based on ontological, epistemological and methodological arguments – arguments that 
reflect the different ways of observing, studying and measuring the world (Neuman, 1994). Ontology is 
defined as ‘claims and assumptions that are made about the nature of social reality, claims about what 
exists, what it looks like, what units make it up and how these units interact with each other. In short, 
ontological assumptions are concerned with what we believe constitutes social reality’; whereas 
epistemology  consists  of ‘the  possible  ways  of gaining  knowledge  of social  reality,  whatever  it is 
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understood to be. In short, claims about how what is assumed to exist can be known’ (Blaikie, 2000: 8). 
Methodological arguments concern ‘the best means for gaining knowledge about the world’ (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 2011:91); that is, the methods used to collect and produce information (Creswell, 2003). 
 
 
 
The main approaches in social science research – positivist and interpretive – adopt different 
ontological, epistemological and methodological arguments to shape theory and design research 
techniques. They each hold a particular philosophical assumption, principles and ideas about conducting 
social research. They are also different in the way they approach issues of subjectivity versus objectivity 
and the role of values, context and contingency in social research (Neuman, 1994; Creswell, 2003; 
Greene, 2008). Consideration of these issues helps to clarify the study’s approach. 
 
 
 
Positivist social science believes in natural scientific research, and accepts as scientific evidence only 
facts established by systematic personal observation. Thus, a positivist researcher employs a deductive 
process to gather facts and produce generalizations about cause and effect relationships between 
variables through objective, observable, and quantifiable data. These cause and effect relationships, 
once identified, can be used to predict general patterns of human activity or outcomes. Methodologically, 
the aim is to detect regularities in nature, propose generalizations, deduce what these imply for the next 
case, and observe whether the prediction succeeds or not (Marsh and Stoker, 2002; Deacon et al, 
1999; Neuman, 1994). Therefore, one positivist epistemological assumption is that questionnaires, 
experiments, surveys, and statistics should ensure objectivity, replicability and causality (Deacon et al, 
1999; Neuman, 1994; Creswell, 2003; Greene, 2008; Marsh and Stoker, 2002). 
 
 
 
An interpretive social science is rooted in the belief that internal reality is an important element that can 
be researched to better understand the way in which people make sense of their world. It emphasizes 
an understanding of how people feel inside, how they create meaning, and their personal reasons or 
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motivations for making decisions.   This implies that evidence about social action cannot be isolated 
from the context in which it occurs, nor from the meanings that social actors assign to them. Therefore, 
people act on their beliefs and preferences, and their actions can be explained by these beliefs and 
preferences (Neuman, 1994; Bevir et al, 2003; Jennings, 1983). Methodologically, the aim is to 
inductively generate theory about social reality, which involves drawing ‘generalizable inferences’ out of 
observations or findings (Bryman, 2001). The interpretive epistemological assumption is that through 
methods such as interviews, document analysis and observation, we can understand people’s beliefs, 
preferences and the meanings they attach to social phenomena. Therefore, an interpretive researcher 
cannot divorce themselves from their own socio-cultural realities and adopt a value-free position, nor 
can they operate in an apolitical environment. Researchers need to reflect on their own views and 
feelings and identify how these might impact on their study. In other words, an objective analysis of 
events or social phenomena is impossible (Deacon et al, 1999; Neuman, 1994; Marsh and Stoker, 
2002). 
 
 
 
 
Both positivist and interpretive researchers have been criticized, mostly by each other, for taking an 
inflexible approach to studying and understanding social reality. Although changes have occurred within 
positivist approaches, their core features, mainly a belief in the superiority of observable or external 
reality over internal reality, have been retained. A main drawback of positivism has been this inflexible 
concern with abstract laws, formulas and statistics that ignores the importance of contextual factors 
such as social and cultural forces that might also affect human activity. Thus positivists are said to fail 
to distinguish people and social institutions from the world of nature; assume a connection between 
their measurements and the concepts they are meant to reveal, as well as assuming that respondents 
to a questionnaire interpret the questions in the same way; and tend to believe that it is possible to 
‘control’ variables in experimental research involving ‘human subjects’ to achieve unambiguous results 
 
(Denzin, 1970; Cicourel 1964; Blumer, 1956; Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). 
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Conversely, critics of an interpretive approach to understanding social reality argue that it is ‘soft’ and 
 
‘unscientific’; that it offers only opinions or subjective judgments about the world, and has no basis on 
which to judge the validity of its claims. Thus interpretivists are said to be too subjective; their data and 
findings raise questions of representativeness, because of the use of brief or limited examples in 
relation to explanations; and the generalizability of information obtained from the normally small 
samples involved is questionable (Marsh and Stoker, 2002; Silverman, 2000; Grix, 2002). 
 
 
 
Although these two philosophical approaches (positivism and interpretivism) have been conceptualized 
as incompatible and mutually exclusive, they can be combined to offer a comprehensive understanding 
of phenomena under study. The two approaches ‘provide a way of considering structures and processes, 
establishing relationships and thereby providing a means of bridging macro-micro levels of social 
analysis’ (Bryman 1988:8). For instance, qualitative findings can illustrate, explain and add depth to 
quantitative findings, and also highlight different dimensions of a research problem (Gilbert, 2001). 
Thus, a quantitative positivist approach could produce useful data in the study of human behavior, for 
example in assessing Malawian elites’ attitudes towards poverty and the poor; but it would not capture 
individual variations in experience and meaning.  On the other hand, an interpretive approach could 
produce useful data on Malawian elites’ history, values, beliefs, meanings, and feelings towards poverty 
and the poor (Kopinak, 1999; Deacon et al, 1999; Neuman, 1994). This is what is called pragmatism or 
pluralism, a more recent approach to social science that can be traced to the work of Charles Peirce 
(1905), William James (1907; 1981), and John Dewey (1917; 1931). However, there is also evidence of 
a mixed-method approach in the works of sociologists such as Gans (1963), Hollingshead (1949), 
Jahoda, Lazarsfeld & Zeisel (1931/2003), and Lynd & Lynd (1929/1959), before the label ‘mixed- 
method’ came into use (Johnson et al, 2007; Cherryholmes, 1992). 
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The emphasis of pragmatism is on the problem being studied, and pragmatists (for example 
Cherryholmes, 1992; Greene et al, 1989; Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2008; Creswell, 2003) believe that 
the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods ensures a deeper understanding of the problem, 
thus, knowledge claims can arise out of actions, situations and consequences. Therefore, a researcher 
who adopts a pluralist point of view is able to rely on multiple methods: the application to their research 
of different world views and different forms of analysis. The logic of inquiry includes induction (discovery 
of patterns), deduction (testing of theories and hypotheses), and abduction (uncovering and relying on 
the best of a set of explanations in order to understand one’s results) (Collins et al, 2007). Clearly, 
positivist and interpretive approaches offer different ways of understanding Malawian elites’ perceptions 
of poverty and the poor, which makes it logical to combine or triangulate qualitative and quantitative 
methods and findings. This assists in gathering data that reveal the underlying formations that organize 
meaning-making and provide an understanding of how elites make sense of their world on a day-to-day 
basis. In addition, a weakness in one approach may be compensated for by a strength in the other 
(Kopinak, 1999; Deacon et al, 1999; Neuman, 1994). 
 
 
 
 
4.2.1 Research Design 
 
 
The decision to combine interpretive qualitative and positivist quantitative approaches to understanding 
elite perceptions of poverty and the poor in Malawi raised questions on the procedures to be employed 
for collecting, analyzing, interpreting and reporting data. Thus a decision had to be made regarding the 
timing (concurrent or sequential) of data collection; the weighting (equal or unequal) given to the different 
approaches; and the type of mixing (merging, embedding or connecting data) employed during data 
analysis. These decisions could lead to the adoption of an integrated triangulation, or embedded, 
explanatory or exploratory research designs (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007). The most likely of these 
was an integrated triangulation research design, where mixing would occur throughout all stages, from 
data collection to analytic processing and then to interpretation (Jang et al 2008). Such a process 
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involves the combination of two or more data sources, methodological approaches, theoretical 
perspectives and analytical methods within the same study (Thurmond, 2001:253). The aim is to 
compare and contrast, or validate and expand, quantitative data/findings with qualitative data/findings, 
or vice versa, in order to counter biases and limitations within the research design (Creswell and Plano 
Clark, 2007; Greene, et al, 1989). 
 
 
 
Generally, this study was driven by a qualitative paradigm, because understanding elite perceptions of 
poverty and the poor in Malawi requires a face-to-face discussion with the actors involved or observing 
them in their settings. However, data from both qualitative and quantitative methods were integrated, in 
order to fully explore, describe and understand the phenomena under study. This was the first level at 
which triangulation occurred in this study, and between- or across-method, rather than within-method, 
triangulation was employed. The triangulation of data from interviews, observations and questionnaires 
with information from documents ensured that the subjective and objective aspects of elite perceptions 
of poverty and the poor were fully revealed (Kopinak, 1999). 
 
 
 
Second, at the data sources level, a concurrent approach to the timing of research was employed. 
Thus, qualitative and quantitative data were collected during the same timeframe, independent of each 
other, but from the same unit of analysis. The same individuals were selected for both the qualitative 
and quantitative data collection processes, in order to ease convergence or comparison, although 
sample sizes were different (see Section 4.3) (Jick, 1979; Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007; Greene, et 
al, 1989). 
 
 
 
Lastly, at the data analysis level, each dataset (qualitative – interviews, observations, documents; and 
quantitative– – questionnaires) was analyzed within the parameters of its paradigm. Based on the 
literature  and  research  questions,  themes  were picked  from  the  qualitative  datasets  and  followed 
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across the quantitative dataset to ‘create a constellation of findings which can be used to generate a 
multi-faceted picture of the phenomena. This is an analysis led by a grounded, inductive approach but 
developed through a focused, iterative process of data interrogation which aims to interweave the 
findings that emerge from each dataset’ (Moran-Ellis et al, 2006:54). This procedure preserved the 
value of open and exploratory qualitative inquiry, whilst incorporating the focus and specificity of the 
quantitative data (Moran-Ellis et al, 2006). 
 
 
 
There are instances where collecting two different datasets might lead to conflict between them, but such 
inconsistencies between quantitative and qualitative datasets can lead to the development of new 
theoretical perspectives on the phenomena under study. Rather than rejecting one dataset, it is prudent 
to accept the two conflicting datasets as revealing different aspects of the same phenomena, thus 
providing a holistic view of reality. However, these inconsistencies can be minimized if quantitative and 
qualitative datasets are different in terms of their strengths, limitations and biases, and ask or answer 
the same question (Freshwater 2007; Slomin-Nevo et al, 2009; Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007; 
Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2008; Greene et al, 1989). 
 
 
 
The use of methodological triangulation in this study ensures convergence and corroboration of results 
from different methods studying the same phenomena, thus increasing the validity of, and confidence 
in, the findings. During data analysis, triangulation served to elaborate, enhance, illustrate, and clarify 
results from one method by setting them against results from another. This involved verification of 
overlapping results; validation of quantitatively generated constructs through comparison; probing in 
order to determine the cause of discrepancies due to misrepresentation by participants; identifying 
representative and non-representative cases; and clarification of ambiguous replies to questions 
(Kopinak, 1999: 173; Johnson et al, 2007). Thus the study was not limited to the understanding of facts 
or mere opinions, but provided an inquiry into elites’ political culture, and their deeper values and 
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beliefs, especially those that upheld particular institutional arrangements (Reis, 2010; Wilson, 1992; 
Almond and Verba, 1989) about the sort of questions raised in Chapter 1 (Section1.1.2). 
 
 
 
4.3 Data Collection Method 
 
 
 
 
Method is used here to refer to the techniques of data collection and analysis that were guided by 
questions developed from the analytical framework (see Chapter 3, Section 3.4). The fieldwork on 
which this thesis is based took place between March and August 2008. The adoption of a mixed- method 
design allowed the researcher to use different sources of data, such as documents, archival records 
(speeches, newspaper articles and parliamentary proceedings), interviews, observations and 
questionnaires. These are detailed below. 
 
 
 
 
4.3.1 Document Analysis 
 
This stage of data collection involved the gathering and analysis of documents produced in the course 
of everyday events, such as official government publications and official statistics, policy documents, 
budget documents, political speeches, official reports on and records of poverty, and mass media 
reports, to understand how policy is made and how politics impacts on it. These documents were 
sourced from the Malawi Parliament, the Malawi National Archive in Zomba, the Malawi Broadcasting 
Corporation and the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development Library. Specifically, the following 
records were analysed: 
 
 
 
1. Proceedings of Malawi’s parliamentary budget sessions between 1961 and 2007, as 
outlined in Hansard.  Thirty-one sessions were analysed from the colonial period, the 
one party state period, and the democratic state period. 
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2. Newspaper articles between 1996 and 2008 were sourced from the main newspapers 
(Nation and Daily Times) and older newspapers covering the one party state period 
were sourced from the national archive. 
3. Twenty six presidential speeches (Dr Banda [1964-1991], Dr Muluzi [1994-2004] and 
Dr Bingu Wa Mutharika [2004-2008]) were sourced from the Malawi Broadcasting 
Corporation. This also included recordings of party political broadcasts and Malawi 
Congress Party Conferences. 
4. Various policy documents and reports from Government, donors and NGOs. 
 
 
 
 
The analysis of documents was linked to the research questions for the study, and intended to draw 
inferences from audio and written reports as to how elites in Malawi thought and talked about poverty 
and the poor. Drawing on analytical styles within content analysis, the emphasis was on understanding 
what was said in relation to poverty and the poor, who said it, and why. This involved coding, extraction 
of major themes, grouping of similar and different themes, and creating categories. Categorisation 
involved comparisons between data classified as belonging to one group and data classified in a 
different category, which provided a means of describing the phenomena under study. Thus, trends and 
patterns of elite perceptions of poverty and the poor were established. The greatest advantage of 
document analysis is that it is unobtrusive and non-reactive: it can be conducted without disturbing the 
setting in any way. However, the main point made against it is that the researcher determines where to 
place the greatest emphasis after gathering the data, which can lead to bias (Marshall and Rossman, 
1995; Dey, 1993; Weber, 1990; Krippendorff, 2004). In order to offset this criticism, data from 
observations, interviews and questionnaires were used. These are discussed below. 
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4.3.2 Observations 
 
 
 
Observations provide additional information or insight into elite perceptions and help to capture what 
elites actually do or say, rather than what they say they do. As a non-participant observer, I was able to 
observe how elites talked about poverty, their priorities,  and their opinions  about poor people.  To 
ensure that unusable data was not collected and that the researcher’s own experience and perceptions 
did not impact on the process, an observation checklist drawn from the interview guide was prepared 
(Yin, 2003; Denscombe, 1998) (see Appendix 1). The data collected through observations was placed 
within the analytical framework for further investigation; thus a check was carried out on the frequency 
and distribution of phenomena. This work focused on understanding what perceptions of poverty and 
the poor were typical and widespread, and how these views were distributed among elite categories 
(Denscombe, 1998:164). 
 
 
 
 
The observations that were carried out were of meetings, workshops and debates on social protection 
policy and poverty in Malawi’s capital city, Lilongwe. I introduced myself as a research student and all 
those being observed were aware of my status. This procedure was accepted by the respondents, and 
my presence did not seem to affect the discussion. The following seminars, meetings, parliamentary 
proceedings and media debates were observed: 
 
 
 
1. 25th-27th   March  2008  –  Training  on  social  protection  programming  for  senior  civil 
society leaders organised by the Institute for Policy Research and Social Development; 
2. 28th-29th   March,  2008  –  Member  of  Parliament  training  and  dialogue  on  social 
protection policy organised by the Institute for Policy Research and Social 
Development; 
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3. 12th April, 2008 –  Meeting on the way forward for an old age social pension scheme in 
 
Malawi organised by the Ministry for the Elderly and Disabled; 
 
4. 17th    April,  2008  –  Parliamentary  Committee  on  Social  and  Community  Affairs 
consultative meeting on social protection organised by the Ministry of Economic 
Planning and Development; 
5. 22nd   May  2008  –  Round  table  discussions  with  female  Members  of  Parliament 
organised by the Catholic Centre for Justice and Peace (CCJP); 
6. 7th May, 2008 – Central Region Consultative Workshop on a civil society manifesto on 
social, economic and political programs organised by the Malawi Economic Justice 
Network; 
7. 20th  June 2008 – Public debate: ‘Is the villager aware of his/her share in the national 
budget’ organised by ZODIAK radio station; 
8. 21st May-July, 2008 – Observed parliamentary proceedings on the budget session; 
 
9. July, 2008 - A briefing by IMF to the Ministry of Finance on the world economic outlook 
and what Malawi needs to be doing in the face of inflation to cushion the poor. 
 
 
4.3.3 Interviews and Questionnaires 
 
 
 
A semi-structured interview format was adopted for this study. Semi-structured interviews are more 
interactive than questionnaires, as well as being flexible in nature, and they enabled an in-depth 
exploration of elites’ views and personal accounts of poverty issues. This involved understanding various 
emotions, experiences and perceptions about poverty and the poor; as well as receiving sensitive or 
privileged information which required coaxing and careful handling, as well as contact with selected 
key elites in the field (Denscombe, 1998; Mason, 2002). A critical case purposive20 sampling 
 
 
 
20   Choosing  settings,  groups,  and/or  individuals  based  on  specific  characteristics  because  their  inclusion  helps  the 
researcher with compelling insights into a phenomenon of interest (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Patton, 1990). 
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was used to select key informants, which was complemented by snowballing21. Snowballing enabled 
access to other informants who could elaborate on some issues pertaining to poverty in Malawi. As 
opposed to random sampling, the sampling method in this thesis selected people who were perceived 
to hold considerable knowledge on poverty issues, solutions and pro-poor policy processes. This 
ensured that a representative sample of elites involved in, or having a say in, the policy process were 
selected during sampling. 
 
 
 
This thesis is interested in powerful individuals, those who are in decision-making positions and those 
who exercise influence over decisions pertaining to pro-poor policy. The definition of elites adopted in 
Chapter 3 necessitated a positional approach to sampling, as opposed to a reputational or decisional22 
approach.  The positional approach assumes that power in society is based on resources associated 
with positions of authority. Therefore, holders of key positions in political, public and private institutions 
are identified as belonging to the elite (Hoffmann-Lange, 1989). 
 
 
 
For this thesis, individuals were sampled from the main institutions, including: occupants of political 
office (Government Ministers and MPs from the major political parties); the upper echelons of the civil 
service (Principle Secretaries); leaders of private sector organisations; civil society leaders; academic 
and media elites; and INGO leaders and leaders within donor organisations. 
 
A brief discussion of some of the institutions from which key informants were selected is important. 
First, Government  Ministers  and MPs from the major political  parties (UDF, MCP and DPP) were 
 
 
21 Snowballing sampling is a non-probability sampling method often employed in field research whereby each person 
interviewed may be asked to suggest additional people for interviewing (Babbie, 2008). 
22A reputational approach relies on experts to identify powerful people in the society one is studying. A weakness of this 
approach is that it is reliant on experts’ perceptions, which might be subjective, or might be the result of incomplete knowledge 
about the power structures that exist. Thus its usefulness is limited to communities where decision-making power is 
concentrated among a readily identifiable elite group. A decisional approach identifies powerful individuals based on 
active or direct participation in political decision-making. Its emphasis is on behaviour as a measure of influence; therefore it 
is less prone to subjectivity than the reputational approach. But the necessarily small range of issues that can be studied 
empirically in order to identify decision-makers makes it difficult to generalize findings to cover the entire power structure 
(Hoffmann-Lange, 1987: 29-30). 
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sampled.   According to Rakner et al (2004), these people are key stakeholders in decision-making. 
They are able to undermine the formal rules of the game that govern key decisions, such as the budget 
process, in a manner that reduces transparency, limits distribution and ensure that decisions serve 
powerful interests.  Second, civil servants in Malawi, as in many other states, have extensive influence 
on policy processes. Their power lies in their responsibility for enforcing decisions and their ability to 
decide the allocation of budgetary resources, which allows them to pick and choose the individuals, 
families and communities that undergo development (Huntington and Weiner, 1987; Johnson and Start, 
2001). Bureaucrats in Malawi move easily into other elite positions in the private sector, NGOs and 
Parliament; thus it is not uncommon to find MPs who are former bureaucrats or MPs owning newspapers 
or other businesses. Third, private sector leaders were sampled for their role in policy- making as 
established in the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS). In this document, the 
Government identified the development of the private sector as essential to economic growth and 
poverty reduction through public-private partnerships and job creation. Fourth, civil society organisations 
(CSOs) in Malawi are many in number and have always had an influence on social development policy, 
albeit limited under the one-party system. 
 
 
 
In recent times, CSOs have contributed to representing the voices of the poor in policy decisions, and 
the resulting improved relationships with government have had measurable results in terms of policy 
development.  For  instance,  their  participation  in  the  Poverty  Reduction  Strategy  process  and  the 
budget cycle influenced the direction adopted by the Malawi government in the economic partnership 
agreement negotiations. Malawian CSO leaders seem to be closely connected to political, bureaucratic, 
private sector and other national elites, as they often share the social origins and educational 
background of these people. Fifth, the sample of the media and academic elites included lecturers, 
reporters  and  individuals  who  could  influence  Malawi’s  social  and  cultural  values  but  who  also 
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contributed to policy through budget consultations. Finally, elites from the INGO and donor sector were 
sampled for their role in influencing policy decisions and implementation in Malawi. 
 
 
 
The list of respondents was drawn from the Ministers’ Private Red Book, which contains names, 
addresses and contact telephone numbers of all Ministers, Principal Secretaries, Heads of Departments, 
Heads of Parastatals and other important people such as Advisors to the President. Another list sourced 
from Parliament provided the names and contact details of Members of Parliament and heads of 
parliamentary committees such as the Committees on Social and Community Welfare Services, 
Agriculture, and Finance.   A list from CONGOMA23 provided the names of the various registered CSOs, 
the heads of these organisations and their contact details. A list of media institutions sourced from 
Namisa24 provided the names and contact details of editors and journalists.  Using these four lists, 
names were drawn up of possible respondents and priority was given to those organisations dealing with 
pro-poor policy. Initially, a list of 200 respondents was drawn up, which was later trimmed to 100 
individuals. The 100 respondents were given a questionnaire (see Appendix 4) and 60 of these 100 
respondents, were asked for face-to-face interviews. Fifty-two of the 60 respondents asked for face-
to-face interviews consented to be interviewed, thus 52 interviews were held. The same respondents 
used in the quantitative phase of the research were used for the interview phase, which made 
converging and comparison of data easier (Creswell, 2009). 
 
 
 
The 60 respondents were sent an introductory letter, a letter requesting an interview and a schedule 
(see Appendix 2 - 3) from which the respondent could choose an appropriate date and time or suggest 
an alternative date and time. The requests for interviews and the questionnaires were hand-delivered 
and included a covering letter explaining the purpose of the study and the need for cooperation and 
confidentiality. The questionnaires included information regarding the date on which the questionnaire 
 
 
23 Council for Nongovernmental Organisation in Malawi, an umbrella body for civil society in Malawi 
24 National Media Institute of Southern Africa (Malawi Chapter) 
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would be collected, and this ensured a higher return rate than a request for them to be posted to the 
researcher would have done. Of the 100 questionnaires distributed, 86 were returned (see Appendix 
16). Some questionnaires had to be discarded because they were incomplete or had been filled in by 
personal assistants or secretaries on behalf of their bosses. Sometimes, the recipients of a 
questionnaire would request a meeting to discuss the questionnaire in depth, which always proved 
worthwhile. 
 
 
 
 
Once requests for interviews were sent, they were followed up with a phone call to ensure that 
respondents had received the letter and to check whether they had picked a suitable time and date for 
the interview. These follow-up calls proved important, as some respondents ignored, or indicated they 
had not received, the request, and another request had to be delivered. The system of hand delivering 
the interview requests, though time-consuming, proved worthwhile, as I was sometimes able to meet 
respondents and set up interviews in the process of delivering the letters. In a very few cases, I was 
asked to carry out the interview on the spot as I was delivering these letters. 
 
 
 
 
The personal delivery of interview requests was made easier because I had already categorised the 
potential respondents, and the interviews were carried out in phases. Phase one was government and 
civil service figures, and consisted of Ministers, Principal Secretaries and Heads of Departments. 
Gaining access to elites within the civil service was not easy at the beginning, but as soon as I started 
‘name-dropping’ or making a reference to someone important I had already interviewed and, in some 
instances requesting my father25 to make a special appeal, access became easier. Phase two 
interviews involved Members of Parliament (MPs). This was problematic as MPs in Malawi do not have 
offices, and this meant that when I interviewed those who lived within the area where I was based, I 
had to find a place to meet them, usually the public foyer of the nearest hotel. However, since my 
 
25 Hon Tedson Kalebe, Member of Parliament and Minister of Energy and Mines at the time of the fieldwork. 
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research coincided with the budget sitting of Parliament, I was able to interview more MPs than I might 
ordinarily have expected, especially those from the Opposition. There were some MPs whom I had 
wanted to interview because of the knowledge they had displayed during parliamentary debates, but I 
could not do so because they requested general expenses, accommodation and fuel expenses. The 
researcher’s financial position and ethical considerations, did not allow for this kind of expenditure. 
 
 
 
Phase three of the interviews was with civil society and the media. This phase proved much easier, as 
the respondents were willing to be interviewed and the discussions were more casual, more like having 
a chat – mainly, because I was seen as a colleague doing something they had already done or 
intended to do. This allowed the interviewees to impart information they might not have otherwise done, 
especially on their views about other elites. The final phase involved interviewing the donor community, 
which proved extremely difficult. Many donors did not want a face-to-face interview, as they indicated 
that the research subject was too political. Of the respondents approached, only one agreed to an 
interview; some filled in the questionnaire; and one, the IMF Chief Resident, asked to meet me, and 
although refusing a formal interview, did discuss some issues of poverty. However, several Malawian 
employees working within donor organisation in positions of influence were interviewed. 
 
 
 
I conducted 52 interviews (see Appendix 5)26, which provided me with a diverse group of elites. An 
interview guide (see Appendix 6) permitted an open-ended discussion with respondents and enabled 
an understanding of their perceptions, attitudes, views and opinions on poverty and the poor in Malawi. 
All interviews were recorded and notes taken during the interview. 
 
4.3.4 Generalizability 
A mixed-method approach enabled a fuller, broader and deeper understanding of Malawian elite 
perceptions of poverty and the poor; but the findings did not ensure generalizability to other individuals, 
 
 
26 A more detailed list of respondents is available upon request. 
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groups, contexts or settings, or to other time periods (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 2003). When it came to 
sampling, labelling the group being studied ‘elites’ made it difficult to establish the precise outer 
boundaries of any elite in order to construct a representative sample (Hossain, 2005). However, as the 
concern of this study was to understand the dominant themes and areas of dissent among elites on 
poverty issues, it was not necessary that the sample should enable measurement of differences or 
priorities among the different elite sections. Although I cannot claim generalizability, the use of 
triangulation permits me to claim a degree of representativeness and strengthens the inferences drawn 
from the data. In addition, after a succession of interviews produced no new categories, themes or 
explanations,  a saturation point was reached which increased  confidence  in the data (see Bowen, 
2008; Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
 
 
 
 
4.4 Data Analysis Strategy 
 
 
 
In analysing the research findings, I had to be aware that the perceptions articulated by elites might be 
what these people considered to be acceptable discourse, rather than their own deeply held views 
about poverty and the poor in Malawi. Therefore the analysis and interpretation of Malawian elite 
perceptions of poverty in the thesis can be seen as one of many possible interpretations of the 
phenomena under study. Despite these limitations, the analysis and interpretation of the perceptions of 
poverty was conducted in a rigorous manner. The initial analysis of the interview material involved re- 
reading the data in the course of transcribing it. During this process, I developed confidence in the data 
I was analysing and attempted to differentiate mere opinions from deeply held attitudes or values that 
appeared to be under discussion amongst the elites (although this distinction is difficult). This involved 
estimating the extent to which elite perceptions were realistic and consistent when set in their social 
and political context and compared with their views on other aspects of Malawian society. In addition, 
elite  perceptions  expressed  in interviews  were compared  with  other  forms  of public  discourse  on 
poverty in Malawi, for instance with media coverage, observations of elite meetings carried out by the 
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researcher, and political, government and donor policy and documents on poverty. In order to identify 
areas where particular elite views were dominant and to compare views (differences and consensus) 
amongst the different elite categories, some elite perceptions were quantified and presented in table 
form. These tables are not conclusive, nor even necessarily evidence, in their own right; but they are 
indicative, providing a rough and additional guide where useful (Hossain, 2003). 
 
 
 
 
Generally the process of analysing data involved categorising and coding interview notes using 
analytical coding that represented the themes of the key research questions of the study. Statements 
with similar viewpoints were clustered and labelled with the same code. The codes were grouped by 
similarity, and themes and relationships were identified, so that patterns, commonalities and differences 
emerged.  Generalizations that explained the themes and relationships identified in the data were 
developed after careful inspection and review of the initial coding and categorisation of the data (Jick, 
1979; Denscombe, 1998; Denzin and Lincoln, 2003). These generalizations and findings of the research 
were compared with the propositions put forward in de Swaan’s (1988) theory of social consciousness, in 
order to determine whether the latter were valid for the Malawian elite. The analysis of qualitative and 
quantitative data was aided by the use of NVIVO analysis software and SPSS. 
 
 
 
 
4.5 Issues in Data Collection and Other Limitations of the Study 
 
 
4.5.1 Gaining Access to Respondents 
 
 
 
The problems associated with gaining access to elites in Malawi are similar to those faced in similar 
undertakings in other countries. The issue of the time elites were willing to commit to an interview at the 
onset of my research necessitated the use of a questionnaire for wider coverage. In Malawi, the problem 
of access was compounded by the lack of offices for Members of Parliament, who formed one category 
of the elites interviewed.  Members of Parliament, unless serving as ministers or deputy 
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ministers or as presidents of a party, do not have offices from which they work, or a secretary. Therefore, 
at the beginning of the fieldwork, it proved difficult to gain access to political elites. This was further 
made difficult by the political environment and the continuing battle between the ruling party (the DPP) 
and the Opposition over Section 6527. The battle over Section 65 had had made the headlines of every 
newspaper in Malawi since 2004, and was still dominating public discourse in the six-month period during 
which fieldwork was carried out. Since 2004, the budget session of Parliament has been the place where 
the issue of Section 65 becomes magnified, as the budget fails to pass unless the speaker of the 
Parliament invokes the Section. 
 
 
 
For the past four years, the Government in Malawi has been in a standoff with the Opposition, who 
have refused to pass the budget unless certain seats in Parliament are declared vacant. The 
Government has had to use CSOs, Chiefs28 and members of society at large to put pressure on the 
Opposition to pass the budget.  During my time in Malawi there were a number of demonstrations by 
Chiefs and their communities in various areas who presented petitions to the District Assembly 
requesting MPs to pass the budget. At one time, a group of angry people mobbed Parliament before a 
parliamentary sitting started, holding some MPs hostage and preventing others from entering 
Parliament.   This meant that during the budget sitting I attended, a significant number of the discussions 
were on Section 65, with the Opposition boycotting parliamentary sittings, particularly when the 
President was scheduled to be in the House. With a budget sitting that commenced in May, the 
budget for the year 2008-2009 was only passed at the end of August. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27 Section 65 of the 1995 Constitution states that if a member of parliament leaves the party on whose ticket he was elected 
and joins another party in the National Assembly, his/her seat will be declared vacant. 
28 Chiefs were another category that would have been useful to interview, considering their importance in Malawian politics. 
There were several chiefs at the Central Region Consultative meeting on ‘a civil society manifesto on social, economic and 
political programmes’ that I observed. I gave questionnaires to some of them, but then I realised that these were incomplete 
and they had to be discarded. Having had a chat with one of the Chiefs, it was evident that I should have translated the 
questionnaire into Chichewa (the local language). 
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During this sitting, bills such as those for peri-urban water, among others, failed to get past the first 
reading and were defeated when they went to the vote because of the failure of the Speaker to declare 
vacant the seats of MPs deemed to have crossed the floor.  Hence, many of the respondents were 
suspicious about the goals and purpose of this research. My position29 made respondents from 
opposition parties question whether I was collecting information on behalf of my father. In addition to an 
appeal to Chiefs and members of civil society, the President was telling Malawians that the Opposition 
did not care about the poor and that was why they were refusing to pass the budget. Therefore, 
questioning elites about their views and perceptions of poverty and the poor aroused suspicion amongst 
respondents, and I had to make an extra effort to gain and win their confidence. The system of hand 
delivering requests and following up with telephone calls proved very helpful in building trust and 
establishing my identity as a student researcher. 
 
 
 
The problem of gatekeepers also affected access to respondents such as Ministers, Principal 
Secretaries and Heads of Departments. I had to convince secretaries and personal assistants that the 
research was important enough to take up their boss’s time. In one instance, I was informed that it was 
beneath the Principal Secretary for Education to respond to the questionnaire. I asked some well- 
positioned people to speak on my behalf and I received a personal call from the Principal Secretary to 
pick up the questionnaire. I found that name-dropping was a good tactic to get respondents to either 
answer the questionnaire or agree to an interview. Bureaucratic culture was also a problem as some 
respondents expected me to go through their superiors, particularly in the case of Principal Secretaries 
and their deputies. 
 
Getting the information from the interviewee was not always easy. Interviews ranged from one that 
lasted only 13 minutes (despite rephrasing of questions and probing) to some that lasted 45 minutes 
 
 
 
 
29 Daughter of a sitting Member of Parliament and Minister in the ruling party (the DPP). 
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(mainly Ministers and Principal Secretaries) and others that took as much as two hours. None of my 
respondents refused to be recorded during the interview, which was useful as it allowed for a better 
discussion. 
 
4.5.2 Axiology 
 
Axiology refers to the role of the researcher’s own values within a piece of research. It is the 
acknowledgement that researchers have personal characteristics and ideas influenced by their class, 
ethnicity, gender, religion and historical period. These in turn influence or become connected to the 
researcher’s values and moral notions. Therefore, the researcher approaches the phenomena under 
study with preconceptions, assumptions, ideologies and beliefs. 
 
 
 
As an insider within the community, and someone familiar with the phenomena under study, my 
experience of poverty, the poor and elites influenced my values and moral judgements. During my 
previous employment as a public relations officer for the Tobacco Association of Malawi, I saw first- 
hand the injustices within the tobacco industry, where the rich manipulated the poor to their advantage. 
The poor smallholder tobacco farmers invested (for them) a lot of money in their farms but received 
very little money from the sale of their tobacco, whilst the rest of the industry, from the buyers to the 
association that represented them, prospered. It is important to understand that, in Malawi, farmers, 
particularly tobacco farmers, form a majority of the country’s poorest people. It was difficult for me to 
accept what I considered exploitation of the poor by elites in the tobacco industry, as well as the 
inequality that existed. During this time I experienced behaviour by political elites, such as government 
ministers, that I felt perpetuated poverty in Malawi: for example, elites bought up maize from the national 
reserves in times of plenty and sold it to the poor at exorbitant prices when there was a maize shortage.  
The tobacco industry bosses failed to take any action to alleviate the suffering of poor farmers as 
they sank deeper into poverty and debt every year. I wondered why leaders within the 
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tobacco industry did not see that a lack of support for the farmers might have a negative impact on 
 
these industrialists’ own livelihood if the farmers stopped growing tobacco. 
 
 
 
 
My second job, after the one with the Tobacco Association of Malawi, included working on politics and 
governance for the British High Commission and the management of the DFID’s Small Grants Scheme 
under the British High Commissioner. This was a job that enabled me to work with politicians and 
bureaucrats, especially those working on social policy. I observed that elites seemed to express their 
concern and propose policy for alleviating poverty, but there was no real impact on poverty levels. 
There seemed to be a lack of political will to implement and monitor pro-poor policies, as corruption was 
rampant. 
 
 
 
Throughout the process of preparing and conducting this research, I have had to face my own prejudices 
towards elites (of which I am arguably one). My experiences have meant that my attitude towards 
elites is negative, in that I view them as the cause of many problems, particularly economic ones, in 
Malawi. During my fieldwork I became more aware of my own values and my position as a researcher, 
and how my personal feelings and moral notions about various things could impact on the research as a 
whole. I was conscious of my prejudices against certain respondents because of what they had done 
in the past when in office, or their stance on various issues (particularly civil society organisations, MPs 
and Ministers). This realisation, which came about early on in the research, was important: it enabled 
me to use my values, beliefs and knowledge as a fundamental resource during the research, particularly 
when carrying out observations, listening to political speeches and, most importantly, during face-to-face 
interviews with elites. It involved me in self-reflection, in order to avoid bias, and in acknowledging 
evidence that would seem to disprove my value position, whilst at the same time using these values as 
a frame of reference for further probing on particular issues (Lincoln and 
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Guba, 1985). Although I was aware of my values and moral notions, the use of questionnaires helped 
me to separate these from the research, as the questionnaires were self-administered. 
 
 
 
4.6 Ethical Considerations 
 
 
 
Researching  social  life  presents  the  researcher  with  ethical  dilemmas  that  need  to be  taken  into 
account at the beginning of his or her study. This dilemma is between truth, or the right to know, and 
human dignity and privacy. Ethics are a matter of “principled sensitivity to the rights of others and these 
ethics limit the choices we can make in pursuit of the truth. Ethics say that whilst truth is better, human 
dignity is much better, even if it leaves us ignorant” (Bulmer, 2001: 45). 
 
 
 
 
There are four issues a researcher must consider in order to ascertain the extent to which the study has 
adhered to the ethical principles of social research. The following ethical issues were important for this 
research: that there was no harm to participants; that there was informed consent by interview 
respondents and by those who provided access to materials from parliament and the national archives; 
that there was no invasion of privacy; and that deception was not involved. Ensuring that respondents 
or participants in a study are not harmed is an important aspect of any research. This relates not only to 
physical harm, but also to the harming of people’s development and self-esteem, the raising of their 
stress levels, and the possibility that they might be induced to perform reprehensible acts (Bryman, 
2008:118). 
 
 
 
 
 
The best protection for participants is to ensure that they cannot be identified in any material published, 
and therefore their identities or records should remain confidential. In this research, confidentiality was 
guaranteed in writing when participants were first solicited for the study. Participants were informed in 
writing that the purpose of the interview or questionnaire and the use of the outcomes of the study were 
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purely academic, and that the respondents’ identities and the data collected would be confidential. 
During the interviews, participants were further assured of anonymity and confidentiality. The participants  
for this study were elites  from  the civil service,  members  of parliament  from different parties, and 
leaders within civil society, and the issue of confidentiality was very important to them. There was a fear 
of bosses, especially from Principal Secretaries, but interestingly none of the respondents refused to be 
recorded. Permission to record an interview was sought at the beginning of each interview session. On 
the other hand, the researcher had to make decisions on the extent to which participants were pressed 
for their views, to ensure that there was voluntary participation. To ensure the ethical integrity of the 
study, all recordings of the interviews, and questionnaires, have been stored in such a way that they 
cannot compromise anonymity. Consequently, where direct quotes have been used, they have not been 
attributed to people by giving their real name. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
 
 
This chapter has discussed the methodological framework employed in the collection and analysis of 
data in the study of elite perceptions of poverty and the poor in Malawi. The study adopted an across- 
method triangulation, with the qualitative inquiry leading the analysis of data in a way that preserved the 
value of an inductive approach but incorporated the focus and specificity of the quantitative data. This 
chapter has also discussed some issues in data collection, as well as other methodological limitations. 
The researcher had aimed to use semi-structured interviews, observations, document analysis and 
focus group discussion. However, at the beginning of fieldwork, getting elites to sit for an interview of at 
least 45 minutes proved difficult, hence a questionnaire was developed. Time constraints, previous 
commitments and different schedules made it impossible to carry out focus group discussions. This was 
also made difficult by financial constraints, as some potential respondents demanded expenses to attend 
a meeting of this kind. This chapter concluded with an explanation of the ethical considerations accepted 
for the study. The next chapter introduces the background to the study and the political- economic 
environment under which Malawian elites operate and pro-poor policies are implemented. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MALAWI’S POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
This chapter outlines some key characteristics of Malawian society and the Malawian economy, and 
highlights the country’s elites’ preferences for a ‘human resource’ conceptualisation of development 
and anti-poverty interventions.   Section 5.2 details the economic philosophy that underpinned 
development policy in Malawi from quasi-state capitalism to market-orientation, and this is of relevance 
for understanding the market-orientation of elite support for pro-poor and economic development policies 
and elite attitudes towards the role of the state (Chapter 8). Section 5.3 is a brief description of the 
features of Malawi’s social structure and the rise and transformation of elites in relation to social, 
economic and political changes, from the colonial period to independence and the present democratic 
dispensation. Section 5.4 discusses the pervasiveness of poverty and inequality in Malawi – features 
that have persisted despite good levels of economic growth at various periods in Malawi’s development. 
This helps to make sense of the elites’ explanation for the presence of poverty and inequality (Chapter 
7) and their opinion regarding policy initiatives (Chapter Eight). Section 5.4 (Subsection 5.4.1) explores 
the political context in which various development policies have been implemented in Malawi, to 
understand how state elites have shaped economic, political and social outcomes. This section goes on 
to document how neopatrimonial characteristics have been evident across the different political systems 
(democratic and authoritarian) and regimes in Malawi, but with different development outcomes. This 
background is of value for understanding the views elites have of the poor as passive or dependent, 
and the elites’ faith in the continuing importance of social relations for reducing social conflict in 
Malawian society, and thus ensuring the continued absence of the threats that can emanate from 
poverty and the poor (Chapter 7). 
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5.2 Economic Policy and Economic Development 
 
 
 
Malawi’s macroeconomic policies since the colonial period (1891-1964) set the context for understanding  
social  change,  politics  and  the  impact  of  economic  policies  on  poverty.  Economic policies also 
provide the context for exploring the formation and transformation of elites in Malawi. Malawi emerged 
from a struggle against the economic exploitation and political oppression of the colonial period with the 
need for economic development and poverty reduction high on the agenda. Symptomatic of these needs 
were low African wage rates, poor transportation networks, land shortage, underdeveloped African 
trade, and lack of market regulation (Power, 2010:47). 
 
 
 
During the colonial period, Malawi’s economy was characterised by estate farming, peasant cash crop 
production  and a labour reserve economy.  The growth of the estate sector was facilitated  by the 
transfer of land to Europeans, with Malawians providing hard labour. The introduction of the hut30  and 
poll taxes ensured that Malawians sought wage labour on estates. These taxes were not fully effective 
in ensuring an increase in wage labourers, as Malawians were able to pay them by growing cash crops 
or by migrating to South Africa or Zimbabwe. This led to the introduction of a differential tax, where on 
production of a certificate from a non-African employer, the tax was halved (Power, 2010). At the same 
time,  a  quasi-feudal  system  called  ‘thangata’31,  which  developed  alongside  the  ‘visiting-tenant’32 
system, led to a growth in peasant cash crop production. Although there were some contributions to the 
economy from the estate and labour reserve economy, the economy did not flourish, as coffee, cotton 
and tobacco prices fell in 1902 and then again in the 1930s (Kydd and Christiansen, 1982). Many of the 
tobacco  estates  were  abandoned,  and  as  Malawi  was  of  no  strategic  importance,  the  colonial 
 
 
30 A hut tax was a form of taxation that each hut or household had to pay in cash, labour or grain to the colonial masters. 
This generated revenues to support the development of the colonial administration, encouraged cash mindedness amongst 
the Africans, and provided a stable African labour force (Power, 2010: 14; see also Baker, 1975) 
31 Thangata was a quasi-feudal arrangement under which peasants had to supply labour to the plantation in exchange for 
the use of a plot of Iand (Kydd and Christiansen, 1982: 357). 
32 This was a share-cropping arrangement under which peasant families obtained land on estates on the condition that they 
grew a cash crop which was sold to the estate at a price determined by the estate owner (Kydd and Christiansen, 1982: 
358). 
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government did not spend significant amounts on health, education or manufacturing. Thus, the low 
standard of living and the ‘thangata’ system became a source of discontent amongst Malawians, which 
led to the Chilembwe uprising of 1915. This uprising was aided by the creation of native and tribal 
associations33  from 1912 on (and continuing up to 1940). These associations were formed to represent 
African interests on various government bodies (Pryor, 1990; Kydd and Christiansen, 1982). 
 
 
 
The native associations were merged in 1944 to create the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC), which 
became the vehicle for demands for independence in Malawi. The NAC was renamed the Malawi 
Congress Party (MCP) in 1959, with Kamuzu Banda as its leader. The MCP had the following aim: ‘to 
work for unity of the aborigines of Nyasaland in order that a well-digested native opinion may be 
available and ascertainable by the Government and to encourage the inculcation and practise of habits 
of industry, thrift and cleanliness amongst the people and to propagate the gospel of the dignity of 
labour’ (McCracken, 1998: 234). Thus the Banda government that came to power in 1964 and 
autocratically34  ruled Malawi from 1966 until 1993 under a capitalist label was enhanced by Banda’s 
familiarity with the virtues of private enterprise and individual achievement gained from his stay in Britain 
and the United States. Although Banda espoused capitalist ideals by encouraging private ownership of 
large-scale enterprises, he practised quasi-state capitalism: at one end he encouraged the 
development of private large-scale enterprises; and at the other end he encouraged ‘setting up 
state industries, taking shareholdings in private enterprise, or outright nationalization’ (Thomas, 1975: 
33). This is not surprising as Banda’s goal in the post-independence period was not only political but 
 
also economic independence from Britain. To this end, Banda appeared willing to adopt any economic 
 
 
 
 
33 There were a significant number of native and tribal associations in Malawi, among which were: the Southern Region, the 
North Nyasa, the Central Region, and the West Nyasa Native Associations; and the Angoni Highlands, the Lomwe tribal 
and the Achewa Improvement Associations (Power, 2010). 
34 
Banda introduced a new constitution in 1966 abolishing parliamentary elections and the multiparty system that existed in 
1964, as well as bestowing on himself unlimited powers to rule the country as he pleased. Consequently, Banda could 
dissolve Parliament or dismiss his cabinet at will and decide who could run for parliamentary seats (Ihonvbere, 1997; 
Meinhardt and Patel, 2003:3). 
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ideology that suited this goal: 'If private enterprise is afraid and hesitant, I will be forced to introduce in 
this country state socialism, or its alternative. I am not going to wait. We want development in this 
country, and we are going to develop this country by all means, by all ways open to us' (Hansard, 1965: 
414). 
 
 
 
 
As Pryor (1990) notes, Banda’s professed economic philosophy was that Malawi could not adopt 
capitalism in the way that the Americans had, by privatising railways, electricity, or water facilities; nor 
could it embrace the communism of the Russians or Chinese, where the state owned everything. 
Instead, Banda believed that these two philosophies could be adapted and a middle ground reached 
where  the  Government  owned  some  enterprises  but  the  people  owned  the  means  of  production 
through the ownership of land.    Banda adopted policies that would reduce the budget deficit and 
maximize economic growth. Therefore many social sectors, such as health and primary education, 
were sidelined or ignored. Instead, guided by the Statement of Development Policies 1971-80 strategy, 
the Government put the emphasis on increasing agricultural productivity, export earnings and domestic 
income. In the education sector, the emphasis was on secondary, technical and university education to 
ensure the availability of much-needed skills at the expense of primary school education (Pryor, 1990). 
 
 
 
According to the World Bank (1982), between 1968 and 1983 the economic sectors (agriculture, 
transport and infrastructure) received over 50 percent of development expenditures, whilst in the period 
1967-80, this expenditure rose to 75 percent. Banda chose to ignore the growing evidence of poverty 
and concentrated public investment in the productive sectors, with consequent improvements in 
development generally, infrastructure, fixed capital formation, and worker productivity (Conroy, 2006; 
Cammack and Kelsall, 2011). There was no real attempt to articulate social policy objectives: ‘Socially, 
there is nothing specific I have in mind. But the government is determined to build more primary and 
secondary schools, more teacher training and technical colleges, where and when they are needed and 
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funds are available’ (Banda, 1974)35. The official view of the Banda government was that as long as 
every Malawian was well fed, lived in a house that did not leak and had adequate clothing, the question 
of poverty did not arise in national policy (Chinsinga, 2002). 
 
 
 
Therefore, in the agriculture sector, Banda implemented policies aimed at growing the estate sector 
that was to be the main driver of economic development. The estate sector, which was dominated by 
elites and significantly supported through taxes on smallholder farmers, as well as receiving other 
preferential treatment, grew rapidly. The bias in Banda’s policy took several forms: customary land was 
annexed from the smallholder sector; smallholder farmers were not allowed to grow export crops such 
as tobacco, tea and sugar; and they were paid less for their produce by the state marketing board – the 
Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) (Conroy, 2006; Chinsinga, 2002). On 
the one hand, there were elites that had unlimited access to land, access to commercial credit, and 
could grow any crops. On the other, there were smallholder farmers restricted to growing less productive 
crops, the prices of their produce were determined by the Government, and they were paid low wages 
for their labour. Thus the policies that the Malawian government implemented clearly defined those who 
would benefit from economic growth and the bias of these policies towards estate farmers was 
revealed when Malawi was hit by exogenous shocks: declining terms of trade, drought conditions in 
1979-1980, a rise in international interest rates, and the war in Mozambique (which increased 
transportation costs for Malawi and disrupted Malawi’s trade route to the sea) from the late 1970s. These 
exogenous shocks in the late 1970s revealed structural weaknesses in the economy and the deepening 
level of poverty. Thus GDP growth per capita between 1979 and 1984 only averaged 0.1% and was 
0.5% between 1985 and 1992 (Kennedy, 1996; Conroy, 2006; Harrigan, 2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 An excerpt from a speech by Kamuzu Banda made during the MCP convention in Lilongwe, 1/09/1974, as Malawi 
celebrated ten years of independence. 
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Although there were some notable improvements36 between 1964 and 1979, Malawi’s quasi-state 
capitalism failed to address issues of poverty and inequality. In the face of the exogenous shocks noted 
above, Banda’s nationalistic ideals for economic independence were weakened as he was forced to 
adopt a free-market economy and accept aid from the IMF and World Bank. At the end of Banda’s 
regime, state-led development was reversed: the agriculture sector was liberalised (centring on the 
lifting of controls on prices, market liberalisation, and the repealing of the Special Crops Act37); there 
were reforms in the parastatal and financial sectors (which included the liberalisation of the exchange 
rate, relaxation of exchange controls, and interest rate liberalisation); and the budget was rationalised 
to work more efficiently, thus improving the allocation and quality of public expenditures. The policies 
adopted by Malawi between 1981 and 1990 under Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) reduced 
the already minimal expenditure on the social sectors, made worse by the introduction of user fees for 
social services such as health (Brown, 1995; Harrigan, 2003; AFRODAD, 2007a; Pryor, 1990). During 
the structural adjustment period and well into the early 1990s, GDP38 averaged 2.4%, well below the 
population growth, and adjustment failed to change the economy’s reliance on agriculture (Harrigan, 
2001). 
 
 
 
 
SAPs were met with a lack of political will from the political elite such that full privatisation, especially of 
ADMARC, was not carried out; and the Banda government was unwilling to liberalise the tobacco 
industry, which would have enabled poor smallholder farmers to grow tobacco. Banda’s reluctance to 
fully adopt a free-market economy ended with his defeat in the democratic election of 1994. Muluzi, 
who became president under the banner of poverty reduction, reversed the system that had allowed the 
exploitation  of  smallholder  farmers  by  liberalising  agriculture,  removing  caps  on  tenant  wages, 
 
 
36 For instance ‘infant mortality declined from 200 per 1000 in 1964 to 130, and per capita daily calorie intake increased from 
2,250 in 1964 to 2,400 in 1975’ (AFRODAD 2007:18; Booth et al,  2006). Malawi’s economic performance was impressive; 
GDP  grew  by  an  average  of  8%  between  1965-1973  (World  Bank,  1975).  By  1981  Malawi  had  raised  its  domestic 
investment from 9% of GDP at independence to 25% , whilst domestic savings increased to 17%t (Record, 2007). 
37 The repeal of the Special Crops Act lifted restrictions on smallholder production of burley tobacco, which until 1994 was 
grown only by estate farmers (Harrigan, 2003). 
38 See Appendix 7 for key macro-economic indicators between 1982-1992 
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privatising state enterprises and levelling the playing field for private sector participation  (Stambuli, 
 
2002). Muluzi’s emphasis on private sector growth was not surprising: his United Democratic Front 
(UDF) party was led by business tycoons who had grown rich during Banda’s time by retaining close 
ties with the ruling party (Chingaipe and Leftwich, 2007). Muluzi also reversed Banda’s industrial policy 
that had favoured high-level entrepreneur development through parastatals and he ensured the 
participation of small and medium enterprises with support from initiatives such as the National 
Association of Business Women (NABW), the Development of Malawi Traders Trust (DEMATT), the 
Small Enterprise Development of Malawi (SEDOM), the Women’s World Banking (WWB), the Promotion 
of Micro Enterprises for Rural Women (PWERM), the Malawi Savings and Credit Cooperative 
(MUSCCO), the Small and Medium Enterprise Fund (SMEF), the Malawi Mudzi Fund, and the Youth 
Credit Scheme (Chinsinga 2002: 26). 
 
 
 
These enterprises did not have the desired effect on the economy, nor on poverty. The neglect of 
agriculture led to food insecurity; and corruption, rent-seeking and economic exploitation became 
widespread. Beneficiaries of these initiatives deliberately defaulted in the name of democracy, leading 
to their demise (Chirwa et al, 1996).  In addition, these initiatives seemed ill-conceived, as no real policy 
existed to provide the necessary access to markets and infrastructural support (Chinsinga, 2002; 
Chingaipe and Leftwich, 2007). Munthali (2010) notes that another reason for the failure of Muluzi’s 
policies was that they were implemented alongside deregulation policies (i.e. privatisation) that 
benefited the haves rather than the have-nots, as the haves were able to purchase privatised companies 
or assets. So, Muluzi’s two terms in office did not result in any significant growth in the economy, and 
fiscal indiscipline characterised this period, with government spending more than its revenues and 
grants, thereby increasing internal and external debt.  Domestic debt increased from MK9.5 billion at the 
end of 2001 to MK54.5 billion early in 2004, and interest on this debt alone accounted for 10% of the 
national budget (Whitworth, 2004). Malawi’s growth between 1994 and 2004 
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fluctuated, starting at -12.3% in 1994, reaching 5% in 1997, and falling back to -4% in 2001; and at the 
time Muluzi left office in 2004, GDP per capita remained at US$160, the same level as when he 
assumed office in 1994. This is a clear indication of the poor living conditions of most Malawians, 
especially if we take into account inflation, which was at 11.424 in 2004 (Cammack and Kelsall, 2010; 
Conroy, 2006; World Economic Outlook, 2011). 
 
 
 
The economic policy adopted by the second democratic government, elected in 2004 and led by Bingu 
Wa Mutharika, did not represent a significant departure from Muluzi’s philosophy. The Mutharika 
government’s ‘Malawi Growth and Development Strategy’ (MGDS) was a capitalist model with the private 
sector as the engine of growth. However, Mutharika’s approach involved moderate state interventions to 
deal with market failures. Thus Mutharika embarked on a growth-oriented strategy to ensure the 
stable growth of 6% prescribed by the World Bank as an effective level for reducing poverty, and he 
adhered to fiscal rules to regain donor confidence (Government of Malawi, 2007). Since 2006 growth 
has averaged 7.5%, which the Government argues has expanded the resources available for 
improved service delivery and has enabled it to implement social protection policy initiatives, such as 
the farming inputs subsidy programme and cash transfers to the poor. 
 
 
 
 
Since the implementation of SAPs in Malawi in 1981, the adoption of economic reforms has been slow 
and uneven, and governments (both democratic and autocratic) have been unwilling or unable (due to 
pressure from civil society) to implement particular aspects of the SAPs programme. For instance, 
some reforms, such as the removal of subsidies, the privatisation of the ADMARC, Air Malawi, the 
Electricity Supply Corporation (ESCOM) and the Water Boards, proceeded in 2005, following reluctance 
by the Muluzi regime to implement these. However, no regime has digressed from a broad market 
orientation in economic policy since the adoption of SAPs (Harrigan, 2001; Munthali, 2010). The 
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next section draws on the discussion above to explore Malawi’s social structure – in particular the impact 
economic policies have had in the development of elites. 
 
 
 
 
5.3 Social Structure and Change 
 
 
 
 
One consequence of the borders imposed by the British on Malawi is that the country does not have 
any kind of ethnic unity. Malawi’s ethnic groups are varied39, with the Chewa and Nyanja constituting 
more than 40% of the total population. Although territorial borders shared with Zambia, Tanzania and 
Mozambique remain unchanged, internal borders were constantly changed over the course of the 
colonial period (1891-1964) for commercial and administrative purposes. These borders cut across 
various ethnic groups with different social and political systems (Power, 2010; Pryor, 1990). Despite 
these differences, interethnic relations in Malawi have been relatively calm. This is mainly because, 
firstly, when Malawi gained independence the relative average incomes of various ethnic groups were 
similar; secondly, three-quarters of the population could understand the Chewa language, which was 
made an official language in 1968, alongside English; and thirdly, intermixing and intermarriage, as well 
as travel outside Malawi, primarily as labour migrants or soldiers, had led to a collective identity as 
‘Malawians’ regardless of ethnicity. This aided the nation-building process, and ethnic differences have 
not since been enough to seriously undermine national interests (Forster, 1994; Pryor, 1990; Power, 
2010). 
 
 
 
However, interethnic relations have proved difficult at the level of politics, and with the introduction of 
multiparty politics in 1994, these differences started to play a significant role in determining who held 
power in Malawi (DFID, 2004). Banda’s autocratic regime had ensured that there was a balance in the 
 
 
 
39 Malawi’s largest ethnolinguistic groups are in the northern region (Tumbuka, Henga, Sukwa, Ndali, Nkonde, Tonga and 
Ngoni); the central Region (Chewa and Maseko Ngoni); and t h e  southern region (Mang’anja, Nyanja, Sena, Yao and Lomwe). 
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ratio of ethnic groups in the civil service and cabinet (see Table 5.1) (Pryor, 1990). Ensuring ethnic 
balance, or what Pryor (1990) terms ‘ethnic arithmetic’, is a crucial political skill and was even more so 
during Banda’s rule, as the native associations that merged to form the MCP were based on ethnic or 
regional lines. Therefore, to avoid perceptions of ethnic or regional bias and ensure support for the 
nation-building project, some semblance of ethnic equality in the cabinet and other top government 
positions was essential. In addition, Banda’s four cornerstones of unity, loyalty, obedience and 
discipline were religiously followed, and distinctions on ethnic or regional lines were outlawed, which 
removed ethnic divisions to which class conflicts could be attached (Phiri, 2000). 
 
 
 
Table 5.1: Ethnic Groups in 1966 and Ethnic Origins of Cabinet Ministers 
between 1964 -1983 
 
Ethnic Group                Population       Cabinet Ministers 
1966  1964 - 1983 
Chewa                            28.3                   29.5 
Nyanja                            15.3                    3.3 
Lomwe                            11.8                   6.6 
Yao                                 11.2                   16.4 
Ngoni                              9.0                     11.5 
Tumbuka                        7.4                     11.5 
Sena                               2.8                     3.3 
Tonga                              2.0                    8.0 
Other                              12.2                    9.8 
Total                               100                    100 
Source: Pryor (1990: 25) 
 
 
 
 
Members of the various elites in Malawi are still drawn from across the country’s various ethnic 
groupings.. Also, in comparison with elites in developed countries, Malawian elites are not too distant 
from the masses, mainly because of their recent ascent to elite status. Even members of the current 
elites who served under the Banda regime have not been in their position for more than two generations 
(see Section 5.4).  Like most African elites, those of Malawi have a traditional bond with the rural 
masses. As Chapter 7 will show, it is not uncommon for members of national elites living in the 
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urban centres to send financial support to relatives in rural areas, especially for educating young relatives. 
Hence, 
 
 
 
Aside from ordinary domestic responsibilities, members of the national elites typically maintain 
a whole separate sphere of responsibilities to their families, which often means their home 
village, clan, or lineage group. Since they are educated and wealthy, relatives send them 
orphans to raise, who arrive on their doorsteps hungry or ill, and they expect these cosmopolitan 
kin to solve all sorts of family problems, from a young person who is going astray, to a baby who 
needs medicine, to a cousin who has been turned away by the hospital offering antiretroviral 
treatment (Swidler and Watkins, 2009: 1191). 
 
 
 
Thus kinship ties mean that elites maintain close affective ties to individuals from quite disparate social 
levels. These ties are likely to remain, since they play a vital welfare function as deepening poverty and 
lack of welfare provision in Malawi require the poor to seek alternative means of survival (Miller, 1974). 
A three-year study on social policy by Chilowa et al. (2000) established that the poor’s major coping 
strategy was to ask for assistance from social networks of friends and the extended family (see 
Appendix 8). Other studies (Chirwa and Chilowa, 1997; Pearce et al., 1996) have identified similar 
coping strategies. According to Miller, kinship ties not only weaken elite cohesion, but also retard the 
development of a class-consciousness, as there are no feelings of common cause with others in the 
same position (1974). This does not imply that small class differences in asset ownership (e.g. land) do 
not exist, nor that these cannot translate into power differences; but these distinctions are not sharp 
enough to arouse conflict (Miller, 1974; Jul-Larsen and Mvula, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
5.3.1 The Pre-Independence Period 
 
 
 
In the early colonial period, economic classes (in terms of differences in access to the means of 
production or gainful occupation) were not highly differentiated because of Malawi’s predominantly rural 
society and the low degree of tenancy in rural areas. For instance, in 1945, less than 2% of the 
population lived in urban areas, and by 1966 this had only increased to 3.9%. This trend has not 
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changed, as in 2008, 85% of the population still lived in rural areas and were mainly involved in 
agriculture (Pryor, 1990:27; NSO, 2008). However, the division of land into crown (public), private 
(leasehold or freehold) and native (customary), by the colonial administration led to a distinction 
between commercial and subsistence farmers. Commercial farmers, though fewer in number, owned 
many hectares of land40; whereas smallholder farmers owned between 0.7 and 1.5 hectares each. 
Thus, access to private land played a key role in the creation of elites in the early colonial period.  In 
1894 the first elites of European origin were created through the granting of 69 certificates of land claims, 
thus creating the first estates in Malawi (Jul-Larsen and Mvula, 2007; Chilowa, 1998). 
 
 
 
The establishment of estates led to social differentiation amongst the native population: between those 
who became supervisors or foremen, normally receiving certain privileges and better wages, and those 
who became labourers. The former were mainly those who had benefited from missionary education, 
introduced in the 1800s. Missionary education in Malawi contributed to the emergence of educated 
elites, as those educated by missionaries themselves took up teaching positions in state and mission 
schools, and acceded to positions in tribal authority structures and the colonial administration 
(McCracken, 2008). In this way, those involved in traditional authorities became a kind of local elite and 
these included chiefs, sub-chiefs and group village headmen (Jul-Larsen and Mvula, 2007). 
 
 
 
Thus the first Malawian economic elites were those who had access to mission schools and then to 
salary-based positions in the colonial administration. These individuals, including some who had 
originally been migrant labourers, accumulated wealth that enabled them to invest in estates, transport, 
trade,  rest  houses,  maize  mills,  brick  production,  animal  husbandry,  and  newspaper  publishing. 
According to Power, ‘These were “new men”, members of a growing “accumulating class” born of the 
 
 
 
 
 
40 Before 1980 private land could reach up to 500 hectares and mainly involved larger companies that were in the hands of 
the national elite (Jul-Larsen and Mvula, 2007:178). 
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colonial economy’ (2010:44). Thus, a group of educated and entrepreneurial elites who had developed 
some local economic powers was created (Jul-Larsen and Mvula, 2007). 
 
 
 
These are the elites who became involved in the formation of the native associations that later became 
part of the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC): they became an emerging political elite. Native 
associations were the main means for native Malawians to organize and, as argued by Miller (1974), 
organization is the vital ingredient that makes elite rule inevitable and natural. In 1912, the North Nyasa 
Native Association was formed to engage the colonial administration on the welfare of Malawians. The 
West Nyasa and Mombera Associations were formed in 1914 and 1920 respectively, with more 
associations formed in the south in the 1920s. Membership of these associations required the individual 
to be of good knowledge and character. Thus mission teachers and religious ministers, government 
clerks, educated headmen and chiefs took part in the deliberations of the associations (Okoth, 2006). In 
1944, as nationalist sentiments grew in Malawi, James Sangala (a Blantyre educated government clerk) 
formed the NAC, the first political party to represent all native Malawians. The various native 
associations then became affiliated to the NAC and were transformed into the party’s branches. The 
1945 constitution of the NAC stated that only intelligent and progressive Africans should be appointed 
to government advisory committees. Although in theory NAC membership was open to all men and 
women, in practice, however, only educated people were encouraged to attend meetings (McCracken, 
1998). 
 
 
 
 
The first president of the NAC was Levi Mumba, a graduate of Livingstonia Institution, a senior 
government official, and a former secretary of the North Nyasa Native Association. Mumba and Sangala 
believed in unity in fighting for improvements in Malawians’ welfare, but they also embraced the 
importance for decision-making of including a wide spectrum of associations and interest groups 
representing civil society. For instance, Sangala ‘combined his role as chief organizer of Congress in 
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the 1940s with active participation in the Parents and Guardians Educational Association, the Black and 
White Club, the Shire Highland Football League and the Blantyre African Co-operative Trading Society’ 
(McCracken, 1998:235). Thus the NAC’s development was closely linked to associations of farmers, 
workers and traders. Chirwa et al. (2004), note that between 1947 and 1949, trade unions became 
registered, forming the first organised labour movement in Malawi. The general secretaries of these 
independent trade unions, such as Chakufwa Chihana and Suzgo Msiska41, were also active members 
of the NAC. In this way, during the colonial period, the sphere of elites had expanded to include 
economic, social and political elites who contributed to decision-making through their involvement in the 
NAC. 
 
 
 
However, between 1956 and 1964 the NAC became intolerant of dissenting views, resulting in, for 
example, the suspension from the party in 1962 of Chakufwa Chihana, for calling for a workers’ strike 
over wages. In 1963 the NAC, which had been renamed the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) in 1959, 
stripped trade unions of their independence by opposing the Trade Union (Amendment) Ordinance. 
Whilst Chihana and Msiska resigned their posts and fled the country, other trade union leaders were 
absorbed into the civil service or party bureaucracy (McCracken, 1998). 
 
5.3.2 The Post-Independence Period 
 
 
 
By the time Malawi became independent, in 1964, the sphere of the political elite had been significantly 
reduced or restricted in terms of its participation in decision-making. Thus the one-party state 
undermined the role of the politicians, the trade unions, the civil service, and private businessmen in 
policy-making. As stated in Chapter 4, despite the increase of civil society organisations in the 1970s 
and 1980s, their role was limited to social issues, with no real participation in the decision-making 
process. From 1960 to 1993, politics began and ended with Dr Kamuzu Banda, and there was no 
 
41 
Chakufwa Chihana and Suzgo Msiska were the General Secretaries of the Transport & Allied Workers Union and the 
Commercial & General Workers Union respectively (McCracken, 1998). 
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separation of the presidency from the Government, the party from its leaders, politics from the law or 
the state from the nation. ‘All these were fused and crystallised into Banda’s personal political 
achievements and abilities and no one-else had the potential to offer an alternative’ (Chirwa, 2001:9). 
Since his 1958 arrival in Malawi from Ghana, where he had practiced medicine, Dr Banda used different 
means to consolidate his power – including intimidation, coercion and murder – and he based his 
leadership style on tight control on the press, the judiciary and the legislature (Power, 1998). 
 
 
 
According to Chinsinga (2002), the legislature and judiciary were merely rubber stamps for executive 
decisions. Popular participation in the affairs of government was non-existent; there was no free 
expression, competition or access to political processes. Unquestioning loyalty to Banda was required 
of everyone who participated in public life. The personal aggrandizement of the leader became the all- 
consuming goal of Malawian politics (Chirwa, 2001). Banda’s leadership philosophy was that, ‘Familiarity 
breeds contempt. A leader must live above the people. He must be different from them. They are 
proud of him when they know that he is someone different and exceptional’ (Baker, 2001:4). He 
therefore ensured that his leadership status attained divine proportions42, and he was able to amass 
huge personal wealth. Through his ownership of the largest private commercial farm and control over 
the largest private enterprise, the ‘Press Corporation’ conglomerate, Banda set himself apart from the 
rest of the population (Baker, 2001). He allocated power and wealth carefully to his loyal supporters, 
and reserved the right to withdraw any privileges when it suited him. ‘Banda therefore used the power 
of the state to direct productive assets into the hands of those he thought would use them most 
productively (politicians and civil servants with capitalist ambitions), and/or those whose political support 
was useful (smaller African businessmen, in particular members of the Malawi Congress Party, 
and investors)’ (Meinhardt and Patel, 2003:4). 
 
 
 
 
42  Therefore, Banda was not to be questioned. As one Member of Parliament, A.W. Chipungu, stated in the late 1960s, 
‘There is no opposition in heaven. God himself does not want opposition; that is why he chased Satan away. Why should 
Banda have opposition?’ (Africa Watch, 1990) 
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Banda’s land policy of 1966 adopted similar distinctions between private, public and customary land as 
in the colonial period. Following independence, the number of estates grew from 250 in 1970 to 30,000 
in 1995. Banda’s post-independence agricultural policy, which favoured large-scale agricultural and 
industrial development, played a significant role in the social differentiation process in Malawi. As noted 
in Section 5.2, under Banda’s policy land was annexed from smallholder farmers and distributed to 
estate farmers, and smallholder farmers were prohibited from growing cash crops such as tobacco. 
This widened the gap between the estate and smallholder sectors and aided the emergence of elites 
(Jul-Larsen and Mvula, 2007; Chilowa, 1998). Banda’s control over access to land was used to 
systematically reward political loyalty. Thus, there was a strong link between membership of the 
national elite and access to land. However, Jul-Larsen and Mvula (2007) argue that although some 
elites maintained their influence through large estate holdings, the most prominent and powerful elites 
were being reproduced through their political control rather than through their control of production. 
Therefore, in the post-independence era, it was not through access to land that individuals were 
members of the socio-economic elite but through their access to political power or positions in the civil 
service (p.179). 
 
 
 
From independence onwards, the national elite were a small, close-knit group that was connected 
through various economic, political and social activities. Most elites held government positions, such as 
parliamentary or civil service positions, but also owned newspapers or various business ventures, such 
as transport or the running of state enterprises, or were involved in the growing of tobacco. Thus elites 
participated in a tight web of interconnected social relationships (Anders, 2001). 
 
5.3.3 The Democratic Period 
 
 
 
Since Malawi moved from a highly centralized one-party state to a more democratic system, there is 
evidence of expansion, diversification and wider influence on policy decisions within the elite. The 
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institutions created in the initial period of democratic rule have provided the incentives and space within 
which a variety of elites can pursue their interests (Von Doepp, 2002). Social mobility and the economic 
basis of elites are no longer solely dependent on political or bureaucratic positions but also reflect growth 
in the private sector. In addition, the intensification of aid to Malawi following political liberalisation in 
1994 has provided civil society with the finances and international expertise to develop policies 
concerning poverty and also to influence government policy through advocacy. The international and 
national non-governmental organizations involved are staffed by university-educated individuals, and 
at times civil servants and academics supplement their incomes by acting as consultants for international 
agencies (Swidler and Watkins, 2009). Jul-Larsen and Mvula (2007) note that an over-reliance on aid 
(see Appendix 9) by the Malawian government since 1994 means that aid has played an important role 
in social differentiation in Malawi. 
 
 
 
On the other hand, the state’s tolerance of diversity in society has expanded, so that civil society and 
private sector elites have interacted with public sector elites on various issues, especially on the welfare 
of the poor. For instance, Chingaipe and Leftwich (2007) note that the Malawi Economic Growth Strategy 
(MEGS) was developed in partnership with the private sector and the Malawi Growth Development 
Strategy (MGDS) places the private sector at the centre of economic growth and poverty reduction. 
Public-private partnerships are being encouraged through the Private Sector Development Strategy and 
Reform Programme for Malawi 2007-2011. As indicated in Chapter 4 (4.3.3), civil society elites in 
Malawi have made a significant and visible difference in representing the poor by developing 
relationships with policy-making bodies. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) have successfully lobbied 
to be involved in technical discussions on the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (MPRSP), and 
they monitor core social sectors such as agriculture, education, health and governance-related 
expenditures. The national budget is the main area in which CSOs continue to participate to encourage 
pro-poor spending and prudent management (James and Malunga, 2006; Bamusi, 2007). However, 
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although the state has accepted the existence of CSOs as an alternative voice to government, the 
magnitude and sustainability of these contributions to the development process is debatable, especially 
as their independence is questionable and their sustainability dependent on donor funding (James and 
Malunga, 2006). 
 
 
 
Democracy has also increased the space for the academic and media sectors to contribute to 
development processes. These sectors have been involved in the technical and monitoring aspects of 
the MPRSP, in order to promote accountability and transparency.  The media have also been involved 
in the dissemination of information on various policies, for instance they have disseminated government 
information on HIV/Aids to young people (Manyozo, 2004; Kerr and Mapanje, 2002). There is, however, 
continuing suppression of the media and restriction on academic freedom43 such that their contribution 
to development is limited. 
 
 
 
Despite  the  difficulties  in  accurately  measuring  increased  wealth  and  inequality,  a  comparatively 
wealthy and educated elite has developed since independence and the trend toward more general 
inequalities of income has not been reduced by government (Thomas, 1975). However, contemporary 
elites seem to rely less on bureaucratic position, wealth and political power, than did elites during the 
one-party system. Since 1994 the civil service has experienced a loss of its professional work ethic, 
because the possibility of securing employment is dependent on political, family or regional/ethnic 
connections and not on merit (Booth et al., 2006, DFID, 2004). Thus positions in the civil service are 
filled by political cronies, sidelining senior officials in a way that de-motivates them and reduces 
administrative efficiency (Booth et al., 2006). On the other hand, elites have been attracted to perceived 
opportunities in the business and NGO sectors. Thus professional elites in the private, media, CSO, 
INGO and academic sectors have emerged; and these new elites have to some extent entered into 
 
43 For instance the recent dismissal by President Mutharika of several lecturers at the University of Malawi over the content 
of a lecture that pointed out that, social problems could lead to social uprisings, as evidenced in Tunisia and Egypt 
(Nyasatimes, 2011). 
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partnerships with the Government on poverty issues. Generally, political elites can no longer exercise 
monopoly power over decision-making as they did under the one-party state. Thus, a change from one- 
party politics to democratic politics has influenced the transformation of elites in Malawi. The next section 
discusses Malawi’s politics and poverty policy. 
 
 
 
5.4 Politics and Poverty Policy in Malawi 
 
 
 
 
Under the one-party state, anti-poverty policy was not a priority; but by 1994 there was a political 
consensus on the importance of reducing poverty in Malawi. However, over the past 30 years there has 
not been a significant reduction in poverty, and per capita income has grown by only 0.2% percent per 
annum, despite attempts by successive governments and donors to improve the lives of the poor. In 
addition, Malawi faces several challenges, some longstanding, others newer. Among them are its 
landlocked position, the AIDS pandemic, chronic malnutrition, declining soil fertility, shortages of land, 
food insecurity and inadequate agricultural policies (Conroy, 2006; Action Aid, 2006). These challenges, 
which make the poor even more vulnerable, mean that for every 30% of the population that moves out 
of poverty, 30% of the non-poor become poor (MGDS, 2006-2011). There has, however been a 
modest improvement in Human Development Indicators (HDIs), especially for the areas of life 
expectancy (up by 10 years), education (enrolment levels up by 3%) and GNI (up 21%). Between 1980 
and 2010, Malawi’s overall HDI rose by 1.3% annually, from 0.258 to 0.385, moving Malawi from 164 th 
position in the HDI figures for 2008 to 153rd out of 169 countries in the HDI figures for 2010 (see HDR, 
2010; Conroy, 2006). According to Malawi’s welfare survey of 2009, poverty has declined from 52.4% in 
 
2005 to 39% in 201044. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
44 It is important to note that the Welfare Survey does not measure all the dimensions of poverty, as does the Integrated 
Household Survey, which indicated that poverty was 63 percent in 1998 and 52.4 percent in 2005. The 2010 HDR indicates 
that multidimensional poverty in Malawi stands at 72.3 percent of the population and the intensity of deprivation is 53.2%. 
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Poverty in Malawi is experienced through unemployment and lack of access to resources or social 
services such as education and health services; therefore those living in the rural areas of Malawi are 
more likely to be poor. For instance, 56% of the rural population is living in poverty compared to 25% in 
urban areas, and 25% are ultra-poor compared to 6% in urban areas. This is mainly because rural 
areas are less developed than urban areas in terms of roads, schools, health and business centres. In 
addition, the manner in which agricultural policies have been implemented in Malawi over the past 40 
years has served to increase inequality. The rural poor own small pieces of land, which has increased 
their vulnerability to poverty because they are unable to produce enough for subsistence (Integrated 
Household Survey, 2004/2005). 
 
 
 
The prevalence of rural poverty does not negate the fact that urban poverty is also severe. There has 
been a modest level of urbanization in Malawi: in 1964 only 5% of Malawians lived in urban areas; but 
this figure had grown by 5% and 11% in 1966 and 1987 respectively. According to the 1998 and 2008 
censuses, 14% and 15% of Malawi’s population lived in urban areas in these two years. The fact that 
the increase in urban populations has not been matched by a growth in urban employment levels or in 
decent housing has worsened the life of the urban poor and led to the spread of slums. Only 35,000 
jobs are created each year for 200,000 job seekers.  Without employment, people are unable to pay for 
services such as health, education and clean water and are also more vulnerable to inflation. In urban 
settings there has been an escalation in cases of armed robbery, suggesting that there is a link between 
the level of poverty and that of social ills, such as crime (USAID, 2002; Englund, 2002c; NSO, 
1998 and 2008). 
 
 
 
 
The period between 1964 and 1980 was one in which Malawi achieved unprecedented levels of 
economic development (GDP averaged 5.6% annually) despite being an autocratic state (Pryor, 1990). 
However, Banda’s market-based policies, the aim of which was to increase national income, meant that 
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social protection took the form of price controls and subsidies. Although these policies brought some 
successes45, many Malawians did not benefit from them or from Banda’s impressive economic 
performance (GOM, 2005; Fozzard and Simwaka, 2002). Conversely, the implementation of structural 
adjustment policies (SAPs) between 1981 and the early 1990s meant that the only visible poverty 
reduction initiatives were food transfers and targeted nutrition programmes.  SAPs had a negative 
impact on food security, and this saw Malawi experiencing a food crisis in 1987 that forced the 
Government to import 140,000 metric tonnes of maize. In terms of GDP, Malawi experienced a growth 
rate of just over 1% in 1986 and less than 1% in 1987, leading to an increase in poverty in the 1980s 
(Conroy, 2006). With the policies Banda implemented, an increase in poverty was inevitable, given the 
Government’s previous low expenditure on social services (Chinsinga, 2002). Banda tried to reverse 
the situation by adopting a special programme called the Social Dimension of Adjustment in 1990 to 
ensure that social and poverty concerns were integrated into development policy. 
 
 
 
However, by 1993, Banda was being ousted from power, and in 1994, the democratically  elected 
United Democratic Front (UDF) government, led by Muluzi, a former secretary general of Banda’s 
Malawi Congress Party (MCP) who also held several ministerial positions in the Banda regime, allocated  
substantial  funds  to  social  sectors  such  as  free  primary  education  and  health  (Nthara, 2003). 
The Muluzi government’s overarching goal was poverty reduction based on the reversal of Banda’s 
policies. The Poverty Alleviation Programme (PAP), devised in 1994, guided policy and aimed to 
empower the poor to change their life circumstances. PAP interventions, many of which were market- 
oriented, included credit schemes, targeted input subsidies, public works, cash or food for work and 
integrated livelihood  support.  Despite  being  well  articulated,  the  PAP  had  little  impact  on  actual 
 
 
45 Despite the emphasis on the productive rather than the social sectors, there were some improvements in social welfare. 
‘Infant mortality declined from 200 per 1000 in 1964 to 130, and per capita daily calorie intake increased from 2,250 in 1964 
to 2,400 in 1975’ (AFRODAD 2007:18; Booth et al., 2006). Between 1964 and 1979 the economy grew at an impressive 
rate: GDP rose from 0.3% in 1964 to 19.7% in 1979; industrial output expanded at the rate of 10% per annum. The average 
economic growth was estimated at 6% compared to only a 2.9% growth rate per annum. Domestic exports rose from US$48 
million in 1970 to US$285 million in 1980 (Chirwa and Chilowa, 1997; Pryor, 1990). 
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programmes and expenditure decisions. There was no real understanding of who the poor were, what 
poverty was, the specific solutions to be applied to different dimensions of poverty, the stakeholders 
who should be involved in implementing pro-poor policy, what each institution’s activities were, and 
especially who was responsible for translating the PAP into concrete activities (Kennedy, 1996; 
Chinsinga, 2002; Bloom et al., 2005; Slater and Tsoka, 2007). The above problems, coupled with lack 
of ‘political will’, made any real changes in the life of the poor difficult (Chirwa, 2004). Despite its pro- 
poor stance, the PAP still operated within the policy environment of market-oriented policies under 
SAPs, without consideration of the impact SAPs would have on its agenda. For example, the 
Government failed to recognize that the full privatisation of the Agricultural Development and Marketing 
Corporation (ADMARC) might have an impact on the ability of the poor to empower themselves, as this 
closed the only ready market where they could sell their produce (Chinsinga, 2002). 
 
 
 
Ellis et al. (2003) observe that, by 1999, Malawi had abandoned the PAP, discarding any lessons learnt 
from its implementation, and had adopted the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (MPRSP), which 
became fully operational in 2002. The MPRSP divided social welfare provision into support for 
different categories of the poor, mainly according to disability and their capacity to work (see 
Appendices 9 and 10). A distinguishing feature of the MPRSP was its commitment to the classification 
of certain budget lines under the programme as Pro-Poor Expenditure (PPE), which were to be 
protected against cuts. Despite these efforts the MPRSP failed to have the desired impact, as resources 
were diverted to non-priority areas. In 2003, instead of a projected PPE expenditure of 25.2%, 
there was a decline of 9.2% (IMF and IDA, 2003; GoM, 2005). Muluzi’s preoccupation with domestic 
political rivalries and bolstering the UDFs position in Parliament seriously undermined the 
implementation of the stated objective of poverty alleviation. Rather, he satisfied the economic interests 
of his supporters within the legislature and electoral constituencies and resorted to populist policies 
(Fozzard and Simwaka, 2002; Von Doepp, 2002). 
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The second democratic government, elected in 2004, and led by Mutharika, recognised that economic 
growth should be complemented by equality policies. Inequality in Malawi remains a significant concern 
as the Integrated Household Survey (IHS) of 2008 shows: ‘The richest 10 percent of the population has 
a median per capita income that is eight times higher than the median per capita income of the poorest 
10 percent. Moreover, the richest 10 percent of the population has a median income that is three times 
higher than the overall median income in the country.’ (p.146). The Mutharika government adopted a 
growth-oriented strategy, guided by the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS), which 
focused on agriculture and food security, irrigation and water development, transport and 
communication, infrastructure development, and the prevention and management of nutritional 
disorders, HIV and AIDS (Government of Malawi, 2007). 
 
 
 
In order to respond to poverty specifically, the Mutharika government developed the Malawi Social 
Protection Framework in 2006 to move the country towards long-term social protection. Prior to the 
implementation of this social protection policy, measures for dealing with poverty had been ad hoc and 
short-term. There were some extensive programmes, particularly the Malawi Agricultural Inputs Subsidy 
Programme, but the resources were thinly spread and failed to have the desired impact.  According to 
Tsoka and Slater (2007), the Social Protection Policy initiative is a more long-term, predictable 
programme that helps poor households deal with risk and disaster through a more institutionalized and 
coordinated approach. The interventions implemented under the Social Protection Policy address 
different types of vulnerability, such as chronic poverty, disasters and market failures. Thus, productivity-
enhancing interventions, such as agricultural subsidies, cash transfers or public works are targeted at 
economically active people who lack access to assets, inputs or markets; whereas, direct welfare 
transfers, such as food and cash transfers, range from short-term relief during periods of disaster (e.g. 
drought or floods) to institutionalised social security (old age pensions, cash transfers dispensed  mainly  
to  the  elderly  and  female-  or  child-headed  households,   and  school  meals 
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programmes). These interventions, in particular the Agricultural Subsidy Programme, have improved 
food security for destitute and vulnerable households, as maize production has increased46  since 2005 
(Chinsinga and O’Brien, 2008; Slater and Tsoka, 2007; Devereux et al, 2006). A summary of social 
protection strategies (see Table 5.2) implemented since 1964 shows that they have been heavily 
market-oriented, with a concentration on productivity-enhancing initiatives, and Appendix 12 shows a 
timeline for the major policies that have underpinned poverty reduction in Malawi. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 The 2005-2006 maize harvest of 2.6 million metric tonnes was half a million greater than Malawi’s annual requirement of 
2.1 million tonnes. The surplus for the 2006-2007 growing season was 1.3 million tonnes, and during this period, Malawi 
became a net exporter of food within the Southern African region (Chinsinga and O’Brien, 2008:33). 
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Table 5.2: A Summary of Social Protection Policies in Malawi 
 
Period Types of Intervention Comments 
1964-1981 Input and output price controls 
 
Universal input subsidy 
 
Farmers’ clubs and input credit facilities 
Few  formal  safety  net  interventions 
(beyond price controls/subsidies). 
Market-based policies and practices 
predominated. This can best be 
described as ‘the good old days’ in 
terms of protection from exposure to the 
effects of poverty and covariant shocks. 
1981-1990 Input and output price decontrols 
 
Phasing out of universal subsidies 
Targeted nutrition programmes 
Food transfers (relief) 
SAPS   forced   the   Government   to 
dismantle the social protection system 
with no replacements. The period had 
no effective protection for the poor and 
vulnerable, except in emergencies. 
1990-1994 Interventions under the Social Dimension of 
Adjustment, including credit schemes 
(Malawi Mudzi Fund) 
 
Targeted  nutrition  programmes  and  food 
transfers 
Inspired by calls for ‘adjustment with a 
human   face’.   Politics   in   the   early 
1990s  weakened  farmers’  clubs, 
which led to the collapse of the credit 
system. The effect was that the little 
that remained for the smallholder 
collapsed. 
1994- 2006 MSMEs credit scheme 
 
Public  works  programme,  cash  for  work, 
food for work 
 
Input   transfers   (starter   packs,   targeted 
inputs) 
 
Food transfers (relief and other types) 
School meals 
Cash transfers (pilot) Targeted 
input subsidies Targeted 
nutrition programmes 
Integrated livelihood support 
Dominated by government and donor 
initiatives. Gradual increase in NGOs 
offering social protection. Input 
transfers took advantage of the collapse 
of the credit scheme, escalating input 
prices and the frequent droughts. Food 
transfers and food programmes 
became annual, as food insecurity 
increased. Interventions were targeted 
on reducing and alleviating poverty. 
2006 - 2011 Social    Protection    Policy:    social    cash 
transfers and agricultural subsidies 
 
Non-contributory      old      age      pensions 
(planned) 
 
Community development projects 
 
Public works programme 
 
Cash and food for work 
 
Capacity building for vulnerable and 
marginalised people (e.g. orphans, the 
elderly, those infected with HIV/AIDS) 
This is an attempt by the Government 
of Malawi to move from safety-net 
programming to more long-term, 
predictable social protection that helps 
poor households deal with risks and 
disasters through a more 
institutionalised and coordinated 
approach. The goal of these 
interventions is to ensure food security, 
raise household incomes and enhance 
productivity. The Government has also 
been planning old age pensions, 
which have yet to be implemented. 
Sources: Slater and Tsoka (2007) Malawi Social Protection Status Report, World Bank, p.21, (Between 1964 and 2006); 
Government of Malawi (2007) (Between 2006 – 2011). 
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5.4.1 Neopatrimonialism and Poverty Policy in Malawi 
 
 
 
This sub-section discusses the political context in which poverty reduction initiatives have been 
implemented in Malawi and it shows that political systems and neopatrimonialism do not fully explain 
the pro-poor outcomes or lack thereof; and that understanding the role of elites is essential to 
understanding pro-poor policy success or failure. 
 
 
 
Although there have been some modest rates of economic growth between 1964 and the present day 
(HDR, 2010), underlying the changes in the political system has been pervasive and constant poverty, 
as well as inequality. One explanation for the continued poverty is that an extremely small elite 
simultaneously control both the economic and the political spheres in Malawi, taking the formal political 
processes and decision-making away from formal/public spaces and re-positioning them in informal 
spaces from which the poor are excluded (Booth et al, 2006). Ruling elites are considered to have failed 
to successfully implement much-needed pro-poor policies, as public resources have been directed 
towards constituencies rather than national development. Politics in Malawi has been about 
negotiating development for localised constituencies. Neopatrimonial politics has been an unchanging 
feature of both authoritarian and democratic rule, resulting in a politics that is personalised, based on 
money, and centred on a ‘big-man’ (usually the President) (Englund, 2002). 
 
 
Between 1964 and 1994, it was Banda’s centralisation of power and his ‘state monopoly capitalism’ that 
fused state and business in Banda himself, and which played a key role in the ‘cultivation of patrimonial 
populism which created a mix of private and public sector activity’ (Harrigan, 2001:31). In order to 
promote a populist platform, the ADMARC was used to maintain rural markets that provided subsidised 
agricultural inputs and purchased crops; whilst profits from the Press Holding Company were used to 
construct Kamuzu Academy47  and build houses for senior members of the Malawi Women’s League. In 
 
 
 
47 Kamuzu Academy is a secondary school based on the British public school model (Harrigan, 2001). 
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addition, Banda converted one million hectares of leasehold land into estates and provided these to 
aspiring commercial farmers, many of them bureaucrats, MPs and party members. Thus, Malawi’s 
political economy was a semi-state, interventionist, capitalist economy sustained through political 
patronage, traditionalism and populism (Harrigan, 2001; Cammack and Kelsall, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
Neopatrimonialism was evident in the 1994 and 1998 parliamentary and presidential election results, 
which clearly showed voting along regional and ethnic48  lines (see Appendix 13) (Chirwa, 2005:2), as 
the electorate believed that to get access to resources, one needed to vote for a person with whom one 
had kinship ties (Fozzard and Simwaka, 2002:14). UDF elites had frequently suggested at rallies that 
those who voted for the opposition would not benefit from development initiatives (DFID, 2004). In 1994 
and 1998, regionalism produced a hung parliament, making it difficult for the ruling party to have its bills 
and policies approved and passed in Parliament. This created a need for coalitions, to ensure that 
policies were approved (Chirwa, 1994). Since 1994, the UDF government has entered into coalitions 
with other parties and bought individual MPs to join the UDF. Patronage used to boost Muluzi’s numerical 
superiority in Parliament influenced the award of contracts, the appointment, and the protection of corrupt 
politicians, including ministers and cabinet appointments (Cammack, 2004:9). 
 
 
 
Unlike Banda, the UDF’s ruling elites have used their influence to siphon off public and project funds to 
their personal accounts or for party campaigning. In 1995 the UDF/AFORD coalition was accused of 
handing over funds meant for poverty alleviation to loyal parliamentarians (DFID, 2004).  Promises of 
free  food,  fertiliser,  shoes,  houses,  bicycles  and  credit,  have  been  used  to  garner  support.  An 
illustration of this is the Government’s decision to expand massively the free distribution of seeds and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 With the UDF capturing the southern region, the MCP the central region, and the AFORD the northern region, where the 
leaders of each party come from. 
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fertiliser, and the provision of free secondary schooling, in the run-up to the 1999 general elections 
 
(Fozzard and Simwaka, 2002:11). 
 
 
 
 
The various political parties in Malawi cannot be distinguished from one another by their ideologies or 
programmes, as they compete on a populist agenda. Thus, to suppress opposition to his rule, Muluzi 
has resorted to the use of Banda’s tradition of violence, and at times has banned all public 
demonstrations (Maroleng, 2003). As Ott et al. argue, the present crop of politicians in Malawi ‘learned 
their politics at the feet of Banda and the default mode of their responses is undemocratic and you have 
to remind them constantly of the new political dispensation’ (Ott et al., 2003:21). For instance, the 
UDF’s leader, Muluzi, served as the MCP’s secretary general until 1982, when he fell out with Banda; 
the UDF’s secretary general had been Minister of Health in the MCP government until fired in 1991; and 
the UDF’s Aleke Banda had a reputation as head of the much feared Malawi Young Pioneers49 and 
was in charge of several portfolios in the Banda government. ‘In reality they came together because 
they had been marginalised from the political and power arrangement of the Banda regime (Ihonvbere, 
1997:232). 
 
 
 
 
Thus the culture of silence, unquestioning loyalty and the need to please the President represents 
continuity between the old and the new Malawi. The President is still seen as being above criticism (Ott 
et al., 2003:17), and undue respect for authority is pervasive in most traditional settings. This has 
serious implications for policy implementation, as any attempt to criticise or challenge authority is seen 
as insubordination, seriously reducing the space for policy dialogue and participation (Bwalya et al., 
2004:18). 
 
 
49 The Malawi Young Pioneers were established in 1964 and represented the paramilitary wing of the Malawi Congress 
Party. Up to 1967, the Young Pioneers were mainly concerned with rural development work and political indoctrination. 
However, over the years, the MYP became the most dreaded agent of Banda’s brutality, a major instrument for the 
operationalisation of Dr Banda's one-party state dictatorship and domestic terrorism. The Pioneers bore arms and conducted 
espionage and intelligence operations, besides being the most trusted bodyguards around Banda (Chirambo, 
2004). 
50 ‘Boma’ is a Swahili word for the enclosure around the dwelling units of traditional chiefs, slave owners or colonial masters 
(Meinhardt and Patel, 2003). 
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Contemporary political culture in Malawi is in many ways similar to that of the Banda times, as can be 
seen in the arguments during the UDF’s bid for a third term. In a move reminiscent of the Banda 
regime, the UDF created a youth wing called the Young Democrats who were used to carry out violent 
acts against the Opposition, especially during the 1999 and 2004 elections, as well as during the third 
term debate. Following a critical letter written to UDF leader Muluzi by the Muslim community in 2001, 
‘One Sheikh was beaten up after the opening of Parliament by youths shouting – are you happy when 
the bwana (master) is insulted?’ (Englund, 2002:193).  What is problematic, argues Englund, is not only 
the violence but the reference to the President as ‘master’, denoting someone who is above criticism 
and whose power can partly be entrenched through the use of violence and intimidation. This was 
reminiscent of the Banda era, where critical comments about the MCP, the Government or the President 
were punished by the regime. Banda would often insist to Malawians that, ‘We need to be disciplined 
and obedient, not argumentative and contradictory. Don’t go this way when you are told to go that 
way, don’t ask why and don’t ask if it is necessary’ (Hirshmann 1995:250). 
 
 
 
Therefore, the Malawi Government is still referred to as ‘boma50’ and Meinhardt and Patel (2003) argue 
that the reference to government as ‘boma’, has serious implications for political culture. ‘In the minds 
of the ordinary people, the government is conceptualised and understood as a powerful and feared 
institution that operates at the top and the people do not see themselves as part of the governance 
process’ (Meinhardt and Patel, 2003:51). For example, despite corruption being rampant under the 
Muluzi government, it did not elicit any strong public condemnation, and corrupt acts by elites were 
tolerated even when very few of the benefits filtered down to ordinary people. This is mainly because 
social relationships are characterised by inequality and a large power distance; collectivism in the value 
system generates conformism and tolerance of mediocrity; and there is an aversion to uncertainty and 
assertive behaviour which results in a low tolerance for dissent. Thus, ‘In Malawi hierarchy is expected, 
50 ‘Boma’ is a Swahili word for the enclosure around the dwelling units of traditional chiefs, slave owners or colonial masters 
(Meinhardt and Patel, 2003). 
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inequality is desired and anticipated. Less powerful people are expected to be dependent on more 
powerful people; women defer to men; subordinates envision being told what to do and the according of 
privileges and status to members of the elites is expected and welcome’ (Booth et al., 2006: 18). This 
attitude has affected the development of mutual support and initiatives among the citizens (Inglehart, 
1988) and the creation of a national identity (Meinhardt and Patel, 2003). 
 
 
 
The bulk of the literature51 on neopatrimonialism has tended to argue that this characteristic of African 
politics is inherent in authoritarian regimes. Thus, neopatrimonialism is seen as non-democratic, 
providing mechanisms and norms that stabilise authoritarian regimes and undermine political 
participation, as well as being the key cause of Africa’s economic crisis (Van de Walle, 2007). 
Neopatrimonialism conceptualised in this way fails to grasp adequately the ideational and variegated 
undercurrents that shape African politics. Much of the discourse on neopatrimonialism has tended to 
ignore its legal-rational dimension and has concentrated on the patrimonial aspect. It is interesting to 
see that in the 1970s patrimonialism was considered important for ensuring cohesion in African 
societies, but in its contemporary form it is regarded as a threat to political and socio-economic 
development and a cause of weakness in states (Chabal, 2002; Erdmann and Engel, 2006). 
 
 
In Malawi, neopatrimonialism has been evident across both democratic and authoritarian dispensations. 
Presidential patronage has been effective in buying off MPs, and political parties have remained 
weakly institutionalised groupings of the followers of particular personalities (Cammack et al, 2007; 
O’Neil, 2007; Booth et al, 2006). Like many African states, Malawi exhibits characteristics that defy 
the goals formulated in the democratisation process. These goals, according to which citizens would be  
autonomous, discrete and self-referential individuals, run contrary to African attitudes, where the 
individual’s identity is formulated with reference to the community. Hence political systems function 
51  For a discussion of neopatrimonialism as anti-democratic and an explanatory factor in economic crisis in Africa, see Erdmann and 
Engel, 2007; Van de Walle, 2007; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; and Van de Walle, 2001. 
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according to the logic of community, which is informal and produces relationships that are based on 
kinship, ethnicity or regionalism. (Chabal, 2002:453). Leftwich and Hogg (2008) argue that formal 
institutions introduced by the international community are considered alien to the historical traditions, 
institutional legacies, cultural patterns and value systems of African societies; and so, these institutions 
are often distorted, undermined or by-passed. Englund (2002) describes multipartyism, regular 
parliamentary and presidential elections, new constitutions, freedom of expression and the existence of 
a non-governmental sector as the ‘paraphernalia of democracy’ that ensures the flow of development 
aid, but does not really change the neopatrimonial character of African states. 
 
 
However, neopatrimonialism might not always be a negative feature in the implementation of pro-poor 
policy. For example, ‘The success of the Asian Tigers was not a result of good governance, but a 
positive form of cronyism (patron-clientelism), which involved the mobilization of deeply rooted ethnic, 
regional and familial networks, and reciprocating systems of payoffs and political patronage’, (Hyung- 
Gon, 2003:25). Kelsall et al. (2010) argue that there is evidence of developmental patrimonialism where 
rent-creation and distribution is geared towards long-term and productive activities, and non- 
developmental patrimonialism, where rent-creation and distribution are short-term and geared towards 
non-productive activities, in countries like Malawi. 
 
 
The period between 1964 and 1979 in which Malawi achieved unprecedented levels of economic 
development (Pryor, 1990) saw a pattern of centralised, long-term rent-seeking and technocratic 
integrity. Therefore, Banda created a political culture and structures that enabled him to determine the 
major rents that would be created and how to distribute them. The creation of rents was determined by 
Banda’s vision52 and the ability of the bureaucracy to provide robust and technically sound advice to the 
ruling elites. The period between 1980 and 1994 saw a reversal of this trend: although still centralised, 
 
 
52  Banda’s vision was to construct roads, a railway, a university, and a new capital city, Lilongwe, which he achieved 
(Cammack and Kelsall, 2011). 
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Banda’s power had begun to wane due to his age (80s), and his management of rents also weakened. 
Rents became geared towards short-term needs and the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs), 
which not only disrupted the system for channelling rents but also changed the types of rent-creation 
and distribution that could be encouraged. As a result, growth stagnated53 and never again reached the 
heights it reached between 1964 and 1979 (Cammack and Kelsall, 2011). 
 
 
 
Generally, the authoritarian system under which Dr Banda ruled from 1964-1994 enabled him to use 
repression, charisma, populism and traditional authority to gain legitimacy. His state-sponsored 
repression gave his patronage a distinctive character, where patronage followed policy. Excessive 
patronage was limited, and through his Crop Inspection Tours, Malawians were made to feel part of the 
development process. It has been argued in the literature that until the fiscal crisis hit in the 1980s, 
Malawi was seen as a developmental state54 (see Chapter 2). Banda had a clear and well-articulated 
development vision for Malawi, which he sought to implement. It may have been the wrong policy (intra- 
sectoral bias, which skewed income distribution, resulting in massive inequalities) but it was consistently 
elaborated and followed (Cammack, 2007; Booth et al, 2006). The Public Sector Investment Plan (PSIP) 
went through an iterative process to ensure affordability and alignment with development plans. The civil 
service is considered to have been more professional and more highly motivated under Banda. Even 
though there was a stifling of independent thinking, technical advice was given and taken. The civil 
service had a high status, and civil servants were respected, honest, disciplined, well paid and 
hardworking. Corruption was centralised under Banda’s rule, and even though profits were siphoned 
off from state companies, Banda’s patronage was less damaging than Muluzi’s,  as  economic  rents  
were  geared  towards  building  a  modern  economic  infrastructure, 
 
 
 
 
53 GDP fell by 3.3%, 7.9% and 12.4% in 1988, 1991 and 1994 respectively (Kaluwa et al, 1992). 
54 Malawi’s semi-state-led, export-oriented development strategy, the indirect manner in which a strong state intervened in 
the economy and the resulting blurring of the private and public sector, is similar to the development strategies of the Asian 
tigers, who have been considered developmental states (Harrigan, 2001:47). 
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stimulating commercial farming, and creating an African business class (Cammack and Kelsall, 2011; 
Booth et al, 2006; Anders, 2002). 
 
 
 
In contrast, the democratic period between 1994-2004 saw a pattern of decentralised, short-term rent 
management, a deterioration of the civil service and deteriorating growth rates (Cammack and Kelsall, 
2011; Cammack et al, 2010). Muluzi, who ruled under a democratic political system from 1994 to 2004, 
relied on patronage to gain legitimacy, even more so than Banda, as the new political rules created 
insecurity55 for the ruling elite. Muluzi did not have a clear vision for Malawi, and a lack of discipline at 
the top saw increasing democratisation of corruption and the informalisation of public administration. 
The result was political and economic chaos and a failure to consolidate democracy. During this time, 
patronage is said to have driven policy: Loyalists were appointed to parastatal boards and government 
posts, and cronies to cabinet positions, which enabled the siphoning off of monies from the public 
coffers to fund political careers, pay-off supporters, enable individuals to get rich, and hire UDF youths 
to crush opponents (Cammack and Kelsall, 2011; Cammack, 2007; Booth et al, 2006). Justin Malewezi, 
who once served as Vice President in Muluzi’s administration, indicated in his manifesto that only 25% 
of government decisions were implemented, and the civil service was regarded as an avenue for self- 
enrichment. Muluzi not only gobbled up the profits from state-owned enterprises such as the ADMARC, 
but also consumed the country’s capital assets (Booth et al, 2006). This was a non-developmental 
neopatrimonialism which had serious implications for economic growth, policy-making and poverty 
reduction (Kelsall, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55  ‘Muluzi had to contend with opposition parties, multi-party elections, a minority government and coalition forming, and 
errant MPs who could possibly be bought by other parties’ leaders. To retain support, the President needed resources to 
distribute: he appointed (often unqualified) loyalists to parastatal boards for instance, increased the size of his cabinet to 
include more cronies, and oversaw the siphoning off of funds from government coffers by senior party people for political 
and personal ends’ (Cammack and Kelsall, 2011:91). 
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According to Cammack and Kelsall (2011), the period since 2004, in which Malawi has been led by 
Mutharika, has seen a return of some aspects of Banda’s centralised, long-term rent management and 
the promotion of a disciplined civil service. Mutharika, who came to power in 2004 under Muluzi’s UDF 
government, inherited a weakly institutionalised democratic political system, with a weak economy and 
an ineffective administration. His subsequent break from the UDF and the formation of his own political 
party left Mutharika without support within the elite and at grassroots level. He used patronage and 
clientelism to build support, and took on the leadership styles of both Muluzi (personality politics and 
distribution of public resources to clients) and Banda56, although many argue that his leadership style is 
closer to that of Banda. He reached out to civil society and the media, took a zero-tolerance stand on 
corruption, and implemented populist policies such as input subsidies. He used public office 
appointments to encourage opposition politicians to join his party and harassed the media and 
threatened his opponents, mostly with prosecution for previous corrupt practices (Cammack, 2007). 
Mutharika has sought the support of traditional leaders and elevated himself to heights similar to those 
reached by Banda. In 2008, the title of ‘Ngwazi57’ was conferred on him by the Ngoni chiefs. This was a 
title used by Banda, which served to portray Mutharika, as a powerful leader, full of wisdom. However, 
Mutharika has gained support from donors and Malawians over the implementation of the subsidised 
inputs programme which has seen Malawi’s food production secure over two planting seasons 
(Cammack, 2007:12). Cammack and Kelsall (2011) have termed Mutharika’s first term in office as ‘hard 
budget clientelism’: elite political support was bought, partly through access to rents in the business 
sector, but not in a way that derailed the macro-economy or the development vision. 
 
 
During Mutharika’s rule there has been a considerable degree of growth (see Section 5.2), but since 
 
2009, the economy has faltered and faced several crises: an exit of cotton and tobacco buyers, 
shortages of foreign currency, artificially high exchange rates and the emergence of a black market in 
56  
Mutharika, like Banda, worked hard and took time over details, studying policy memos, quizzing his senior staff, and 
debating policy with them (Cammack and Kelsall, 2011:92). 
57 Ngwazi means ‘conqueror’ and invoked fear amongst Malawians in the Banda era (Cammack, 2007). 
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currency, fuel shortages, budget overspends and the withdrawal of budget support by the DFID, the 
World Bank, the ADB, Norway and Germany (Cammack and Kelsall, 2011; DFID, 2011). It would seem 
that Mutharika’s second term represents a return to Muluzi’s short-term rent-seeking and this seems to 
be affecting the development project. 
 
 
 
During these different periods, formal and informal institutions interacted but produced quite different 
outcomes, leading the ‘Drivers of Change’ study in Malawi to conclude that development in Malawi will 
not necessitate a sharp break with neopatrimonialism (2004; Jutting et al., 2007). Some authors (Booth 
et al., 2006; Ihonvbere, 1997; Kelsall et al, 2010) argue that Malawi needs to revert to the pattern of 
1964-1993, where patronage followed policy rather than policy being entirely driven by patronage. 
According to Kelsall et al. (2010), centralised control over rents, organised clientelism and a long-term 
approach to rent management would lead to support for development goals and control over corruption. 
In addition, ruling elites need to draw on a nationalism that can invoke powerful and widely shared 
moral symbols, as in some periods of Malawi’s political history. This would require the formation of 
norms, values and moral judgments that encompassed emotional attachments and patterns of identity 
and affinity (Duffield 1999).  However, wherever informal institutions dominate, the exercise of power is 
discretionary and behaviour is determined by moral and social norms rather than by the rule of law. The 
answer lies in the discretionary power state actors have to control and allocate public resources in 
society (Jutting et al, 2007). 
 
 
 
Although democracy opens up societies to popular participation in policy-making processes, ensures 
that state power is no longer the preserve of the executive and the bureaucracy, and makes  state 
actors accountable to the legislatures and more transparent in their dealings with citizens (Goetz and 
Jenkins, 2005), variations in development outcomes are a result of how elites exercise power (Helmke 
and Levitsky, 2006; see also Leftwich and Hogg, 2008). In countries like Malawi, where the state is not 
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properly institutionalised, the judicial system is deficient; and where there is no productive investment in 
society, it is difficult to understand how electoral competition alone can result in better government and 
a more efficient framework for economic growth and poverty reduction (Chabal, 2002). Interest should 
be directed towards how the self-binding element of ruling elites can be institutionalised, or how to 
restrain or mitigate the worst effects of neopatrimonialism (Hyden, 2008; Kelsall, 2008). 
 
 
 
The above discussion shows that the exercise of power is discretionary, and behaviour is determined 
by the discretionary power that state elites have to control and allocate public resources. In Malawi, 
where elites have great influence over political, social and economic life, they can now enhance their 
importance by implementing development policy. The particular personalities and leadership styles of 
Malawi’s post-independence presidents (Dr Kamuzu Banda, Bakili Muluzi and Bingu Wa Mutharika), 
and the changing environment in which they have governed, has influenced economic development 
and anti-poverty policies. These leaders have differed in their approaches to policy, especially in terms 
of policy consistency, long-term vision, ability to discipline and coordinate both donors and different 
arms of government in line with their vision, prioritisation of objectives and resources, and the 
improvements they have brought about in civil service performance (Booth et al., 2006; Cammack, 
2007). All the factors identified as key to the success of economic reform in the literature are dependent 
on effective elites, for instance: the government’s level of understanding of economic issues, its 
commitment to reform, the insulation of key technocrats, and their ability to build coalitions on behalf of 
reform (Gyimah-Boadi and Van de Walle, 1996:228). In Malawi, where elites have increasing influence 
over political, social and economic life, they are important in implementing development policy. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
This chapter has discussed the socio-economic and political characteristics of Malawian society that 
underpin the persistence and pervasiveness of poverty and inequality. It has reflected on social changes, 
political culture and poverty from the colonial period to the present time. It has shown that the rise and 
transformation of elites has been related to political developments and changes in the economic 
philosophy and social policies of Malawi. Between 1964 and 1994, Banda’s centralisation of power and 
quasi-state capitalism led to the formation of business and bureaucratic elites, as well as political 
elites whose wealth was based on involvement in estate farming or state enterprises. There was 
limited space for media, academic and civil society elites to participate in decision-making. Since the 
transition to democracy began in 1994, there has been an expansion and diversification within the 
elite. The economic basis of elites is no longer limited to access to bureaucratic or political positions. 
The intensification of aid has created a professional layer of media, academic and civil society elites. In 
addition, liberalisation and privatisation have introduced a medium in which private enterprise can 
develop. Despite this expansion, elites still remain a close-knit group, with individuals straddling worlds 
as diverse as political positions newspaper ownership and other business activities. On the other hand, 
aid dependence has pushed Malawian elites towards implementing the donors’ free-market policies. 
 
 
 
The chapter also shows that there was a healthy growth in the economy under Banda’s rule; but growth 
increased inequality. Inequality and poverty continued to grow during Muluzi’s rule, a period in which 
economic development deteriorated and eventually became negative. Since 2004, Mutharika has 
implemented growth policies alongside equality policies, and these have led to a healthy growth in the 
economy and some improvement in human development. So it would seem that it is not growth alone 
that has determined changes in human development indicators: increased spending on social sectors 
has played a part; anti-poverty policies have been implemented; and there have been institutional 
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reforms. Yet poverty and inequality persist in Malawi, and the impact of colonialism and the one-party 
state on political culture and policy are not enough to explain this persistence. It is decisions, actions 
and inaction by ruling elites that have shaped social change in Malawi and determined the degree of 
this change. Ruling elites that are committed to development will fashion strategies and institutions in 
such a way that they respond to their vision and goals for this aspect of the national life. In order to 
understand the direction and mechanisms of social change in Malawi, we need to understand the 
perceptions of elites, their preferences, beliefs, values and norms. These issues are discussed in the 
next three chapters. 
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CHAPTER SIX: ELITE UNDERSTANDING OF POVERTY AND THE POOR IN 
MALAWI 
 
6.0 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
This chapter analyses respondent’s perceptions of the nature and extent of poverty in Malawi. It offers 
a factual assessment by respondents of the society in which they live, and forms the basis of this 
study’s understanding of elite thinking about the character of the poor, the causes of poverty, and the 
solutions to poverty. The chapter demonstrates that Malawian respondents are not detached from the 
community in which they live; nor do they overtly place the blame for poverty on the poor themselves: 
rather, they display substantial knowledge about the extent and causes of poverty. The chapter will also 
demonstrate that Malawian respondents’ opinions on the consequences of poverty for democracy and 
economic growth suggest that they perceive poverty to be synonymous with underdevelopment 
generally. 
 
 
 
Of particular interest is Malawian respondents’ insistence on thinking of poverty in terms of equity rather 
than equality. This implies that respondents would prefer that resources were distributed according to 
the needs of the individual. However, a belief in equity also means a belief in making resources available 
to ‘deserving’ individuals who work hard, whereas a belief in equality can mean making resources 
available to everyone, including ‘undeserving’ free riders. Again, respondents do not categorise the poor 
along ethnic lines; nor do their perceptions seem to be laden with value judgements concerning the 
poor’s morality. The poor are not considered very different from the respondents themselves, and there 
seems to be a perceived bond between respondents and the poor, particularly the rural poor, 
suggesting a belief that despite differences between elites and the poor, Malawi is seen as a 
harmonious society. 
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Respondent’s perceptions of the nature, character and extent of poverty are similar, despite the fact 
that, since the transition to democracy in 1994, the Malawian elite is no longer a narrow-based group 
dominated by political and bureaucratic elites. The reforms undertaken by government have opened up 
the market to new entrants: for instance, the private sector has grown and more people are involved in 
the growing of tobacco and the running of businesses. In addition, there has been a proliferation of civil 
society organisations, media houses, and INGOs, which has weakened the grip of the old colonial and 
one-party state elites58. Despite this expansion, the respondents expressed a unified view of poverty 
and inequality, signifying that elites may form a relatively homogenous group with interaction among the 
different sectors. Despite this, there are some differences in their views: for instance, political and 
media respondents’ descriptions of poverty emphasise access to productive resources such as land, 
and they appear more sympathetic to the rural poor. In another example of difference, inequality was 
not a major concern for political respondents, as it was for academic and civil society respondents. 
 
 
 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 discusses respondents’ estimation and descriptions of 
poverty. Section 6.2 focuses on respondents’ categorisation of the different types of poor. Section 6.3 
examines respondents’ views about rural and urban poverty, with an emphasis on their views of the 
severity of poverty. The discussion in Section 6.4 centres on respondents perceptions of inequality and 
on their preference for equity as the basis for allocating and distributing resources, and Section 6.5 
shows which social groups respondents consider to be most at risk of poverty in Malawi. 
 
 
 
6.1. Elite Estimation and Description of Poverty 
 
 
 
 
The  results  of  the  survey  and  semi-structured  interviews  carried  out  for  this  study  indicate  that 
 
Malawian elites are knowledgeable about the problem of poverty and consider it the most important 
 
 
 
 
58 See Chapter 5 on the development of elites; Clarke and Sison, 2005 
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issue facing Malawi.  A majority of the respondents opened the interview with a statement of their belief 
that poverty was real, severe and a problem that would work against Malawi’s development. No 
respondent claimed that poverty was not severe and significant. Even when asked a question that 
might not seem directly related to poverty, respondents identified poor social conditions as a concern. 
As the survey results (Table 6.1) show, when asked what the main obstacle to democracy was, social 
issues such as low educational levels (74% of respondents) and high levels of poverty (71% of 
respondents)  were top of the list. These problems seemed to attract more attention than political 
issues, despite the prominence at the time of the study of political issues concerned with Section 6559. 
Inflation60 was considered far less relevant, although this problem had been seen as a major concern in 
terms of its impact on growth61. 
 
 
 
Table 6.1                            Obstacles to Democracy 
 
 YES 
n % 
NO 
n % 
Low educational levels 64 74 22 26 
High levels of poverty 61 71 25 29 
Lack of party tradition 36 42 50 58 
Incompetence of those in power 32 37 54 63 
Selfishness of elites 32 37 54 63 
Political clientelism 24 28 62 72 
Power centralised in the Executive 11 13 75 87 
High inflation rate 0 0 86   100 
*Data derived from questionnaires; n = 86 
 
 
Social issues remained salient amongst the examples cited by elites, even when the latter were asked 
what they consider to be the most important problems for Malawi. Table 6.2 demonstrates that poverty 
 
 
 
59 Section 65 authorises the Speaker of the Malawian Parliament to declare vacant the seat of any member of parliament 
who leaves the party on whose ticket he was elected and joins another party in the National Assembly. As shown in Chapter 
5, following the regional and ethnic lines voting took in the elections of 1999 and 2004 , ruling parties have not had the 
overall majority necessary to pass urgently needed bills. This has led to coalitions; but more common has been the movement 
of party members from the Opposition into ruling parties, attracted by promises of cabinet positions or financial 
compensation (see Appendix 13). 
60  According to the IMF, inflation in Malawi was 7.41% in 2010, which is a significant improvement on the inflation of 
15.464%, 29.597% and 83.148% in 2005, 2000 and 1995 respectively (World Economic Outlook, 2011). Since 2007 (see 
Appendix 14) inflation has been within single digits, and this could explain the lack of concern amongst respondents. 
61 Honourable Friday Jumbe, Hansard, Budget Statement of 2003/2004; Hon Goodall Gondwe, Hansard, Budget Statement 
of 2008/2009. 
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was the top choice for respondents (90% of respondents) followed by education and health (74% of 
respondents). Other social issues62 received interest from 67% of respondents, as well as 
unemployment (62%) and income distribution (55%). This awareness of the social problems Malawi is 
facing is not surprising considering that social issues were at the heart of the struggle for independence 
(see Chapter 5) and poverty reduction was the platform on which multiparty elections were fought in 
1994. Since 1994, poverty reduction and improving social services has been a preoccupation of Malawi’s 
governments. Then again, Malawian elites are not far removed from the poor, since extended family and 
social network ties are relatively strong (see Chapters 5 and 8), and poverty is quite visible, with beggars 
a common sight on Malawi’s streets63. 
 
 
 
Table 6.2                Malawi’s Most Important Problems 
 
 Yes 
n % 
No 
n % 
Poverty 77 90 9 10 
Education and health 64 74 22 26 
Corruption 62 72 24 28 
Other social issues 58 67 28 33 
Unemployment 53 62 33 38 
Income distribution 47 55 39 45 
Foreign dependency 45 52 41 48 
Political patronage/clientelism 44 51 42 49 
Governability 40 47 46 53 
Behaviour of elites 34 40 52 60 
Other political issues 31 36 55 64 
Moral crisis 28 33 58 67 
Inflation 26 30 60 70 
Other economic issues 26 30 60 70 
*Data derived from questionnaires, n = 86 
 
 
Consequently,  responses  derived  from  semi-structured  interviews  (see  Table  6.3)  on  the  level  of 
poverty in Malawi show that 42% of the respondents considered poverty to affect over 70% of the 
 
62 Other social issues that were not itemized in the questionnaire included equality, equity, shelter, overpopulation, gender, 
crime and HIV/AIDS. These issues were raised by respondents during face-to-face interviews and in their discussions of the 
character and extent of poverty in Malawi. 
63 Agnes Mizere, ‘Begging for Survival’, The Sunday Times, March 2, 2008. 
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population, whilst a similar percentage considered poverty to affect over 50% of the population. In total 
 
84% of the respondents across different categories believed that over 50% of the population was 
affected by poverty and only 10% considered poverty to affect less than 49% of the population. This 
estimation ran contrary to the official view that poverty levels are declining and can now be estimated at 
a maximum of 40% (see Chapter 5). Some respondents indicated that poverty was as high as 90%, 
and many within the civil service indicated  that ‘to be politically correct’ then they would estimate 
poverty at a little over 50%, but if they were being frank, poverty was at least 65%. As one high-ranking 
government official indicated, ‘To be realistic, 70% of Malawians are poor’ (Principal Secretary, Civil 
Service, 6/6/08)64. The respondents (10%) who indicated that poverty affected less than 49% of the 
population consisted of four bureaucrats and one reporter from a state-owned media house. These 
respondents indicated a trust in the Government’s  official statistics. They believed that low poverty 
levels were a result of improvements in growth and good harvests that had led to food security (Regional 
Controller, Media, 19/05/08; PS, Civil Service, 17/05/08, 5/05/08, 23/04/08, and 30/04/08). 
 
 
 
Table 6.3                           Elite Estimate of Poverty 
 
Elite estimate of the proportion of poor in 
the population 
Elite 
n % 
71-100% 
51-70% 
40-50% 
Missing Value 
22 42 
22 42 
5 10 
3 6 
 
Total Interviewed 
 
52 100% 
*Derived from semi-structured interviews. Total Respondents = 52 
 
 
 
Other respondents (84%) considered that the statistics65 being used by the Government were outdated 
and reflected neither poverty in 2008 nor the number of people threatened with poverty in the future as 
 
 
 
64  In  keeping  with  a  positional  definition  of  elites,  all  interviews  from  this  page  are referenced as  follows:  (position, 
organisation and date of interview). 
65  According to Government of Malawi Welfare Monitoring Surveys, poverty in Malawi decreased from 52.4% in 2004 to 
50% in 2005, 40% in 2008 and to 39% in 2009 (see http://www.nso.malawi.net). 
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a result of climate change, food security issues and access to financial resources. In addition, the 
official estimate of poverty was seen to be based on an international understanding of poverty, rather 
than a local understanding, which would result in a much higher percentage. 
Levels of poverty in Malawi are much higher than the official statistics. The recent statistics 
indicate that poverty has declined from 65% to 52%, and I think these statistics are suspect. 
They are meant to serve a political purpose and there is a huge paradox in terms of the 
relationship between poverty and the elites. On one hand, the elites love the existence of 
poverty, because it gives them the basis to campaign, for purposes of getting into office. If there 
was no poverty, there would be no reason to campaign for office, and they have campaigned on 
the basis of what they can do to alleviate poverty. At the same time, for them to stay in office 
they have to underplay the level of poverty in order to create the impression that they are doing 
well to reduce it. This tension ends up distorting the realities of the levels of poverty and in my 
view 70% of Malawians are struggling. If you look at the prices of food, they have silently risen, 
so that I have to buy a chicken at MK900 when last month I bought it at MK500. As a 
lecturer I am struggling to make ends meet and I think of the man who does not have a job or 
lives in the rural areas, surviving on subsistence farming. How much are they suffering?  This  
is  not  portrayed  by  the  official  statistics  (Academic,  University  of  Malawi, 
8/05/08). 
 
 
 
These higher estimates of the levels of poverty in comparison with official statistics suggest two things: 
first, a lack of faith in official statistics; and second, that elites perceive high levels of poverty perhaps 
because poverty really is visible. As earlier stated, Malawian elites are not detached from their 
communities66 and are therefore exposed to the realities of poverty. Most respondents considered 
poverty a constant companion for Malawians: for example, 
 
 
 
In Malawi it is accepted and expected that if you travel ten minutes out of the city, you will not 
have electricity, running water, sanitation, and that you will see children without clothes on their 
back or begging by the side of the road during school time. These things are not questioned; 
they are normal (Advocacy Manager, INGO, 27/05/08). 
 
 
 
During my observations of budget proceedings in parliament, MPs often indicated that poverty was the 
defining characteristic of Malawi. One MP67 said in an almost nonchalant way, ‘Who doesn’t know that 
there is poverty in Malawi? An analysis of documentary evidence such as newspapers, presidential 
 
 
66  Unlike South Africa, where a study on elite perceptions found that there was a greater geographical distance between 
elites and the poor, because South African elites lived quite separately from the poor (Kalati and Manor, 2005). 
67 
Honourable Folger Nyirongo, Member of Parliament (observed on 30th April, 2008). 
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speeches and national assembly debates indicated that there was undoubtedly knowledge of the 
character and extent of poverty in Malawi. In his speeches from 1994 on, former president Bakili Muluzi 
often reiterated the importance of reducing poverty and would say, ‘When I see poor people, my heart 
breaks. We can’t go on like this’68. Presidential speeches from 2004 on by President Mutharika pointed 
to the importance of moving from poverty to prosperity by strengthening the public, private and 
agricultural sectors. In addition, my analysis of The Nation newspaper shows that since it was launched, 
in 1996, it has discussed various anti-poverty strategies implemented by Government, from the Poverty 
Alleviation Programme and the MPRSP to MDGs, pro-poor budgeting and the MGDS. In 200569, The 
Nation published an article where it discussed the ‘numerous’ economic strategies that had failed to 
reduce poverty and this was reiterated in a 200670 article that noted that Malawians were still as poor 
as they had been ten years previously. In addition, in 200871 the paper analysed the impact that a pro-
poor budget had had on poor people and concluded that the incomes of the poor had not changed. 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, respondent’s perceptions of a high level of poverty do not necessarily mean that they 
have a deep understanding of poverty in Malawi, as their views could be a reflection of donor views72 
about poverty in the country. Many of the respondents were familiar with ‘buzzwords’73  in international 
development discourse, such as ‘the poverty line’, ‘empowerment’ and ‘participation’, which is an 
indication of their awareness of national and international debates on poverty; but this awareness also 
creates the space for combined anti-poverty efforts. It is also true, however, that this awareness might 
also  be  indicative  of Malawi’s dependence  on donor  aid  and  policies,  which  several  respondents 
 
 
 
 
 
68 Speech delivered by Bakili Muluzi at the launch of a village housing scheme in Mzimba, Malawi on 07/10/2002. 
69 Ephraim Munthali , ‘Numerous strategies, several poor people’, The Nation on 03/02/2005. 
70 Willie Zingani, ‘Malawians still as poor as ten years ago’, The Nation on 01/06/2006. 
71 Dumbani Mzale, ‘Pro-poor budget: Has a poor man’s life changed?’ The Nation on Sunday on 01/06/2008. 
72 Several respondents quoted the World Bank, UNICEF and UN statistics on poverty in Malawi and used the poverty line to 
discuss estimates of poverty in Malawi. 
73 See Cornwall and Brock (2005) on buzzwords in development discourse and their implications for development policy. 
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commented on.  One  respondent’s  view  captures  the  mood  of  those  who  talked  about  donor 
 
dependency: 
 
The problem that we have had in Malawi is that our policies have been donor driven. We have 
failed to generate our own policies. All our policies came from donors. They keep coming from 
donors and from the Bretton Woods institutions (MP, Parliament, 23/03/2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.4 Elite Descriptions of Poverty 
 
Description of poverty Elites 
n % 
Failure to access basic resources: food, shelter, shoes, clothing 48 92 
Lack of access to basic services: health, water, education 35 67 
Lack of access to land 8 15 
Helplessness/voicelessness; lack of political participation 7 13 
Lack of employment (mainly for the urban poor) 5                10 
Overpopulation 1 2 
*Derived from semi-structured interviews with more than one response allowed. Total Respondents = 52 
 
 
 
 
Table  6.4  presents  respondents’  descriptions  of poverty  and  shows  that  92%  of the  interviewees 
viewed poverty in terms of lack of well-being or the lack of access to basic resources, with 67% seeing 
poverty as the lack of access to basic services. Therefore, respondents argued that in Malawi poverty 
started with the failure to access basic resources such as food, shelter, clothes or shoes followed by 
lack of access to basic services such as education, medical care, potable water, sanitation and 
infrastructure, all of which made the poverty situation severe. The concepts used by respondents to 
convey their ideas about poverty in Malawi seemed to be based on direct observation or interaction 
with the poor more than on conventional poverty measures such as poverty lines or income. The 
respondents tended to describe poverty in terms similar to those in which the poor conveyed their own 
understanding of poverty74, and they stressed the negative implications of lack of access to water, 
health  and  education  services  for  the  poor’s  income,  food  security,  literacy  levels  and  general 
vulnerability. Although these services were seen as secondary in terms of pressing needs, they were 
 
 
74 Khaila S. et al. (1999), Consultations with the poor- Malawi, The Poverty Group, World Bank. 
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still considered real tragedies of poverty, with the poor dying from curable diseases because of lack of 
fees to pay for medical care or from ignorance because of lack of education. It was noted that despite 
free education many children from poor households were failing to access primary education, and the 
problems associated with water and sanitation were also considered a cause for concern. Despite 
similarities in elites’ views regarding access to basic resources and services, the respondents who 
emphasised lack of access to land (15%), voicelessness and helplessness (13%) and unemployment 
(10%),  were academic,  CSO,  INGO/Donor,  private  sector,  media  and  political  elites.  These issues 
ranked low amongst bureaucrats. 
 
 
Illiteracy featured highly in the discussions with different elite categories about access to basic services. 
The very high illiteracy levels were a concern for some elites, as this response illustrates: ‘Malawi is the 
most uneducated country of all the countries I have ever been to’ (Managing Director, CSO, 6/05/08). 
Illiteracy was perceived as the basis of lack of participation in political decision-making processes by 
the poor, who failed to participate because they were not able to understand policy issues. One 
respondent argued that many pro-poor policies being implemented would never have the desired 
impact on poverty if the poor were not educated, as they could not meaningfully contribute to 
development (Regional Manager, Media, 9/04/08). 
 
 
 
Generally, respondents spoke with conviction and fluency about what it meant to be poor, often giving 
examples of family members who were poor or of people who worked for them. It may be Malawi’s 
extended family system, or the fact that since independence, in 1964, poverty has been a key policy 
issue, that has caused respondents to be sensitised to the issue of poverty; but they were aware that 
poverty could mean helplessness and a struggle for survival. As one respondent indicated, poverty is 
‘kuvutika kwa kaya kaya’, meaning that in the face of available resources such as water, the poor have 
no bucket to fetch water, or cannot access free education because they have no clothes for their 
children: ‘Only God knows how they survive’ (Director, CSO, 7/04/08). 
160  
6.2. Elites on the Categories of the Poor 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.5 shows respondents’ responses to the question: What categories can you identify among the 
poor?’ This question was important in understanding whether elites saw the poor as a homogeneous or 
heterogeneous group, and in the latter case, how they distinguished between different categories of 
poor. This formed the basis for understanding whether respondents distinguished the deserving from 
the undeserving poor, and the impact of this on their policy choices in dealing with poverty (see Chapter 
7). As we can see, responses are along the lines of those prevalent in international discourses on 
poverty. The main defining factor was the poor’s capacity or opportunity to do something about their 
condition. Respondents tended to rank the poor as follows: first, the very poor, who lacked all the basic 
necessities of life, had no employment, and survived on a day-to-day basis. This group was defined as 
‘qualifying for handouts from government’ and requiring constant help75. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.5                                      Categories of Poor 
 
Category Description 
Very Poor (Ovutikitsitsa) Those who cannot do anything to improve their lot, they 
can only just get by, and are barely able to feed 
themselves (elderly, children, disabled and uneducated). 
Poor (Osapeza bwino) Those who, given the resources or opportunities, would 
be  able  to  change  their  situation,  but  not  have  the 
means, such as land or employment. 
Better-Off Poor(Opezako bwino) Those who can afford at least one meal a day, have 
some clothing, shelter, access to markets and land, but 
are still poor because they are vulnerable to external or 
internal  hazards  such  as  drought  or  rising  market 
prices. 
*Derived from semi-structured interviews 
 
 
 
The second group was that of poor people who had energy and ability, but lacked the economic or 
social opportunities to live a decent life. As we shall see, many in this group were considered lazy as 
 
 
 
 
75 This is not to say that respondents were in support of welfare programmes, which are considered handouts, as most went 
on to say that Malawi needed to reduce this category (see Chapter 7, Section 7.4.1.2 for a discussion on handouts). 
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they failed to move themselves out of poverty. This perception resonated with the responses from many 
respondents that poverty was related to the ability of a person to exert themselves and work hard. 
Finally, the third group was considered better off in relation to the rest of the poor. This group could 
afford at least one meal a day and some form of clothing, were able to find casual labour, and could 
access markets for their goods, for instance for tobacco they had grown. However, respondents pointed 
out that by international standards of poverty, even this third group still fell below the poverty line. 
 
 
 
According to the respondents, this categorisation of the poor (see Table 6.5) should determine the 
interventions targeted at each category. Some respondents noted that government interventions had 
targeted all three categories with subsidies and public works programmes, but that these had favoured 
the active poor, thus excluding the inactive poor such as the elderly and the disabled, who should have 
been receiving welfare transfers. To be effective, it was said that interventions for these three groups 
should be implemented simultaneously to avoid a cycle where one group moved out of poverty and 
another became poor (see Chapter 5). For instance, the labouring poor had seasonal jobs where they 
were low paid  and  could  fall into  poverty  if they  lost  their  job  (Project  Coordinator,  Government, 
28/4/08). 
 
 
 
 
However,  some  respondents  who  had  argued  that  at least  90%  of Malawians  were poor  divided 
 
Malawi’s society into four groups, as this respondent shows: 
 
There are four categories: the first segment is about 2% who are the very rich and includes 
politicians, businessmen of Indian origins and some professionals such as lawyers or those 
working for private companies, such as managing directors and financial controllers. Then you 
have the moderately rich who are about 20% and include those in white collar jobs such as 
principal  secretaries,  civil  servants,  lecturers  and  members  of  parliament.  This group of 
ordinary Malawians survive because they have a predictable source of income, which they use 
to meet shortfalls, and people are able to lend them money because they know that they can 
repay it. This is the group that best describes life because it shows that it is a continuous 
struggle to survive and it is only their permanent employment that gives them some kind of 
insurance.The third category is 40% percent and mainly in rural areas and they are able to 
have food through farming but they have to supplement this with business and remittances 
from children in the urban areas. For instance my mother would fall in that category because 
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she expects that I will send something every month. The last category that has increased are 
those people who survive by the grace of God. They are not sure where their next meal is 
coming from and survive through piece work. They can only survive if they are healthy, because 
they rely solely on their labour. If they become sick then they are at the mercy of the community.  
The  majority  in  this  group  are  young  men  (Academic,  University  of  Malawi, 
8/05/08). 
 
 
 
Some respondents argued that it was difficult to categorise the poor in Malawi because even those in 
employment were unable to develop personally or afford a good lifestyle, because they were weighed 
down by remittances to family members76. Hence, almost all sections of society were considered poor. 
In this sense, respondents did not draw a very clear distinction between themselves and the poor. As 
this respondent indicated: ‘Elites care about the poor but they do not have very much themselves. The 
will is there, but no resources’ (Minister, Civil Service, 15/04/08). This attempt to downplay social 
distinctions suggests that respondents felt that they were similar, or ought to be similar, to the poor. 
 
 
 
6.3 Elites on the Location of the Poor: the Visible but Happy Rural Poor versus 
the Invisible Suffering Urban Poor 
 
 
Derived from interview data, Figure 6.1 presents the location of the poor and the visibility or severity of 
poverty in Malawi. According to the 2008 population and housing census, 85% of the 13.1 million total 
population live in rural areas (NSO, 2005). Respondents’ views were consistent with this data, as 45 of 
the 52 respondents noted that in terms of visibility, there were more poor people in rural areas. However, 
36 respondents argued that although the urban poor were fewer in number, they tended to suffer 
more than those in the rural areas. Despite this perception, there was less sympathy for the urban 
poor because of a sense of greater opportunity not being taken up. As this respondent noted, ‘In urban 
areas the poor have opportunities, and if they had a little imagination they should not be poor’ 
(Principal Secretary (PS), Civil Service, 8/6/08). 
 
 
 
76 At least 42 of the 52 respondents mentioned the impact of the extended family on personal growth. This is discussed at 
length in Chapter 7. 
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Figure 6.1: Elite Perceptions of Poverty in Rural and Urban Areas 
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The rural character of poverty in Malawi has had important implications for policy and social change. 
First, most government policy efforts have focused on developing solutions for reducing rural poverty. 
Post-1994 pro-poor policies, such as the Malawi Social Action Fund, Malawi Rural Development Fund, 
Rural Land Development Project and the Integrated Rural Development Programme, have aimed at 
boosting rural incomes, agricultural productivity and market activity, and compensating for production 
deficits (Government of Malawi, 2007; Dorward and Kydd, 2004). The respondents saw the rural poor 
as disadvantaged in that they had no access to employment except as casual labourers, and no access 
to potable water, health centres or education – or, where these were present, they had to travel long 
distances to access them. One minister said, 
 
Poverty is so vivid in the rural areas because as an MP when I address meetings, I see scantily 
dressed children with no shoes and hungry. Even though we talk about a dollar a day, there are 
some people in the rural areas that live on zero dollars a day (Minister, Civil Service, 30/4/08). 
 
 
 
Second, rural poverty was seen by the respondents as increasing levels of urban poverty, because 
some of the rural poor had migrated into urban areas, leading to a growth in poverty and slums in urban 
areas. As a principal secretary explained, ‘People are looking for a better life, jobs and better social 
services such as health, education and food’ (PS, Civil Service, 15/5/08). Therefore: 
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In Malawi behind every developed suburb there is a growing slum; for instance, Area 47 has 
Ntandire, Area 10 has Kauma and near Area 43 you have Senti and Mgona. This tells you that 
Malawi is growing into a two-tier society and these slums do not provide basic services. The 
people in these slums buy water on a daily basis. Not that people in suburbs do not buy water, 
but the difference is that in suburbs people pay at the end of the month for their water bill. The 
poor are in a situation where they have to find money on a daily basis to buy water and at the 
same time they have no food or cannot afford three meals a day. They are strained and resort 
to crime. These slums are the hubs of crime (National Coordinator, CSO, 6/05/08). 
 
 
This is considered the tragedy of urban poverty, as the poor live on the edge of the suburbs: 
 
 
 
Urban poverty is relative because there is someone living in a mansion in Area 47 next door to 
a slum called Ntandire. The people in Ntandire do not close their eyes to what is going on in 
Area 47. You are watering your yard and they do not have potable water. Poverty therefore 
becomes more pronounced because their neighbour is enjoying the luxuries that they are 
denied. The urban poor live close to plenty and they do not have anything to eat, but that is not 
to say there is no desperate poverty in urban areas, there is.  The bulk of the urban poor have 
no access to safe drinking water, only 20% have access to electricity and the rates of HIV/AIDS 
infections are higher than in the rural areas. Although the rural poor do not use potable water 
they have other sources such as shallow wells. In urban areas if a poor person has no access 
to water then they really feel the impact as they start to rely on unsafe sources. Just compare a 
person living in Ntandire or Tsiliza and a person living in Area 47 who are only separated by a 
road. In Area 47 one is throwing away grams of nsima77and in Ntandire or Tsiliza someone is 
sitting on an empty stomach. There are defining characteristics of urban poverty that make it 
different to rural poverty but the average person in the rural areas is poor and you are likely to 
meet poor people in rural areas (Managing Director, CSO,24/4/08). 
 
 
That Malawi’s slums had problems in the areas of sanitation and drinking water, and had experienced 
some outbreaks of cholera and waterborne diseases, was agreed upon. However, the respondents 
pointed out that in comparison to other countries such as Tanzania or Kenya, Malawi was better-off. By 
contrast, other countries like Kenya, slum dwellers use carton boxes to sleep; at least in Malawi, the 
urban poor lived in mud houses (MP, Parliament, 28/03/08; PS, Civil Service, 15/5/08; Director, CSO, 
7/04/08). 
 
 
 
There was an idealistic view among the respondents, especially bureaucrats, that the rural poor were 
better  able  to  survive  because  they  had  access  to  land,  and  were  living  within  their  own  social 
 
 
 
 
77 Nsima is a maize meal product and a staple food in Malawi. It is made from ground maize flour known locally as ufa 
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environment, close to their relatives who could share with them what they had; whereas the urban poor 
could not rely on social networks because those they met were strangers who were also trying to 
survive. The rural poor were considered to be ‘more comfortably poor than the urban poor’ (Regional 
Manager, Media, 16/5/08). 
 
 
 
Those in the rural areas are able to grow their own products because of access to land, which 
the peri-urban poor do not have (Minister, Civil Service, 15/04/08). 
 
If I am poor in the rural areas, I have a little bit of land to farm on and a place where I can build 
a hut, uncles and aunties I can rely on when times are hard and everything collapses. When 
you are in town and you do not have money, you have nowhere to go, you don’t have water, 
food or an uncle to assist you (PS, Civil Service, 8/4/08). 
 
 
 
However, having access to land was not considered an immediate passport out of poverty. Respondents, 
mainly academic and those belonging to INGOs and civil society, acknowledged that other issues, such 
as land ownership, agricultural inputs, education, and irrigation affected people’s productivity. In 
addition, Malawi’s natural resources in the rural areas are being depleted, making it difficult for the 
rural poor to access enough for their needs, for instance enough wood for fuel. Fourteen respondents 
argued that poverty had deepened in the rural areas in the past 20 years. They argued that climate 
shocks such as drought, and SAPs, which led to the removal of input subsidies, had left the 85% of the 
rural poor who relied on farming unable to access needed inputs. This made farming unprofitable, made 
life unbearable for the rural poor, and broke down their traditional support mechanism. 
 
In the past the people in the rural areas could help each other survive conditions of shocks and 
stress, but now it is every man for himself, which has led to the deepening of poverty in rural 
areas. These days you hardly see the stratification that used to be there in the rural areas. 
Because in the past you could go into the rural areas and immediately notice that there are 
some people who are slightly better off and those that are not doing so well. But now a 
common response from the people out there is that we are all poor, there is no difference 
between the rural and urban poverty, especially if the poverty is in those traditional settlement 
areas (Academic, University of Malawi, 8/5/08). 
 
Sometimes you can see extreme poverty in the peri-urban areas where there is overcrowding, 
people drinking water from unsafe sources, a lot of alcohol and substance abuse. However, the 
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sharing that used to be there in the rural areas is no longer there. People do not have the same 
resources they used to have to share with others. Things are changing. In our culture we are 
not supposed to have orphans because these are supposed to be absorbed by our extended 
family, but now you see many orphans in the rural areas. People cannot help because they are 
overstretched and people in the rural areas are dependent on ties with people in the urban 
areas to provide for their basic resources. Especially with HIV/Aids and scarcity of land, the 
extended family is overstretched (Advocacy Manager, INGO, 27/05/08). 
 
 
 
Therefore, for some respondents, both urban and rural poverty were painful and severe; but the outward 
appearance of the urban poor (perhaps a nice shirt and shoes), might be deceptive, resulting in the 
under-appreciation of their poverty by policymakers. Thus respondents believed that in order to reduce 
urbanisation and the perceived negative effects (for instance, a belief that urbanization would lead to 
a two-tier society or a process of class segregation), pro-poor policies should aim to ameliorate both 
rural and urban poverty. For example, reviving rural growth centres and implementing food security 
programmes would create jobs and keep the rural poor from migrating. 
 
 
 
These policies were also considered a means of evading a ‘ticking time bomb’78  that might one day 
escalate into violence that was already brewing amongst the urban poor (see Chapter 8).  Some of the 
responses to the issue of urban-rural poverty exposed elite’s self-interest and a sense of 
interdependence between them and the poor. For instance, respondents were interested in dealing with 
rural poverty to stop urbanisation, which they saw as bringing in social ills that needed to be addressed. 
 
 
 
There are programmes to address poverty in rural areas, such as the Rural Growth Centres 
and the Integrated Rural Development Programmes supported by the World Bank. A number of 
donors aim to ensure an equal footing in terms of access to basic necessities such as water, 
roads, telecommunications, and health services. The aim is to spur economic growth and 
development in the rural areas, so that jobs can be created in people’s own areas and stop 
urbanization. Those of us in the urban areas need to address the social ills of immigrants from 
the rural areas (PS, Civil Service, 15/6/08). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
78  Poverty was likened to a ‘ticking time bomb’ which if not addressed could result in social ills such as social uprisings, 
crime and diseases (interview with MP, Parliament, 8/04/08). 
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Interestingly, one respondent noted that it might be important for Malawi’s development not to stop 
rural-urban migration. He argued that an increase in urban poverty would force elites to experience 
poverty in their midst and might also result in the urban poor demanding their rights. This might force 
the government to develop the education system, and improve the availability of employment and 
housing, because there would be a demand for development (PS, Civil Service, 5/05/08). This view is 
quite similar to De Swaan’s (1988; 2005) argument that the impact of social ills emanating from the 
poor is a strong incentive for the elite to act. 
 
 
 
An important point to note is that the political respondents were more sympathetic towards the rural 
poor than other elite categories, which could be mainly due to their close proximity to the rural poor. 
The political respondents, by virtue of their representative position, interacted more with, and were closer 
to, the poor through patronage or social networks, as well as having constant interaction with their 
constituents, who were mostly poor. In addition, they were expected to provide for the poor in terms 
of food, money for accessing education or health services, and much more (argument developed in 
Chapter 7). During my observations of parliamentary proceedings on 5th May, 2008, a bill was tabled 
under the European Union Water Facility (Malawi Peri-Urban Water and Sanitation) project. During the 
second reading of the bill, it went to a vote and failed to go into the third reading because 89 MPs voted 
against it. There were other political factors that influenced this decision (see Appendix 14), but the 
interesting thing was the reason MPs gave for voting against the bill. Those opposing could be heard 
shouting: ‘nza ntauni izi’ (this is for urban areas) hence arguing that it was not as important as it would 
have been if it had been targeted at the rural poor. 
 
 
 
Thus, urban poverty might be seen as more painful, but CSO respondents believed that it had been 
easier to ignore because the urban poor were fewer in number and most elites had never really thought 
of any urban dweller as poor. 
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You can smell the poverty in areas like Ntandire, Kauma, and Nchesi. These are forgotten 
because when we talk about poverty in Malawi we talk about rural poverty. The poverty in our 
midst is usually forgotten (National Coordinator, CSO, 13/5/08). 
 
In the past I used to think that the poor in the urban areas are much better off, but after 
CADECOM carried out a survey, we discovered that there are areas like Nchesi, Kauma (peri- 
urban areas) that are poorer than those in the rural setting. It all comes down to basic things 
like firewood, water, land that the rural poor person can easily access in the village. The urban 
poor require money to access these basic things in town. The same water that the rural poor 
collects from a stream and boils it to make it safe, the urban poor have to purchase it, buy 
firewood to boil it to make it safe. Whilst the rich pay for water at the end of the month these 
peri-urban poor pay on a daily basis. They are not able to negotiate payment because of their 
position in society. You also find that it is more expensive to pay for water on a daily basis. 
Urban poor are more vulnerable and their poverty is more severe (Secretary General, CSO, 
7/05/08). 
 
 
 
Interestingly, the role of CSO respondents is to influence policy-making processes and direct service 
delivery. Thus, a partial comprehension of the location of the poor might greatly impact on their capacity 
to influence policy processes.  This was evident during my observation of a consultative workshop 
where CSOs were to draw up a manifesto for influencing economic, social and political issues in 
Malawi. During discussions, the workshop coordinator (Dr Edge Kanyongolo, University of Malawi) 
observed that the participants were not aware of what was in the Malawi Growth and Development 
Strategy, which they were supposed to draw on in deciding on areas they might influence. 
 
 
 
6.4 Elites on Inequality 
 
 
 
Malawi has been considered to be a highly unequal country, with its levels of inequality sometimes 
likened to those of Brazil and described as the highest in Africa (Durevall, 2002). This might not have 
been accurate by 2009, when the gini index was 0.39, according to the UNDP’s Human Development 
Report (2009), but inequality in Malawi had been steadily rising from 1968, when the gini-coefficient 
stood at 0.48, to 0.62 in 1995 and 0.50 in 1998. The rationale for asking respondents to discuss their 
understanding of inequality was to ascertain their conception of how inequality might be related to 
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poverty.   Did elites view inequality in terms of income, access to services or other factors not easily 
quantifiable, such as power differentials in social relationships? 
 
 
 
The respondents saw a strong relationship between poverty and inequality. According to the interview 
data, the respondents felt that there was a wide gap between the incomes of the rich and the poor in 
Malawi, although political respondents were quick to point out that inequality was not as bad as in other 
countries. As one minister indicated, income inequality was only beginning to show because the rural 
poor spent their time working on other people’s land (mainly that of elites) rather than in their own 
gardens. ‘The rural poor prefer to make money for the day. Therefore the rich become richer and the 
poor poorer’ (Minister, Civil Service, 30/4/08). 
 
 
 
The political respondents denial of a wide income gap between the rich and the poor seems like an 
attempt to defend themselves against accusations of corruption and conspicuous accumulation of wealth 
levelled against them by academics and other elite categories. Since the transition to democracy in 
1994, political elites have used public resources to garner political support by giving handouts to 
supporters, but have also used public office to accumulate wealth (Booth et al., 2006). As these 
respondents pointed out: 
There is a positive correlation between wealth and politics. People move from professional 
jobs to politics because that is where you accumulate wealth. For instance, Patricia Kaliati 
(Minister of Information and Civic Education) was a school teacher and before she joined politics 
she did not even have a car, but the moment she went into politics she started driving fancy cars 
and living in a mansion. Therefore inequality is political in nature and if you discuss it then you 
are discussing those people in power (Head of Section, Civil Service, 28/04/08). 
 
 
 
Under Kamuzu Banda corruption involved very few elites; but under Bakili, corruption involved 
a big group of people who plundered public resources. It was common to see certain groups of 
people having many mansions, buy and constantly change vehicle, and own businesses, when 
millions were perishing. It was moral decay on the part of political elites (National Secretary, 
CSO, 6/05/08). 
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In contrast to political, academic, and civil society respondents argued that income inequality was 
increasing because a minority of the population had control over a majority of the national income, 
whilst the majority of the population, who were poor, enjoy a nominal proportion of the national income. 
 
 
 
Inequality over the years has increased, whilst the majority of the people are suffering in their 
livelihoods. There is a small minority that has become much better than the rest of society. This 
small grouping of the political elite has benefited from the liberalisation of both the political and 
economic system. The politicians have really exploited the state because economic liberalisation 
has meant putting up state owned companies for sale and they are the people who have 
ended up buying these companies. They have extended these benefits to a small group closely 
related to them through lucrative contracts. You see in Malawi the private sector exists but its 
survival relies on having close links with the state because most of the lucrative contracts are 
given out by the state. Therefore you find that it is the very same politicians who are also 
businessmen and have ended up accumulating wealth at the expense of the poor majority. The 
gap between the poor and the better offs has widened and at the same time the number of those 
that are well-off has shrunk. Sometimes when you drive around town you are surprised by the 
type of cars people are driving and that is a manifestation of conspicuous consumption 
(Academic, University of Malawi, 8/5/08). 
 
 
 
Inequality in Malawi is high and 5% of the population controls over 50% of the national income. 
The poorest 80% percent enjoy only 20% of the national income (Managing Director, CSO, 
6/5/08). 
 
 
 
 
 
Elites identified other areas where inequality was evident in Malawi. First, gender inequality, which was 
mainly discussed in terms of empowering women to participate in policy processes and increase their 
representation in parliament. One respondent noted that in a cabinet of 19, only two were women and 
out of 38 permanent secretaries, only four were women (PS, Civil Service, 17/04/08)79. Although 
respondents acknowledged that there had been marked improvements, as some top positions, such as 
Director of Public Prosecutions and Chairperson of the Malawi Electoral Commission, had gone to 
women, they recognized that stereotypes in Malawi’s traditions and the upbringing of its people 
threatened to worsen gender inequality as women were generally seen as inferior to men. Second, 
inequality was conceived of in terms of access to basic services such as education, which made social 
 
 
79 Views on gender inequality were substantiated during sampling, where 14 out of the 86 survey respondents were women. 
None of the 16 CSOs sampled for interviews were headed by a woman. 
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mobility difficult or impossible.  There is a big gap between elites and the poor because one is educated 
and the other is not and their entry levels into employment are different. The problem in Malawi is the 
low numbers of spaces at tertiary level (PS, 17/4/08). 
 
 
 
 
Inequality in education also had an impact on gender inequality, as more men were educated in 
comparison to women. Third, respondents agreed that land was a major source of inequality in Malawi, 
especially between estate and smallholder farmers. As land was a productive resource and the main 
means of earning a livelihood, those without access to land were recognized as being significantly 
disadvantaged. In areas like Mulanje, Thyolo and Chiradzulu, there were people owning vast tracts of 
fertile land whilst the poor were left with infertile hill side land or did not even own land and were 
squatters on other people’s land (Advocacy Manager, INGO, 27/05/08; Academic, University of Malawi, 
08/05/08; and PS, Civil Service, 5/05/08)80. 
 
 
 
Many respondents agreed that Malawi’s agricultural economy maintained and reproduced patterns of 
inequality. For instance the economic policies implemented by Kamuzu Banda perpetuated inequalities 
by favouring elites, thus allowing them to limit the opportunities available to the poor (see Chapter 5). 
Elites exercise social, economic and political power to impose their preferences, in a manner that 
benefits them. As a project coordinator noted, ‘When we employ servants in Malawi, no one cares 
about minimum wage. It is take it or leave it.’ (PS, 28/4/08). Another respondent stated that: 
 
The distribution of resources in Malawi favours the well-to-do. I would blame it on democracy, 
because the Asians that supported the Muluzi government in 1994 have benefited immensely. 
But the mothers who were dancing at political rallies in 1994 are still dancing today and have 
not gotten anything out of it. Even now the President has got his boys (Mulli Brothers, Noel 
Masangwi81) who are pumping in money and some he takes around on his trips especially to 
 
 
80  According to the 2005 Integrated Household Survey, the gini coefficient for land inequality is 0.884 between estate and 
smallholder farmers (IHS, 2005). 
81
Mulli  Brothers  is  a  company  whose  mission  is  to  enhance  the  profitability  and  competitiveness  of  manufacturing 
companies and uplift the lives of local people through a variety of community based economic activities. Mulli Brothers has 
worked in partnership with the Government and has often been retained to provide agricultural inputs for the Government’s 
subsidy programme. Until the cabinet reshuffle on 8 th  September, 2011, Felton Mulli served in Mutharika’s cabinet in the 
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mainland China. These are the groups that will benefit when he wins again in 2009. Mulli 
brothers are the biggest transporters all of a sudden, when their businesses were not doing so 
well. This is a trend that will not change. In this same country people are living in mansions that 
you cannot believe exist here, and outside of Lilongwe people are living in shacks. You even 
have people within the same catchment area, one family has enough food that it throws away 
some of its food, whilst someone who lives in the servants’ quarters is struggling to survive. 
Even in the tobacco industry there are the peasant farmers who have been growing tobacco for 
over 30 years and they get very little for their tobacco. There is now a growth in contract farming 
and this is the group that is getting a lot of money from the auction floors, not the poor farmers. 
These contract farmers are hired by big tobacco companies such as Limbe Leaf, and even the 
President is doing contract farming. And when their tobacco goes to the floor they get US$9 per 
kilogram whilst the peasant farmer gets US$1 for their tobacco (Bureau Chief, Media, 
16/5/08). 
 
 
There was also agreement amongst the respondents that inequality existed because the poor were 
unable to organize for mass action, tending to organize vertically instead of horizontally. Therefore, 
poor people considered relationships with MPs or those in authority within the civil service or civil 
society as more important than affinity with other poor people, and they conspired with those in 
authority, reporting to them plans for mass action. On the other hand, respondents felt that inequality 
did not lead to any form of civil unrest caused by the poor because poverty had been a constant 
companion of Malawians. As this respondent comments: ’It is like a tradition. To be poor, or not to 
have access to basic resources, is the order of the day. It is normal; it is the way things are. Poor 
people are resigned to their fate’ (Executive Director, CSO, 15/4/08).   Another reason cited was 
that the poor took inequality as normal because they were not aware of their rights. They felt that 
elites knew better and should not be questioned. The poor were seen as ‘letting sleeping dogs lie’ 
to preserve communal life, where the poor and elites were dependent on each other (Regional 
Manager, Media, 16/4/08). The excerpt below captures elites’ view that the poor in Malawi have not 
developed the attitudes or personality characteristics that would enable them to take an active role, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ministry of Health. Masangwi, which owns Elvis Freight and Cargo Services, belongs to Noel Masangwi, who is also the 
ruling party’s (the Democratic Progressive Party’s) regional governor for the southern region of Malawi. Elvis Freight has 
also been given government contracts to transport agricultural inputs for the subsidy programme to rural areas (see 
Nyasatimes.com and Mullibrothers.com). 
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to  accept  the  privileges  and  bear  the  responsibility  of  the  democratic  process  in  their  society 
 
(Packenham, 1964). 
 
 
 
 
 
Excerpt from Interview Transcript – Executive Director, CSO, 15/4/08)82 
 
 
 
 
Inequality in Malawi is not really discussed because poverty has been a constant companion for us, traditionally. Therefore to be 
poor or not to have access to basic resources is the order of the day. It is normal; it’s the way things are. If we had a helicopter 
and we took some poor Malawians to South Africa, they would realise and start to question and demand more, therefore issues 
of transparency and accountability will be entrenched. At the moment they believe that you cannot contradict those in authority, 
that they know it all. The issue of inequality does not come in as a topic that can be discussed because people accept their fate. 
There is a sense of fatalism. A person who has travelled can question and know that there is more, that we are lagging behind 
and can even question those in authority. For a poor person, if they have enough fertiliser for this season, what else do they 
need? If you have a lot of tobacco and the buying price is high, despite high poverty levels you cannot question the Government. 
That would be considered an insult. Even if you can ask people in the village about Sam Mpasu being convicted of the MK187 
million education scam, people would be saying it is not fair, others have also eaten from the national cake but have not been 
convicted. There is no sense of ownership, that the money being stolen rightfully belongs to them. A lot of people really believe 
that this is the way things are supposed to be and this is unfortunate. 
 
Another reason why society is the way it is, is because our relationships, in terms of organising for action towards policy, is not 
there. We cannot organise horizontally, we organise vertically. So if you have a relationship with a member of parliament, or most 
important person in the civil service, then that is more important. So if you were to organise mass action to fight for your rights it 
means one amongst that group will report to authority to get favours. Look at South Africa and how the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions is organised. This shows how a community can come together to fight for their rights. But in Malawi any 
mass action dies a natural death because there will be some people who will conspire with those in authority. That is why you 
cannot fight against issues of inequality, because people will talk about God has given them, it’s their time and so on. President 
Bingu once said to the clergy that the preaching in church has led Malawians to be poor because preachers have taught Malawians 
that if you achieve and are successful, you will not enter the kingdom of God. In Zambia and Mozambique people are progressing 
and Malawi remains the poorest amongst the SADC countries and other Africans come to Malawi and start businesses and they 
are succeeding. Why not Malawians? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondents’ views suggested that the problems of poverty and inequality were perceived as a political 
problem. Inequality was based on which policies elites chose to implement, how resources were 
allocated and how they implemented policies (Clarke and Sisson, 2005). However, some respondents 
considered inequality to be natural, as this respondent suggested: ‘Everywhere people are not equal. 
 
 
 
82 The Ministry of Education scam (given as an example in the excerpt) involved the giving out of contracts to companies 
both national and international and paying them exorbitant amounts for work that could be done far more cheaply, or for 
work that was not done or was incomplete. This scam also involved the Minister of Education at that time, Mr Sam Mpasu, 
who planned, coordinated, approved and executed activities that led to the granting of a contract to a British company 
(Fieldyork) to supply school notebooks in Malawi over another company that would have supplied the notebooks for far less 
than Fieldyork quoted. As a result of these dubious contracts, the Government lost MK187 million (US$1.32 million) (see 
Ng’ambi, 2011; Khembo, 2004; http://www.anti-corruptionbureau.mw). 
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Even in a socialist state people are not equal’ (Acting Executive Director, Private Sector, 12/05/08). Then 
again, there was a belief in the trickledown theory of economic growth. Thus equality of opportunity 
meant that the Government only needed to provide an enabling environment and the poor would lift 
themselves out of poverty (Greig et al, 2007). 
 
Malawian society does not discuss inequality because we believe so much in the trickledown 
theory of economic growth. Our planners have not taken into account the issue of distribution of 
resources because they are obsessed with economic growth (Head of Policy, INGO, 24/04/08). 
 
In government, the elite do agree that we need to introduce strong macroeconomic policies that 
spur growth and they believe that these will have a trickledown effect (PS, Civil Service, 
11/04/08). 
 
 
For some respondents, the term ‘inequality’ itself does not elicit any reaction because it is not a ‘telling 
term’ and its impact can be either positive or negative for society. 
 
 
 
Inequality is a concept that can easily be misunderstood and is highly unacceptable amongst 
the poor because they have to acknowledge inequalities within their own communities. In 
receiving development assistance, the poor prefer to say that they are all poor within particular 
locations. Inequality is a concept that cannot be easily translated into our language. People 
understand the word ‘umphawi’ to mean poverty, but to make them understand inequality one 
would have to tell a story (PS, Civil Service, 10/4/08). 
 
 
 
Consequently, inequity is considered a better term than inequality as it exposes issues of justice and 
fairness: essentially, ‘Inequality is not wrong but inequity is wrong’ (Managing Director, CSO, 24/4/08). 
Inequity appears to reflect the political culture, which is based on ethnic and regional identities. As 
argued in Chapter 5, ethnicity has had a major impact on Malawi’s politics, more so following the 
dismantling of Banda’s four cornerstones (unity, peace, obedience and loyalty). Often Banda would tell 
Malawians that tribalism played no part in the country and its politics, and no one should hate someone 
because  of their tribe,  district  or region83.  However, regionalism  linked  to ethnicity  underpins  post 
democratic-transition  politics, to the extent that Malawi’s political parties are based on regionalism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
83 H.E. Kamuzu Banda, speech at the MCP Convention held on 1/9/1969 at Kwacha in Blantyre. 
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Therefore, members of parliament represent regional interests and aspirations; and party 
representatives call for regional equity in the distribution of resources during budget discussions84. 
 
 
 
Equally, the preference for equity is symptomatic of the dual character of Malawi’s agricultural system. 
Many of the Malawian elites are involved in estate farming, and they have an interest in ensuring that 
they also have access to subsidised inputs. During my observation of workshops on social protection 
policy, participants asked that subsidies be universal, for all maize and tobacco farmers85. This suggests 
that whilst Malawian elites might care about inequality, they are not as concerned about it as they are 
about equity in Malawi. It explains why some respondents indicated that inequality was not of serious 
concern, as it was in South Africa, Brazil or India, as Malawi did not have extremely poor people or 
extremely rich people. ‘The gap between the rich and the poor may be increasing, but this does not 
mean the poor are at the same level as ten years ago. The poor are seen to have improved in their 
position at the same time as the rich’ (Minister, Civil Service, 7/05/08; PS, Civil Service, 11/04/08; Chief 
Executive Officer, Private Sector, 13/05/08). These respondent’s views are contrary to those of the World 
Bank’s 2007 Malawi Poverty and Vulnerability assessment, which stated that there had not been much 
progress in reducing inequality since the transition to democracy in 1994. The assessment noted that 
income inequality persisted in Malawi, with the richest 10% of the population having a median per 
capita income eight times higher (MK50,373 per person per annum) than the median per capita income 
of the poorest 10% (K6,370 per person per annum). 
 
 
 
6.5 Elites on Social Groups at Risk of Poverty 
 
 
 
Table 6.6 lists in ascending order the social groups respondents considered to be vulnerable to poverty 
in Malawi. Children were seen to be at risk and more vulnerable to poverty because of the spread of 
 
84 Hon. J.Z.U. Tembo, Malawi Congress Party – Leader of Opposition, Budget Session 2004. 
85  See Chinsinga 2007a, 2011 on universal or targeted subsidies, as well as on the parliamentary resolution in 2005 for 
universal subsidies for both maize and tobacco. 
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HIV; respondents noted that the number of orphans had grown, putting a heavy burden on those 
relatives looking after them. This assessment is consistent with government and donor data that notes 
that over one million children in Malawi are vulnerable due to AIDS, which has led to child-labour, 
prostitution and begging. Several categories of elites noted that if these orphans were not given the 
right opportunities in life then Malawi would have a generation gap in the future (Operations Manager, 
Donor, 16/06/08; Advocacy Manager, INGO, 27/05/08; MP, 6/05/08; MP, 16/04/08; PS, Civil Service, 
23/04/08; PS, Civil Service, 2/05/08; PS, Civil Service, 17/04/08; Minister, Civil Service, 7/05/08; Deputy 
 
Director, Private Sector, 12/05/08; National Coordinator, CSO, 21/05/08; Regional Manager, Media, 
 
16/05/08). 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.6: Vulnerable Social Groups 
 
Social Groups Respondents 
Orphans/children 27 
Women/female headed households 26 
Elderly-headed households 16 
Youth 9 
Child-headed households 7 
The sick 5 
Male-headed households 5 
Disabled 4 
Beggars 1 
*Respondents were allowed more than one choice. Total respondents = 52 
 
 
 
Even though women were considered the second group at risk, some respondents argued that women 
were at an advantage compared to male-headed households. Due to labour migration to South Africa 
and Zimbabwe during the colonial period and rural-urban migration, women took on men’s roles to 
provide for their families and became responsible for farming activities (Pryor, 1990). Therefore, women 
may be considered less vulnerable because they lead farming families and they are more industrious. 
As these respondents noted: 
The advantage with women is that they are active members of the family because they work to 
earn an income to help the family. They start up small businesses to survive and fetch water. 
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Men are not innovative in fending for the family. Kamuzu Banda asked me a funny question 
once about the definition of an orphan. He said an orphan is one who has lost the mother and 
all the mothers’ sisters including the grandmother have died, even if the father is still alive. If 
the father dies and the mother is still alive, then that child is not an orphan because a mother 
will strive hard to provide for that child because women have always been providers (MP, 
6/5/08). 
 
The social groups more at risk of poverty are men more than women because women usually 
find casual work. For instance, if you have a farm and you want casual labourers, it is women 
who come for work (PS, Civil Service, 5/05/08). 
 
I have reservations when it comes to women being at risk of poverty, because women are 
fighters (Regional Manager, Media, 09/05/08). 
 
Women are less vulnerable to poverty because all farming families in Malawi are led by women 
and women are more industrious (Bureau Chief, Media, 16/05/08). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The elderly were also seen as vulnerable to poverty because they were seen as not having the capacity 
to work and having no form of state support. The elderly are often deemed to be witches in Malawi and 
blamed for any calamity that befalls a village, such as a death and lack of rain. The elderly in Malawi 
have also been further burdened by the growth in the number of orphans because of HIV/Aids, which 
has seen a growth in elderly-headed households. In contrast, young people have been seen as more 
active members of society and more reliant on their ability to work, therefore lack of employment or 
sickness makes them vulnerable to poverty. Respondents considered that many young people had 
moved from rural areas to urban areas in search of employment. They ended up as street vendors 
because the Government had failed to create employment for them. Young people were considered to 
be a group that was aware that they were being pushed into vulnerability and were therefore able to 
act. Respondents noted that their dissatisfaction was mostly expressed through delinquent behaviour, 
such as theft, and they were also seen as conduits for disruption of the social and political order by the 
powerful in society (National Coordinator, CSO, 21/05/08; Executive Director, CSO, 12/05/08; CEO, 
Private Sector, 13/05/08; Leader, Donor, 5/06/08). 
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Other groups such as male-headed or child-headed households, the disabled, the sick and beggars, 
including young people, were picked by less than 10 of the 52 respondents as being vulnerable to 
poverty. These groups could be considered as active and unemployed only because of sickness or lack 
of industriousness. The sick were mainly those suffering from HIV/Aids, a disease considered a result 
of immoral behaviour. The respondents’ perception that disabled people were not vulnerable was 
consistent  with  the  discourse  in  Malawi  as  seen  through  newspaper  articles.  My  analysis86  of 
 
newspaper articles between 1996 and 2008 found that most articles on disability dwelled on the 
successes the disabled had had despite the challenges faced. This view indicated a belief that disabled 
poor people could lift themselves out of poverty by actively taking advantage of the opportunities in the 
economy and could succeed through hard work, without specific policies designed to address their 
needs, and without begging. 
 
 
 
The condemnation of beggars was clear in the responses interviewees gave about begging and is 
illustrated by the fact that only one member of the elite felt that this group was vulnerable to poverty. It 
was clear that respondents preferred supporting the active poor, arguing that they had ‘little sympathy 
for beggars’ (PS, Civil Service, 16/7/08). 
Sometimes I find people my age with a child on their back begging. I would not mind if that 
person knocked on my gate asking for a job. I would be much more receptive, even giving them 
alms. The same goes for children. There are children groups like ‘Chisomo’ and they should 
not be on the street. Most child beggars in town are coming from neighbouring areas like 
Nchesi (slums) and are sent by their parents to beg. They are professional beggars. Some 
people think because they have a disability then society owes them something. Some people 
prefer to beg than work (PS, 16/7/08). 
 
I do not want to be burdened by beggars and am only responsible for my family (National 
Coordinator, CSO, 21/05/08). 
 
I do not encourage people to give beggars money because each time you give you are telling 
them to come back tomorrow to be given again. Beggars must not be given anything. They 
need to be rehabilitated (Acting Executive Director, Private Sector, 12/05/08). 
 
 
 
86   The analysis of written documents, such as newspapers, drew on this thesis’s stated objectives and research questions 
(see Chapter 1, Section 1.1.1 and 1.1.2) to classify key ideas or themes relating to how and what the texts say about 
poverty and the poor, from which inferences were made. 
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As a symbol of injustice and inequality, beggars were to be rehabilitated, so that in future they would 
offer an image of a just and equal Malawi. 
We need to find something for them to do. It doesn’t reflect well on the type of society we are 
living that you can have people going about in the streets seeking for assistance that is the 
inequality we were talking about. That is why I say we need to find something for them to do. 
But even when they receive cash transfers from government, what do they do with that money? 
I met a beggar one time and we disagreed with my wife on whether to give him money as I 
thought he looked drunk. I asked him if he was drunk and he said he does not drink so we gave 
him some money. He started jumping up and down on the street screaming, ‘God bless you!’ 
and the whole street was looking at him. But you wonder what they do with this money as the 
next morning they are there, because it has become an occupation (Executive Director, 
Government, 05/6/08). 
 
 
 
However, some respondents, who saw beggars as vulnerable, argued that it was wrong for people to 
think that beggars enjoyed begging, noting that it was the lack of access to resources and opportunities 
that pushed people onto the streets. Do people really think someone can leave their house to wait in 
the streets for change if there was something better to do at home? People need to make an analysis 
of the situation and see how best beggars can be assisted by government, donors and NGOs (Secretary 
General, CSO, 7/5/08). 
 
 
 
6.6 Elite Perceptions of Poverty: Variation 
 
 
 
 
Malawian respondents’ perceptions of poverty are relatively similar across different categories of elites, 
such that we can with some level of confidence talk about an ‘elite culture’87. Areas of difference among 
the elites seem related to other characteristics, such as sector, occupation and at times political party 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
87  Having been brought up in similar educational, religious and social institutions, the members of the elites acquire 
‘psychological affinities’ which manifest themselves in shared linguistic nuances, manner of speech, dress, jokes and ideas. 
This makes it possible for them to say of one another: ‘He/she is of course one of us’ (see Cohen, 1981:228; Mills, 1956). 
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affiliation. For instance, senior civil servants tended to emphasise official statistics on levels of poverty 
in Malawi, arguing that government policies on growth and agriculture had contributed to low levels of 
poverty. CSO respondents tended to describe poverty in terms of human rights, participation and 
vulnerability. Conversely, political, INGO/donor, media, academic and private sector respondents 
emphasised lack of access to basic resources and services. But political and academic respondents 
differed in that they also described poverty as lack of access to land, which they saw as a productive 
resource for the poor. Although there was significant agreement that poverty was more visible in rural 
areas, senior civil servants also tended to believe that the rural poor were in a privileged position, as 
they had access to land and lived among kin. Political, academic and INGO respondents differed, and 
viewed the rural poor as more vulnerable to poverty owing to climate shocks and the implementation of 
SAPs. 
 
 
 
Generally, political respondents, especially those in opposition, appeared more sympathetic towards 
the rural poor, whom they believed were denied access to basic resources and services by the 
Government.  In contrast, CSO elites were more sympathetic towards the urban poor, whom they 
believed were much more vulnerable because they lived among the wealthy and close to resources 
(water, education) that were often out of their reach metaphorically. Variations also appeared in 
respondents’ discussions of inequality. Private sector and political respondents tended to view inequality 
as inevitable, as based on one’s ability to work hard. As one respondent put it: ‘We are all given 
equal opportunities in Malawi. One’s success depends on how one uses these opportunities’ (Acting 
Executive Director, Private Sector, 12/05/08). CSO, media, and INGO respondents, and senior civil 
servants, all blamed inequality on corruption by the governing elites and on unequal access to 
education and land. However, senior civil servants and CSO respondents preferred the term equity to 
equality, as it presented issues of justice and fairness. Generally, there were no significant variations in 
elite perceptions of poverty that were based on regional or ethnic background, or on gender. 
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6.7 Conclusion 
 
The respondents’ perceptions discussed in this chapter demonstrate that the respondents were aware 
of the nature, extent and character of poverty. Both the questionnaires and interview data show that 
poverty is considered one of Malawi’s major problems. Respondents did not differentiate between types 
of poor people or types of poverty along ethnic lines; nor is their categorisation of the poor judgemental 
or based on the morality of the poor; rather, the poor were considered to be worthy of support. However, 
respondents’ views on inequality do not reflect any sort of radical egalitarian values – or even a milder 
doctrine, such as equality in initial socio-economic conditions (Reis, 2005:43). Respondents’ 
emphasis on equity rather than equality suggests that there is a preference for the allocation of 
resources based on fitness, or whether the poor are deserving or undeserving, and is related to the 
views expressed during interviews that most Malawians are poor, including the elite themselves. 
Therefore, equity would ensure that all Malawians got an equal opportunity to benefit from the economy 
in relation to their needs, not necessarily in an equal outcome. Outcome would be dependent on hard 
work, providence and the ability to discern opportunities, but respondents were concerned that a huge 
gap between the haves and the have-nots would lead to high urbanisation and associated social ills. 
 
 
 
Significant inequality in Malawi is a paradox, considering the country is poor and agriculture-based. In 
addition, rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, which were the main causes of widening inequality in 
the early phases of economic growth in developed countries, have been limited in most African countries 
(Kuznets, 1955). Following rapid industrialisation, developed countries were able to stabilise and 
reduce income inequalities. Then again, inequality and poverty in Malawi are politically determined and 
linked to how and why elites or governments make decisions and implement these decisions. Would 
Malawian elites see the sense in focusing on pro-poor interventions when pro-growth policies would 
also benefit the poor? Respondents’ estimation of poverty was higher than the official statistics, which   
begins   to   explain   their   support   for   economic   growth   policies   that   would   address 
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underdevelopment in general rather than direct welfare which might not adequately respond to 
everyone’s needs (see Chapter 8). Accordingly, if a significant proportion of the country is poor, how do 
you address the problems associated with poverty and development separately, other than through 
economic growth? 
 
 
 
Although respondents did not explain poverty in terms of Malawi’s colonial history, they mentioned the 
negative impact of structural adjustment programmes on rural economic and social life. This has 
strengthened ties between elites and the rural poor, who rely on elites for welfare support. These rural- 
urban connections presuppose a social cleavage between the rural poor and urban elites. However, 
respondents’ perception of the rural and urban poor indicates their idealised view of the rural poor and 
also begins to suggest that the poor are responsible for their situation. 
 
 
 
This chapter has shown that the respondents involved in this research had good knowledge of the 
extent of poverty and a concern for social problems in Malawi. Poverty reduction is obviously considered 
essential for consolidating democracy and attaining other important goals, such as economic growth. 
Equally important is the fact that respondents were able to define the problem of poverty using facts 
prevalent in the development community, which might have been a reflection of the Malawi government’s 
dependency on donors for support in their pro-poor policy. Nevertheless, there is a meeting of minds 
between the respondents and donor agencies concerning who the poor are, where they are located, and 
the categories into which they fall (Hossain, 1999). These factual assessments of poverty by Malawian 
elites are a first step towards gaining the sort of ‘social consciousness’ that leads to taking collective 
action on poverty reduction. 
 
 
 
However, knowledge of, and sensitivity to, the extent of poverty do not necessarily mean the problem 
 
will be placed at the top of the country’s policy agenda (Reis, 2005). It is unlikely that Malawian elites 
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will be moved to act by the official government statistics on poverty, which are lower than their own 
estimation of poverty. However, a similar situation could arise to that which occurred in 1889 in Britain 
where, on being informed by Charles Booth that one-third of the population lived below the poverty line, 
the comfortable classes were roused to action against poverty.  However, as argued in Chapter 1, it 
was not merely the breadth of the poverty situation that shocked British elites into action but Booth’s 
argument that these were not lazy or undeserving people, but hard working and struggling people who 
needed the help of government to alleviate their poverty. Thus, welfare assistance towards the poor 
was linked to a range of ideas about the poor (Hossain and Moore, 1999; Himmelfarb, 1984; Squires, 
1990). The next chapter explores Malawian elites’ views of the causes of poverty, which will lead into a 
discussion of their views on the poor in Malawi, particularly on whether they blame the poor for persistent 
poverty or take any responsibility for it. 
184  
CHAPTER SEVEN: ELITE VIEWS ON THE CAUSES OF POVERTY 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse elite perceptions of both the causes of poverty and the 
character of the poor in Malawi. Respondents to questionnaires and interviews used in this study cited 
a wide range of causes of poverty, including political, economic and social factors, revealing a 
perception that poverty was impossible to differentiate from insufficient development in Malawi. Primarily, 
respondents emphasised structural causes of poverty, such as poor economic growth and low levels 
of education, and behavioural causes, such as the character of the poor and a lack of political will.   
It seems that without entirely blaming the poor themselves, respondents adopted a ‘culture of 
poverty’ perspective to explain the responsibility of the poor for their own poverty. They emphasized the 
poor’s fatalistic attitudes, beliefs and behaviours. According to the respondents, these attitudes and 
behaviours lead to an opportunistic and unequal relationship between elites and the poor; but at the 
same time they ensured harmony between them. Although respondents’ views on the structural and 
behavioural causes of the phenomenon may appear to be at odds with each other, together they suggest 
that the respondents are aware of the severity of poverty in Malawi and are also conscious of their 
dominant position and the fact that they may bear some responsibility for continuing poverty in Malawi. 
 
 
 
The chapter is divided into three major sections. Section 7.2 presents elite views on the main causes of 
poverty in Malawi and shows the emergence of sharp distinctions between structural and behavioural 
causes of poverty. Section 7.3 discusses the structural causes of poverty as presented by respondents, 
highlighting how these structures militate against the poor moving out of poverty. Section 7.4 focuses 
on respondent’s views of the character of the poor, emphasising their view of the poor’s responsibility 
for their own poverty. This section also focuses on the views of respondents on their responsibility for 
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persistent poverty, highlighting their failure to implement policy and also the way in which they benefit 
from the unfair distribution of resources. Section 7.5 shows how respondents’ views of the character of 
the poor determine the nature of their contact or relationship with the poor. 
 
 
 
7.2 Elites Views on the Main Causes of Poverty 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.1 lists the causes of poverty given by different categories of elite, as derived from the 
questionnaires. Respondents were given seven points with which they had to note their agreement or 
disagreement, and the resulting data has been organised to enable a comparison of their perceptions. 
Respondents could offer alternative suggestions that were not on the list presented to them, and the 
suggestions they came up with are listed in Box 7.1. Table 7.1 shows that insufficient economic 
development and lack of political will were ranked highly. Insufficient economic development was 
highlighted by civil service, donor and media respondents, whilst CSO respondents were split on this 
issue. Lack of political will was highlighted by civil service and academic respondents, and even by 
CSO and political respondents, who, by virtue of their positions, would be expected to mobilise political 
will. There was no significant support from respondents for the effect of corruption in causing poverty, 
although CSO and civil service respondents were split in their views88. Similarly, with the exception of 
the Civil Service, very few respondents assigned blame to the poor for the presence of poverty. Nor did 
they blame themselves for being insensitive or for failing to implement social policies and monopolising 
opportunities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 The respondents’ views could reflect a perception that something was being done about corruption, following President 
Mutharika’s zero-tolerance stance announced in 2004 (Presidential speech, 24/05/2004). Since then, there have been a 
number of high profile cases (former President Bakili Muluzi, former Minister of Education, Sam Mpasu) that have been 
prosecuted, and according to the 2010 corruption index, Malawi has improved from a Corruption Perception Index (CPI) 
score of 2.80 in 2008 to 3.40 in 2010 (a score of 10 means a country is highly clean and 0, highly corrupt). 
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Table 7.1: Elites on the Causes of Poverty in Malawi 
 
 
 
 
 
Category 
 
 
 
 
 
Academic 
 
 
 
 
 
CSO 
 
 
 
 
 
Donor 
 
 
 
 
Civil 
Service 
 
 
 
 
 
Media 
 
 
 
 
 
INGO 
 
 
 
 
 
Political 
 
 
 
 
Private 
Sector 
 
 
 
 
Missing 
Value 
 
 
 
 
Total 
  
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
Insufficient  economic 
development 
 
0 
 
50 
 
67 
 
27 
 
37 
 
40 
 
41 
 
100 
 
0 
 
57 
Lack  of  political  will 
to fight poverty 
 
100 
 
56 
 
33 
 
64 
 
37 
 
60 
 
59 
 
0 
 
0 
 
52 
Corruption/patronage/ 
clientelism 
 
0 
 
50 
 
33 
 
50 
 
0 
 
40 
 
24 
 
0 
 
100 
 
35 
Lack of effort  on the 
part of the poor 
 
0 
 
13 
 
33 
 
55 
 
25 
 
20 
 
29 
 
0 
 
0 
 
31 
Monopolization of 
opportunities 
 
0 
 
25 
 
27 
 
45 
 
13 
 
20 
 
24 
 
0 
 
0 
 
28 
Government failure to 
fulfil social 
obligations 
 
 
0 
 
 
31 
 
 
27 
 
 
36 
 
 
0 
 
 
20 
 
 
24 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
26 
Elites  lack  sensitivity 
towards the poor 
 
0 
 
13 
 
7 
 
41 
 
13 
 
20 
 
18 
 
0 
 
0 
 
20 
*Data derived from questionnaires. Total respondents = 86. All the percentages for each category are calculated based on the total of interviewees in each 
category. 
 
 
Box 7.1: Comments from Questionnaires on the Causes of Poverty 
 
 
 
Low educational levels 
Lack of performance culture 
Low resource base 
Weak human resource capacity 
Power imbalance between the different classes and sexes 
Unfair terms of international trade 
The community is ignorant of economic activities that would swiftly pull them out of the poverty cocoon 
Ethnicity and tribalism 
Physical, economic and social shocks; drought, floods, poor market prices and disease 
Economic transmission 
Natural disasters, shocks and the inability of people to be resilient 
Injustice and social exclusion or inequality 
Lack of capital for businesses 
Dependency syndrome 
Lack of political vision and policy implementation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When asked whether the Government had failed to fulfil its social function, only 26% of respondents 
agreed (see Table 7.1). This 26% was made up of CSO, donor, civil service, INGO and political 
respondents. Interestingly, this response was prevalent amongst respondents from the Civil Service, 
who hold the most responsibility for policy planning and implementation, and are therefore tasked with 
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fulfilling the Government’s social obligations. However, it is important to note that, even though the Civil 
Service has this responsibility, power and influence in Malawi reside in the executive, and the Civil 
Service has been infused with politics (Rakner et al, 2004), to the extent that, in 2004, during President 
Mutharika’s swearing-in ceremony, the President referred to the politicisation of the Civil Service and 
soon moved to implement civil service reforms that would ensure professionalism, efficiency and 
accountability89. The politicization of the Civil Service could explain why civil service respondents 
suggested that there was a monopolization of opportunities, and that elites lacked sensitivity towards 
the poor. Tables 7.1 and Box 7.1 indicate that across the different elite categories there appears to be 
an inclination towards structural explanations (e.g. social and economic situations) rather than 
behavioural explanations (e.g. characteristics of the poor or of the elites) for the existence of poverty in 
Malawi. Consequently, attempts at reducing poverty are seen as equivalent to attempts at economic 
development (see also Jordan, 2004; Lahat and Menahem, 2009). 
 
 
 
Table 7.2, below, shows the causes of poverty cited by 52 respondents during face-to-face interviews. 
The categories listed in this table were produced by coding unstructured responses, and are thus 
interpretations of respondent’s perceptions. Although some categories, such as ‘lack of education’ or 
‘weak private sector’, do not alter the respondents’ perceptions, others, such as ‘lack of democratisation’, 
include an array of issues from participation, empowerment and politics generally. Therefore, Table 7.2 
is a rough guide to, rather than a definitive account of, respondents’ views on the causes of poverty. 
These responses were later grouped according to the ideas they presented on 
structural or behavioural causes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
89 Swearing-in ceremony speech by President Bingu Wa Mutharika, delivered on 24th May, 2004. 
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Table 7.2: Elite Perceptions of the Main Causes of Poverty in Malawi 
 
Category Academic CSO Donor/INGO Civil 
Service 
Media Political Private 
Sector 
Structural Causes 
 % % % % % % % 
Lack of democratisation 0 55 50 8 0 10 33 
Lack of education 100 64 50 75 71 60 67 
Global factors (unfair 
terms   of   trade,   market 
prices, aid) 
0 36 25 25 0 20 67 
Overpopulation 0 0 0 8 0 50 33 
Weak private sector 100 9 0 33 0 10 0 
Malawi’s landlocked nature 
/high transport costs 
0 9 0 8 0 10 33 
 
Lack  of  resources  (land, 
money) 
100 55 25 33 29 50 33 
Lack of economic growth 100 36 50 42 43 40 0 
Unequal  power  relations 
and inequality 
0 64 50 8 0 0 33 
Unemployment 0 9 0 0 14 20 0 
Behavioural Causes 
Behaviour and attitudes of 
the poor 
100 64 36 50 71 100 100 
Religion 0 0 13 17 0 0 0 
Lack   of   entrepreneurial 
spirit 
0 0 0 8 0 0 100 
Lack of political will 0 55 25 50 57 50 0 
Lack of visionary leaders 0 9 0 0 0 20 0 
Behaviour of the elite 
(patronage and populist 
politics, corruption) 
100 9 36 42 14 30 33 
*Data derived from face-to-face interviews with elites. All the percentages for each category are calculated based on the total of interviewees in each 
category. 
 
 
 
 
Table 7.2 indicates that the respondents appear to agree that lack of education, lack of economic growth 
and the behaviour and attitudes of the poor are the main causes of poverty, although among 
INGO/donor respondents’ support for the idea that the poor themselves are a cause of poverty is 
minimal. However, there are areas in which the respondents’ views differ. It seems that civil society 
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respondents emphasise unequal power relations, inequality, lack of democratisation and resources 
more than other elite categories, perhaps reflecting a dominance of organisations involved in advocating 
social justice amongst the CSO category. Political respondents emphasise the effects of population 
growth, lack of resources such as land, and lack of political will. There is a minority of respondents  from  
the  private  sector  and  the  Civil  Service  who  highlight  population  pressure;  but political 
respondents dominated this discussion. As one MP indicated, 
High population growth is the main cause of poverty. We were 3.6 million people in 1964 and 
currently we are 13 million, but could be as high as 15 -18 million in Malawi. Considering that 
we have only one rainy season and one harvest, then the population is too big to survive (MP, 
Parliament, 6/5/08). 
 
 
 
This could be a reflection of MPs’ need to represent the interests of their constituents, who are mainly 
poor, and the close contact MPs maintain with the poor. My analysis90 of the Malawi Parliament’s 
Hansard documents (1965-2008) and observations of parliamentary proceedings indicated that in their 
contributions parliamentarians emphasised that they had been directed by their constituents to support 
social justice issues. As one speaker said, ‘Poor people in my constituency instructed me to talk about 
water, housing, and food’ (Hon. Mwenifumbo, 29/04/08). Then again, political respondents seemed to 
lay claim to direct experience of poverty, emphasising their responsibility towards their constituents for 
the provision of basic needs such as food and access to services, for instance paying school fees for 
children in the constituency and taking people to the hospital (this point will be developed in Chapter 8). 
 
 
 
The INGO/donor category identified the nature of policies themselves as leading to inequality, and lack 
of education as a cause of poverty, reflecting their direct involvement in implementing government 
policy. For example, at the time of the survey UNICEF and Concern Worldwide had been working in 
partnership with the Malawi Government to implement child policies and welfare policies through the 
 
 
90 The analysis of Hansard documents drew on this thesis’s stated objectives and research questions (see Chapter 1, 
Section 1.1.1 and 1.1.2) to classify key ideas or themes relating to what and how various Members of Parliament discuss 
issues of poverty and the poor, from which inferences were made. A similar procedure was followed for the analysis of 
parliamentary debates and observations. 
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social protection policy. This is likely to be why INGO respondents argued that policies in Malawi 
allocated wealth to certain groups to the detriment of others, and more resources to urban than to rural 
areas. The tobacco industry was given as an example, with farm owners retaining 90% of the profits 
and their tenants, who actually grew the tobacco, getting very little in return. In addition, the law allows 
owners to pay tenants in food, which is charged at exorbitant prices. Hence inequality has become 
institutionalised, so that it does not allow some groups to graduate out of poverty. Instead these 
institutions/structures enable some groups to control and monopolize power over institutions that 
legitimize discrimination.  By contrast, civil service and academic respondents emphasised a weak 
private sector, the behaviour of elites, land issues, and lack of political will as causes of poverty; and 
respondents from the media emphasised lack of political will, whilst private sector respondents 
emphasised lack of entrepreneurial spirit and global factors. 
 
 
Despite these divergent views on the causes of poverty, respondents’ views show that there was 
consensus on illiteracy as the most prominent cause. A majority of interviewees in each category argued 
that it was meaningless to implement pro-poor policies if the recipients were uneducated. Education is 
what determines the extent to which the poor will use the resources made available to them and 
their attitude towards development. Therefore, respondents considered education to be key to 
development, particularly poverty reduction, as it enabled reasoning and innovativeness. As this 
respondent noted, 
If educational levels are so low, the thinking capacity is low and when you go into a community 
with your interventions, nothing changes. We need to emphasise a change in poor people’s 
perception towards development; otherwise they just get development resources and do not 
use them to their benefit. Most of the time they misuse the resources (National Secretary, CSO, 
7/05/08). 
 
 
 
The education referred to here is not only higher education but also primary, secondary and 
entrepreneurial training that would enable the poor to develop innovative ideas as to the use of available 
resources. However, more emphasis was placed on primary and entrepreneurial education. 
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These are seen to be essential for developing human resources necessary for growth and poverty 
reduction. 
 
 
 
Perhaps Malawian elites agree on education as a solution because it is perceived as a factor that 
distinguishes elites from the poor. Since colonial times, education has played a key role in social mobility, 
as those who received missionary education were employed in the colonial administration or as farm 
managers. Thus current members of the elites, or their families, have escaped rural life through access 
to education, and so they believe that education can change the life of the poor: ‘Education is what 
separates the haves from the have-nots’ (Minister, Civil Service, 30/04/08). There is a perception 
amongst the respondents that the condition of the poor is something within their means to change 
through education. 
 
 
 
7.3 Elite Views on the Structural Causes of Poverty 
 
 
 
 
This section discusses the structural causes of poverty, as indicated by respondents during face-to-face 
interviews. There was awareness amongst the respondents that poverty was a complex and 
multidimensional problem; and the causes of poverty in Malawi were considered to be vast and varied. 
These responses reveal a perception that the causes of poverty are closely linked to insufficient 
development, which necessitates attention to broader national development strategies, rather than 
redistribution or direct welfare transfers. 
 
 
 
7.3.1 Education and Poverty 
 
 
Education is the key for attaining prosperity. It is a catalyst for socio-economic development, 
industrial growth and an instrument for empowering the poor, the weak and the voiceless. 
Education enhances group solidarity, national consciousness and tolerance of diversity (Malawi 
Growth and Development Strategy, 2007:51). 
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The Malawi Growth and Development Strategy states that the emphasis in the education sector is on 
equipping students, especially at primary school level, with the basic knowledge and skills to enable 
them to function as competent and productive citizens. Education also provides the academic basis for 
gainful employment in the informal, private and public sectors, and produces high quality professionals 
with relevant knowledge. Achievement in education is associated with increased agricultural productivity, 
higher incomes, lower fertility rates and improved nutrition and health. The overall goal of education is, 
therefore, to develop human capital to enable full participation in the socio-economic and political 
development of the country. The Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper also put education at the 
centre of poverty alleviation, believing that this would yield ‘broad economic and social benefits’. 
 
 
 
Correspondingly, the Malawian national budget has seen a steady increase in expenditure on education. 
By the 2008-2009 budget, education was receiving the third largest allocation, with an increase of MK3.9 
billion over 2007-2008. Poverty research in Malawi has also given prominence to education as a 
determinant of household or individual poverty. The Integrated Household Survey of 
2004-2005 showed that poverty was highest amongst those with no educational qualifications and 
lowest amongst those with some educational qualifications (see Figure 7.1). 
 
 
 
Fig 7.1: Population in Poverty in Relation to Educational Qualifications91 
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91 PSLC = Primary School Leaving Certificate; JCE = Junior Certificate of Examination; MSCE = Malawi School Certificate of 
Education (equivalent to GCSE). 
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.Respondents’ conceptualisation of education was similar: they cited it as the cure for all the causes of 
poverty in Malawi. Elites believe that the low educational level is the reason why poverty in Malawi is 
increasing, and why society has not developed attitudes and values conducive to the implementation of 
pro-poor policies and the skills to enhance productivity. As this respondent argued, ‘Education is the 
key, as it impacts on the attitudes of the poor. If all people were educated, then they would have a 
positive attitude towards development’ (PS, Civil Service, 11/4/08). What an education does is ‘to make 
you see doors where there are no doors or to sense opportunities’ (Academic, University of Malawi, 
8/5/08). One respondent argued that an educated workforce would attract foreign companies seeking 
labour reserves: 
 
 
 
If people are educated as a country you attract employers. The UK is using customer service 
people from India because they have a large number of educated people. Yet they do not have 
mineral resources or tourism. You cannot cry foul about growing poverty if you are not investing 
in education (Minister, Civil Service, 7/5/08)92. 
 
 
 
To most CSO respondents, education is what separates the haves from the have-nots and widens the 
gap between elites and the poor. They believe that, ‘as the education gap gets wider, that in itself creates 
a barrier between elites and the poor. There are certain things that cannot be communicated to the 
uneducated poor as to someone who is educated’ (Managing Director, CSO, 6/05/08).   The fact that 
many respondents had emerged from rural poverty through education was seen as an example of the 
possibility for social mobility that education could open up. Therefore, ‘If one is not educated, it is 
more or less that you have made a decision of which grouping in society you are going to belong to’ 
(National Coordinator,  CSO, 13/05/08).  Emerging from this view is the assumption  that individuals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
92 The perception by this respondent about mineral resources and tourism in India is not accurate as India has a rich 
accumulation of minerals such as coal, copper, gold, zinc and diamonds among others and its rich cultural and historical 
past attracts tourists from around the world (Fazili and Ashraf, 2006). Although India has 74% literacy rate, it still holds the 
largest number of illiterate people in the world, and when you compare with China’s literacy rate of 96%, India’s literacy rate 
is much lower (www.unesco.org; HDR, 2009). This shows how literacy impacts development when you compare different 
states, which makes this statement valid overall. 
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choose to be uneducated, rather than being inhibited by limited opportunities for a good education. This 
point will be developed in some detail in Chapter 8. 
 
 
 
The failure of the agricultural sector was also identified with lack of education, resulting in the failure to 
utilise land productively and use markets effectively. One respondent stated: 
 
 
 
If you gave land to a person who has at least received secondary school education and one 
that has not, it is the one with some form of education that will make better use of the land. Our 
main problem has been the lack of education, which has impacted our production, and 
production  has  three  elements,  which  are  land,  capital  and  labour.  The  quality  of  labour 
impacts how you use the land and capital available to you (Country Director, INGO, 27/5/08). 
 
 
 
Coupled with this is the idea that illiteracy has meant lack of technological advances that could have 
helped Malawi increase its agricultural production. 
The use of the hoe also takes people’s time. A person will be digging the whole day on a small 
piece of land when we could have been using other methods (PS, Civil Service, 23/4/08; similar 
views were expressed by MP, Parliament, 28/03/2008). 
 
 
 
Some respondents argued that illiteracy had perpetuated personality politics. Parties did not espouse 
any ideology; rather they aimed to appeal to supporters through patronage. As this respondent argued, 
‘If the population was fairly literate, then we would be electing members of parliament based on what 
they can offer Malawians and the strength of their policies and be able to hold them to account’ (National 
Coordinator, Civil Service, 2/05/08). A CSO leader blamed the increasing corruption itself on illiteracy, 
arguing that it was because of lack of education that poor Malawians allowed corruption to thrive, 
because they did not comprehend how to fulfil their citizenship duties by contributing to social, 
economic and political processes (Managing Director, CSO, 6/05/08). 
 
 
 
My analysis of debates in the National Assembly from 1965 to 2008 also shows that education has 
been emphasised in discussions on poverty. The former president, Dr Muluzi, in his various state 
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addresses to Parliament often indicated that, ‘The one cause of poverty is ignorance, and it holds the 
key to changing the lives and attitudes of our people for the better’ (State of the Nation Address, 1997). 
Other comments on education came from Members of Parliament: 
 
 
 
An illiterate person is economically less productive’ (Shawa, 1991). 
 
 
 
 
The leader of the Opposition once stated: 
 
Education is important if Malawi is to improve the skills of its labour force. For Malawi to achieve 
economic growth, it needs a productive human resource. A well educated labour force can have 
a maximum impact on poverty and meet the challenges of globalisation  (Tembo, 
2000). 
 
 
 
 
Although respondents agreed that illiteracy was a problem for Malawi, they acknowledged that the 
education system was fraught with problems caused by management, monopolisation of educational 
resources and poor planning. 
 
 
 
Although the Government has introduced free primary education, poverty deters the poor from sending 
their children to school. Children from poor households cannot go to school because they are hungry 
and do not have proper clothing.  In addition to this, education is not equally accessible, as the areas in 
which poor people live have few schools, and these are normally located far from their communities. 
Below is an excerpt from a face-to-face interview that captures some of the problems facing education 
in Malawi: 
The free primary education was a political decision to gain a popular vote without assessing the 
situation on the ground. They could have used a phased approach, but instead fully 
implemented this policy. Yet many areas had no infrastructures such as classrooms. The 
problem is not that we do not have teachers: we do, but the problem is distribution of these 
teachers. You have teachers running away from rural areas because there are no facilities 
such as good teachers’ houses or classrooms. The Government should find a way of keeping 
196  
teachers in the rural areas, because you find a school in the rural areas where enrolment is 
1000 students and there are only three teachers. Most of the time these teachers are not fully 
qualified, therefore poor people become even more disadvantaged.  In the rural areas there is 
need for incentives that would keep people in these areas where there is no electricity or running 
water. Most of the time, teachers in the rural areas only have a diploma and not a degree. 
This just needs proper planning and distribution.  The other problem with our education is that, 
since 1964, the curriculum has been tailored at people getting employment. The curriculum has 
not changed to the current challenges as needs for Malawi have changed. The management of 
education is poor, the ministry is too big, and they need to separate it in three: early education 
between primary and nursery, and secondary, then tertiary education. There is no proper early 
education system, and that is where the disparity starts, because a child of an elite will be sent 
to a nursery school whilst a poor child will not attend nursery school. When they meet in 
standard eight, they cannot compete, because one has a better foundation (Programme 
Manager, Donor, 16/06/2008). 
 
 
 
 
Other respondents felt that elites and their networks monopolised opportunities through preferential 
access to higher education, to the detriment of poor people, who were deterred from going to school. 
One respondent gave an example of a small village on the outskirts of the city of Lilongwe where. 
The residents do not encourage their children to go to school because there is no benefit in it. 
This is because there was a boy who passed his GCSE with eighteen points, which should 
have earned him an automatic place at the university, but he was unable to go. Nine years 
have gone by and he is still farming. Everyone uses him as an example to discourage people 
from going to school; at the moment a girl from this same village has gotten twenty-five points 
and she has been told by the community not to expect anything. They tell her ‘inu ndinu 
ayani93’” (PS, Civil Service, 17/4/08). 
 
 
 
Maybe it is not illiteracy alone but also the fact that ‘the environment provided to the poor to uplift 
 
themselves out of poverty is not conducive enough’ (Regional Manager, Media, 16/5/08). 
 
 
 
 
Emerging from respondents’ views is the idea that low educational levels have negatively impacted each 
sector of development in Malawi. One respondent said: ‘If I was president of Malawi, I would stop all 
projects and just educate Malawians, because people with an education are more open to programmes, 
assimilate them faster and use resources effectively” (Country Director, INGO, 27/5/08). 
 
 
 
93 ‘Who are you to want anything better than this? This is how your life is meant to be’. 
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However, inherent in this discussion of education is an attempt by respondents to blame the poor and 
justify the presence of poverty. Whilst some did not explicitly blame the poor directly as a cause of their 
own poverty, others, like this respondent, were more open: 
 
 
 
Most poor people who are not educated just fold their hands and do nothing all day. They are 
resigned to their fate. If a person is educated, they are ambitious to progress and do things 
better. You work hard to equal those at your level, and education makes you think wider. There 
are those who can develop without an education, but they are not many (Country Director, 
INGO, 27/5/08). 
 
 
 
 
It is important to understand the type of education elites advocate for the poor masses, which leads to 
questions about genuine commitment to education as the main means of reducing poverty. The returns 
from primary education are seen as beneficial to society because primary education enhances and 
sustains the ability of the poor to deliver the productive labour required in a market economy (Cammack, 
2003; Harber, 2002). However, the return from higher education is viewed as accruing to the individual. 
This distinction is important for understanding elites’ support for policies with wider benefits to society, 
and this will be further explored in Chapter 8. 
 
 
 
7.3.2 Land and Overpopulation 
 
 
 
 
 
Some respondents argued that in order to understand poverty there is a need to understand the 
structures that generate it. According to Table 7.2, academic (100%), political (50%), CSO (55%) and 
other respondents from the media, Civil Service and INGO/donor categories believe that land is a cause 
of poverty in Malawi. As indicated in Chapter 5, in an agrarian economy like Malawi, land is the major 
productive resource, and poverty can be explained by people’s failure to have access to land or make an 
adequate living out of their land. In addition, in Chapter 5 it was suggested that access to land is a 
major source of inequality, and most respondents stated that the land distribution package in the 
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1960s transferred large amounts of land from the traditional sector to the commercial sector, leaving 
people without adequate land for subsistence. This had been made worse by an increase in population, 
which respondents argued made ‘the ability to own land a safety net’ (Academic, University of Malawi, 
8/05/2008)94. Those that do not have land are left seeking a livelihood in an environment where sources 
of livelihood are scarce. Respondents noted that lack of access to land or failure to use land productively 
meant that the poor could not produce enough to feed themselves or generate income to buy other 
necessities. The fact that there has been slow progress in formalising individual rights to customary land 
since the proposed 2002 land reforms means that the majority of poor people have no legal access to 
land, and therefore cannot use their land as collateral to access credit. 
 
 
 
However, respondents were aware that access to land alone is not an immediate route out of poverty. 
As this respondent noted: ‘The poor in the rural areas do have access to land, but this is not an 
immediate passport to graduate out of poverty. It is what one is able to do with that land that helps them 
escape poverty, which is related to access to inputs such as fertiliser as well as irrigation schemes’ 
(National Coordinator, CSO, 21/5/08). Hence, access to land needs to be accompanied by non-land 
assets such as credit, which enables land holders to access fertilisers and seeds, access to extension 
services, and training in modern farming techniques (Chinsinga et al, 2008). 
 
 
 
 
7.3.3 Overdependence on Agriculture, Lack of Technological Advancement, and the Global 
Impact on Poverty 
 
Respondents noted that Malawi had been heavily dependent on agriculture for decades, but still used 
primitive methods of farming that resulted in poor yields: 
 
 
 
 
94 Similar views were expressed in the 2004-2005 budget statement delivered to Parliament by Hon G. Gongwe. In addition, during the 
37th Session of 19th March, 2004, where political elites discussed Malawi’s Land Bill, it was acknowledged that the land bill was very 
important as it addressed the issue of poverty and gave a sense of ownership to Malawians. Thus, legal instruments such as title 
deeds would enable rural Malawians to acquire credit from financial institutions and access farming inputs, such as fertiliser (Hon, 
Mwenifumbo; Hon Bwanali and Hon Mdala). 
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We are still using a hoe, we have not mechanized, and we have huge sources of water but we 
have not gone into massive irrigation schemes. We still wait for the rain and hence only plant 
once a year (MP, Parliament, 28/3/08). 
 
 
 
Thus lack of investment in agriculture was seen to have left Malawians in a downward spiral of poverty 
from one year to the next. The main problems, according to this CEO, are the impact of global forces, 
lack of resources and illiteracy. He argued that, 
 
Farmers have to take care of their own production costs but are susceptible to market factors. 
Those that are doing well in farming have combined good business acumen with education 
(CEO, Private sector, 13/05/08). 
 
 
 
 
Furthermore, Malawi exports raw materials with unfair terms of trade, and the country is given poor 
prices on the international market for its goods. Then again, the imposition of structural adjustment 
programmes by the Bretton Woods Institutions is considered to have removed development 
strategies that were beneficial for the poor. For instance, 
 
Malawi was asked to remove agricultural subsidies when developed countries are still using 
these. Therefore, Malawi ended up closing food distribution centres, such as ADMARC, and 
that curtailed food distribution to the poor, resulting in perpetual food shortages. The reduction 
of staff within the Civil Service meant that low paid staff were laid off, creating a poverty trap. 
SAPs created a bigger poverty trap because services were not being delivered to the masses 
(PS, Civil Service, 17/4/08). 
 
 
 
Other respondents (see Table 7.2 - Donor, 25%; CSO, 36% and Political, 20%) argued that it was 
Malawi’s over-dependence on aid that exacerbated the poverty situation. Foreign aid is seen to have 
made the country vulnerable to donor pressure and the conditionalities that lead to the implementation 
of donor policies rather than locally designed policies. As this respondent from the donor community 
argued, there is no recognition by the leaders in Malawi that aid is meant to be transitional and needs to 
be spent effectively at the time that one has access to it (Resident Representative, Donor, 25/05/08). 
Agreeing with this view, other respondents argued that Malawi had failed to develop a plan for reducing 
aid dependence or an aid exit strategy. As these two respondents argued, 
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Malawi should take Zimbabwe as an example of what happens when donors stop their support. 
A country collapses and we need to make hay whilst the sun shines. Any time aid to Africa can 
stop or be reduced significantly (Director, CSO, 7/4/08). 
 
 
 
We concentrate too much on what the donor can do. This is not sustainable. We need to start 
doing things ourselves (MP, 28/4/08)95. 
 
 
 
The Malawian media also picked up on the issue of Malawi’s dependency on foreign aid. On 2nd 
February, 1996, The Nation ran an article that emphasised that Malawi had been ‘begging’ for a long 
time. The article cautioned that, 
No country has developed by begging as an end in itself but rather as a means to an end. 
Therefore, the Government should be committed to managing foreign assistance effectively 
and seek to make the best use of local resources (Dzilankhulani, 1996). 
 
 
 
Similarly in March 2008, the Daily Times and The Nation ran an article where the Chinese Ambassador, 
Fan Guijin, told the Government of Malawi that no country had developed through foreign aid. This 
followed an avalanche of requests for financial support to the newly opened Chinese High Commission 
from government agencies, CSOs and parastatals. Although the envoy was condemned by the ruling 
party96  for his remarks, the media proceeded to discuss Malawi’s dependence on aid, cautioning both 
the Government and citizens. 
 
 
 
 
7.3.4 Weak Private and Manufacturing Sector 
 
 
 
As Table 7.2 shows, some respondents (academic, civil service, political and CSO) indicated that lack 
of private sector development was another cause of poverty, as a strong private sector was needed for 
 
 
 
95 On 14th July, 2011, DFID announced the suspension of budget support to Malawi. This is the support that allows the 
Government to implement pro-poor strategies: http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Media-Room/Press-releases/2011/Government-to- 
suspend-general-budget-support-to-Malawi/.  The  suspension  has  forced  the  Government  to  implement  a  zero-deficit 
budget, with serious implications for social and economic development, particularly poverty reduction. 
 
96 Following the remarks made by Guijin, government spokesperson, Patricia Kaliati (Minister of Information at the time) 
asked the envoy to respect Malawians and use the proper channels for complaints: 
http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/a-13-2008-03-28-voa36.html 
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job creation and raising people’s incomes. (Project Coordinator, Civil Service, 28/04/08; National 
Coordinator, CSO, 21/05/08). In addition to this, respondents spoke of the lack of microfinance for the 
poor, which meant that the poor not only lacked access to sources of employment but also to 
opportunities to better themselves on their own initiative. It was considered urgent that, ‘Government 
make an effort to create industries and opportunities, especially in rural communities, which would 
serve as markets and sources of employment’ (Minister, Civil Service, 6/6/08). One respondent noted 
that the private sector failed to thrive because, 
 
 
 
Its survival relies on having close links with the state, because most of the lucrative contracts 
are given out by the state. Therefore you find that it is the very same politicians who are also 
businessmen and have ended up accumulating wealth at the expense of the poor majority 
(Academic, University of Malawi, 08/5/08). 
 
 
 
 
The African Economic Outlook (2010) argues that private sector development is central to economic 
growth and its limited development in Malawi is detrimental to growth. However, they acknowledge, as 
did some respondents (see Table 7.2), that high transport costs resulting from Malawi’s landlocked 
position have constrained the growth of the private and manufacturing sector. 
 
 
 
The discussion above shows that there is awareness of the multidimensional nature of poverty and the 
varied causes of poverty in Malawi. However, emerging from respondents’ views is a perception that 
the character of the country’s poor and of its elites contributes to the prevalence of poverty. This is 
discussed in the next section. 
 
 
 
7.4 Elites on the Behavioural Causes of Poverty 
 
 
 
 
This section discusses the behavioural causes of poverty as described by respondents during face-to- 
face interviews. These causes relate to the character and behaviour of individuals, such as the poor or 
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the elites themselves. In relation to the poor, behavioural causes are those that make them unable to 
be entrepreneurial and take full advantage of the market economy. The poor are generally considered 
to become dependent on welfare policies, especially those that involve cash or food transfers, which 
are seen to perpetuate poverty and lead to other social ills. As far as elites are concerned, aspects of 
their behaviour that cause poverty are those that make them unable and unwilling to ensure economic 
opportunities for the country, and their inability, where such opportunities do exist, to implement these 
to the benefit of the poor. 
 
7.4.1 Elite Views of the Poor 
 
 
 
Table 7.2 shows that there was a perception that certain behaviour and attitudes of the poor make them 
responsible for their own poverty. The respondents whose views the table represents argued that the 
poor were unproductive and lazy, preferring to drink and dance gule wa mkulu (a traditional dance) 
rather than farming or identifying opportunities in the market that could improve their welfare (Bureau 
Chief, Media, 16/05/08; Acting Executive Director, Private Sector, 12/05/08; Deputy Director, Private 
Sector, 12/05/08; Executive Director, CSO, 15/04/08; PS, Civil Service, 17/04/08; Head of Section, Civil 
Service, 28/04/08; Project Coordinator, Civil Service, 28/04/08; Executive Director, CSO, 15/04/08). 
 
 
 
This produces a situation where a large percentage of unproductive Malawians depend on the small 
percentage of the population that is productive. As this respondent put it: 
 
 
We have a small population that is productive, about 30%, and a larger group that is 
unproductive, about 70%. The 30% is feeding the 70%, and that is not going to work. The poor 
are unproductive and lazy and, therefore, their behaviour and attitudes contribute to levels of 
poverty in Malawi. We have one planting season here and once the crop fails, there is hunger 
and the country has to look for food. People are unproductive. There is HIV/Aids, and we are 
having more young people and older people. The productive ages between 18 and 30 are 
gone, and these are meant to be our future leaders. On the other hand, you find the youth that 
are in the rural areas, they sit around doing nothing, or they come into town to beg, literally 
unproductive.  We have  to get  our people  to  work and  keep  them  busy  (MP, Parliament, 
28/4/08). 
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Therefore, the poor were considered to be a drain on economic efficiency. Malawi was understood to 
be locked into a cycle of providing trivial things, like mosquito nets, instead of investing in economic 
growth: ‘We are organising mosquito nets to give to poor people for free. Why do we do that? You 
mean people cannot afford to buy a MK300 (equivalent to GBP1.23) mosquito net?’ (Director, Media, 
16/4/08). 
 
 
 
 
These views betray an attempt by respondents to separate the deserving from the undeserving poor, 
the deserving being those suffering from poverty not caused by themselves and the undeserving being 
the cause of their own poverty. This will be discussed further below, in relation to ideas about the 
character of the poor. 
 
7.4.1.1 The Mindset of the Poor 
 
 
 
In a study of elites and poverty in Bangladesh, Hossain notes that the attitude of the poor towards 
development and personal improvement was widely considered to be negative. Generally, respondents 
argued that these attitudes needed to change and that elites should ensure such a change. Not only did 
these attitudes determine behaviour, they separated the poor from the non-poor. The poor’s attitudes 
towards savings, identifying opportunities, and work were considered to be negative as compared to 
those of the non-poor (Hossain, 2003:46). 
 
 
 
Similarly, the Malawian respondents in this study refused to describe the poor as lazy, except for the 
few mentioned above, and where they mentioned laziness, it was quickly qualified with a more positive 
statement. For instance, during observations of elite-level discussions on social protection policy, 
specifically the cash transfer component of this, a former Minister of Finance and sitting Member of 
Parliament stated: 
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I do not want to be seen as inhumane, that I don’t want to support poor people, but I do not 
understand why we should be supporting lazy people and drunkards with cash transfers. Don’t 
get me wrong, I am not saying we should not be supporting them (28th March, 2008). 
 
 
 
Those respondents who were requested to fill in the questionnaire in addition to a face-to-face interview 
were quick to admonish my use of ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ poor in the questionnaire. They 
normally took a moral position, arguing that Malawians were hardworking people, and that it was the 
elites’ failure to implement appropriate policies that had led to dependency. One respondent indicated 
that, 
It could be that people are lazy because our policies have been misdirected, and people no 
longer have the opportunities that they once had, or alternatives. It is difficult to say someone is 
poor because they are not industrious. It could be our own bad policies that lead to laziness or 
lack of initiative. It is our failure to educate the masses that is the problem” (Executive Director, 
CSO, 15/4/08). 
 
 
 
Other participants at a social protection workshop (28th March, 2008) were not so subtle in their 
preference for the active rather than the inactive poor. This workshop was only for Members of 
Parliament and some of the comments highlighted here are interesting in this regard. 
 
 
 
Let us inject funds towards the energetic poor. 
 
 
 
The poor bring poverty on themselves. For instance they will sell their subsidised fertiliser 
coupons and sit in the bar to drink. 
 
 
Let us put money on poor, energetic and sober Malawians. Let us not put money on mad and 
useless people. 
 
 
We should be concentrating on production to build the country rather than these handouts 
 
[cash transfers]. 
 
 
 
Social protection policy will destroy the ethics of working hard. 
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These statements correspond with the issue of the poor’s fatalistic and dependent mindset that was 
much discussed during face-to-face interviews. Many respondents argued that mindset determines the 
likelihood of someone getting up and working hard or doing the opposite. Reflected in the above 
statements is the notion that some policies aimed at reducing the inequality and structural impediments 
stimulate negative attributes, such as dependence, lack of entrepreneurial spirit and motivation. 
Inequality was justified by one respondent on the basis that it was difficult to uplift all poor people 
because different poor people had different priorities and ambitions: 
 
 
 
Although in the rural areas there are few opportunities, a man can go into the river or stream 
nearby and get some bamboo shoots to make baskets or sleeping mats and sell in town, or go 
to the forest, cut down some trees, make a hoe and sell it. On the other hand, he can tell his 
wife that together they should collect water and soil to mould bricks to sell. These are all 
activities that can bring some income into the family, but for some reason there is no incentive 
for the poor to work hard and uplift themselves out of poverty. They just wake up in the morning 
and sit all day playing one game after the other, and they do nothing productive. There is lack 
of drive to improve oneself, and there is need to deal with our people’s mindset (PS, Civil 
Service, 17/04/08). 
 
 
 
The idea of changing mindsets was taken up by several respondents (Head of Policy, INGO, 24/04/08; 
MP,  28/03/08;  Minister,  Civil  Service,  7/05/08;  PS,  23/04/08;  National  Coordinator,  Civil  Service, 
2/05/08; National Director, Media, 16/04/08; Bureau Chief, Media, 16/05/08; General Manager, Media, 
 
15/05/08; Director of Programmes, CSO, 7/04/08; National Coordinator, CSO, 17/06/08), who believed 
that the mindset of the poor needed to be changed as it was the main cause of poverty. As this 
respondent argued: 
 
 
 
If the poor believed that there was a solution to their problem and that their lives could change, 
their attitudes and mindset would also change. This is the role that the elites have – changing 
people’s mindset and providing opportunities (Head of Policy, INGO, 24/04/08). 
 
 
 
The ideas about the poor indicated in these statements are similar to elite views on the causes of 
poverty in nineteenth century Europe and the USA (as discussed in Chapter 3). There was a belief that 
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the exercise of the virtues of diligence, prudence, sobriety, thrift and initiative was the pathway to 
affluence. Therefore, poverty was caused by idleness, improvidence, and intemperance – defects of 
character which the individual could, if she or he chose, overcome. Although hazards of life such as 
unemployment, sickness, old age, and death of the breadwinner were acknowledged, it was the mark 
of a provident man that he set aside savings to cover these risks (Berthoud et al, 1981:7). In this case, 
Malawian elites are arguing that even though the opportunities are few, it is the mark of a provident 
man to be creative with what is available to earn a living. As one respondent asked, ‘If government is 
providing free primary education, what is stopping the parents from looking for food so the child can go 
to school?’ (PS, Civil Service, 28/4/08). 
 
 
 
In addition, in situations where the poor had worked on their land and had produced something, the 
respondents believed the poor squandered this opportunity by failing to invest, or they invested in 
unproductive areas. 
Some people even make money from growing of tobacco, but they will decide to marry another 
wife rather than building a house with the proper roofing. Those that work in our houses choose 
to use their money on beer instead of buying a bag of fertiliser, which would help them in the 
planting season. It is the way they use the meagre resources they earn. It is usually on 
unproductive activities (PS, Civil Service, 02/05/08). 
 
 
 
 
7.4.1.2 Culture of Dependency 
 
 
 
Respondents indicated that the culture of dependency or over-reliance on handouts was what 
determined the poor’s failure to search for solutions to their poverty. Under Kamuzu Banda, it was 
argued, the poor were seen as self-sufficient: although they relied on the non-poor in urban areas, the 
relationship was seen as reciprocal. There was some nostalgia for the ‘old times’, when they took 
second hand clothes to relatives in the rural areas in exchange for food, because the poor then grew 
plenty of food. There was a widespread belief that this self-sufficient mentality had been replaced by a 
belief that someone else would take care and provide for them: 
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That mentality, that donors and government will help us, reduces the zeal to work hard, and 
they sit idle waiting for handouts or they start to beg. People no longer ask for work but for alms 
(Member, Parliamentary Committee, 31/03/08). 
 
People think manna will fall from heaven. People cannot think of what to do to escape poverty 
(PS, 2/5/08). 
 
 
 
A national coordinator for an agricultural CSO told a story of a study that his organisation had carried 
out on food and nutrition. They had found that the poor would like to remain poor to continue receiving 
aid, and, ‘They know that if they do not work someone will come to help them. Some of the poor are 
satisfied with poverty levels; therefore they cannot break out of the poverty cycle’ (13/5/08). 
 
 
The poor were described as having a slave mentality and paralysis of analysis. (Poverty has made the 
poor unable to think beyond their poverty or in terms of long-term benefit. Rather, they opt for short- 
term relief). One respondent indicated that: 
Malawians have shifted their interest in ethical work and responsible and accountable living to 
an attitude of ‘tidye nawo’ [reaping where they have not sown], or to support those in power to 
benefit financially. We are unable to question how a member of parliament can manage to have 
five vehicles, buy houses or run businesses on their salaries. The poor are only thinking ‘give 
me today my daily bread’ and do not think about tomorrow. When people are trapped in a 
system of hand to mouth, they cannot think beyond that (National Coordinator, CSO, 6/5/08). 
 
 
 
The poor were considered to have failed to develop a sense of active participation, to have failed to 
fulfil their duty as citizens. The concept of Boma (government) was seen as having encouraged 
passivity in them. Since colonial times, Boma has been a powerful concept for ordinary people – one to 
be feared and respected. ‘Boma is not something that is approachable. It is very removed from society 
and democracy, and does not mean anything to many Malawians’ (National Coordinator, CSO, 6/5/08). 
Generally, the poor’s fatalistic and passive attitudes mean that their poverty is not a threat to elites, as 
the poor are polite and submissive. As this respondent noted: ‘Malawians are only peaceful because 
they are poor’ (PS, 28/4/08). 
 
 
 
These views on the slave mentality and passivity of the poor can be traced back to the time of Dr 
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Banda (see Chapter 5), who called on Malawians to be disciplined, obedient, not argumentative or 
contradictory. He would often say, ‘Don’t go this way when you are told to go that way, don’t ask why, 
and don’t ask if it is necessary” (Hirshmann 1995). According to Booth et al. (2006), this culture of 
silence and unquestioning loyalty has impacted on Malawians in such a way that they remain passive 
onlookers in their country’s development. The nature of Malawi’s traditional society, in which social 
relationships were characterized by inequality and a large power gap, meant that inequality was 
generally accepted, and citizens gladly deferred to authority. This helps to explain why abuses by big 
men are tolerated, even when very few benefits trickle down to poor people. 
 
 
 
It can therefore be argued that the culture of docility and passivity, created particularly by the one-party 
system, explains a lack of civic tradition of engagement between various social forces. This lack of civic 
engagement has cemented the distance between elites and the poor: 
Compare the situation in Malawi to South Africa, where despite the human rights issues they 
went through they have the most vibrant civic engagement in Africa, and elites listen to the 
demands of the people, especially on HIV/AIDS. In Malawi, we do not have alternative means 
of engaging with the elites and, as a result, the elites get away with anything. There are some 
things that have happened in Malawi that could have ended in civil strife in other countries, 
because people do not want to be taken for granted (Academic, University of Malawi, 8/5/08). 
 
 
7.4.1.3 Poverty as Fate and God-given 
 
 
 
Another view of the poor is that they are resigned to their fate, tending to view poverty as bad luck or 
misfortune. The poor were seen to be using their situation as an excuse not to be industrious, nor to get 
involved in development projects such as food-for-work programmes. As this respondent argued, 
 
 
 
People need to be preoccupied with creating wealth and how to improve one’s life. But they are 
busy living day to day, arguing that ‘my parents were poor so I will also end up poor no matter 
what I try’. There is no generational improvement; the parents of today are still living in the 
thatched roofed house just like their predecessors (PS, Civil Service, 6/6/08). 
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In 2002, former president Muluzi stated that poor people needed to change their mindsets and 
understand that living in a mud house with a grass thatched roof was not the status quo.97 This 
perception shows that the character of poor people rather than the social and economic structures is 
considered a cause of poverty. 
 
 
 
There was some agreement amongst the respondents in this study that the poor in Malawi were 
respected by society as a moral symbol and a repository of integrity, whereas society depicted the rich 
as evil. For example, if someone opens a business, people assume that they have killed someone. In 
Malawi, the rich are considered ‘witches’, who have become rich by practicing witchcraft or through 
immoral acts, such as corruption (National Coordinator, CSO, 17/06/08; Regional Manager, Media, 
16/05/08; Deputy Director, Private Sector, 12/05/08; MP, Parliament, 28/03/08). . 
 
 
 
 
In his book, Africa: The Politics of Suffering and Smiling, Chabal discusses the concept of witchcraft as 
serving three purposes in African life: healing, accountability and social leveller. It offers solutions to 
everyday problems, such as sickness, death or bad luck; it can be used to force politicians to fulfil their 
obligations; and it can be used to force the wealthy to distribute their wealth to the poor (2009: 76). In 
this case, the idea that witchcraft is present among the rich is used by the poor to idealise and 
normalise poverty. Religion was considered the main contributor to this thinking, with its teaching that 
entering heaven is harder for a rich man than a poor man (Matthew 19: 24). 
The poor tend to think there is something holy about being poor, that we start coming up with 
anecdotes that depict the rich as not worthy of entering the kingdom of God.  Somehow if you 
are in the village people sneer at the well to do, not the poor, and there is a consensus that we 
should not laugh at poor people. But is it not the wish of the poor to be food self-sufficient? (PS, 
Civil Service, 6/6/08). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
97 Speech by President Bakili Muluzi at the launch of the village housing scheme in Mzimba, in the northern region of 
Malawi, held on 07/10/2002. 
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7.4.1.4 Traditional and Cultural Practices 
 
 
 
Another common view was that the poor’s harmful traditional and cultural practices played a role in 
increasing poverty. One respondent mentioned kupimbira, a practice in which a poor family takes their 
daughter to a rich family in exchange for money. The child becomes a slave to that family, carrying out 
all domestic chores and is often sexually abused by the men in that household (Minister, Civil Service, 
15/04/08).  Other cultural traditions, such as chikamwini (where a man leaves his home village to settle 
at his wife’s village upon marriage) have led to insecurity, because the man lives in fear that if 
something goes wrong with his marriage, he will be chased from the village and have to leave behind 
his investments. Therefore, they find it better to sit idle and not to invest in any enterprise, as they have 
no sense of permanence. In many of his speeches, former president Dr Bakili Muluzi talked about the 
impact of cultural traditions on poverty. On 17th August 2008, during the enthronement of chiefs in 
Mangochi, Muluzi told those gathered that cultural beliefs such as kuchotsa fumbi (which means ‘to 
remove dust’, an initiation ceremony that may include unprotected inter-generational sex) will spread 
diseases such as HIV/AIDS and kill Malawians, and others such as chinamwali (preparing a girl for 
marriage) deter children, especially girls, from going to school, increasing gender inequality. 
 
 
 
It was generally believed that these behavioural causes of poverty were inherent in individuals, 
sustained, and transmitted to future generations, thus creating a culture of poverty amongst future 
generations that reinforced these negative social and behavioural deficiencies (Jordan, 2004). 
 
 
 
 
7.4.2 Lack of Visionary Leaders and Political Will 
 
 
In discussing the behavioural causes of poverty, some respondents refused to declare overtly that the 
poor were lazy. Rather, they stressed that if the poor were to be considered lazy, it would be because 
of the social and economic structures that militated against their movement out of poverty. 
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People need opportunities to strive. They are not lazy (Minister, Civil Service, 21/04/08). 
 
It is the environment.  Why were poor people not lazy during the Banda years?  (General 
Manager, Media, 15/05/08) 
 
There is no justification to say poor people are lazy unless they have been empowered and 
educated (Programme Director, CSO, 13/05/08). 
 
 
 
Some respondents across all categories (see Table 7.2) went further, saying that the behaviour of the 
poor was moulded by the behaviour of the elites, thus the poor’s behaviour and attitudes were, by 
default, a result of the elites’ corruption, self-interest, and failure to implement policy, ensure growth, 
and ensure markets for agricultural products. As one PS elaborated: 
 
 
 
During the time of Muluzi there was one Minister (Aleke Banda) that always used to say that 
Malawians are lazy and always drinking instead of working. But I have always disagreed with 
that, because I believe Malawians are very rational beings such that if you explain to him/her 
the benefits of a particular course of action they will patronise that. But if ‘Capitol Hill98’ lets him 
down and frustrates him then he will fold his arms and do nothing. That is why I believe that if 
we say Malawians are lazy then what we are saying is that Capitol Hill is lazy, because we are 
not guiding the poor, telling them where the opportunities are, and we are not empowering 
them economically. The poor look to us to give them ideas and guide them, but every time we 
tell them that they should produce a lot of goods, and when they harvest there are no markets, 
do you expect them to do it again? Then when they stop you call them lazy. That is not true. 
How come when they go to South Africa they do well? (PS, Civil Service, 5/5/08). 
 
 
 
Another respondent argued that the perceived behaviour of the poor should be taken in context: 
 
What if the time you find a poor person drunk or lounging about doing nothing, it is because 
they were celebrating something? We do have poor people that are lazy and drunkards, just 
like we have elites that are lazy and drunkards. This is not characteristic of the poor only, but it 
is a human characteristic (Head of Policy, INGO, 24/4/08). 
 
 
Therefore, lack of political will to implement much needed pro-poor policies and lack of visionary leaders 
who could identify opportunities for the country were seen to be exacerbating the poverty situation.  Most 
respondents  agreed  that the environment  the elites had created  contributed  to the behaviour  and  
attitudes  of  the  poor.  Hence, a l t h o u g h  some respondents accepted behavioural 
 
 
 
 
98 Capitol Hill is where government offices are located. 
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explanations for persistent poverty, they also acknowledged that these interacted with structural causes 
and conditioned behavioural outcomes. As a result, the poor developed attitudes and behaviours in 
response to the environment (Edgerton, 2000). 
 
 
 
In other words, it was argued that elites should bear some responsibility for laziness, lack of 
industriousness, passivity, and drinking amongst the poor. Respondents singled out the nature of politics 
in Malawi – personalistic and populist – as having contributed to the behaviour of the poor. As the 
literature99 on Malawian politics shows, the advancement of political parties has been based on what 
individual politicians and political parties can offer to the electorates in terms of money, food items and 
so on. Thus, 
Most of the major poverty reduction initiatives have been launched in the wake of general 
elections, and there is hype over these initiatives before the elections, which dies down after 
the elections. Most initiatives have ended up serving the instruments of patronage; for instance, 
following the 1994 elections, the government set up funds as revolving funds for the poor, but 
they never survived the initial phase  (Academic, University of Malawi, 8/05/08). 
 
 
 
During his term in office, former president Muluzi would often distribute food items at political rallies: ‘I 
have brought with me 2000 bags of maize to distribute. I just don’t move with nothing. The MP for your 
area told me some people have not harvested enough’100. Respondents were therefore insistent that 
the attitudes of the poor were driven by Malawi’s brand of politics, which had ensured that the poor 
were lazy, unenlightened or fighting for handouts, and passive, so that they did not realise that they 
could change their situation. 
 
 
 
In addition to politicians, faith-based groups and local leaders were also seen to have failed to inculcate 
an attitude of industriousness and self-reliance amongst the poor. 
The politicians say beg and it shall be given; the faith-based leaders say pray and wait for 
manna  to  come  from  heaven;  and  the  local  leaders  say  look  to  us  for  support  and 
 
99  For a discussion on neopatrimonial politics and its impact on patronage and populism in Malawi, see Cammack and 
Kelsall, 2011; Booth et al., 2006; Gilman, 2001; and Cammack, 2007. 
100 Bakili Muluzi, Speech at the Launch of MASAF 3 in Mangochi on 28/10/03. 
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innovativeness. This has not helped people to come out of poverty and has affected the mindset 
of many Malawians (CEO, Private Sector, 6/6/08). 
 
 
 
A prominent academic intimated that: ‘Elites love poverty, creating unnecessary roadblocks to make 
sure the poor are not enlightened and perpetuate the culture of dependency’ (Academic, University of 
Malawi, 8/5/08). The transition to democracy in 1994 was considered to have worsened the dependency 
situation because people were told that under a democracy, government would do everything: 
Even those with land or the energy to produce were just hanging around waiting to be given. 
Youth week101 programmes, where communities used to work together to fix roads, schools, 
hospitals and bridges, died. You find that people within a community would rather be walking 
through a bush rather than coming together as a community to clear the road, just because 
someone told them to do so is ‘thangata’ [slavery] (National coordinator, Media, 16/4/08). 
 
 
 
Again there was recognition that elites had failed to implement appropriate policies that targeted the 
poor in Malawi, because there was no real understanding of what poverty was: 
Elites can discuss poverty as an academic subject but fail to put a human face to poverty. They 
can even quote statistics on the level of poverty and talk about the number of Malawians living 
below a dollar a day, but most of them do not understand what these mean. They are talking 
about someone who is struggling to survive. There are those that can talk about figures and 
provide theories for dealing with poverty but nothing is really done (National Coordinator, CSO, 
6/5/08). 
 
The Government is offering fertiliser subsidies, yet some people do not have land; and if they 
do plant and harvest, they are provided poor prices for their products, or there are no markets 
available, which discourages people from doing anything. If the poor could see the benefit of 
being involved in development programmes, their attitudes would change (National Secretary, 
CSO, 7/5/08). 
 
 
 
Some respondents argued that most policies were designed to please donors rather than the Malawian 
people, making them a failure from the planning stage: 
Poverty reduction on policy papers is a priority, but this is driven by outside influence. Donors 
dictate what Malawians need; it is not the Government that is influencing the direction of policy 
(Bureau Chief, Media, 16/5/08). 
 
 
 
101 Youth Week was an annual event during the rule of Kamuzu Banda where the youth took part in community activities 
such as road clearing, cleaning of public places, mending bridges and boundaries around graveyards, construction of bus 
shelters etc. 
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Our policies have been donor driven. We have failed to generate our own policies. All our 
policies come from donors, and they keep coming from donors and from the Bretton Woods 
Institutions. For example, we have tried for years to have a subsidy programme for our farmers, 
but these donors have refused. They keep coming up with different projects/programmes. 
Mchinji alone has 30 or more projects by donors. We are seen as guinea pigs. Malawi is where 
people carry out experiments and nothing is home grown. At least we should be making our 
own mistakes. All the time we have consultants and experts coming to Malawi and telling us 
what to do (MP, Parliament, 28/3/08). 
 
 
 
Others noted that the donor argument was just an excuse to divert attention from the source of the 
problem: the elites. They argued that the amount of development that one saw on the ground was not 
proportionate to the amount of money Malawi received from donors. 
Donors are not responsible for our poverty; the Government has implemented structural 
adjustment programmes, poverty alleviation policy, MPRSP, MDGs and the Malawi Growth 
Development Strategy with no real impact on poverty. Instead of developing policy based on 
these previous policies, elites are requesting to travel to Brazil and South Africa, to study their 
social protection policy (MP, 8/4/08). 
 
 
 
However, the most common response was that Malawi was over-reliant on donor funding, reducing 
elites’ incentive to implement pro-poor policies. As these respondents explained: ‘Look at HIV/AIDs. 
Malawi is so dependent on global funds, there is no effort on the Government’s part’ (Director of 
Programmes and Development, CSO, 7/4/08); and, ‘If we talk of the cash transfers and MASAF, they 
are donor driven’ (MP, Parliament, 28/3/08). 
 
 
 
It has been argued by Moore (2010) that an inevitable outcome of aid is that it creates incentives that 
influence the priority elites give to poverty reduction. These perverse incentives lead to the perpetuation 
of fragile states unable to ensure development and growth or respond effectively to citizen needs 
because of access to unearned sources of income (p.70). Thus elites are unresponsive to the needs of 
the poor and wait for growth or education to sort out their problems (see Chapter 8). As Tables 7.1 and 
7.2 show, insufficient growth and education were considered key by a majority of the respondents. 
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Lack of political will was seen as evident in the lack of democratisation and empowerment of the poor. 
Respondents, mostly from the INGO category, believed that poverty could not be reduced if the poor 
did not have power. It was argued that the presence of political will would mean access to water, 
qualified teachers, better quality education, a population with information on how to uplift themselves, 
and less corrupt leaders. As this respondent noted, ‘If the poor had power they would be able to demand 
sharing, bridging the gap between the haves and have nots. The solution to poverty is about giving 
power to the poor’ (Head of Policy, INGO, 24/04/08). Thus, the failure to incorporate the poor into policy 
planning, decisions and implementation meant that resources were spent on planning meetings and 
workshops, or on purchasing vehicles, and very little went towards the poor (CEO, Private Sector, 
13/05/08). However, most respondents did not believe that spending donor funds on planning meetings 
constituted lack of awareness of poverty, arguing that they understood what it meant to be poor because 
they came from similar backgrounds to the poor (see Chapter 6). As one respondent noted, ‘Elites 
come from humble beginnings in the rural areas’ (Academic, University of Malawi, 8/5/08). 
 
 
 
 
Interestingly, similar to the data in Table 7.1, a significant number of political and civil service 
respondents mentioned lack of political will as a cause of poverty during face-to-face interviews. This is 
interesting as political and civil service respondents are in a position to implement effectively, or 
influence t he  effective i mp lementa t i on  o f , pro-poor pol icy . These respondents  m e n t i o n e d  
c or rup t  leaders (usually comparing the three regimes in Malawi since 1964) who had no clear ideas 
on how to develop Malawi, arguing that: 
If the leadership has no vision, is not educated and is corrupt, the country’s development is 
affected. Despite the negative human rights abuses under Kamuzu, Malawians were better off 
in terms of livelihoods. Under the rule of Bakili, we went backwards and Malawi was the third 
poorest country, but with Bingu Malawi is improving from a point where we had only 0.2 percent 
growth to the present growth of 7 percent (Minister, Civil Service, 30/4/08). 
 
 
 
In their discussion of the attitudes and behaviour of the elites, the respondents appeared to draw 
distinctions between different categories of elites. It was a common perception of the other categories 
216  
that  the political elite’s behaviour was aimed at  keeping  the poor uneducated and dependant, a 
 
situation that enabled them to reap the most benefit from poverty by using the poor to retain power. 
 
Elites do not really benefit from the existence of poverty, but political elites do benefit. The 
political elites manipulate the thinking of the poor to translate the ignorance into blind following 
and get votes from them by bribing them with very useless materials which do not match the 
vote (National Coordinator, CSO, 17/06/08). 
 
Elites benefit because then the poor will not challenge them and they rely on the poor to keep 
themselves in power (PS/ Civil Service, 11/04/08). 
The political elites give little handouts to the poor in exchange for votes (Deputy Director, Private 
Sector, 12/05/08; CEO, Private Sector, 13/05/08). 
 
Elites do benefit from the existence of poverty because they are the people involved in 
businesses and politics. They find labour cheap and give people handouts in exchange for 
political votes, and they become richer than ever before at the expense of the poor masses 
(General Manager, Media, 15/05/08). 
 
 
 
By contrast, most political respondents claimed that the behaviour of bureaucratic elites was causing 
poverty in Malawi, especially through corrupt acts, whilst private sector respondents also considered 
the bureaucratic elite to be self-interested. 
The civil service is very corrupt, especially through the awarding of contracts; this is the biggest 
area where corruption goes on. They receive kickbacks from the private sector for contracts. 
Therefore we need to strengthen accountability institutions such as the Anti-corruption Bureau, 
public procurement,  and the office of the Director of Public Prosecutions  (MP, Parliament, 
23/03/08). 
 
Corruption is making us lose a third of the funds allocated in the budget. These are mainly 
misappropriated by the bureaucratic elites because members of parliament do not have direct 
access to these funds. This makes us lose resources that can be spent on the poor (MP, 
Parliament, 6/05/08). 
 
Policy makers are selfish because they do not look at poverty in its context. They only look at 
personal gains and professional satisfaction. If you are a trained policy maker then you are 
satisfied if one of your policies is accepted and you are not concerned with the impact this 
policy has on poor people (Deputy Director, Private Sector, 12/05/08). 
 
 
 
 
The CSO and INGO respondents accused the private sector of failing to play their role in development 
and only being interested in making profits. 
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More private sector organisations need to carry out social responsibility programmes, not the 
short-term ones such as supporting a football match. These are not at the core of reducing 
poverty, and social responsibility should have an element of empowerment through grants for 
businesses (National Coordinator, CSO, 21/05/08). 
 
The private sector needs to play a more visible role in assisting government to reduce poverty 
(Country Director, INGO, 24/04/08). 
 
The private sector is interested in making profits not assisting the poor. There needs to be a 
law that instructs the private sector to reinvest back into the community (National Coordinator, 
CSO, 6/05/08). 
 
 
 
The responses in this section demonstrate that the respondents did not solely blame the poor for the 
presence of poverty. Rather, respondents’ views on the causes of poverty reflected a realization that 
they themselves bore some responsibility for the plight of the poor because of their failure to provide an 
environment conducive to effort or to implement policies that would reduce poverty. Respondents were 
able to draw a causal link between their action or inaction and the levels of poverty. One example given 
was that in Malawi, 
Allocation is nepotistic and regions that can help the economy grow are sidelined because 
leaders will not get votes from those regions. If these regions are developed then you are 
creating wealth and reducing poverty, but because of these nepotistic attitudes in allocation of 
resources, even the Rural Development Growth programmes have died. These programmes 
were meant to reduce inequality, reduce urbanisation and ensure that services are available at 
the rural level (Head of Section, Civil Service, 28/4/08). 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, one can conclude that respondents across the different elite categories were aware that 
their action or inaction had a strong bearing on the levels of poverty in the country. 
 
 
 
7.5 Strong Ties, Unequal Relationship 
 
 
 
The idea held by some respondents that the poor were ignorant, unaware, dependant, fatalistic and 
passive correlated with respondents’ views of their relationship or contact with the poor. Thus, these 
characteristics of the poor not only separated them from elites but put them in an unequal position. 
According to the respondents, this inequality dictated and created a relationship of master and servant, 
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with elites as the saviours of the poor. As one respondent pointed out: ‘Elites have a say in everything. 
They are said to be the wisest, to have all the knowledge and to hold the key to ending poverty’ (Head 
of Policy, INGO, 24/4/8). Therefore, when the poor meet members of the elites, they are quick to greet 
them as ‘Bwana’ (Boss), which cements the unequal relationship that ensues: 
As elites, we expect the poor to clap hands for us, kneeling down for us, and we want to be 
gods for them. If we could empower them they would not treat us like gods, but we do not want 
to empower them so that they can be coming to our houses to beg for goods. When they come 
to our houses they kneel for us and they think they cannot be given unless they are kneeling 
(Minister, Civil Service, 30/4/08). 
 
 
 
The relationship between elites and the poor was described as opportunistic, exploitative, and 
functional, with elites benefiting from the presence of the poor by getting cheap labour, buying votes 
during elections, and the opportunity to buy the poor’s products cheaply. 
 
 
 
Respondents described their link to poor people as encompassing both personal and professional links. 
Personal links were those with extended family, with the poor who worked in their households or their 
farms. Through these links elites  said they were expected to provide financial resources,  such as 
paying school fees for relatives’ children, especially those that had lost their parents from HIV/AIDs. For 
Members  of Parliament,  this also involved paying  fees for children  in the constituency,  paying for 
funeral costs, and providing personal financial assistance towards development projects such as the 
construction of boreholes. Professionally, there is the link as the poor’s representatives in parliament 
(Members of Parliament), as someone having influence on pro-poor policy (those working in the civil 
service), and as someone who can provide goods and services (especially the members of civil society). 
There was consensus that respondents had strong connections with the poor because each one had 
links with their home village and had experienced poverty at some point in their lives. 
 
In Malawi, we all have very strong links with the rural poor through extended families. The 
whole village is related in one way or another, and what happens in one household affects the 
other households. For us in these positions, people have evidence that you are employed and 
earn something at the end of the day. You become more of a central person from whom people 
can seek for financial assistance, and you are therefore in direct contact with the poor all the 
219  
time. Whether you like it or not, by virtue of your position everybody who has less than you 
feels they are entitled to your help. Whether directly or indirectly we have contact with the poor; 
for instance, houseboys, those working at my farm, extended family. Most of the time 50% of 
what we earn goes out towards supporting the poor. You spend money towards extended 
family, pay wages, people’s school fees, those asking for alms – our lives really revolve around 
providing for the poor (Director of Programmes, CSO, 7/4/08). 
 
 
Although these links between elites and the poor do exist, some respondents felt they were minimal 
and superficial: 
 
Elites do have contact with the poor, but this is one-way contact where the elites are masters. 
When the elites come into contact with the poor, they have an agenda and the poor people’s 
only response is, ‘Yes, bwana’ (Country Director, INGO, 27/05/08). 
 
Mostly  the  contact  between  elites  and  the  poor  is  exploitative  (Executive  Director,  CSO, 
12/05/08). 
 
The contact between elites and the poor is minimal. We are not doing enough (Minister, Civil 
Service, 15/04/08). 
 
There is no real contact between the poor and elites because the poor do not know their role in 
development (Resident Representative, Donor, 25/05/08). 
 
 
 
 
 
There is always an agenda for interacting with the poor, such as votes or visits to rural areas that are 
receiving support from NGOs, donors and government. During meetings with the poor, the poor usually 
sit on the floor, and visitors from these agencies sit on chairs, which is indicative of the power distance 
that exists. Therefore, there is no real engagement with the poor that can lead to a better understanding 
of their situation (PS, Civil Service, 5/05/08; Executive Director, CSO, 15/04/080). In addition, one 
respondent spoke of, 
 
The way elites dress when they go to meet the poor. For instance, MPs like to dress 
immaculately in tailor-made suits, and this scares the poor from fully participating in developing 
solutions to their problems. The poor feel that the elites should provide all the solutions to their 
problems and provide them with finances as well (Director, CSO, 17/6/08). 
 
 
 
Thus, the elites’ failure to understand the situation of the poor is arguably because contact between 
 
them and the poor is event-oriented or functional. For instance: 
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Members of Parliament interact with their constituents based on a political agenda. The purpose 
for interaction is political. Sometimes Executive Directors of NGOs carry out visits to rural 
areas that they support; but the poor start giving respect that defines the power structures and 
therefore real interaction is not there. Therefore the engagement with the poor in order to 
understand them is minimal. Sometimes we interact with the poor, for instance, when we meet 
them on the streets as beggars, or from buying their produce or our visits to the village. That is 
why some elites when the poor tell them about their situation, it becomes news because they 
do not really know the condition of the poor. They start talking about ‘I went to the village, I met 
so and so, and they were telling me their condition. This is an important issue that requires 
attention’. But elites should understand poverty issues because this is visible on a daily basis 
(Coordinator, CSO, 15/4/8). 
 
 
One respondent argued that the divide between elites and the poor resulted in their analysing poverty 
in theoretical terms, not as a lived experience (Country Director, INGO, 24/04/08). However, other 
respondents felt that their extended family relations and traditional contacts through the church enhanced 
their understanding of poverty and the poor, arguing that: ‘There is no single person that does not 
come from the village, therefore we are all attached to poverty. You will be hard pressed to find 
someone who has not experienced poverty in one form or another’ (MP, Parliament, 28/3/08). 
 
 
In contrast, there were those respondents who believed that, just as the elite used the poor for labour 
and votes, the poor used the elites as their benefactors. As these respondents stated: 
 
Elites take advantage of the poor by offering them poor pay for their services, knowing that 
there is unemployment; and the poor are used for votes into parliament by making promises 
that the elites never keep. But the poor can also abuse elites, using them for their daily needs 
(Donor, 16/6/08). 
 
 
 
Do not underestimate the poor because they also have a motive for associating with the elite. 
They can also be exploitative (Principal Secretary, 2/5/08). 
 
 
 
For others, there was a view that the poor felt entitled to share the elites’ wealth and take offence when 
 
the elites tell them to work hard and uplift themselves. 
 
 
Sadly if you tell them to stop begging and uplift themselves, they think ‘ukuwalalatira’ (laughing 
at their poor status). The poor don’t go to the rich to offer a service in order to be paid, but they 
are always begging. No one in my village has ever told me that they have something to sell me 
that would earn them some money. But they simply come and say that they have a child in 
school therefore want my assistance (PS, Civil Service, 17/04/08). 
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Whether you like it or not, by virtue of your position everybody who has less than you feels they 
are entitled to your help (Director of Programmes, CSO, 7/04/08). 
 
 
 
It could be that despite the unequal nature of their relationship, respondents felt close to the poor 
because of the kinship that linked rich with poor, powerful with powerless, and urban with rural. Even 
though the respondents felt encumbered by the claims of kinship on their own resources (as we shall 
see in Chapter 8), kinship contributed to a sense of belonging. Therefore, elites and the poor are 
’Inextricably linked in a relation of unequal dependence by which they relate to each other within the 
framework of the extended kin networks to which they belong’ (Chabal, 2009:46- 47). In addition, 
Malawi’s economy, which has been dominated by a dual agricultural development strategy since the 
colonial period (promotion of estate over smallholder farming) has had a significant influence on social 
relations, so that the poor have depended on the elite (see Chapter 5). Therefore, elites cannot live in a 
community detached from the poor, and it is this sense of belonging and obligation towards the poor 
that makes them human and social. As these respondents argued, 
 
Direct assistance towards extended family is a moral obligation for elites to give back to society 
(Advocacy Manager, INGO, 27/05/08). 
 
The charitable activities that elites are involved in are not solely out of moral obligation because 
it has gone beyond this. It has come to a situation where if elites do not do anything then 
someone will die, therefore we are helping people to survive (Governance Specialist, Donor, 
6/06/08). 
 
As much as elites may be seen as exploiting the poor, this is one form of welfare the poor can rely on in 
the absence of social services from government. 
 
 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
Analysis of elite perceptions of the causes of poverty produces information that contributes to the wider 
theoretical objectives of this thesis. For the theory of “social consciousness”, this relates to the extent to 
which elites feel responsibility towards the poor and for the existence of poverty. Thus it involves an 
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analysis of elite moral evaluations of a causal chain between their action or inaction and the levels of 
poverty in Malawi. 
 
 
 
As evidenced through questionnaires, interviews, observations and analysis of speeches, newspapers 
and parliamentary debates, members of the Malawian elite have strong views about the causes of 
poverty. The research for this study indicates that poverty is seen as primarily a problem of 
underdevelopment, thus respondents emphasised structural causes, especially the lack of economic 
growth, education, industrialisation, democratisation and diversification of sources of growth. Some 
refused to adopt individualistic explanations that apportion blame for poverty to the poor. Rather, they 
fully acknowledge the elites’ responsibility towards the poor, indicating that their lack of action is what 
causes the poor to be poor. Failure to provide resources, services and an environment that would 
encourage the poor to help themselves has left the poor helpless and dependant. Some respondents 
described poverty as a political problem, caused by inequitable distribution of resources, corruption and 
the persistence of personalistic politics and patronage. Although respondents blamed elites for these 
political problems, they tended to dissociate themselves from this blame, thus denying their influence. 
Mostly, respondents blamed other elite groups: for instance, MPs blamed bureaucratic elites for 
corruption; CSOs and private sector elites blamed political elites for allowing their need for votes to 
influence policy; CSO and INGO elites blamed the private sector for not ploughing their gains back into 
society; and private sector elites blamed bureaucratic elites for valuing personal gain and professional 
satisfaction over the impact of policies on the poor102. 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, respondents indicated that they believed that the poor had developed a culture of poverty, 
accepting their poverty as normal and resigned to it as a way of life. The poor are seen to be 
 
 
 
102 See Marquette (2011) who discusses this kind of attitude as ‘selective moral disengagement’, where individuals are involved 
in moral disengagement practices such as displacement of responsibility. Thus individuals will minimize their role in 
contributing to issues such as corruption or poverty in this case. Rather, individuals will talk about corruption or poverty as a 
collective action problem as opposed to being personally responsible (see also Bandura, 2002). 
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passive and distant from government, marginalised and unable to demand the services they need. 
Hence, their relationship with elites is unequal, although respondents viewed it as in some ways 
beneficial to both sides. 
 
 
 
It is important to note that, despite identifying a number of causes of poverty, elites see a lack of 
education as the most important cause of all. It is because the poor are illiterate and cannot formulate 
their demands properly that elites take advantage of them and do not provide them with the development 
initiatives and services they have promised. It is therefore the view of the elite that the various 
causes of poverty can be resolved through education (see Chapter 8). However, it has been pointed 
out that: 
Claiming education to be the best solution to poverty effectively diverts attention away from 
inequality, and onto less political issues, like the mentality of the poor. Implicitly, if education is 
the best solution to poverty, the causes of poverty – although not the fault of the poor – must be 
inherent within the poor, rather than in socio-economic relations or patterns of inequality 
(Hossain and Moore, 1999:112). 
 
 
 
Such thinking begins to reduce the elites’ sense of responsibility towards poverty and the poor in Malawi. 
For instance, although respondents emphasised structural causes and their own responsibility for 
persistent poverty, elites obviously believe that these causes can be reduced by changes in the 
behaviour and attitudes of the poor, which can considerably reduce their own incentive to take action. 
For instance, implementation of pro-poor policies might slide down the agenda, due to elite perceptions 
that such implementation could lead to laziness or dependency on the part of the poor. By contrast, 
respondents’ views on the structural and behavioural causes of poverty should not be seen as 
contradictory, as they demonstrate the elites’ awareness of the enormity of the poverty problem and 
inequality, but also their awareness of their own monopoly of privilege (Reis, 2010). 
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The observation that emerges from this chapter is that elites perceive the causes of poverty to be varied, 
and entrenched in Malawi’s general under-development. The poor are seen as passive, dependent and 
resigned to their fate, thus presenting no threat to the elites. This should be borne in mind during the 
discussion in the next chapter of the solutions elites suggest for poverty reduction and their views on the 
impact that poverty has on their own welfare. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: ELITES ON ANTI-POVERTY STRATEGIES AND THE NEGATIVE 
CONSEQUENCES OF POVERTY AND THE POOR ON ELITE WELFARE 
 
8.0 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
This chapter discusses respondents’ attitudes towards anti-poverty strategies. The chapter shows that 
respondents’ believe that poverty reduction cannot happen except through economic growth. Although 
some respondents argued that there should be a distributional shift towards the poor during the growth 
process, their value orientation was revealed in their preference for policies with a strong bias towards 
the economically active poor. In particular, education was preferred as a solution that would complement 
economic growth, providing the stimulus for the poor to take advantage of growth. Respondents’ 
believed that innovativeness, hard work, diligence and honesty, combined with economic growth, would 
provide the recipe for the poor to pull themselves out of poverty. This chapter also examines the extent 
to which Malawian respondents were conscious of three potential threats, insurrection, crime and health 
hazards, which have, in other contexts, led elites to believe that their welfare was at risk from the threat 
that poverty and the poor presented. Malawian respondents did not appear overly concerned about 
these threats, and where potential threats were present, individualised responses are adopted. Although 
they felt that there was a strong correlation between poverty and disease as well as crime, this was 
never discussed as presenting a threat to elite welfare. The potential for social insurrection elicited the 
least concern from respondents, who saw the nature of Malawians (see Chapter 7) as making a 
rebellion or revolution impossible. This was also partly explained by a fourth phenomenon: the 
extended family and patronage networks. These ties ensured social harmony, which made it impossible 
for the poor to foment any sort of rebellion. 
 
 
 
These arguments are developed in four major sections. In Section 8.1, the chapter discusses 
respondents’ attitudes to the relationship between poverty reduction and economic growth. Section 8.2 
assesses respondents’ attitudes towards various strategies for poverty reduction and their pro-poor 
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policy preferences. Section 8.3 analyses respondents’ views on the effect of poverty and the poor on 
their own welfare. Section 8.4 discusses respondents’ views on which institutions they believe should 
be responsible for poverty reduction, which reveals a preference for state-led rather than civil-society- 
led poverty reduction. 
 
 
 
8.1 Elite Priorities: Poverty Reduction or Economic Growth? 
 
 
 
The data presented in Table 8.1 are derived from questionnaires regarding respondents’ views on what 
Malawi’s main policy objectives should be. Respondents were presented with ten choices with which 
they had to indicate agreement or disagreement, and these data have been organised to enable 
comparison amongst different categories of elite. The data reveal that respondents’ policy preferences 
are related to their understanding of poverty and their perceptions of the causes of poverty. 
 
 
 
 
A significant number of respondents listed poverty and inequality (87%) first, with education (86%) and 
economic growth (74%) ranked second and third respectively, as the main policy objectives for Malawi. 
A preference for these options was significant across all the categories of elite, whereas preserving 
democracy was more popular amongst civil society, civil service, media and political respondents, whose 
ability to influence policy is dependent on democratic institutions. Interestingly, a smaller number of 
political respondents believed that increasing participation in decision-making should be a priority, which 
seems to support the view in the literature, that Malawian political elites have failed to ensure that the 
structures required for meaningful participation are available. This was evident in the PRSP and 
decentralisation processes (Bwalya et al, 2004; Chinsinga, 2003). Conversely, the table shows 
significant support for social protection policy amongst academic, civil society, donor, civil service, 
INGO and private sector respondents, perhaps because some members of these groups had been 
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closely involved  in the planning  and implementation  of subsidies and cash transfers, or  they may 
generally be left-leaning individuals with a concern for disadvantaged members of society. 
 
Table 8.1: Respondents on Malawi’s Policy Objectives 
 
 
 
 
 
Category 
 
 
 
 
 
Academic 
 
 
 
 
 
CSO 
 
 
 
 
 
Donor 
 
 
 
 
Civil 
Service 
 
 
 
 
Media 
 
 
 
 
INGO 
 
 
 
 
Political 
 
 
 
Private 
Sector 
 
 
 
Missing 
Value 
 
 
 
 
Total 
  
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
 
Eliminate poverty and 
reduce inequality 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
81 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
 
 
95 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
87 
Increase    educational 
levels 
 
 
0 
 
 
63 
 
 
100 
 
 
95 
 
 
100 
 
 
60 
 
 
94 
 
 
100 
 
 
0 
 
 
86 
 
Guarantee    economic 
growth 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
75 
 
 
 
87 
 
 
 
68 
 
 
 
86 
 
 
 
60 
 
 
 
65 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
74 
 
Preserve democracy 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
56 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
 
77 
 
 
 
86 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
71 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
60 
 
Implement    a    social 
protection policy 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
 
 
 
53 
 
 
 
 
77 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
Increase popular 
participation in 
decision making 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
63 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
 
 
77 
 
 
 
 
63 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
57 
 
Protect the 
environment 
 
 
 
100) 
 
 
 
56 
 
 
 
53 
 
 
 
77 
 
 
 
38 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
59 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
57 
 
Integrate the economy 
into the international 
market 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
Keep order 
 
 
0 
 
 
19 
 
 
27 
 
 
59 
 
 
25 
 
 
20 
 
 
47 
 
 
100 
 
 
0 
 
 
37 
Reduce the size of the 
state 
 
 
0 
 
 
31 
 
 
20 
 
 
45 
 
 
13 
 
 
0 
 
 
12 
 
 
100 
 
 
0 
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*Data derived from questionnaires. Total respondents = 86. All the percentages for each category are calculated based on the total of interviewees in each 
category. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.2 looks at the respondents’ views on the main means of reducing poverty. The respondents 
 
were  presented  with  eight  choices  with  which  they  indicated  their  agreement  or  disagreement. 
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Education was rated highly across all categories, and was by far the most popular response as a policy 
objective (Table 8.1). More than 50% of the respondents within the civil service, media, political, CSO 
and private sectors agreed that it was important to increase the efficiency of public social services. 
Promoting agriculture was ranked third, and was more popular amongst donor, academic, private 
sector and INGO respondents, whilst the CSO respondents were split equally. Ideally, the overall 
support (56%) for land reform appears contrary to popular belief that elites are not supportive of these 
reforms (see Chinsinga et al, 2008). However, looking at the data there is less support from civil service 
and political respondents, who are state actors responsible for implementing the initiative. To a certain 
extent this also shows that land reform is a political process, as it addresses issues of inequality. 
 
 
 
Table 8.2: Respondents on the Main Means of Reducing Poverty 
 
Category Academic CSO Donor Civil 
Service 
Media INGO Political Private 
Sector 
Missing 
Value 
Total 
  
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
 
 
% 
Yes 
 
Increase spending on 
education and educational 
reforms 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
 
 
 
60 
 
 
 
 
68 
   
 
 
63 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
 
 
88 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
66 
Increase   the   efficiency   of 
public social services 
 
0 
 
50 
 
47 
 
68 
  
75 
 
40 
 
53 
 
100 
 
100 
 
57 
 
Promote agrarian reforms 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
50 
 
 
 
73 
 
 
 
39 
  
 
 
33 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
 
47 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
56 
 
Introduce   social   protection 
policy for the poor 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
 
 
 
53 
 
 
 
 
45 
   
 
 
33 
 
 
 
 
80 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
Increase social spending 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
44 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
 
45 
   
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
Control population growth 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
38 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
27 
   
 
38 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
29 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
27 
 
Deregulate the economy 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
27 
   
 
23 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
20 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
 
100 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
19 
Increase Income Tax  
0 
 
13 
 
7 
 
9 
  
0 
 
0 
 
18 
 
100 
 
0 
 
10 
*Data derived from questionnaires. Total respondents = 86. All the percentages for each category are calculated based on the total of interviewees in each 
category. 
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Though there is some support for social protection policies, especially amongst CSO, donor, private 
sector and INGO respondents, there is minimal support for increasing social spending, population control 
and deregulating the market. Considering Malawi’s failure to raise revenues has resulted in aid 
dependence in order to finance the budget deficit (Chipeta, 1998), increasing income tax does not 
strike respondents as the best means of reducing poverty. The reasons for the lack of support for these 
initiatives became obvious during face-to-face interviews, where respondents indicated their support for 
initiatives that address underdevelopment generally. 
 
 
 
Table 8.3 shows respondents’ views on whether they believed that economic growth alone could reduce 
poverty in Malawi. This data was obtained through face-to-face interviews, and has been organised 
according to the divergent views amongst the respondents. 
 
 
Table 8 . 3 :  Respondents o n   Economic  Growth  and  Pro-Poor  Growth  as 
 
Solutions for Poverty 
 
 
Response Academic CSO Donor Civil service Media INGO Parliament Private 
 
Sector 
Total 
Yes 
 
% 
1 
 
100 
8 
 
72 
3 
 
60 
8 
 
53 
2 
 
29 
3 
 
75 
3 
 
50 
3 
 
100 
31 
 
60 
Yes but needs 
 
to be pro-poor 
 
% 
0 
 
 
 
0 
3 
 
 
 
28 
2 
 
 
 
40 
7 
 
 
 
47 
5 
 
 
 
71 
1 
 
 
 
25 
3 
 
 
 
50 
0 
 
 
 
0 
21 
 
 
 
40 
Total 
 
Respondents 
 
 
1 
 
 
11 
 
 
5 
 
 
15 
 
 
7 
 
 
4 
 
 
6 
 
 
3 
 
 
52 
*Derived from face-to-face interviews with respondents. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There was some confidence in the potential of economic growth as the best means for reducing poverty, 
although this optimism was not universal. The majority (60%) of respondents identified economic growth 
as the best means of reducing poverty in Malawi, while others (40%) questioned the 
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efficacy of growth alone, showing a preference for pro-poor growth. It was amongst the media category 
of respondents that more respondents (71%) opted for pro-poor growth, and amongst members of 
parliament (50%) that responses were equally split. During interviews, these two categories often 
presented themselves as representing the interests of the poor, as they worked at the local level. Most 
of the respondents indicated that they had observed families receiving cash transfers and acknowledged 
the benefits of these in the lives of the poor. Although they questioned their sustainability and perceived 
a negative impact on the poor (see Chapter 7), the respondents’ views reflected a growing awareness of 
the potential value of direct welfare transfers in reducing poverty, especially in situations where 
resources for more comprehensive support were not available. Generally, respondents believed that 
growth was at least necessary to tackle poverty in the long term, and confidence in growth extended 
across different categories of respondents. 
 
 
 
 
There are two possible explanations for respondents’ widespread belief in growth as a solution for 
poverty. First, Malawi’s development policy has emphasised economic growth, except between 1994 
and 2004, where poverty was emphasised, and this has increased preference for growth. Growth 
provides opportunities to which the poor can contribute, and from which they can benefit. Second, in 
many ways, the categories are blurred, with many respondents straddling both the public and private 
sectors. This potentially leads to a convergence in respondents’ beliefs and values, which may be an 
asset for influencing pro-poor policy. 
 
 
 
 
Looking back at Table 8.1 (p. 227), 74% of the respondents selected economic growth as one of the 
main policy objectives for Malawi. Documentary evidence also suggests that economic growth is 
considered necessary for poverty reduction in Malawi: 
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Unfortunately the situation in the villages does not reflect any sign of economic improvement. 
People in the villages remain poor; per capita income has fallen and is continuing to fall. Basic 
essentials are scarce – people can hardly afford to buy soap, clothes, sugar, salt and food 
(Tembo, 2000). 
 
In 2004 the Minister of Finance also made a clear link between growth and poverty, noting that, 
 
‘In 2003 the Malawi economy grew only by 4.4%, which is below the 6% required to make an 
impact on poverty reduction’ (Gondwe, 2004). 
 
 
For some respondents, growth was essential for keeping the rural poor from migrating into urban areas 
by investing in the areas where the poor lived: 
 
Integrated rural development where economic hubs are created is the starting point for poverty 
reduction. Because you are creating a place where the poor can market their goods and sell 
them. Create local industries where they can sell their mangoes, apples, tomatoes, and we also 
need to ensure that the rural areas are electrified. It is depressing to see the number of fruits 
such as mangoes, tangerines that lie rotten because we do not have a way of preserving them. 
I meet so many people with cassava on their bicycles coming to town to sell their products and 
if they had markets in their own areas, imagine how much can be achieved (PS, Civil Service, 
7/05/08). 
 
To reduce migration, the government is attempting to revive rural growth centres and ensure 
food security. We need to create jobs in the rural areas (Minister, Civil Service, 30/04/08). 
 
 
 
One good example is the infrastructural programmes supported by the World Bank; and a 
number of donors are also supporting rural development, so that we are on an equal footing in 
terms of access to basic necessities such as water, roads, telecommunications and health 
services. The aim is to spur economic growth and development in the rural areas and jobs can 
be created in their own areas and stop urbanization (PS, Civil Service, 5/05/08). 
 
 
 
Other  respondents  believed  that  growth  was  essential  because  previous  attempts  that  prioritised 
poverty reduction without growth did not have the desired impact. 
Poverty reduction is a priority for government, nothing else. We might be paying attention to 
economic growth but that is important for sustainable poverty reduction. In the past the 
government used to provide bridges or boreholes to reduce poverty, but there was no 
improvement in the lives of the poor. We need to grow the economy, create more wealth and 
employment opportunities. Economic growth is important because there must be something to 
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share. In this government we are talking about social protection policy and that needs growth 
(PS, 7/5/08). 
 
We need to balance poverty reduction and economic growth; we took a wrong turn in our 
implementation of the MPRSP because we ignored economic growth and fully concentrated on 
poverty reduction (PS, Civil Service, 5/05/08). 
 
In Malawi where we have poverty, where we want to reduce it and at the same time escape 
from it, we cannot just concentrate on growth alone or pro-poor policy. In government, the elite 
do agree that we need to introduce strong macroeconomic policies that spur growth. They 
believe that there will be a trickledown effect, but ironically they do recognise that they are in a 
situation where they cannot ignore poverty reduction programmes (PS, Civil Service, 11/04/08). 
 
 
 
However, some respondents questioned how growth would best be achieved and who would benefit 
from it. Are the interventions targeting the active poor, the inactive poor, or elites? As these 
respondents argued: 
Although you cannot have social spending without economic growth, the issue is how we 
achieve this growth. Do we support elites who have the means of production, and they will be 
cheaper to invest in for a faster growth? Or do we target the productive poor who have land 
and all they need are inputs? Or do we go to the poorest of the poor and pick them up and 
therefore spend more? These are things that Malawians have not debated about to find the 
faster way to achieve growth. The argument is that if we invest in the productive poor then we 
shoot up production and the economy will grow which will provide for the needs of the poorest. 
But that argument has difficulties because evidence from the input subsidy of 2004/2005 shows 
that support towards the poorest of the poor can also result in good yields (National Coordinator, 
CSO, 13/5/08). 
 
If we only grow the economy without the poor accessing social services, then only the elites 
benefit (Executive Director, CSO, 12/05/08). 
 
 
 
Accordingly, there was acknowledgement amongst some respondents that growth did not always have 
the greatest payoff to the poor unless there were special interventions. Thus a purely growth agenda 
was seen as absolving elites of responsibility, because lack of effective poverty reduction could always 
be blamed on lack of economic growth (Head of Policy, INGO, 24/04/08). Others considered economic 
growth a capitalistic way of tackling poverty, which took from the poor without focusing on social sectors 
(PS, Civil Service, 11/04/08; Executive Director, CSO, 11/06/08). Some highlighted issues of resource 
accumulation and social justice: 
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We spend a lot of time dealing with growth and we ignore social justice. We need special 
interventions for the poor (Project Coordinator, Civil Service, 28/04/08) 
 
In the past year we have had good numbers in terms of economic growth; and, if we can 
ensure equitable redistribution of resources, then poverty would be reduced (CEO, Private 
Sector, 13/05/08) 
 
The economy needs to grow so that we can supply and implement pro-poor strategies (Director 
of Programmes, CSO, 7/04/08; Operations Manager, Donor, 16/06/08) 
 
 
 
Therefore, growth should ensure access to productive assets and economic opportunities for the poor 
through effective allocation of the benefits of growth to the poor (Ward, 1999:26). As this academic 
noted: ‘I think the people out there know what to do in order to get out of poverty, but they lack the 
means. This is because they do not have the power to do anything meaningful on their own accord to 
confront the structures that perpetuate poverty’ (Academic, University of Malawi, 8/5/08). Despite 
emphasising pro-poor growth, some respondents’    solution is to invest in education, employment 
creation, subsidies, rural development and health, so that the poor contribute to and benefit from growth 
(Operations Manager, Donor, 16/06/08; Director of Programmes, CSO, 7/04/08; PS, Civil Service, 
23/04/08; PS, Civil Service, 11/04/08; Executive Director, Civil  Service, 5/05/08; and Regional Manager, 
Media, 9/04/08). 
 
 
 
Most respondents appear to generally support policies aimed at the active and industrious poor, or 
those that raise such human resource potential. As this respondent stated: ‘We need to invest in 
technical education so that people can get skills to help themselves, and also to invest in micro financing’ 
(Project Coordinator, Civil Service, 28/04/08).  Moore and Hossain (2002) consider these views a 
‘human resource’ definition of development. Therefore education is promoted not for its intrinsic value 
but its instrumental value, in that it contributes to economic growth, as well as opening up minds, 
increasing awareness and realising human potential. This can be interpreted as ‘a matter of people who 
are physically fit enough to work regularly, dextrously and efficiently; psychologically adapted to the 
routines and procedures of modern organisations; emotionally attuned to self-seeking enterprise; and 
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intellectually skilled in terms of both basic literacy and numeracy and more demanding and creative 
 
abilities’ (Hossain and Moore, 2002:15). 
 
 
 
 
Some respondents condemned Malawi for failing to use its human resource to ensure growth, as the 
 
Asian Tigers did: 
 
We hear that Malawi in 1964 was at par with Malaysia, South Korea and Taiwan in their 
development level, but these days South Korea is making Samsung when Malawians cannot 
even make a sewing needle.  This shows that there is something intrinsically wrong with 
Malawians and we are not doing well. Some people say we do not have a mineral resource, 
that is why we are not developing, but you do not require this to develop. The Asian Tigers 
barely had natural resources, but they have developed by using their manpower (MP, 6/5/8).  
 
Some people say this labour we have is not educated, but look at what the Asian Tigers were 
able to achieve. It also depends on the type of industry you are bringing in; for instance, making 
mobile phones requires a production line, and what is needed is to train that person on what 
they are supposed to do on that line (PS, Civil Service, 5/05/08). 
 
 
 
The respondents’ ‘human resource’ stance resonates with their lack of support for policies that 
essentially mean taking from the well-off to provide for the poor, such as increasing income tax, cash 
transfers and food distribution. Thus one would be hard pressed to find support for a poverty reduction 
strategy that exclusively relied on redistribution from the rich or the middle class (Rodrik, 2000:1). 
Rather, an educated nation is seen as important for meeting the objectives of growth and poverty 
reduction, which also enables the poor to take advantage of growth. Therefore, social policies are 
palatable if they conform to this ‘human resource’ notion of development (Moore and Hossain, 2002). 
 
 
 
8.2 Elites on the Main Means of Reducing Poverty 
 
 
 
 
This  section  examines  what  policy  strategies  respondents  considered  to  be  feasible  for  reducing 
poverty in Malawi. 
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8.2.1 Strategies Targeting the Industrious Poor 
 
 
 
The data in Table 8.4 are derived from questionnaires and present elite views regarding the viability 
and desirability of particular social policies.  The respondents were presented with fourteen strategies 
and had to indicate whether they felt each strategy was viable or desirable. The question attempted to 
understand whether respondents believed that feasible means existed to reduce poverty and would 
support these means. 
 
 
 
Table 8.4: Viability and Desirability of Particular Social Policies 
 
 
 Viable    and 
desirable 
Desirable 
but not 
viable 
Viable but 
not 
desirable 
Neither 
viable nor 
desirable 
 % % % % 
 
Micro finance 
77 10 5 8 
 
Public works programme 
71 14 10 5 
Free and universal primary education 70 27 1 2 
 
Fertiliser subsidies 
59 33 3 5 
 
Free and universal primary health services 
59 34 2 5 
 
National safety nets programme 
48 27 15 10 
 
Old age pensions 
43 36 7 14 
 
Cash transfers/ direct welfare transfers 
31 34 14 21 
 
Popular housing programmes 
30 50 2 18 
 
Child benefits 
29 17 2 52 
 
Free university education 
21 51 5 23 
 
Minimum income for different age groups 
21 35 7 37 
 
Food distribution programmes 
20 40 16 24 
 
Unemployment insurance 
15 38 13 34 
 
*Data derived from questionnaires. Total respondents = 86. 
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The data (Table 8.4) show that despite respondents’ attempts to conceal their view of the poor as lazy 
(see Chapter 7), their policy choices revealed a preference for policies that would target the productive, 
industrious and active poor, such as fertiliser subsidies, public works and micro-finance programs. Other 
strategies, such as free and universal primary education and health care, are instrumental policies that 
support growth generally. However, there appeared to be some considerable support for the national 
safety nets programme, which in Malawi has concentrated on food distribution when disasters have 
struck. This is in some ways similar to food distribution programmes, which received minimal support. 
During the interviews, respondents indicated that safety nets were desirable because they targeted 
those who had suffered from floods or droughts. Respondents were more sympathetic towards these 
types of safety net, even though they might be considered handouts, because they supported people 
during a crisis and required a short-term investment. However, this could also reflect the fact that 
safety nets safeguard elites’ legitimacy. The neo-patrimonial nature of Malawi’s society (see Chapter 
5) means that elites are judged on their ability to feed the masses, and this responsibility becomes 
more important during periods when interventions, such as agriculture subsidies, fail to ensure food 
security (Chinsinga, 2007b; Cammack, 2006). In my analysis of presidential speeches, I observed that 
Kamuzu Banda ensured food security through annual crop inspection tours; Bakili Muluzi distributed 
maize at public rallies and implemented a free seed and fertilizer programme; and Bingu WA Mutharika 
reinstated crop inspection tours and introduced the seed and fertilizer subsidy programme. At the 
launch of the ‘feed the nation fund’, Mutharika noted that, ‘If some of our people go hungry, then we 
cannot have peace in our country (21/08/05). This shows that there is a practical basis to elite authority 
in Malawi: food security. 
 
 
 
Other forms of safety nets, such as public works (71%) and fertiliser subsidies (51%), were considered 
more viable and desirable than strategies such as cash transfers (31%). In addition, other strategies such 
as unemployment benefits, minimum income, and child benefits were also not supported, with 
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34%, 37%, and 52% of respondents respectively, indicating that they were neither viable nor desirable. 
Despite this, however, there seems to be at least some conviction about the feasibility of most of these 
policies (Table 8.4), because the proportion of those who considered them viable and desirable was 
significant. 
 
 
 
Possible reasons for lack of support for cash transfers or food distribution became clear during face-to- 
face interviews: 
We cannot be giving the poor free food and expect them to graduate out of poverty, but we 
must give them opportunities to become productive members of society. Otherwise, we end up 
taking one group out of poverty and another back into poverty (National Coordinator, CSO, 
13/5/08). 
 
 
 
 
The solution therefore is to ‘teach people to fish rather than giving them fish’ (MP, 6/5/08). Otherwise, 
 
‘cash transfers are like manna from heaven’ (Bureau Chief, Media, 16/4/08). Most respondents indicated 
that cash transfers were too costly, not necessary and were doomed to failure in the absence of aid. 
Some respondents argued that cash transfers, as opposed to education for example, required 
support from taxation and indicated that this was not desirable in Malawi. As these respondents stated: 
Raising taxes is not ideal in Malawi. They are predatory and I would lead a revolution against 
them if they were implemented. Only if we could see roads being constructed and drugs 
available in all hospitals then people might be willing to pay higher taxes (Regional Manager, 
Media, 16/5/08). 
 
We are not able to raise taxes to support the social protection policy with the numbers of poor 
people that we have at present unless poverty levels were lower (Programme Director, CSO, 
13/05/08). 
 
Raising of taxes to accommodate social protection policy, well, it could be affordable only if it’s 
properly planned. You are giving money to unproductive sectors so people might prefer to raise 
taxes to support the subsidy program. Social protection is tricky because you are looking after 
the unproductive sectors of society (MP, Parliament, 28/03/08). 
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For others, the social protection policy presents a rent-seeking opportunity for political elites: 
 
Social protection policy, I don’t even want to think about it. You know there are members of 
parliament who have come into this office because they have heard of this initiative and are 
asking me to write a letter (which I have recently written) to donors asking for funds for these 
MPs to go to Brazil and South Africa to study their social protection policy. Not one MP but 
twelve of them plus two officials. What information of importance will they yield that we cannot 
pick from other policies we have implemented? These are MPs who have sat on designs 
monitoring donor flows and trying to see how effective aid mechanisms have been. One of 
them when I asked him (MP) how many people are accessing ARVs in Malawi, he said, ‘Don’t 
worry. I know what is happening in the nation on ARVs; but I will come back to you with exact 
figures’. He never came back with that figure which shows that to him he is not concerned and 
the issue is to go to Brazil to study social protection. I wish some of these initiatives were able 
to deliver, but at the rate we are going we will achieve nothing (MP, Parliament, 8/4/08). 
 
 
 
 
 
Others compared the social protection policy to previous initiatives, like the Malawi Social Action Fund 
(MASAF): ‘We had MASAF and loan facilities, like MARDEF, and none of these have had an impact on 
poverty. Where are the schools that MASAF built?’ (Executive Director, Media, 16/4/08). A prominent 
religious leader was more scathing in his view of social protection policy, arguing that almost every 
Malawian is poor: ‘The social protection policy is a non-starter because it is discriminatory. In Malawi it 
is very difficult to determine who is poor and needs what kind of support.’ (13/5/08). Questions of viability 
and targeting were raised, as Malawi does not have identity cards or birth certificates that can 
substantiate people’s ages. As this respondent argued: 
As some critics say, most poor people look old because of poverty, and in a nation that does 
not have birth certificates, how do you identify seventy-year old people, which is the ceiling for 
receipt of old age pensions? (General Manager, Media, 15/5/08). 
 
 
 
This summarises some central themes in the discussion of the main means of reducing poverty. Social 
protection may be necessary but is not seen as feasible, given that poverty affects nearly every 
Malawian. Education, public works, micro-credit, and subsidies are not only desirable and viable, they 
are essential for enhancing the productivity of the poor, thus enabling them to reduce their own poverty. 
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Respondents’ policy preferences reveal a partiality towards the active rather than the inactive poor. 
During my fieldwork, I attended several meetings within the Ministry of Persons with Disabilities and the 
Elderly, where plans were drawn up on how to implement a non-contributory old-age pension in Malawi 
as part of the strategies being implemented under the social protection policy. Despite spending time 
planning out the pensions and setting out the age limit (only those that are seventy years and above 
can receive), nothing was budgeted for in the 2008/2009 or the 2009/2010 budget. The fact that all the 
planning towards pensions has not resulted in actual implementation resonates with the perception of 
many respondents. An insight into these perceptions was given by a private sector official: 
 
 
 
We need to be assisting people with producing crops or starting a business. It is better than 
cash transfers. Especially these universal pensions, even for people who have not been working 
are laughable. How and who is going to pay for these pensions? (Chief Executive Officer, 
Private Sector, 13/05/08). 
 
 
 
The idea that cash or food transfers and pensions were handouts and led to dependency was prevalent 
amongst most of the respondents (see also Chapter 7). Thus, for some respondents, public works 
encouraged hard work, whilst cash transfers encouraged laziness and lack of planning by the poor. 
 
 
 
Public works programmes are good because they ensure ownership, especially because you 
are doing things that improve your own area such as roads. The money earned can be used to 
buy food and farming inputs. We had received some funding of US$1.1 million from EU during 
the food crisis of 2005, and one of the conditions was that those that are hungry but able to 
work were given public works to get food. These were asked to make manure, cultivate their 
land and they would receive some seeds. That is assisting that person to get food in the short 
term but also in the long term. With cash transfers someone can decide not to take a bath for 
three days, puts on torn clothes, come and present themselves as poor to receive this money, 
and do so the following month as long as the project is there. This is not sustainable and breeds 
laziness. When someone gives you money you have not planned for, you can’t think of what you 
want to do with that money (National Secretary, CSO, 7/5/08). 
 
What I am saying is that people have to work, they cannot just receive handouts. Yes, I am my 
brother’s keeper, but the poor also have a responsibility towards poverty reduction. I am not 
saying all poor people are lazy (MP, 8/4/08). 
 
Public works programme are more desirable than the cash transfer programmes. The concept 
and spirit of work is important; they are doing community work which keeps them busy. Cash 
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transfers are handouts, but to some extent, social protection can work if properly done. But the 
cash transfer aspect cannot work for Malawi. We have a different historical background to other 
countries where cash transfers have worked (MP, 28/03/08). 
 
 
 
A minority of respondents (Country Director, INGO, 24/04/08; Bureau Chief, Media, 16/05/08; National 
Coordinator, CSO, 17/06/08; Country Director, INGO, 27/05/08; PS, Civil Service, 11/04/08; Head of 
Section, Civil Service, 28/04/08; Minister, Civil Service, 7/05/08) believed that cash transfers were 
important for equalizing incomes in Malawi, supporting the poor’s social development,  empowering 
them to spearhead their own agenda and engage in economic activities. However, most respondents 
stated that when implemented, social protection strategies, including subsidies, should be a short-term 
measure with a clear exit strategy. As a respondent suggested, cash transfers should be conditional by 
requesting recipients to save some of the money received or send their children to school (Advocacy 
Manager, INGO, 27/05/08). A respondent from the media became slightly receptive to the idea of cash 
transfers once I explained that these were targeting the elderly and orphaned children. This invoked a 
recollection of a particular experience of the benefit of cash transfers, although its negative impact on 
the poor was still paramount: 
 
I observed the transferring of money to the elderly in Kasungu and when I asked them what 
they did with the money they said they bought food, paid school fees for grand children and 
bought inputs to enable them to farm. But I have a problem with the cash transfers in that 
although we are changing their lives we are creating a dependency syndrome. Because the 
poor would want to stay at that level because they know they will get something at the end of 
the day. With public works we are paying people to fix things that help them in their own lives 
such as roads that give them access to their own markets and so on. These are some of the 
interventions that are increasing the dependency culture and killing the hardworking culture in 
Malawi. Malawi on its own cannot manage to support the cash transfers and public works and 
whoever is pumping in money might decide to stop funding it. What happens then to these 
people that are used to receiving money? (Bureau Chief, Media, 16/5/08). 
 
 
Respondents’ policy preferences reflected nineteenth century Europe’s categorization of the poor as 
deserving and undeserving, which provided moral grounds for helping some poor people but not others, 
and influenced the strategies targeted at each category of the poor (see Chapter 3). These distinctions 
among the poor are politically significant as they enable a process of sorting or ranking the poor 
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according to perceived worthiness, a kind of pre-policymaking arrangement of policy priorities (Hossain, 
 
2005: 965). Therefore, the respondents’ perception of the poor as having fatalistic attitudes and a 
captive, dependant and passive mentality or mindset has moral, social and political implications. 
 
 
 
 
First, respondents might assume that these characteristics of the poor, which Berthoud et al. (1981) 
label ‘defects of character’, lead to missed or squandered opportunities and can be overcome only if the 
individual works hard; consequently poverty might be seen as deserved.  Second, it could be assumed 
that most government action will not have the desired impact on the poor, resulting in further 
dependency and laziness. Thus the solution might be to stop direct welfare support, or implement it in 
such a way that it will not reach the less deserving. As this media leader indicated: 
 
If you keep giving the poor programmes that involve giving cash, food or subsidies, you end up 
breaking the hardworking nature of Malawians. At the end of the day we will achieve laziness, 
and people will get used, and become dependent on handouts (Regional Manager, Media, 
15/5/08). 
 
 
 
Lastly, anti-poverty strategies might target the poor willing to work hard to get out of poverty rather than 
the ‘less industrious’ poor, such as the disabled, children or the elderly. For instance, Table 6.6 (Chapter 
6, p176) shows that only 17%, 13%, 10% and 8% of the respondents viewed youth, child- headed 
households, the sick, and the disabled respectively, as vulnerable to poverty, and 52% considered child 
benefits as neither viable nor desirable (see table 8.4). 
 
8.2.2 Prioritising and Investing in Education 
 
 
 
If we add the first and second column together in table 8.4, education was by far the most prominent 
solution amongst Malawian respondents for reducing poverty in Malawi. Low educational levels are 
seen as the reason why poverty in Malawi is increasing, and why society has not developed attitudes 
and values conducive to the implementation of pro-poor policies and the skills to enhance productivity. 
As these respondents note: 
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Education is the key as it impacts on the attitudes of the poor. If all people were educated then 
they would have a positive attitude towards development (PS, Civil Service, 11/04/08). 
 
What an education does is to make you see doors where there are no doors or to sense 
opportunities (Academic, 08/05/08). 
 
 
 
Therefore, despite the problems associated with free primary education, such as quality and access 
(see Chapter 7), many respondents still trust in the efficacy of education to deal with poverty and ensure 
growth. As this respondent argued, increased spending on education is the main solution to sorting out 
the varied causes of poverty: 
If I were asked to support reduced spending on defence, I would agree only if that money was 
put towards education. There is nothing better the government can do than support education, 
because education alone would improve child mortality rates and reduce population growth and 
cut down on the number of children a family has. It does not make sense when the rural poor 
have five or seven children in today’s life” (MP, 6/5/08). 
 
 
 
The alternative for those who cannot go back to school is technical education to make them functional 
members of society. 
We need ‘school ya kwacha’ (basic education) for those who cannot go back to school, so that 
they are able to manage their resources (National Coordinator, CSO, 17/6/08). 
 
We need to invest in technical education so that people can get skills to help themselves and 
also invest in micro financing (Project Coordinator, Civil Service, 28/04/08). 
 
 
 
Thus, investing in education is seen as promoting productivity and an entrepreneurial spirit. This was 
related to the lack of diversity in agriculture and Malawi’s dependence on tobacco and maize, which 
affects Malawi’s comparative position in trade. 
 
 
 
We have done really well with maize but why can’t we diversify into other cash crops? Why do 
we import milk, meat and fruits? Why can’t we be like the Asian Tigers and invest in high tech 
or entrepreneurship?  It takes so many bags of maize to purchase a simple mobile phone, 
which our friends in Korea are making, and we were at the same development level at the time 
of independence. If our entrepreneurial spirit was harnessed and we were able to produce 
some of these gadgets where would Malawi be? Education is key (MP, 8/4/08). 
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Education is an important factor of production. The world is moving fast in terms of technology, 
and we need an educated Malawi in order to take advantage of these improvements (Executive 
Director, CSO, 11/06/08). 
 
 
 
The importance respondents attached to education is not surprising as education has been viewed as 
playing an important pragmatic and instrumental role in Malawi’s development. In the post- 
independence period, education was aimed at localising expertise in order to replace non-Africans, to 
contribute towards economic and social development, to facilitate national integration, to reduce 
regional and racial inequalities, and to pre-empt threats to social or political stability from the poor 
(Cooksey et al 1994; Ridell, 2003). Emerging from respondents’ views is the idea that education would 
not only raise incomes, reduce inequality and increase employment, but would also transform the poor, 
a large drain on national resources, into an asset. 
 
 
 
Education serves to ‘legitimise social inequalities by providing, in theory, a channel for upward social 
mobility’ (Hossain and Moore, 2002:24). Therefore, the poor who do not get an education can be blamed 
for their own poverty. This also serves to justify the value of hard work as a route out of poverty and a 
belief in the allocative efficiency of the economic system. Hence, elites’ responsibility for ensuring 
poverty reduction and a growing economy is reduced (Halper, 1973). The respondents often pointed to 
themselves as an example of the fact that through education, upward social mobility was possible. 
 
 
 
It is the duty of the poor to know that nothing is impossible, that things might change if they do 
something, that they can do everything in their means to change their condition. For instance, I 
was not always well off. I grew up in the village, learnt under a tree up to form two. When I 
started work nobody gave me anything and I struggled through and learnt how to manage my 
resources (National Director, Media, 16/4/08). 
 
 
 
As a result, elites ‘may be content to allow the longer processes of economic development to tackle 
poverty without any more immediate or direct intervention’ (Hossain and Moore, 2002:25). As this 
respondent observes: 
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There is also a lot of illiteracy in Malawi, but in the north many northerners are very educated, 
such that if you go into the villages you find that there are retired teachers, professors and 
doctors. But poverty is still high and similar to that in other regions where illiteracy is high. The 
problem is not that they are unable to use the resources they have but that they do not have 
the opportunities or resources to actually do something (Regional Manager, Media 16/05/08). 
 
 
 
What seems to emerge is that respondents believe that indirect strategies to reduce poverty are better 
than direct strategies, for a number of reasons: some practical (e.g. higher taxes are very unpopular) 
and some normative (e.g. the poor are not hardworking). Then again, some of the views suggest that 
respondents are looking to East Asia, rather than to other low developing countries, for a model of 
development. 
 
 
 
8.3 The Impact of Poverty and the Poor on Elite Welfare 
 
 
 
This section examines the extent to which respondents believed that the presence of poverty and the 
poor had an impact on their welfare. This is done by assessing the extent to which Malawian elites 
appear concerned or threatened by three potential hazards: crime, disease and uprisings or rebellions. 
 
 
 
 
8.3.1 Minimal Health Threat from Poverty 
 
 
 
Interviews with Malawian respondents suggested they were not concerned that poverty and the poor 
might present a threat to their health. There was awareness that poverty made the poor more prone to 
disease because of poor nutrition and poor sanitation, and that lack of food made the poor’s immune 
systems weak and vulnerable to disease, whilst poor water sources and sanitation led to the spread of 
diarrhoea  and  cholera.  In 2004  USAID noted  that  there  were 17,100  diarrhoea  related  deaths  in 
Malawi; and, in the year 2000, 18.5% of all child mortality cases were from diarrhoea (USAID, 2008: 1). 
These diseases are seen to be linked to poverty: 
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There is a link between poverty and disease or epidemics. For instance, orphans are more 
prone to get HIV/Aids because they are out on the streets and get into prostitution to earn 
money. There are other diseases, like cholera, which come about because of unsafe drinking 
water and spread through the overcrowding in slums such as Tsiliza/Kaliyeka. Even other 
diseases such as malaria come because people have no access to mosquito nets or pesticides 
(Managing Director, INGO, 5/6/08). 
 
 
 
In nineteenth century Europe, health threats to their welfare stimulated elites to act and improve the 
living conditions of the poor. In particular, the threat of diseases such as cholera led to major municipal 
and public health, particularly sanitation, reforms (Moore and Hossain, 2005; de Swaan, 1988). Malawian 
respondents expressed serious concerns about overcrowding within the city slums, which they 
a r g u e d  w o r s e n e d  t h e  s p r e a d  o f  d i s e a s e . Some r e s p o n d e n t s  ( Regional C o n t r o l l e r , 
M e d i a , 19/05/08; Executive Director, CSO, 15/04/08; and Advocacy Manager, INGO, 27/05/08) 
argued that Malawi’s overpopulation in urban areas was a time bomb that could escalate into a rebellion 
if the situation became unbearable. However, there was no indication in respondents’ views that this 
might have an impact on their welfare. There was a sense amongst respondents that something was 
being done to address health issues.  Therefore, there was no urgent threat to elite welfare similar 
to that which drove nineteenth century British elites to take action. 
 
 
 
There was recognition that the poor’s lack of income made it impossible to access medical care or 
purchase medicines, which sometimes led to their death. Such knowledge of the poor’s vulnerability 
was mostly based on respondents’ own experiences through extended family, as this respondent 
illustrated: 
My mother was ill and I brought her to town, took her to the hospital and I have spent a lot of 
money on bills. She is out of hospital and I still have to keep buying the medicines that she 
requires. This made me think that if I had not been alive, my mother would be dead by now, 
because she would not have afforded to pay for the treatment. The poor do not have access to 
medical facilities and die from diseases that can easily be treated because they cannot afford 
medicine (Regional Manager, Media, 9/5/08). 
 
I have my mother, a very sick old lady, and she must be in her late eighties. That is a lady that 
could have died a long time ago if I did not provide clean water, food, a good roof over her 
head and if I did not make sure that she has access to medical care (MP, Parliament, 8/04/08). 
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For some respondents, the link between poverty and diseases was similar to the ‘chicken and egg’ 
 
situation. As this respondent pointed out: 
 
 
 
 
Poverty does affect disease and nutrition. When someone is so exposed to poverty then their 
ability to cope is affected, their nutrition level drops and they are exposed to disease. On the 
other hand, diseases also cause poverty, because there are other people who are able to work 
and fend for their families. They are still poor but have something to eat. But they get 
tuberculosis or HIV/Aids, malaria, and they can’t work anymore and provide for their family. 
Hence the family becomes poorer than they were before. This is an egg or chicken situation – 
what comes first the disease and then poverty or poverty and then the disease? But of course 
you can expect high levels of diseases in poorer communities. For instance, in the case of 
cholera, this results from bad water because someone has not provided good water or a 
hospital to treat the disease or an education to avoid it, to take care of themselves and their 
bodies (Director, CSO, 7/4/08). 
 
 
 
For this prominent CSO Director, the question was, what comes first, the health problem and then 
poverty; or poverty and then the health problem? Whilst agreeing that many health problems were a 
result of poverty, he rarely mentioned the impact it could have on elite welfare and seemed to be 
preoccupied with the causes of health problems, such as lack of clean water, hospitals and illiteracy. 
He reverted to the argument cited earlier in this chapter on the corrective role of education, and argued 
that if the poor were educated, then they could avoid some of the diseases, like cholera, by learning 
how to take care of themselves. 
 
 
 
 
If the poor died from preventable diseases, it was because they ‘lack awareness of timely interventions 
 
for diseases’ (MP, Parliament, 8/04/08) and ‘fail to immunize their children’ (Country Director, INGO, 
 
27/05/08). Thus the existence and spread of diseases amongst the poor was linked to the behaviour 
and attitudes of poor people towards hygiene or health in general and the lack of education. Low 
education meant that: 
There is no appreciation of hygiene measures, and the poor may also skip immunization for 
children, resulting in preventable illness (Director, INGO, 27/5/08). 
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The poor do not adhere to hygiene practices, such as washing hands and wearing clean 
clothes (Donor, 5/6/08). 
 
The poor will use the same streams to answer the call of nature, to wash their clothes, bath and 
draw water for drinking (Editor, Media, 16/5/08). 
 
 
 
It was argued that education could change these attitudes and behaviour: 
 
Poverty derived from lack of education does contribute to disease. Most of the times I have 
gone home (village), I have been told that a child is sick from malaria and has been given 
Panado103 because they do not know any better. Therefore, this child will die because of 
ignorance and lack of sensitization. This is upsetting because they do not know that Panado is 
not a cure for malaria. They do it because of lack of knowledge, education and outreach 
programmes that can sensitize the poor (Minister, Civil Service, 7/5/08). 
 
For instance, if your niece fails to go to school, marries early and does not believe there is 
HIV/Aids because education levels are low, and when she gets ill she believes that she has 
been bewitched, you are called all the way from town to take her to the hospital only to find that 
she is anaemic. If this person had enough education and resources, you would hear of her 
illness when she has been discharged from hospital and they would not wait for you to take 
them for medical treatment (Country Director, INGO, 27/05/08). 
 
 
 
Respondents lacked fear from the impact these diseases might have on elite welfare for two reasons: 
first, they believed that they were highly insulated from disease through access to private medical care 
nationally or abroad: 
Since independence in 1964 and 44 years later, people still go to South Africa for major medical 
treatment. We have changed ministers and PSs in health, yet we have not been innovative 
enough to come up with our own state of the art hospital. Many poor people are dying 
because they cannot be flown out of the country for medical treatment (Country Director, INGO, 
27/5/08). 
 
Elites do not care because they have access to private hospitals and private education. This is 
of course a realisation on the part of the elite that something is wrong with our health system, 
but it does not translate into action (Regional Manager, Media, 16/5/08). 
 
I cannot take my family to a hospital that I know is below standards, but that does not mean I 
am doing nothing to change the situation. The fact that you can afford medical assistance 
abroad does not mean you will ignore the situation in your own country. The issue here is about 
the system the country is using, whether we have the Marxist approach where we all wear the 
same type of clothes. But in our economy we have to understand that there will be differences 
and understand that the hospitals we have are because elites understood the importance of 
developing these institutions (Minister, Civil Service, 7/5/08). 
 
 
 
103 Panado is a painkiller that contains paracetamol and is recommended for relief of mild to moderate pain and fever such 
as headaches, toothache and pain associated with colds and flu (www.drugs.com). 
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Second, respondents believed that diseases were often concentrated in areas where the poor lived. 
Therefore, reference was often made of the poor in the slums, as evidenced by these responses: 
 
 
 
Many of the poor in the slums rely on unsafe water and poor sanitation that can result in 
outbreaks of diseases such as cholera (Manager, Media, 16/05/08). 
 
There is a link between disease and poverty as poor people settle in squatter areas where social 
services such as water or sanitation are not readily available. These things lead to cholera 
(Executive Director, Civil Service, 5/05/08). 
 
The people living in slums have to have money on a daily basis to buy water and firewood. 
When they do not have money to purchase water, they normally resort to the use of dirty 
streams, which leads to cholera (National Coordinator, CSO, 17/06/08). 
 
The poor live in crowded houses, therefore TB or coughs are easily transmitted (Governance 
Specialist, Donor, 5/06/08). 
 
The urban poor live in congested areas that are filthy, and this is the breeding ground for the 
spread of diseases like cholera, tuberculosis and so on. Deaths and violence occur frequently, 
and when they return to their villages they continue with stealing and violence (MP, 6/05/08). 
 
The urban poor have to pay for water on a daily basis in urban areas and on those days where 
they do not have money, they use the nearest stream, which results in diseases such as cholera 
(Deputy Director, Private Sector, 12/05/08). 
 
 
 
Respondents’ views portray a perception akin to what Lister (2004) terms ‘othering’ and show that 
diseases are considered to be something that affects them (the poor) and not us (elites). These views 
enable  respondents  to  distance  themselves  from  the  social  ills  emanating  from  poverty  such  as 
disease. It is not surprising that respondents should feel a sense of ‘untouchability’ when it comes to 
the impact of diseases on their welfare. Findings from research carried out in Bangladesh, Haiti and 
South Africa seem to suggest that elites are either unaware or dismissive of the impact poverty might 
have on their own welfare (Reis and Moore, 2005). One reason offered for this is that in contemporary 
developing countries elites face circumstances that are considerably different from those faced by 
Europe’s nineteenth century elites, which led to their support for pro-poor policies. In the nineteenth 
century, sewerage systems, centres for disease control, refrigeration, antibiotics and immunisation for 
various health problems did not exist, and so elites had to invent them, benefiting all (Turshen, 1989). 
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In modern developing countries, elites can just import existing technologies, negating any drive to find a 
collective solution. 
 
 
 
This has both a positive and negative outcome in terms of pro-poor policy. On the one hand, a ‘late 
development effect’ affords contemporary elites some protection against the negative consequences of 
poverty feared by nineteenth century European elites, mainly through medical scientific improvements” 
(Hossain and Moore, 2002: 22). On the other hand, elites have adopted individualised responses to 
tackling disease, for instance, seeking private medical care; hence, they are not inclined to provide 
basic sanitation and water facilities with wider health, social and economic benefits for the poor (Hossain 
and Moore, 2002). 
 
 
 
However, HIV/Aids is seen as different to other diseases like cholera, and as having a potential impact 
on elite welfare; so a quicker policy response has been seen (although this might also be due to donor 
funding). In 2001, Malawi put in place the National Aids Commission, which is responsible for 
coordinating the response to HIV. Malawi also introduced free HIV testing centres, a national free anti- 
retroviral programme and home-based care for patients (World Bank, 2003a). 
 
 
 
Most respondents, except members of parliament and donors, believed that there was a link between 
poverty and prostitution that had an effect on the health of the elite. The respondents noted that many 
girls from poor households flocked into the cities in search of money but ended up in prostitution. As 
these respondents noted, 
Diseases occur because people want to exchange sex for money. That is why we have deadly 
diseases like HIV/Aids. The poor are prone to HIV/Aids because the young girls are going into 
prostitution to make a living. As President Thabo Mbeki says, there is no HIV/Aids, just poverty 
(Deputy Director, Private Sector, 12/05/08). 
 
When girls are poor and have no decent education, they turn to prostitution. Either way they die. It’s a 
 
choice between dying from poverty or dying from HIV/Aids (Director, Media, 16/04/08). Consequently, 
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these young girls seek out the elite, thereby spreading the disease. In this sense, respondents are not 
insulated from the diseases that the poor have: 
HIV/Aids has an impact on elites because elites are going after young girls who need financial 
support because of poverty. Therefore they get and contribute to the spread of HIV/Aids (MP, 
16/4/08). 
 
 
 
However, the potential impact of HIV/Aids on elite welfare was explained as affecting immoral elites 
who sought prostitutes. 
 
8.3.2 Nonexistent Fear of Insurrection 
 
 
 
In the survey, respondents were asked to choose what they considered to be the worst consequence of 
poverty. The survey data show that 56% percent of the respondents did not consider social conflict and 
chaos as the worst consequence of poverty. Social conflict and chaos is a threat that has collective 
consequences for elites, and would therefore require collective action by elites; but there appeared to 
be little belief that it had any bearing on elite welfare. 
 
 
 
In an attempt to understand why respondents did not consider social conflict and chaos as the worst 
consequences of poverty, interview data were examined. The interview data showed that most 
respondents believed that poverty would not lead to any form of insurrection. This lack of fear of 
insurrection is perhaps unrealistic, considering that there are examples of rebellions in Malawi, however 
small or unsuccessful. In 1915, Reverend John Chilembwe led an uprising against the colonial masters 
and is hailed as the father of nationalism in Malawi. Although the uprising was unsuccessful, it laid the 
ground for the formation of native associations that fought for African representation in the colonial 
administration as well as for better quality services, such as education and health. This same spirit of 
rebellion was evident in the fight for independence, which was granted in 1964, and for democratic rule, 
which was achieved in 1994 (see Chapter 5).  These rebellions have mostly been against social 
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Injustices such as poverty and inequality (The African Executive, 2005).  However, these rebellions are 
considered inconsequential, as this respondent notes: 
 
 
 
Yes we have social unrest; but not the kind that can change things. We express our anger in 
terms of demonstrations and smashing windows here and there. But it never lasts” (PS, Civil 
Service, 23/04/08). 
 
 
 
Some  respondents  (PS,  Civil  Service,  23/04/08;  Executive  Director,  CSO,  15/04/08;  Academic, 
 
08/04/08; and MP, 6/05/08) pointed to the rise in food prices that had not provoked any response from 
the poor. Another respondent pointed to the ten years of the United Democratic Front Government 
(1993-2004), which he considered the most difficult years for the poor, compared to the time of Kamuzu 
Banda’s one-party system. Yet Malawians remained peaceful (General Manager, Media, 15/05/08). 
This respondent noted that: 
We have had attempts (at rebellions) before by the Consumer Association of Malawi when 
bread or transport costs have gone up. They have called on people to boycott bread and public 
transport; but nothing really happens. Malawians do not like to question authority (Director, 
Media, 16/4/08). 
 
 
 
The basis for respondents’ lack of fear of insurrections by the poor is their belief that the poor are fairly 
 
peaceful. As this respondent suggested: 
 
Open rebellions in Malawi are not possible. Under normal circumstances in a village setup that 
would be rare and strange, because the system in the village is more equal. But the poor who 
live among us (urban areas) are able to see the inequality, and the differences are too big. A 
family of four in the urban areas might have four cars, enough food for three nutritious meals 
and equate that with the maid who cleans your house on a daily basis, but this poor woman 
lives in these dirty slums. The guard who looks after your life in the night gets peanuts at the 
end of the month; the difference is very big, and we are sitting on a time bomb. It is just the cool 
nature of most Malawians that we do not see a lot of violence and most of them do not want to 
be involved in violence (MP, Parliament, 6/05/08). 
 
 
 
Thus some respondents considered the poor as having accepted their fate. As this prominent minister 
indicated: 
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I get worried because poverty has become acceptable; people believe it is normal to be poor; 
they are resigned to the way life is. Although I am not afraid of the poor revolting against the 
system, I am worried about this acceptance of poverty (Minister, Civil Service, 6/6/08). 
 
 
 
 
Related to this is the view that the poor cannot really rebel because poverty has been an integral part of 
Malawian society. Thus a rebellion would only occur if there was a period of improvement in poor 
people’s lives or things drastically deteriorated. 
 
 
 
Poverty would not result in social unrest, because it is characteristic of Malawi to be poor, we 
have always had poverty. We’ve always had hunger, we have always had some areas 
supported by development and others not supported. It is normal to have poverty and to be 
poor (Project Leader, Donor, 5/6/08). 
 
 
 
Most academic literature on politics and political development supports respondents’ views on the 
passive nature of the Malawian poor. For instance, Jones and Manda (2006) talk of an absence of 
voice and a culture of fear and silence; Ott et al. (2003) of an unquestioning loyalty and a culture of 
silence; Bwalya et al. (2004) of undue respect for authority and submissiveness; and Booth et al. (2006) 
of a dependence culture which means that in Malawi inequality is desired and anticipated. Generally, ‘In 
the minds of the ordinary people, the government is conceptualised and understood as a powerful and 
feared institution that operates at the top and the people do not see themselves as part of the 
governance process, (Meinhardt and Patel, 2003:51; see also Chapter 7). 
 
 
 
Others  see  religion  as  having  contributed  to  the  poor’s  moral  restraint  and  submissiveness. 
 
Consequently, 
 
There is still this religious impact on the poor such that a rebellion would be wrong, therefore 
rebellions would not be possible (MP, 6/05/08). 
 
In a society like ours, full of preachers and churches, they pacify the communities. A country 
like Malawi is less likely to experience a rebellion because if you are poor, your entry into 
heaven is that much easier (PS, Civil Society, 28/04/08). 
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Another respondent likened religion to the role that shock absorbers play in a car, seeing it as beneficial 
in ensuring harmony amongst different groups in society and also making hard work the only 
acceptable route out of poverty: 
Churches are entrenched in Malawi. Therefore the thinking of Malawi as a God fearing nation 
has a negative effect in Malawi. That is why political extremities in terms of corruption and 
utterances by politicians are able to be consumed by Malawians without any real reaction. 
Malawians have shock absorbers because we are mindful of being a God-fearing nation. This 
is important for Malawi, we should not lose it. Riches are always a result of hard work and one 
has to be a hard worker to be rich (National Coordinator, CSO, 17/6/08). 
 
 
 
Another reason given for lack of fear of social insurrection was that respondents believed the poor were 
illiterate and therefore had no understanding of their rights. As these respondents argued: 
 
 
 
You have to remember that if people rise up against something it is an indication of a certain 
level of literacy, and they are able to understand their power and can use it to their advantage. I 
am more afraid of the rise in petty crime and the rise in corruption than I am in an uprising 
(Managing Director, CSO, 6/05/08). 
 
Malawians cannot rebel because we are not knowledgeable about striking as a form of reacting 
to situations that arise. We are not aware of our rights and how to protect our rights (Minister, 
Civil Service, 21/04/08). 
 
 
 
 
Generally,  respondents  believed that the poor  ‘do not like to rock the boat’  (Bureau Chief, Media, 
 
16/05/08), were obedient, did not question authority or voice any concern over poverty, and were docile 
(Executive Director, CSO, 11/06/08). Respondents argued that by nature Malawians were humble, 
which enabled the elite ‘to throw them about like a football’ (PS, Civil Service, 23/04/08).  Their sense of 
insulation was exacerbated by their belief that the violence that accompanied rebellions and other threats 
such as health and crime, affected other poor people, rather than the elite. As this respondent stated: 
Violence would actually revolve around the poor themselves rather than towards elites. With high 
fences the elite are insulated from poverty and in their ability to seek medical attention abroad as 
well as education they are highly insulated. As I said, crime, violence and disease revolve 
around the poor themselves, but it does spill over to the elite now and again  (PS, 
11/04/08). 
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However, the high fences show that elites are in fact affected by rebellions, because crime could be 
seen as a form of rebellion: 
If you want to know that elites are scared just look at the high walls they have and the security 
guards they employ. They pretend that they do not care about rebellions but they are 
unconsciously insecure (National Coordinator, CSO, 6/5/08). 
 
 
 
However, crime was not considered a serious form of rebellion, and definitely not one that would impact 
on their welfare in the short term:   ‘I do not see Malawians rising up, maybe in the next 50 years’ 
(Bureau Chief, Media, 16/5/08).  Therefore, there were some respondents who acknowledged that 
insurrection was possible but was unlikely to occur in the short-term: 
 
 
 
I have not tried to advance this theory of whether the growth of poverty can result in a rebellion 
or uprising by the poor. But for sure I get concerned and worried when I see the people at 4pm 
or 5pm almost stampeding from their work places, walking long distances because they cannot 
afford a bus fare. I get worried.  If you saw me in 1993 it was as if my fear came true. We used 
to see the labour force stampeding like that, and I always said this was a problem (MP, 
Parliament, 8/4/08). 
 
It is a misconception to think that the poor would never rise up. Slowly people are beginning to 
react  and  starting  to  demand  for  the  provision  of  goods  and  services  (PS,  Civil  Service, 
23/4/08). 
 
In Malawi it takes time to rise up, and the social movements are not yet confident enough to 
rebel against social injustices. But we cannot say that it will never happen A time will come 
when people will say enough is enough (Advocacy Manager, INGO, 27/5/08). 
 
Although rebellions cannot occur because of our culture of submissiveness, we need to keep in 
mind that habits change over time. Malawians have not always been quiet, and poor people will 
not be quiet forever. The poor have the capacity to rise up one day, and someone can organise 
them in future. In a democracy rebellions are even more possible (National Coordinator, CSO, 
13/5/08). 
 
If poverty levels rose then there would be a chance of rebellion, because people want to see 
that their leaders are doing something and changing their lives. If the leaders do not meet 
expectations then there will be a rebellion with people wanting to change government” (MP, 
30/4/08). 
 
 
 
Examples were given by the above respondents of rebellions that had occurred, such as those by poor 
 
Malawians against their Asian employers over poor working conditions. Another was the protests from 
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tobacco farmers over poor prices in 2008. The most serious was in 2007, when many Malawians rose 
up against foreign traders and vandalised their places of trade as Malawians complained that these 
groups were taking their markets and hence their livelihood. Most recently, on 20 July, 2011, Malawians 
demonstrated against poor political and economic governance that had worsened life for many of them. 
However, there appeared to be a belief amongst the respondents that these types of rebellions were 
instigated by other elites. For example, following the 20 July demonstrations, President Mutharika said: 
‘People who wear slippers do not strike. It is these political and civil society leaders who want to topple 
my administration’ (Mawawa, 2011). 
 
 
 
Therefore, there is a sense of security from the threat of insurrection, which is driven by elites’ belief 
 
that social uprisings are only possible if the elites instigate them. As indicated by this respondent: 
 
A rebellion in Malawi is not possible without the hand of the elite. For the poor to organise a 
mass movement it requires funds and a certain level of economic muscle. This rebellion would 
require use of communication aides for advocacy and the poor would not have access to these. 
Even during the recent mass action against opposition MPs for refusing to pass the budget, 
you could see banners, type written letters and so on which the poor cannot afford. You could 
see that some elites had a hand in it because the poor cannot write a petition (National 
Secretary, CSO, 7/5/08). 
 
 
 
Other respondents were uncomfortable with the ease with which the poor could be manipulated to form 
a rebellion: ‘The poor can be manipulated on the promises of simple things that they dream of such as 
nice shoes, food, clothes’ (Minister, Civil Service, 6/6/08). There was social awareness amongst 
respondents of the inequality in society and fear that those elites who rebelled could easily find a 
following amongst the poor: 
The facts on the ground show that the distribution of resources is unequal unless government 
programmes start to distribute resources equally or give resources to the poor through social 
protection. The budgeting system is such that the elites get a big share although the elite are in 
the minority. Even the tax system taxes those earning less and these are the people that have 
a lot of people to look after (MP, Parliament, 6/05/08). 
 
 
 
It is plausible to conclude that the fear voiced by respondents of rebellion from other elites drives most 
256  
of the political bargaining in parliament, appeasement through employment, and the general distribution 
of resources amongst the three regions. This would then affect pro-poor policies, as they would not be 
responding to the real needs of the poor104. Moreover, Malawian citizens have not developed the 
attitudes and personal characteristics that would enable them to take an active role, accept the privileges 
and bear the responsibility of the democratic and development process in their society (Packenham, 
1964). As Toye (2007) suggests, to reduce poverty the poor have to be able to organise and challenge 
the system. This was the hope of one respondent: 
I am looking forward to the time that the poor will rebel and claim what is due to them. If only 
the poor had power then we would listen to them, because they are now able to bargain. If the 
70 % of the poor people rose up, then the 30 percent would listen. The time that I hear the poor 
have risen up, that is the day I will know that poverty has a chance of being reduced. Culture 
and the traditions of Malawi do influence the extent to which the poor can rebel, but this brings 
us back to the fact of power. The fact is that Malawians became unquestioning obedient beings 
because of the power Kamuzu exercised over them. People were disempowered and excluded 
from decision-making, such that decisions were made for people that were under threat. It 
might be difficult for people to rise up, but life is changing and people are exposed to technology 
and a time will come when the poor will say enough is enough and rebel. One day this will 
happen in Malawi, and it might not be our generation but maybe the future generation will rebel 
(Head of Policy, INGO, 24/4/08) 
 
 
 
In Chapter 2 we saw how social and political threats to elite welfare were partly responsible for the 
implementation of welfare states in Europe. Although some welfare responses were at times repressive 
rather than ameliorative, threats were partly responsible for ensuring that elites paid attention to poverty 
and the poor, in their midst (Toye, 1999; de Swaan, 2005). The data from Malawi shows that similar 
responses to poverty and the poor are lacking. Malawian respondents seem content with the way 
things are and secure in the knowledge that poverty has not reached a sufficiently worrying level to 
warrant an insurrection. Thus, the threat of insurrection is not a means of keeping poverty high on the 
agenda of elites in Malawi. The next section discusses the potential threat that respondents saw crime 
as posing. 
 
 
104 
As Cammack (2004) argues, Malawian  elites are unresponsive to the needs of the population and form coalitions on 
issues that have no impact on the welfare of the people; whereas the poor are tied to big men by patronage ties along 
regional, ethnic and religious lines. 
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8.3.3 Elites on the Potential Threat from Crime 
 
 
 
Unlike health and insurrection, crime was a significant cause of concern among Malawian respondents: 
when asked to choose the worst consequence of poverty, 85% of the respondents mentioned crime. 
This shows that the respondents placed emphasis on individual negative consequences (i.e. crime) 
rather than collective negative consequences (i.e. health hazards and insurrection) (Reis, 2005). The 
reasons for this became clearer during the analysis of the qualitative data. 
 
 
 
Crime is considered to have increased with the transition to democracy in 1994, and there was no 
shortage of crime stories in the news following the transition. According to the National Crime 
Victimization Survey of 2007, Malawi has relatively high rates of crime and at least 48.5% of the 
respondents to the survey indicated they had experienced crime (Pelser et al, 2007). In the face-to-face 
interviews, some respondents (Governance Specialist, Donor, 16/06/08; PS, Civil Service, 11/04/08; 
MP, 28/03/08) noted that security companies and the use of electric fences seemed to have grown 
proportionate to a perceived increase in crime. Thus respondents’ feeling of insecurity in the face of 
crime was evidenced by the fact that most elites were spending more on paying private security 
companies, constructing high fences and electric fences, and putting up burglar bars. However, very 
few respondents perceived crime to be clearly linked to poverty. This is because respondents considered 
crime to be perpetrated by the non-poor, and destitution was not considered a cause of crime. 
 
 
Thus, respondents made a distinction between crimes of need and economic crimes. Crimes of need 
occurred where poor people lacked the means to cope, especially when facing food security issues, so 
that they resort to crime for subsistence. Economic crimes occurred because people who had less were 
living in close proximity to those that had more (and things that were worth stealing) (Kelly, 2000; Pelser 
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et al., 2007). Consequently, the setup in Malawi, where at the periphery of each suburb there is a slum, 
is seen to present an opportunity for crime: 
 
The poor in urban areas live among the rich: they know what they eat, what they own and the 
lifestyle they lead. They know they have televisions, DVD players, and human nature has it that 
either they want similar things or get it to sell in order to have money; therefore the poor start to 
steal. These people have nothing else to do, therefore can do anything to survive (MP, 6/5/08) 
 
 
Therefore, owning property was a security risk for the respondents: 
 
 
 
I live in area 49. I am considered well to do because of my house and the fact that I have a job. 
I cannot show that I have money because most people around me are poor. For example, I 
was thinking of buying a generator for my house but when I look around my neighbourhood 
some people do not even have electricity, therefore my house would be the only house with 
electricity. Some of these developments are a hazard to your health because they attract 
criminals. Even if I wanted to buy a better car I cannot because it would attract unnecessary 
attention and people begging for alms. You cannot live comfortably when you are surrounded 
by poverty (Director, Media, 16/4/08). 
 
I live in area 47, next to the slum Ntandire where most of the thieves come from to steal in our 
areas. Due to the social gap which is there, they come to steal from us because of poverty. 
Every time there is political unrest in Malawi, all the shops are smashed because they see the 
goods daily, but they are unable to access them. When they get a chance they take what they 
can (PS, Civil Service, 23/04/08). 
 
I live in Lumbadzi amongst the poor and I own a house that is better than my neighbours’, that 
makes me insecure. I am afraid of crime because people believe I am better off (Regional 
Manager, Media, 9/05/08) 
 
 
 
 
Despite  the recognition  that inequality  led to crime, most respondents’  discussions  dwelt on other 
 
motivations for criminal activities, such as unemployment. As this respondent argues: 
 
High unemployment rates, lack of advice for poor people, lack of motivation – these are factors 
that increase crime. The breakdown of the social security system itself contributes to crime. 
Poverty itself is not a big contributor to crime and the poor are hardly involved in crime (Director, 
CSO, 7/04/08). 
 
 
 
However, some respondents considered crime a complex issue, one that related to human nature and 
the criminal mind, mainly of the non-poor. One respondent asked: 
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The elites you talk about, if they steal, are they stealing because they are poor? No, it is 
because of their criminal mind and because it is in them just to grab all the time. Definitely, 
poverty does not explain crime (MP, 8/04/08). 
 
 
 
Another respondent noted that: 
 
Some elites are involved in crime, but it’s not easy for them to get caught, and some gangs are 
sponsored by elites. Although the crime that is most pronounced is the one done by poor people 
(Executive Director, CSO, 12/05/08). 
 
 
 
Consequently, the crimes (corruption) of the non-poor were considered to be more significant than the 
crimes (stealing food) of the poor. This view may be well-founded, as public sector corruption is 
increasing and citizens have to pay bribes to access services, and large sums of money are stolen 
through government contracts and outright thievery (Malawi Government, 2006; Anders, 2002). 
 
 
 
It seems that most respondents failed to acknowledge a link between poverty and crime because they 
wanted to appear sympathetic towards the poor. The poor are seen to have dignity such that,  ‘Despite 
being poor they will not be involved in crime’ (National Coordinator, CSO, 13/05/08), whilst another 
respondent observed that the poor ‘are so preoccupied with survival that they spend more time looking 
for food because that is what is important, not crime’ (Director, CSO, 7/04/08). If the poor’s crime could 
be termed as such, it was because they were ‘vulnerable’ (Country Director, INGO, 24/04/08; Regional 
Manager,  Media,  9/04/08)  and  ‘desperate’  (MP,  Parliament  28/03/08;  Managing  Director,  CSO, 
6/05/08). Generally, the poor were considered peaceful and ‘innocent with no other choice’ (National 
 
Secretary, CSO, 7/05/08). As these respondents argued: 
 
 
The poor are in a situation where they have to find money on a daily basis to buy water and at 
the same time they have no food or cannot afford three meals a day. They are strained and 
resort to crime (National Coordinator, CSO, 6/5/08). 
 
 
 
When the poor break into your house, they steal bags of maize or your goat. They will not take 
anything else, and you know that people are starving because they have nothing to rely on, to 
survive  on,  and  the  only  way  of  getting  something  is  to  steal  (General  Manager,  Media, 
15/05/08). 
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Crime was therefore seen by some respondents as a form of natural justice meted out by the poor 
which ensured distribution of resources (Country Director, INGO, 27/05/08). As these respondents 
noted: 
There is a strong link between poverty and crime. This is their way of being heard because they 
are frustrated and you have a lot of theft and vandalism.  Some vandalise because they want to 
sell but others do it because they say ‘we should be equal’. For instance they would vandalise 
an electricity poll so that there is no electricity, or destroy a bridge so that vehicles are unable 
to pass because they are walking (PS, Civil Service, 23/4/08). 
 
Poor people think that everyone who is well-to-do is the cause of their poverty, therefore would 
want to steal from this person (National Director, Media, 16/04/08). 
 
Crime is a result of the inequality that exists in Malawi. The poor want to have what the rich 
have (PS, 28/04/08). 
 
 
It became clear that the urban poor, who were considered by the respondents to have the resources 
within their means to reduce their poverty, were seen to be involved in economic crimes. 
 
I do not agree that people become criminals because of poverty. I do not expect a villager to 
come and rob my house. I have never seen that. But criminals are those in urban areas, that 
have tasted the good life, and they are not motivated by poverty but want to live a life they have 
not worked hard to get. People become criminals because someone has what they do not have 
(Head of Policy, INGO, 24/04/08). 
 
In the rural areas there is no correlation between poverty and crime or diseases. The poor in 
the rural areas are not prone to crime, but the urban poor are prone to crime. If they don’t have 
any economic activity many of the men resort to crime to do with theft or stealing.  I haven’t 
seen poverty bring out in the rural areas the vices of crime (PS, Civil Service, 6/6/08). 
 
Some poor people, especially in urban areas, are to blame because they are not 
entrepreneurial,  therefore  they  fail  to  uplift  themselves  out  of  poverty  (PS,  Civil  Service, 
28/04/08). 
 
 
 
However, most respondents acknowledged that the poor in urban areas faced untold hardships (see 
also Chapter 6). According to this respondent: 
 
If you go to that slum in Blantyre called Mbayani, it is steaming with children without clothes, 
suffering from malnutrition. There are no adequate services even though it is within city 
boundaries. There are no clinics there. This is bleeding disease and crime. The petty theft 
occurring, the thieves come from there because they have nothing else to do and they need to 
survive.  Crime is a form of rebellion, because if these people were provided with something 
they will choose not to steal. If you meet people that are caught stealing, they have no shoes 
and they are wearing tattered clothes (PS, Civil Service, 24/4/08). 
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Although crime was clearly a concern for the respondents, some respondents pointed out that Malawi’s 
crime was not as bad as in some other countries. As this respondent argued, “there is a connection 
between crime and poverty but not as bad as other countries. The crime rate is there but it’s not as 
bad” (MP, Parliament, 28/3/08). He went on to argue that respondents were somehow immune from the 
effects of crime, noting that: 
Even though the effects of crime are there, they will only trickle down to the elites in the longer 
term. Eventually it could. We are in a very fortunate position because we have not reached that 
part yet. Even though the elites keep themselves in high fences to protect themselves from 
crime, in terms of crime do not compare us with South Africa (MP, 28/3/08). 
 
 
 
 
It was a common view amongst respondents that the impact of crime on their welfare was minimal as 
they could insulate themselves by employing private security firms or build houses with high or electric 
fences (Executive Director, CSO, 15/04/08; National Coordinator, CSO, 6/05/08; Executive Director, 
Civil Service, 5/05/08; PS, Civil Service, 11/04/08; PS, Civil Service, 17/04/08; and MP, 28/03/08; 
Programme Manager, Donor, 6/06/08). 
 
 
 
The ability to make themselves secure led most respondents to believe that crime affected other poor 
people from whom it was easier to steal than from elites. As this respondent states: ‘Crime actually 
revolves around the poor themselves rather than towards elites, but the elites are affected’ (PS, Civil 
Service, 11/4/08). This is also explicit in the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy (2002) which states 
that, ‘For the ultra-poor, the only means of survival may be stealing food or assets from other poor 
people (p. xiv). 
 
 
 
The point is that respondents did not seem to unanimously agree that the poor were prone to crime. 
Rather, they agreed that some poor people committed crime. These were considered crimes of need 
(e.g. stealing food), and respondents believed these to be inconsequential in comparison to economic 
crimes (armed robberies and corruption), committed by the non-poor.  But most respondents felt 
262  
insulated from crime because (a) they believed in the innocence, dignity and generally good moral 
character of the poor; (b) they did not believe poverty or inequality necessarily caused crime; and (c) 
they could afford security. As Kelly (2000) argues, when crime is seen in economic terms, then the best 
solution has been the deterrent effect of the criminal justice system rather than a direct response to 
poverty. In my analysis of parliamentary proceedings, I found that MPs showed concern at growing 
crime in Malawi, but that their solution was to tighten the judicial procedures for dealing with criminals: 
 
 
 
We are saying no to armed robbers in this house. I want those who perpetrate those crimes to 
get it from here that their time is over. This bill is intended to tighten the noose. We are saying 
no to burglars (National Assembly debates, 34th session, 27th June, 2000). 
 
 
Then again it can be argued that strengthening the judicial system is an indication by the elite that living 
in high fenced houses does not render them immune to crime. As one respondent indicated: 
 
In Malawi 50% of the elite know that if poverty is not reduced then they will be affected at one 
time or another. That is why they are trying to introduce social protection policies that will 
mitigate the situation (PS, Civil Service, 11/04/08). 
 
 
 
This respondent continued to argue that the social protection policy was one way of reducing crime in 
 
Malawi, and noted that South Africa was an example of how social protection policy had reduced crime: 
 
 
South Africa has introduced social protection policies, which have helped a lot in reducing crime. 
Without this policy, the crime in RSA would have been higher. The poor are struggling to eat, 
definitely. They will be violent in a society like Malawi, where we do not take the poor on board 
in development planning. Definitely we are heading for disaster. You know social protection has 
been argued as one of the most important interventions for averting instability (PS, Civil 
Service, 11/04/08). 
 
Another respondent believed that increasing poverty would lead to an increase in social problems, and 
thus to elite action: 
 
Elites do care about the poor but they become more caring when poverty starts to impact on 
their welfare through crime and social instability (National Coordinator, CSO, 21/05/08). 
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However, the current lack of fear of health, insurrection and crime was worrying: ‘This lack of fear of 
crime amongst the elites affects the way elites support policies. For instance, the shooting down of bills 
in  parliament  would  not  happen  if  elites  knew  that  the  poor  would  react’  (Bureau  Chief,  Media, 
16/05/08). In nineteenth century Europe, the fear of crime induced elites to act to mitigate the impact 
poverty had on their own welfare, through coordinated public action. However, Malawian respondents, 
although aware and concerned about crime, believed its impact could be mitigated individually through 
private security and fortifying their houses. In addition, the crimes of the non-poor were felt to be more 
threatening than the crimes of the poor, and from respondents’ views, the poor were restrained in their 
response to deprivation. 
 
 
 
 
8.3.4 The Potential Threat from Social Networks 
 
 
In many African societies extended families have been a safety net, with the well-off assuming 
responsibility for the social or economic needs of their poor relations. In some cases in Malawi, and 
indeed in much of Africa, families have pulled resources together to educate one person to become the 
breadwinner for the extended family. Therefore in Malawi to be poor or umphawi implies the lack of kin 
or friends: 
 
There are no poor and rich; the rich have helped those who are in want. No man starves 
because he has no food; no child cries for milk because its parents do not have milk cows; no 
orphan or old person starves because there is nobody to look after them. No, these things are 
unknown in Bantu society (Iliffe, 1987:3). 
 
 
 
This argument is consistent with a study carried out by Chilowa et al. (2000) that identified assistance 
from relatives as the poor’s major coping strategy (see Appendix 8). According to the respondents 
interviewed, the extended family had the greatest negative impact on their own welfare in comparison 
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with crime, disease and social insurrection. The extended family was considered an encumbrance to 
the respondents, who were impaired in their professional or political activities105: 
 
Because I am doing well, have a job and earn a steady income, I have become a target of 
relatives and other poor people who come and beg from me. My ambitions are detracted 
because of the poverty in my family and home village. The little resources I have pay school 
fees for my families’ children. The impact that poverty has on the elites prevents them from 
progressing or become richer (Head of Policy, INGO, 24/04/08). 
 
 
 
If it wasn’t for poverty, I should have been one of the millionaires in Malawi. But if my brothers 
or sisters have children and they cannot afford to send these children to school, it becomes my 
responsibility to educate them. If I do not send these children to school then I do not wish my 
children well, because all these children will camp at their house if I died (Operations Manager, 
Donor, 16/06/08). 
 
 
 
If you drive a car and have a nice house to live in, you cannot refuse people money. They do 
not believe when you say that you do not have money. One relative told me to my face when I 
told him I do not have money that he felt I was lying. The understanding of the poor is that if 
you live in area 47 then you are rich and should provide assistance (Executive Director, CSO, 
15/4/08). 
 
 
 
The extended family was considered a drain on respondents’ resources as it encompassed both their 
 
own kin in their home village and their partner’s family. As this respondent explained: 
 
 
The extended family system in Malawi starts from my family, which is myself, my husband and 
our children, then his brothers and sisters. As well as my brothers and sisters, their children, 
both sets of parents, their brothers and sisters, and the extension goes on (PS, Civil Service, 
2/5/08). 
 
 
 
This affects not only the respondents’ resources but also their mental health. As this respondent noted: 
 
 
This strains even my conscience because the demands are too many that you cannot afford to 
meet them all. But the expectation out there is that I should be able to provide for everything for 
the mere fact that I am working. They think I get a lot of money. If you tell them you do not have 
money they think you are mean and this can be psychologically stressful. Sometimes one has 
to go to the extent of getting into debt to assist people. Otherwise had it been the money was 
for me, my wife and children, I would have been happy because the money is enough for me 
and my wife. But when you bring in the demands from kin it becomes problematic (Academic, 
University of Malawi, 8/5/08). 
 
 
 
 
 
105 For an account of extended families and their role in African life see also Chabal, 2009. 
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When I asked the respondents what these demands entailed, most mentioned basic necessities such 
as food, money for school or hospital fees, funerals, weddings, purchasing agricultural inputs and, in 
most instances, to provide a safety net in times of food crisis that lead to hunger. 
 
 
 
People come to you that some relation is dead and they do not have a coffin, food for people to 
eat during the funeral ceremony and transport to the graveyard. You provide for these. Then 
someone else might come and say someone is sick and there is no transport to take them to 
the hospital. Poverty also impacts me professionally because if you lose a relation, you have to 
leave everything to attend the funeral, and our funerals last two to three days before burial, and 
people do not understand that you need to go back to work. Another thing is that as a 
breadwinner you are expected to mobilise everything and pay for school fees for relatives’ 
children. Sometimes people just show up at your house and tell you that they discussed in the 
village for you to look after a relative’s child, and they bring that child without consultation (PS, 
Civil Society, 17/4/08). 
 
 
 
Political respondents pointed out that apart from extended family, they had to cater for the needs of 
their constituents, including both individual and community needs. This included supporting development 
projects, for instance the building of school blocks or bridges and support for income- generating 
activities, from their personal resources. The respondents were weary of the demands pressed on them. 
As a result, political elites had called on civil society to educate Malawians on the role of a member of 
parliament. 
 
What MPs are doing through charitable acts is a temporary measure. There must be a 
deliberate programme by civil society to civic educate the poor, because it is not a job of an MP 
to buy coffins. We hope a time will come where people will understand our role and theirs (MP, 
Parliament, 16/04/08). 
 
 
A similar call was made by women MPs to the Catholic Centre for Justice and Peace (CCJP)106, 
who argued that Malawians did not understand the role of women leaders: 
 
They expect everything from us and they just want to receive. If I bring development, for 
instance to drill a borehole to provide water, they expect me to transport the brick and sand 
with my own resources. If you do not assist in this way then you will lose your seat in parliament 
(MP, Parliament, 22/05/08). 
 
 
106 CCJP is a civil society organisation that was established in 1992 to contribute to the common effort of the Episcopal 
Conference and the whole Catholic Church in Malawi, in the creation of a just and peaceful Malawian society that promotes 
integral development and lasting peace (http://www.ccjp-lilongwe.org). 
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It was normal to find constituents at the offices of several ministers I was interviewing asking for school 
fees, transport to return to the constituency, employment and so on. Respondents noted that since 
government began providing ambulances in rural areas, calls to pick up sick people to transport them to 
the hospital, or even the dead to the mortuary, had reduced. However, according to the elite this 
reliance of the poor on elite resources could and did lead to corruption. 
 
For a person like a politician, you are always pressed for resources, and you are always trying 
to find ways of acquiring more resources to meet demands and expectations. It’s constant 
pressure, and what every politician is thinking is that they need money in order to be re-elected. 
This can lead to corruption, because you need resources to get into power and resources to 
maintain power, and these resources are not finite. You need to find a way of generating this 
income (MP, 28/3/08). 
 
 
 
Other respondents ridiculed the idea that elites benefited from the poor, arguing that this was not true in 
 
Malawi. As this respondent noted: 
 
There is no joy in being the only person who has a vehicle in the village, because every time 
there is a problem they come to your house to ask for transport to hospital and the like. If you 
have a grocery shop in a rural setting where people do not have money, then you cannot make 
any profit. There is too much money coming from the elites to the poor and elites do not benefit 
from the poor (PS, Civil Service, 6/6/08). 
 
 
 
Despite these perceived negative impacts of social networks on elite welfare, respondents pointed out 
that no one in Malawi could escape contact with the poor, and the extended family actually represented 
a strong link between the poor and the elite. They saw the legitimacy that they had amongst their kin, a 
legitimacy that protected them from violence or social uprisings by the poor, as predicated on their 
ability to provide social and economic support for the poor. Kinship in Africa translates into structures of 
reciprocity that govern interpersonal and intra-communal relations. There is a system of exchange that, 
though unequal, provides a win-win situation for both the elite and the poor (Chabal, 2009). Therefore, 
this link provided social protection for the poor but also security for the respondents by ensuring social 
harmony between the rich and the poor and averting future burdens. For instance, help in paying for the 
education of the children of poor relations would ensure that they became more productive and 
entrepreneurial in reducing their own poverty. 
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I have so many people that am looking after today and my house is one of the largest homes in 
area 47, even though I only have five children. Four of my children are abroad studying, so I 
should only be having one child in the home. But I have twelve children. If you don’t assist 
these children to go to school, they will always be a burden on you and your children. It is a 
vicious circle and to break it you send them to school. If you send a relative’s child to school 
and she leaves school without completing, they cannot come to you for any other assistance 
because you have done your bit (Operations Manager, Donor, 16/06/08). 
 
 
 
The impact of poverty in Malawi is felt through the extended family because if you do not do 
something to help your extended family then you bear all the costs that come along the way. 
That is why we are forced to send our cousins, nieces and nephews to school, so that they 
become independent and no longer need your help (National Coordinator, CSO, 13/05/08). 
 
 
 
Similarly, support towards extended family and kin is seen to avert social tensions in Malawi that might 
lead to social uprisings and violence from the poor. As this respondent stated: 
It becomes very dangerous as a family for you to build a big mansion, well roofed and 
ventilated, and to do nothing for your family members. It threatens your own well being, such 
that in my personal life before I could build a house for myself I had to build one for my mother, 
brothers and only after that could I start thinking of building a house for myself. This ensures 
that there is no tension between me and my kin. These charitable activities are a moral 
obligation for elites because it develops communication between elites and the poor. If you show 
that you care, then the poor will approach you and they start to feel empowered. Otherwise the 
relationship between elites and the poor can become hostile (National Coordinator, CSO, 
17/06/08). 
 
 
This may suggest that support towards the extended family protects elites from some of the negative 
impacts of poverty and may begin to explain respondents’ lack of fear from social uprisings. Alternatively, 
extended family relations may lead to collective responses to poverty reduction: 
 
These charitable activities are a burden for us elites and this will put pressure on elites to do 
something for the poor so that the burden becomes less (MP, Parliament, 6/05/08). 
 
As elites we need to move beyond providing these charitable gifts and provide a conducive 
environment for the poor to escape the poverty trap. We need to introduce credit facilities with 
minimal interest, provide farm inputs that they need, and as elites we should plough back into 
the communities from which we have moved. It is our duty to provide for the poor and the poor 
have the right to benefit from what we have amassed (Country Director, INGO, 24/04/08). 
 
 
Extended family relations cut across stratification or hierarchy and thus link rich with poor, powerful with 
powerless and urban with rural. As Chabal (2009) argues, notwithstanding the negative burdens or 
positive opportunities  that extended  family relations imply, these relations contribute to a sense of 
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socially meaningful belonging (Chabal, 2009:47). This sense of belonging introduces a set of obligations 
and defines how individuals relate to one another as human beings. There is a collective virtue and 
a notion of public good implied in extended family relationships. This can be related to the political 
system as, ‘People begin to vote for politicians along district or kinship lines, so that they have their own 
in power that can then support them financially’ (Academic, University of Malawi, 08/05/08). Therefore, 
despite the unequal, exploitative relationship between respondents and the poor, their relationship is 
mutually beneficial, such that the poor are not likely to rebel against the elites as they need them for 
their social and economic needs. 
 
 
 
 
Another respondent noted that these social relations were beneficial for development in Malawi, arguing 
that, ‘The fact that elites are attached to the village through extended family is good for Africa. For 
instance, the success that Japan had was based on culture and community spirit’ (Resident 
Representative, Donor, 25/5/08). Consequently, despite the negative impact on elite resources of 
extended family demands, respondents overwhelmingly supported continued support towards the poor. 
When I asked respondents whether these charitable deeds were their responsibility, the majority agreed, 
with only two respondents disagreeing. These two members of parliament argued that support towards 
the poor was the role of government, noting that their taxes should go towards support for social 
services. This suggests that although they might rely on patronage for legitimacy and a sense of 
belonging, they did not like the demands it placed on them. 
 
 
 
 
However, charity was considered by the majority of the respondents as a moral and a cultural obligation 
of the elite: 
 
Sometimes, when you stay in town for too long without visiting the rural area, you start to think 
that things are okay. But if you take time to walk around in the rural areas you start to realise 
that there are despicable levels of poverty that exists in Malawi. It is disheartening and you will 
feel a sense of hopelessness, as a country whether we will ever rise from this poverty trap. 
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Charitable activities are a moral obligation on the part of the elite, and it is embedded in our 
cultural orientation. You would not want to see your mother starving when you have a little 
something that you can share (Academic, University of Malawi, 08/05/08). 
 
This kind of support towards the poor is a moral obligation; it is a responsibility from which the 
elites cannot ‘switch off’ unless they turn a blind eye to the problem in their own backyard. As 
things stand there is no way to escape it because the African heritage in us still continues, and 
we are rural in our minds even when we stay in town (MP, Parliament, 6/05/08). 
 
This assistance towards extended family should be a moral obligation if we want to change the 
society because if my sister’s children are educated, then their children will also go to school 
and we are cleaning society in the process (Operations Manager, Donor, 16/06/08). 
 
 
 
 
For some, moral duty is derived from a religious belief that God expects the non-poor to be stewards 
and assist the poor: 
 
Even though extended family commitments impact negatively on my resources, this support 
teaches me and enhances my concern for the poor. I am able to support my family but what 
about those people that do not have families, who do they turn to?   This becomes the 
responsibility of the elites because the Bible teaches us that we need to show concern for the 
poor (Director, CSO, 12/05/08). 
 
I believe in sharing the little God has given me (National Coordinator, CSO, 17/06/08). 
 
Support towards extended family is a cultural and moral duty because God expects us to be 
stewards (Chief Executive, Private Sector, 13/05/08). 
 
 
 
For others, support was more than a moral obligation: it was a matter of life or death: 
 
It has come to a situation where if elites do not do anything, then someone will die. Therefore 
we are helping people to survive. A moral obligation would be to help someone from one point 
to another not to live from day to day (Governance Specialist, Donor, 6/06/08). 
 
 
 
Therefore more involvement in charitable organisations was considered an essential form of social 
responsibility and reinvesting in the community. However, there was recognition that charitable acts 
towards kin were not sufficient to deal with poverty.  Thus, respondents believed that support to kin 
should go towards productive activities, such as agricultural inputs, entrepreneurial activities and 
education. This was consistent with the elites’ view of the importance of poverty alleviation through the 
development of human resources. 
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Morally or practically, if you are well off you cannot ignore your needy relatives, but on the 
other hand, these same handouts increase dependency. Support towards relatives does not 
give them the drive to do better and reduces productivity in their lives (Leader, Donor, 5/06/08). 
 
Moral obligation perpetuates poverty and encourages more relatives to come and beg. 
Sometimes we are doing more harm and we should be helping the poor to help themselves, for 
instance instead of giving maize, we need to provide fertiliser, because the poor also have to 
work (Advocacy Manager, INGO, 27/05/08). 
 
 
 
 
Thus kinship ties generate bonds between elites and the poor and imply a ‘”social consciousness” and 
a degree of social engagement on the part of the elite, including a belief in the interdependent fates of 
rich and poor’ (Clarke and Sison, 2005:75). But can the elites’ feelings of moral obligation and 
personalised commitment towards relatives and kin be generalised and converted into a civic notion of 
responsibility (Reis, 2010:15)? The next section discusses which key actors or institutions respondents 
considered suitable for implementing pro-poor policy in Malawi. 
 
 
 
8.4 Elites’ Faith in the State 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.5 shows that when respondents were asked who should be responsible for taking action 
against poverty, 91% of them assigned responsibility to the state/government107. One reason for this 
overwhelming support for state responsibility may be because of Malawi’s three-decade-long experience 
of a centralised state and the pivotal role of the state in the economy under Kamuzu Banda 
(1964 – 1994). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
107 Government and state was used interchangeably during interviews. 
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Table 8.5: Institutions Responsible for Poverty Reduction 
 
 
 
Category Government civil society Other 
 % % % 
Academic 100 0 0 
CSO 94 6 0 
Donor 80 3 0 
Government 95 0 5 
Media 87 13 0 
INGO 100 0 0 
Parliament 100 0 0 
Private Sector 100 0 0 
Missing value 0 0 1 
Total 91 7 2 
*Data derived from questionnaires. Total respondents = 86. 
 
 
 
Similar support for the state as provider emerged during face-to-face interviews, as indicated below: 
 
Government is the institution that has a major role to play in reducing poverty. The citizens look 
up to the government for assistance, and it should be government that drives the policies from 
formation to implementation. The government should put things in place so that when donors, 
INGOs and civil society come in to assist they are clear in which areas government needs 
support (Regional Manager, Media, 16/05/08). 
 
Government is mandated through our taxes to implement policies and reduce poverty. 
Therefore, government is ultimately responsible for poverty reduction, because it can lay claim 
to a large share of national resources and international funds (Advocacy Manager, INGO, 
27/5/08). 
 
Government is better coordinated than the private sector. The issue here is about the provision 
or delivery of services and government is central to that (MP, 28/03/08). 
 
Government has social responsibility over the people and it is obligated to support its people. 
Donors or civil society have not been elected, therefore not mandated or obligated to implement 
pro-poor policies. The government’s responsibility towards the poor is constitutionally 
guaranteed. The people entrust the government with the power to reduce poverty and inequality 
(Member, Parliamentary Committee, 31/03/08). 
 
 
 
 
Some of those interviewed believed that the private sector was an essential partner in reducing poverty, 
especially in the provision of employment for the poor (Principal Secretary, Civil Service, 28/04/08; 
National Coordinator, CSO, 21/05/08; Academic, 08/05/08; Programme Director, CSO, 13/05/08; Acting 
Executive  Director,  Private  Sector,  12/05/08;  Deputy  Director,  Private  Sector,  12/05/08)   and 
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complementing government initiatives in the provision of goods and service (Director of Programmes, 
CSO, 7/04/08; National Director, Media, 16/04/08; Regional Manager, Media, 9/05/08; Executive 
Director, CSO, 12/05/08; Country Director, INGO, 27/05/08; Operations Manager, Donor, 16/06/08). 
The private sector was also considered to have an equal stake in ensuring a healthy nation and 
economy for their businesses to thrive (Director of Programmes, CSO, 7/04/08). However, there was 
reluctance to involve civil society organisations in implementing social policies, perhaps because 
respondents (including those from civil society) were sceptical about their legitimacy and competence, 
or feared that CSOs would take over the state’s responsibilities: 
 
 
 
I find it wrong when CSOs lead and government follows. It is not natural (Minister, Civil Service, 
7/05/08). 
 
Sometimes CSOs compete with government (National Coordinator, CSO, 13/05/08). 
 
The issue of lack of productivity has been worsened by CSOs and made poor people 
dependent on handouts. CSOs are always busy looking for donations to donate to the rural 
poor, and what do they donate, a bag of flour, they are not helping Malawi (Regional Manager, 
Media, 9/04/08). 
 
People think CSOs are doing a lot of work. This is not true because they spend 48 percent of 
their money on themselves as overheads, to pay for cars and houses (PS, Civil Service, 
28/04/08). 
 
CSOs are cashing in on hunger, HIV/Aids and other problems affecting the poor (PS, Civil 
Service, 5/05/08). 
 
Malawi does not really have a civil society. The one that is there aims to alleviate its own 
poverty. Their interests are donor-driven because they are donor-funded. They are not 
transparent, and they have weak accountability systems (MP, 28/03/08). 
 
Most CSOs aim to earn a livelihood and not to help the poor, and they move from one meeting 
to another to get a sitting allowance (Academic, University of Malawi, 8/05/08). 
 
 
 
Although some respondents saw a significant role for CSOs, others considered them as opportunistic 
and accountable to the donors who funded their activities rather than to Malawians. Then again, most 
respondents identified shortcomings with the state, noting that it had failed to provide a conducive 
environment for other sectors to support its initiatives and provide the institutions or structures required 
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to implement social policies. Despite this view, respondents believed that the state had moral 
responsibility and was officially mandated to act on behalf of the poor. 
 
 
 
Therefore, respondents argued that the state should provide better and more efficient support, especially 
towards educational services and agrarian reforms. Respondents’ willingness to pass on the 
responsibility for poverty reduction to the state was contrary to their view on tax, as they were not willing 
to support the state through an increase in taxes (see Table 8.2, p226). Although some respondents 
understood that poverty reduction would benefit from taxes, they argued that through support towards 
the extended family, they were already doing enough. As this respondent noted: ‘At the moment I am 
supporting  the poor twice, through  taxes  and through  personal  assistance  (Minister, Civil Service, 
21/04/08). Basically, respondents’ belief in economic growth (see Table 8.1, p225) suggested 
considerable confidence that economic growth would generate the necessary revenues that could go 
towards poverty reduction, rather than increasing taxes, a sacrifice, respondents were unwilling to 
make. 
 
 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
This chapter first discussed respondents’ views on anti-poverty strategies and their policy preferences. 
Respondents’ perceptions demonstrated that they generally preferred policies that would have wider 
benefits to society. Thus there was more support for economic growth as a means of reducing poverty, 
and for policies that would minimize direct distribution (Reis, 2005). Respondents favoured policies that 
would improve the human resource component necessary for economic growth, such as education or 
health, and also those policies that would reduce the scope for the poor to become dependent, such as 
agricultural subsidies and micro finance. Therefore, there was very little support for policies such as 
cash transfers or old age pensions that respondents believed would lead to laziness or dependency. 
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Further analysis of respondents’ policy choices reveals a connection between these views and their 
views of the causes of poverty (see Chapter 6). Elite perceptions of the causes of poverty point to 
poverty as a problem of insufficient growth. Inevitably, ‘Solutions are medium–to-long-term with no real 
expectation of immediate impacts on the well-being of the poor, and are focused on fostering self- 
reliance at some future unspecified time rather than on guaranteeing minimum levels of well-being in the 
present’ (Hossain, 2003: 76). Thus poverty is not a matter of urgency or priority, and might be eclipsed 
as a problem by the need for national development. However, we may conclude that Malawian elites 
believe that efficacious and feasible means exist to reduce poverty. There is a widely shared belief in 
education and economic growth as the best means of reducing poverty. 
 
 
 
The second section of this chapter discussed the extent to which respondents feared the negative 
externalities of poverty, such as crime, insurrection and health threats. ‘The rise of welfare policies in 
Western Europe can be interpreted as the combined result of decisions made by rationally oriented elites 
to protect themselves against public evils, plus the active engagement of morally committed ideologues’ 
(Reis, 1999:135). Therefore, social policy was prioritised and effectively implemented following a 
combination of ideological and pragmatic concerns (Reis, 2005). Respondents’ perceptions indicate 
some concern for individual negative consequences of poverty, such as crime and costs associated with 
the extended family, but no real concern for collective negative consequences of poverty, such as 
insurrection or health threats.  Respondents were aware that there was a correlation between poverty 
and disease, but felt insulated because they believed that something was being done; that when there 
was an outbreak of disease, it affected the poor and not them; and that they could easily access 
private health care or go abroad for treatment. 
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In relation to crime, respondents did not feel that the more serious crime was linked to poverty, and 
where crime did threaten their private property and personal security, individualised responses such as 
private security were utilised to reduce this threat. The possibility of insurrection as a response to 
poverty solicited no fear amongst the respondents, as they argued that the personal characteristics of 
the poor made this impossible. Respondents were more worried about other elites using the poor for 
their own ends. 
 
 
 
Support for kin or the extended family seemed to represent a threat to elite welfare, but at the same time 
gave them a sense of security. Even though this threat was not similar to those threats that moved elites 
to action in developed countries, this view suggested an awareness of the negative externalities of 
poverty and a sense of social interdependence between respondents and the poor. Respondents’ 
sense of responsibility towards the poor was met through support towards kin rather than through 
redistributive policies led by the state, supported with state taxes. Thus respondents lacked a sense of 
co-responsibility for action as they placed the responsibility for public action on the state whilst seeking 
private means for mitigating the negative consequences of poverty and the poor on their welfare (Reis, 
2005; Clarke and Sison, 2005). The respondents appeared to have some belief in the principle of social 
citizenship as the best corrective measure to poverty (see Reis, 2005) and appeared not to support a 
universal right of citizens to an extensive set of state guaranteed social and economic provisions. 
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
9.0 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
This thesis employed De Swaan’s theory of ‘social consciousness’ to examine elite attitudes towards 
poverty and the poor in Malawi, in order to understand how these might influence elite’s attitudes 
towards pro-poor policy. This final chapter discusses the wider implications of the analysis of these 
attitudes on understanding the politics of poverty in Malawi. The main argument is that the political 
processes of patronage have underpinned the institutional arrangements within which pro-poor policies 
have been implemented and shaped the nature of state-society relations in Malawi. 
 
 
 
The Chapter proceeds as follows. Section 9.1 reflects on some methodological issues that underpinned 
this study. Responding to the study’s research questions, section 9.2 states the findings of this 
study. Section 9.3, which is divided into two sections, discusses the broader implications of the 
study. Section 9.4 critiques the study’s framework in relation to similar studies carried out in 
other contexts. Section 9.5 concludes the Chapter and discusses issues for further research. 
 
9.1 Malawian Elites: Poverty and Politics 
 
 
 
This thesis has taken into account two major challenges in the way in which elites are conceptualised 
within the literature on Malawi. First, is a methodological problem pertaining to how we study and 
discuss elites, and their role in the politics of pro-poor policy. In Malawi, theories of elite influence are 
inspired by a public choice analysis of politics that views political action as driven by the rational pursuit 
of self-interest (Moore, 1999:37). Consequently, the dominant conceptualization of elites in Malawi is 
one that emphasises their pursuit of particularistic and personal interests over the national interest 
(Cammack, 2011). Hence, the deve lopment  communi ty  t rea ts  Malawian elites as a force to be 
co-opted or circumvented in the implementation of policy (Dicaprio, 2011; Moore, 1999). 
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The implication is that a development paradigm, in the development community,  has emerged that 
sees pro-poor policies as likely to result in conflict and generate opposition from elites, who are likely to 
wish to redirect policies towards patronage or clientelistic interests. Consequently, policymakers and aid 
donors in Malawi have initiated pro-poor policies through consultations with, and mobilisation of, the poor; 
and the pattern of programme aid or budget support has incorporated conditionalities in order to reduce 
resource redirection by elites (Moore, 1999). However, labelling of Malawian elites, by the development 
community, as simply self-interested leads to a failure to understand the social incentives and behavioural 
characteristics that lead them to implement policies in a manner that addresses, or fails to address, the 
needs of the poor (Dicaprio, 2011). 
 
The second problem that underpins this research relates to the points made above. Despite agreement 
amongst development practitioners that Malawian elites are self-interested, there is no attempt to 
understand how these interests can be aligned with national objectives in a way that makes national 
policies effective and sustainable. As Moore (1999) argues, there is scope for elites to gain, or believe 
they gain, from implementing policies that reduce poverty. Moore provides an interpretation of self-
interest that goes beyond the narrow economistic understanding, arguing that elites may feel morally 
obligated to reduce poverty, but in doing so, may themselves positively benefit (1999). 
 
Conversely, in seeking to understand the role of elites in reducing poverty there is a lack of agreement 
in the literature on who constitutes members of the elites. Because of the centralisation of power and the 
constriction of political space under the one-party state, the literature on elites in Malawi has referred to an 
inner circle of ruling elites, such as the executive, parliamentarians and bureaucrats, thereby excluding 
elites from within civil society organisations, donor organisations, the media, the private sector, 
academics, and INGOs. However, in contemporary, liberalised Malawi, the members of the inner circle of 
the ruling elite are no longer the sole actors with responsibility for poverty reduction. Thus one 
contribution this study makes is to a widening perception of who exactly is part of the elite. 
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The two problems highlighted above were addressed in the process of collecting and analyzing data. De 
Swaan’s (1988; 2005) theory of ‘social consciousness’, w a s  u s e d  to analyse the ways in which 
poverty affects elites and interpret their efforts to control it. This type of analysis helped me to go beyond 
the dominant view of elites as materially self-interested individuals to a notion of interest that 
encompassed both material and moral motivations.  
 
The aim was not to determine whether elite perceptions were wrong or right, in line with the dominant 
thinking in the international community, but rather to determine whether these existing perceptions 
helped to make visible the broader processes at work in efforts to reduce poverty in Malawi (Hossain, 
1999). To understand elite attitudes towards poverty in Malawi, interviews, documentary analysis, 
observations and questionnaires were used. As acknowledged in Chapter 4, establishing a 
representative sample of elites is difficult, making generalisation difficult. Nevertheless, the findings of 
this study broaden our understanding of the politics of pro-poor policy in Malawi. 
 
9.2 Malawian Elites and Poverty Reduction 
 
 
 
9.2.1 Main Findings: Causes of Poverty and Policy Choices 
 
 
 
The first major research question looked at respondents’ explanations of the causes of poverty and 
their policy preferences for poverty reduction. To answer this question, respondents’ attitudes were put 
into two groups: first, those that created a factual assessment of the society in which they live; and 
second, those that identified a causal chain linking their (in)action to the living conditions of the poor and 
provided moral evaluations of what ought to be done about the poor’s living conditions. 
 
In this thesis I have argued that Malawian elites’ lack of urgency towards poverty reduction cannot be 
explained by ignorance of poverty or indifference to the poor. Malawian elites are neither isolated from the 
poor nor ignorant of the extent and nature of poverty; nor do they believe that the poor are entirely to 
279  
blame for the presence of poverty in Malawi. Rather, the respondents to the survey demonstrated strong 
personal ties with the poor, which was not surprising given that Malawi is still a traditional society where 
kinship and patronage ties are an important part of social life. Despite this poverty was not considered 
to be a problem requiring immediate action using all available initiatives. Instead, there was a preference 
for policies such as education, subsidies, and growth policies that would address processes of national 
development and enable the poor to help themselves. There was minimal support for policies aimed at 
direct redistribution, such as taxation of the wealthy or cash transfers. In effect, the respondents 
supported pro-poor policies directed at the active rather than the inactive poor believing that the poor 
had developed attitudes that left them unable to take advantage of economic opportunities. T h u s ,  the 
poor h a d  become resigned to poverty and dependent on handouts from kinship and patronage 
networks. Even though respondents acknowledged that structural impediments existed and economic 
opportunities were few, they argued that the poor’s attitude was negative, compared to the non-poor, 
keeping them – and the country – trapped in poverty. 
  
These findings substantiate the argument that perceptions influence policy preferences. Respondents’ 
theories regarding the poor’s behaviour are dominant in explaining policy choices . The theory 
that the poor easily become dependent and lazy was the main explanation for the lack of support for 
cash transfers, whereas support for education resulted from the view that it would change the 
consciousness of poor people who were seen to lack an innovative spirit and have a fatalistic attitude 
(Reis and Moore, 2005). However, the respondents seemed to contradict themselves in that when 
discussing poverty generally, they are reluctant to overtly blame the poor for their condition, arguing 
that the poor they know personally, through kinship and patronage networks, were hardworking 
individuals who deserved assistance. This is not surprising as the respondents are themselves 
conversant with a largely donor-driven discourse on poverty that shuns explanations of poverty that 
primarily blame the poor. But it is clear that respondents ideas about the character of the poor in terms of 
dependency, laziness and fatalistic attitudes, help to explain their lack of support for cash transfers, even 
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if the interview data and observations shows that they seem to feel the need to apologize for these views.    
 
9.2.2 Main Findings: Elements of ‘Social Consciousness’ amongst Malawian Elites 
 
 
 
The second major research question sought to examine whether elements of ‘social consciousness’ were 
present amongst the survey respondents and how these influenced action or inaction in relation to 
poverty reduction. In order to address this question, a set of perceptions was assessed: belief in social 
interdependence; a sense of responsibility; and that feasible means of reducing poverty existed.  
 
The study found that Malawian elites in the study did not seem to feel threatened by the social ills that 
the presence of poverty presents, such as crime, disease and social insurrection – ills that led to decisive 
public action among nineteenth century European elites. The respondents believed that they could defend 
themselves individually from the impact of social ills, by hiring private security if threatened by crime, or 
using private health care if threatened by disease. The character of the poor, and their own ties with the 
poor, led respondents to believe that social insurrection was not likely to occur in Malawi, at least, 
not in the short-term. Thus, applying De Swaan’s framework to this data leads us to conclude that 
Malawian elites may  not feel a similar sense of interdependence with the poor, judging by their lack of 
fear of crime, disease and rebellion. However, the evidence shows that the negative externalities of 
poverty in Malawi are felt directly through kinship and patronage n e t w o r k s . Although t h e  
r e a s o n s  f o r  interdependence are different in the Malawian context, interdependence is still there 
as an important factor, but perhaps much more individualised than in nineteenth century Europe. 
Nevertheless, these views reflect the Malawian respondents’ propensity to have more fear of social ills 
that have personal negative consequences (e.g. through extended family) rather than those that have 
collective consequences (e.g. health threats and social uprisings) a result of the fairly recent 
fragmentation of Malawian society a l o n g  k i n s h i p  l i n e s  (Reis, 2005). T h i s  m e a n s  that even 
though respondents argued that extended family obligations p o s e d  a  t h r e a t ,  t h e y  a l s o  
281  
s e e m e d  t o  s u g g e s t  that these obligations provided them with security from the challenges posed by 
the poor collectively. 
 
 
Second, I argue that the idea of a fragmented social identity has negative consequences for pro-poor 
policies in Malawi as elite’s sense of responsibility a r e  l i m i t e d  t o  individualised responses to the 
poor. This is significantly different from nineteenth century European philanthropic tradition of charity 
donations that helped the poor uplift themselves out of poverty. Responses to poverty being promoted by 
respondents were often structured along patronage lines, such that individuals are first responsible to 
those closest to them. The use of a ‘culture of poverty’ perspective to explain the poor’s responsibility for 
their own poverty further undermined respondents sense of responsibility towards changing the structures 
that perpetuate poverty in Malawi.  
 
Third, the study found that Malawian elites do believe that effective means to reduce poverty exist. There 
was considerable agreement in education as the best means of reducing poverty in Malawi. In addition to 
education, other initiatives such as agricultural subsidies, micro-finance, health and public works 
w e r e  p r e f e r r e d  over cash transfers, old-age pensions and food distribution. Therefore, one 
component of De Swaan’s framework was partially found:  a belief that feasible and effective 
means exist to reduce poverty . H o w e v e r ,  i n  c o m p a r i s o n  t o  n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y  E u r o p e ,  
this could be said to be a partially developed and fragmented ‘social consciousness’ as the respondents’ 
concern for the poor is localized to their immediate social networks and extended family. I t  thus fails 
to conform to the universalistic quality of De Swaan’s framework. The development of a ‘social 
consciousness’ in Europe was a long process accompanied by many social, economic and political 
changes that allowed the movement from charity to welfare programmes; however, Malawi is being 
asked by donors to adopt a version of the welfare state, with cash transfers in particular, but 
without the sorts of social, economic and political changes that brought about social consciousness 
in Europe.Therefore, De Swaan’s framework is less useful in parts (see section 9.4) but useful in 
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flagging up donor assumptions about the course of development in developing countries. 
 
 
9.3 Broader Implications 
 
 
 
This section outlines some implications of the argument presented in this thesis for understanding 
Malawian politics and policy, and theory of policy-making. 
 
9.3.1 Implications for Understanding Malawian Politics and Policy 
 
 
 
The literature on politics and policy in Malawi, in particular pro-poor policy, is silent on how elite attitudes 
towards poverty and the poor can explain the variance between stated pro-poor objectives and pro-poor 
outcomes. Most pro-poor interventions in Malawi have been based on a belief that once elites are aware 
of poverty statistics then policies will be geared towards reducing the numbers of those in poverty; and 
that interventions that have worked elsewhere can be implemented in the context of Malawi.  As argued 
in section 9.2 the respondents’ knowledge of the facts of poverty did not necessarily translate into 
support for pro-poor policies.  
 
In Malawi, the political processes of patronage which have been prevalent since independence in 1964 
and have provided the environment in which the rules of the game have emerged and poverty reduction 
initiatives undertaken. Politics have been personalistic, based on money, centred on a big man and 
mainly about negotiating development for localized constituencies (Englund, 2002). From 1964, Kamuzu 
Banda practiced a restricted form of patronage, thus the rules regarding how resources were distributed 
towards patronage networks, discouraged a free-for-all patronage where corruption and theft of public 
resources were common. Rather, Banda allocated power and wealth to his loyal supporters by directing 
rents towards productive sectors and into the hands of those who would use them most productively 
(Kelsall et al, 2010; Meinhardt and Patel, 2003).  
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The political processes that underpinned and accompanied democratization in 1994, were much more 
driven by competing patronage networks as Banda’s centralized system broke down, and the 
institutional arrangements that emerged, especially in relation to competitive elections, produced 
uncertainty amongst the ruling elite. In order to gain political support, the elite had to negotiate with the 
wider array of interests in society through the disbursement of rents. Under the Muluzi-led government, 
there was widespread corruption, rent-seeking and rent-generating activities. Thus, rents were directed 
at unproductive sectors and populist policies such as promises of free food, seeds, fertilizer, shoes, 
houses, bicycles, and credit with serious implications for achieving stated objectives of poverty reduction 
(Fozzard and Simwaka, 2002; Cammack, 2004; DFID, 2004).  
 
The findings of this study contributes to the literature that questions the idea that democratization 
changes and shapes the logic of patronage, reducing rent-seeking and rent-generating behavior (see 
Kelsall, 2008; Kelsall et al. 2011; Erdmann, 2006; Van de Walle, 2007), and demonstrates that 
patronage may be intensified by multiparty elections, especially in political contexts where institutions 
are unstable, the rules of the game are unclear and not universally agreed, and political parties become 
personal fiefdoms. Malawian respondents’ ideas about moral responsibility towards the poor and support 
towards kin, is a contemporary version of patronage, where multiparty elections allow access to 
resources, but one needs to vote for a person who is their kin. What thus exists in Malawi is a quasi-
democracy infused with the logic of patronage. 
 
The persistent political processes of patronage have interacted with different forms of the state and ruling 
elites, which has led to varied socio-economic outcomes. For instance, between 1964 and 1979, Banda’s 
patronage resulted in unprecedented levels of development, improvements in infrastructure, fixed capital 
formation and worker productivity. Between 1980 and 1993, as Banda grew old and lost control of the 
patronage system, patronage became directed at short-term policy issues and this trend continued into 
1994-2003, such that policy was entirely driven by patronage. Needless to say, the impact on socio-
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economic conditions was negative as growth faltered and poverty grew. Between 2004 and 2009, 
Mutharika reigned in the excesses of the patronage system and reoriented the system towards long-term 
policy, which resulted in food security and positive economic growth (Cammack, 2007; Booth et al, 2006). 
This trend was reversed between 2010 to April, 2012, and patronage was directed at short-term needs, in 
particular patronage was directed at securing the president’s brother’s presidential candidacy in 2014. 
This suggests that in cases where strong patronage exists public policies are weak and can reinforce 
socio-economic and political inequalities, but where political processes of patronage are effectively 
managed and respond to long-term policy vision, patronage may be more responsive to citizen concerns 
and deliver services.  
 
The finding that respondents feel compelled to support their kin and patronage networks, financially or 
otherwise, contributes to an understanding of the legitimacy elites need to acquire within the moral order 
(Hossain, 1999). Malawian respondents emphasised the importance of taking their responsibilities 
towards kinship or patronage ties as a matter of morality but also ‘life and death’ for the poor. However, 
the ability of elites to take responsibility for their clients, by taking sick people to the hospital, providing 
food, transport at funerals, purchasing of coffins, financial support at weddings, and the provision of school 
fees (see Chapter Seven), is also seen as a measure of leadership quality.   
 
Conversely, the way patronage politics structure the rules of the game can be an obstacle to poverty 
reduction and horizontal class alignment (Hyden, 2007). I argue, however, that accepting uncritically that 
patronage politics is an obstacle to horizontal class alignment is problematic considering the argument in 
the literature on Malawi that these ties are disappearing due to commercialization, reflecting a shift from a 
‘moral’ to a ‘market’ economy (Devereux, 1999). Despite these assertions the study has found that patron-
client relations are still appear to be the basis on which state-society relations are based.  
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The research uncovered a belief in the idea of social harmony with the poor, who are linked to elites 
through vertical ties and believed to be passive, dependent and ignorant, mak ing the possibility of 
social uprisings impossible. The idea that these ties smooth social relationships is a romanticized 
version of patron-client relations and may also explain why poverty has not been considered a 
matter requiring urgent action (Hossain, 1999). Elite attitudes provide useful insight into the political 
processes of patronage; although this moral economy of affection may eventually fade, it remains 
important in the absence of state provision of public goods (Hyden, 2007). 
 
I therefore argue that in implementing pro-poor policy we need to identify elite motivations and interests, 
and appeal to these because developmental outcomes will not necessitate a huge break from the political 
processes of patronage, which are deeply entrenched and embedded and provide the essential operating 
codes for politics in Malawi (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997; Chinsinga, 2007). A majority of the 
Malawian poor are not captured by formal political processes and instead solve their problems through 
informal political processes that rely on patronage and clientelism (Hyden, 2007). In the absence of state 
support, patron-client ties offer the poor the chance of survival and the transitory poor a means of avoiding 
destitution (Hickey and Bracking, 2005). As the findings show, although the ties between elites and the 
poor are that of master and servant, they are not always experienced as exploitative; rather they are 
reciprocal forms of exchange that go beyond goods and services to personal favors and obligations 
(Platteau, 1995). Thus, kinship and patron-client ties remain the primary locus of political obligation and 
moral imperative but are also a basis of elite power. Within these rules of the game, elites feel obligated to 
provide financially for their kin even if they find this personally challenging (see Chapter Seven and Eight; 
Kelsall, 2008; Law, 2010).  
 
The lack of fear from collective consequences of poverty (see section 9.2) reflects in some ways the poor’s 
minimum expectation – food security- on which legitimacy in Malawian politics rests (Cammack, 2006; 
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Sahley, 2006; Harrigan, 2003; Khaila et al, 1999). Therefore, the persistence of poverty or inequality is seen 
as an unlikely cause for social uprisings among the poor. It is not a coincidence that Banda emphasized 
agriculture and crop inspection tours to ensure food security; Muluzi introduced the seed and fertilizer 
inputs programme; and Bingu went against donor prescription and introduced the inputs subsidy 
programme. This study contributes to the body of knowledge that pays closer attention to how the 
underlying processes of patronage and the consequent legitimacy it provides, play out in the planning and 
implementation of pro-poor policies.  
 
 
 
The analysis of elite attitudes indicates that patronage has structured institutions in a way that results in  
persona l i sed p a t r o n - c l i e n t e l i s t i c  responses to the poor, rather than redistributive action by the 
state financed by higher taxes. Therefore, support towards the poor fails to conform to the universalistic 
quality that public policies require. Even if poverty reduction is the stated long term policy objective, as 
many of the respondents indicate, and policies are formulated to this end, implementation is determined 
by the opportunity to support kinship and patronage ties (Cromwell and Chintedza, 2005).  
 
The idea that state-society relations in Malawi are ‘harmonious’ provides a fresh perspective on the 
politics of poverty. Under Kamuzu Banda, repression served to enforce compliance with the president’s 
objectives. Therefore, any attempt to understand the contemporary politics of poverty in Malawi has to 
explain the peculiar pattern of submissiveness to authority in the face of inequality, deep poverty, 
exploitation of the poor and a society with little evidence of real propensity towards rebellion. The failure 
of the poor to provide a check on elites is based on a large power distance between elites and the 
poor and relations that are based on patronage (Booth et al , 2006). This illuminates the concept of 
ubunthu (I am because we are): in Malawian society belonging to a network is important, with both the 
well-off a n d  t h e  p o o r  i n c l u d e d  i n  these networks. The study found that these networks could be 
an important opportunity for influencing elites to become more pro-poor as a locus of social 
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engagement between the elite and the poor.  
 
Therefore, the problem “lies in the logic of a situation in which the socio-economic structure is as 
much a constraint on political practice as political practice is on socio-economic structures” (Booth 
and Therkildsen, 2012: 10). As a result elite’s decisions respond to incentives that change slowly 
and do not benefit the poor in the short term. Awareness of these incentives is important and this 
may mean targeting areas of mutual interests among the elite. For instance,  Malawian 
respondents have mutual interest on policies that contribute directly to economic growth, including 
education and agriculture subsidies, but not cash or food transfers.    
 
9.3.2 Implications for Policy-Making Theory 
 
 
 
This section discusses key implications of elite attitudes towards poverty and the poor on policy -
making theory.  
 
There are many theories of policy-making, including rational, incremental, political systems, pluralist, 
elite and group theory which, as Chapter 2 indicated, are divided between linear and interactive models 
of policy-making. The linear model assumes that policy-making follows specific stages, involving a set 
of policy demands that are then processed by the political system into laws, programmes and public 
goods. The interactive model sees the policy-making process as complex and dynamic, involving 
negotiating, bargaining and compromise between different interests. This makes policy-making an 
essentially political process, with different actors, who bring to the process different ideas and interests. 
Because the policy-making process has to accommodate competing demands, it is seen as subject to 
inherent tensions. Thus policy is seen as limited to providing minimum social and economic functions 
and maintaining the life of the elites (Grindle, 1999; Hill, 1993; Easton, 1957; Lasswell, 1951).  
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These approaches to policy-making are premised on stable institutions and agreement on the rules of 
the game. By contrast, Malawi has an unstable socio-political environment and a lack of agreement on 
the rules of the game such that informal politics of patronage and clientelism determine political 
influence and resource allocation over formal institutions. As a result, the policy-making process in 
Malawi possesses a distinctiveness of its own, making these approaches irrelevant for a comprehensive 
understanding of policy-making.   
 
The assessment of elite attitudes shows that policy-making in Malawi does not follow a logical path. 
Even when an issue gets on the agenda, it does not necessary lead to the formation of appropriate 
policies. For instance, although Malawian elites have deep knowledge of the scale and severity of 
poverty, identifying both structural and behavioural causes of poverty, their policy response is not to use 
all available means to reduce poverty. Rather they opt for policies that address issues of 
underdevelopment generally, which would address poverty in the long-term but do little in the short-term. 
In addition, respondents’ ideas about the character (lazy, dependant, passive) of the poor seems to lead 
them to resist policies that target the poor specifically, with short-term targeted inputs, as some poor 
people are seen as undeserving of attention or resources (Bird, 2008). 
 
I  t h e r e f o r e  a r g u e  t h a t  t h e  i n f l u e nc e  o f  p olicy inputs (demands) is not significant, where policies 
are rarely a response to the demands arising out of the environment (political, socio-economic and 
physical) (Jenkins, 1993). Malawi’s political processes of patronage have structured policy -making in 
such a way that it responds to particularistic needs. Therefore, the scope for people to make demands 
or support the policy process under these existing rules and practices are minimal. The poor are to be 
unable to organize horizontally, preferring to maintain vertical ties that guarantee access to the necessities 
of life. Put simply, they are seen as not ‘biting the hand that feeds them’.  
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The study also suggests that policy-making should aim to understand why political processes of 
patronage lead to personalised commitment towards pro-poor policy rather than civic notions of 
responsibility. Understanding this is crucial to understanding why attempts to rationalise policy, 
especially agriculture sector policies, have failed. For instance, attempts to rationalise the Agriculture 
Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) have failed to garner support for changing broader 
institutional and industry-protecting policies (Cammack, 2004). Elite attitudes analysed in this study 
suggest that obligations towards patronage and kinship networks in terms of food, which also serves 
to legitimise elite status and influence, result in lack of support for rationalising ADMARC, even if this 
has potentially wider implications for the nation as a whole 
 
Conversely, although the policy-making process generally contains different policy actors who affect 
various stages of the process, Malawi’s financial position has produced a significant policy actor – donors. 
This means that Malawian policy-makers respond to donor influence in terms of policy priority, and the 
allocation of resources. Donors are believed to have structured the policy-making process in such a way 
that they have become part of the technocracy that manages the processes necessary for the 
implementation of various policies in Malawi (Sahley et al, 2005; Rubin, 2008) and that policies are made 
in order to respond to donor dictates. Thus, the distinctiveness of Malawi’s policy-making process stems 
from both the impact of patronage and donor influence. This means that interactive and linear approaches 
only provide broad outlines for understanding the policy-making process but not a comprehensive analysis 
of the policy context.  
 
The analysis has therefore generated new insights for policy-making theory in relation to poor, aid 
dependent developing countries like Malawi. Dominant policy-making theories, like those based on the 
linear model, fail to take into account the broader political processes that structure state-society relations 
but also constrain or shape the actions of policy actors. In addition intimate knowledge of a particular 
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country context is useful for explaining policy design and outcomes, areas that linear models of policy-
making fail to capture. Therefore, in analyzing obstacles to development, policy-making theories must 
identify the political processes that serve elite interests at the expense of the majority. 
 
 
 
9.4 The Utility of the Framework of ‘Social Consciousness’ 
 
 
 
Two points make the application of De Swaan’s framework of ’social consciousness’ to Malawi 
problematic. First, there are many pro-poor initiatives in Malawi but these do not amount to a welfare 
state in the sense of nineteenth century welfare systems in Europe. Second, unlike Malawi, the history 
of welfare states in nineteenth century Europe was connected to the emergence of the nation-state. 
Therefore, a criticism of using De Swaan’s framework to interpret present day political 
processes of development, is that the theory of ‘social consciousness’ loses its analytical 
power beyond the historical events of nineteenth century Europe. However, De Swaan 
(2005:188) argues that applying this theory to non-western countries does not imply that 
they follow the same path as western countries. Therefore, it would be a great loss for social 
science if the ideas, questions and philosophies assembled about Europe were not brought 
to bear upon the study of non-western societies, as a true test of any theory is its 
applicability outside its original context.  
 
This framework has been usefully employed to study elite perceptions of poverty and inequality in 
countries with varying historical and social contexts, such as Brazil, Phillipines, Haiti, Bangladesh and 
South Africa (Reis and Moore, 2005). These studies found that: first, elites agree that education is the 
best means for reducing poverty. Support for education is either for instrumental reasons, for instance 
‘it can raise or change the consciousness of people still hampered by traditional ways of thinking; 
promote entrepreneurship; or provide specific vocational and technical skills’ (Reis and Moore, 2005: 
20); or as an empowering mechanism in which the poor r ea l i s e  their power potential, and organize to 
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demand their rights and participate in development (Hossain and Moore, 2002). Second, with the 
exception of Bangladesh, elites agree that the state should be primarily responsible for reducing 
poverty as it has the moral responsibility. In contrast, Bangladeshi elites believe that civil society 
organisations are better actors in poverty reduction than the state. These preferences can be explained 
by the degree of institutionalization of the state. Brazil, and South Africa have a history of a centralised 
state, with a central role in development, whereas in Bangladesh CSOs employ more people than the 
state (Reis, 2010). 
 
 
 
Third, across the different countries, except Brazil, helping the poor is part of a patronage tradition that 
is strongly institutionalized and is accepted as part of one’s social and political obligations, often 
rewarded with social prestige. For Brazilian elites, personal patronage is less visible and less attached to 
prestige for the patron (Clarke and Marites, 2000; Reis, 2005). Lastly, despite awareness among elites 
of poverty and moral responsibility towards the poor, there is no real inclination towards support on a 
universal basis. The elites of these countries seem content to wait for the long-term ‘trickle down’ from 
growth in the national economy to the poor (Reis and Moore, 2005). This perspective does not commit 
to any kind of welfare measure; on the contrary, it relieves elites of any obligation towards the poor’ (De 
Swaan, 2005: 192). 
 
Although the thesis uncovers the limitations of De Swaan’s framework, it also uncovers its ongoing 
usefulness. De Swaan’s framework provided a means for posing the right questions, a way for examining 
elite motivations and debates around poverty in their historical context so as to understand why 
provisions to the poor are made, the priority elites attach to poverty reduction and identifying policy areas 
where elite interests coincide (see Hossain, 1999; Deacon 1997).  
 
The findings of this study fail to demonstrate that the negative drivers (crime, disease and social uprising) 
that pushed elites to implement many public health and sanitation reforms in nineteenth century Europe, 
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have the same effect in Malawi (Hossain and Moore, 2005: 202). Rather, the political processes of 
patronage shape the pattern of interdependence between elites and the poor, such that policies are 
directed at particular territorial units with whom elites have ties. This makes it unlikely that public policies 
similar to those European elites initiated in response to poverty will emerge, because the kinship model 
effectively buys off the poor.  
 
According to the findings of this study, De Swaan’s (1988), theory of ‘social consciousness’ needs to be 
adjusted in order to account for historical and socio-cultural factors in Malawi, in particular the political 
processes of patronage that structure state-society relations and institutional arrangements that either 
reduce poverty or not. 
 
9.5 Issues for Further Research and Conclusion 
 
 
In considering the implications of the research results, the limitations of the study have been kept in 
mind. It is notable that studies of elites are often based on small samples, due to the very definition of 
an elite group and a limited response rate. This sample is not representative of the general population, 
with the result that the external validity of the findings and the possibility of generalising from them are 
limited to similar elite populations in different settings. However, the study is a starting point for 
understanding ways of fostering elite commitment and collective action towards poverty reduction. The 
study has unearthed some interesting trends: first is the significance of elite attitudes towards poverty 
and their implication for pro-poor policy; second is the lack of urgency elites feel about poverty reduction, 
which is reflected in their lack of fear of social ills that may emanate from poverty and the poor; and 
finally, the importance of kinship and patronage ties. Therefore, further research would further pull-out 
specific collective action problems at the national, sectoral and local levels as well as research into the 
role of elites in initiating collective action in order to effectively address these problems.  
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The study also suggests that, although the literature portrays personalized relationships in African society 
as detrimental to development, these relationships can become instrumental in contributing to 
progressive outcomes. Further study could contribute to these findings, most notably examining the 
differences between elite perceptions of poverty and those of the poor (such as those carried out 
under the ‘Voices of the Poor’ studies); between elected representatives and high-level bureaucrats; 
between local and national elites; and between elite perceptions and the perceptions of Malawians in 
general. These would enable further analysis of ways to foster commitment to poverty reduction and to 
building institutions that could ensure the poor’s participation in development. 
294  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
 
 
 
 
Abrahamsen,  R.  (2000),  Disciplining  Democracy:  Development  and  Good  Governance  in 
Africa, London: Zed Books 
 
Action Aid International, (2005), “Rights and Responsibilities to end poverty”, Country Strategy 
Paper 2005 - 2010 
 
Action   Aid   International,   (2006),   “Climate   change   and   smallholder   farmers   in   Malawi”, 
http://www.actionaid.org.uk/doc_lib/malawi_climate_change_report.pdf 
 
AFRODAD, (2007a), “The impact of economic reform programmes on social services: the case of 
Malawi”, www.afrodad.org, accessed on 13/01/09 
 
AFRODAD (2007b), A Critical Assessment of Aid Management and Donor Harmonisation: The Case 
of Malawi, 
http://www.afrodad.org/downloads/publications/Aid%20Mgmt%20Malawi%20Final.pdf 
 
Afsar, R. (2010), Poverty, Inequality and the Challenges of Pro-Poor Governance in Bangladesh, 
Journal of South Asian Development, Vol. 5(2): 187–219 
 
Ahluwalia,   M.S.   (1976),   Inequality,   Poverty   and   Development,   Journal   of   Development 
Economics, Vol.3,   307-342. 
 
Ahluwalia,  M.S.,  Carter,  N.G.,  and  Chenery,  H.B.  (1979),  Growth  and  Poverty  in  Developing 
Countries, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 6 (3) 299--341. 
 
Allen, C., (1995,), Understanding African Politics, Review of African Political Economy. 22 (65): 
301 - 320 
 
Allen, T. & Thomas A., (2000), Poverty and Development into the 21st Century, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 
 
Almond G.A. and Verba S. (1989), The civic culture: political attitudes and democracy in five 
nations, Sage Publication, London England 
 
Amsden A., DiCaprio A., and Robinson, J. (2009), Aligning Elites with Development, Wider Angle 
Newsletter, http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/newsletter/articles/en_GB/05-08-2009/ 
 
Anders, G., (2002), “Civil servants in Malawi: Mundane Acts of Appropriation and resistance in the 
Shadow of Good Governance”, http://www.ascleiden.nl/Pdf/paper08092005-anders.pdf 
Anyinam, C.A. (1989), 'The Social Costs of the International Monetary Fund's Adjustment Programs 
for Poverty: The Case of Health Care Development in Ghana', in International Journal of 
Health Services, Vol. I9 (3): 53I-547 
 
Appelbaum, L.D., (2001), The influence of perceived deservingness on policy decisions regarding 
aid to the poor, Political Psychology, Vol. 22 (3): 419 - 442 
 
Apthorpe, R. (1986), Development policy discourse, Public Administration & Development, Vol. 
6(4): 377-389 
295  
Bachrach, P. & Baratz, M.S., (1962), The two faces of power, The American Political Science 
Review, 56, (4): 947-952 
 
Baker,  C.  (1975),  Tax  Collection   in  Malawi:  an  Administrative  History  (1891-1972),  The 
International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 8 (1): 40-62 
 
Baker, C., (2001), Revolt of the Ministers: The Malawi Cabinet Crisis 1964 -1965, I.B. Tauris 
Publishers, London 
 
Bamusi, M. (2007), Isolation and effects on public service delivery for poverty eradication: 
Civil society policy responses to chronic poverty in Malawi, A paper prepared for the 
international workshop “Understanding and addressing spatial poverty traps: an international 
workshop” Hosted by the Chronic Poverty Research Centre and the Overseas Development 
Institute 
 
Bandura, A. (2002), Selective Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral Agency, Journal of 
Moral Education, Vol. 31 (2): 101-119 
 
Baran, P.A. (1957), The Political Economy of Growth, Monthly Review Press: New York 
 
Barker, C., (1996), The Health Care Policy Process, Sage Publications, London 
 
 
 
Bartelink, A., (2004), “Poverty policies and perceptions in Tanzania: An evaluation of Dutch Aid to 
two district rural development programmes”, www.oecd.org 
 
Bastiaensen, J., De Herdt, T., and Vaessen, J. (2002), Poverty, Institutions and Interventions: A 
framework for an institutional analysis of poverty and local anti-poverty interventions, IDPM- 
UA Discussion Paper, No. 6: 1-48 
 
Bayart, J., (1993), The State in Africa: Politics of the Belly, Longman Group LTD, UK 
 
 
Bazeley, P. (2009), The contribution of computer software to integrating qualitative and quantitative 
data analyses. Journal of Mixed Methods Research, Vol. 3 (3): 203-207. 
 
Beall, J. and Ngonyama, M. (2009), Indigenous Institutions, Traditional Leaders and Elite Coalitions 
for Development: The Case of Greater Durban, Cities and Fragile States, Working Paper 
No. 55 
 
Bendix, R., and Lipset, S.M. (1957), Political Sociology : An essay with special reference to the 
development of research in the United States of America and Western Europe, Current 
Sociology, Vol.  6 (2): 79-99 
 
Berman, S. (2001), “Review of ideas, norms and culture in political analysis”, Comparative Politics, 
Vol. 33 (2): 231 - 250 
 
Bertelsen, R., (2004), “Elite Perceptions and systematic theory: ideology and order after World War 
One”, 
http://www.allacademic.com//meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/4/0/7/3/pages40736/p40 
736-2.php 
296  
Berthoud, R., Brown, J., and Cooper, S., (1981), Poverty and the Development of anti-poverty 
policy in the UK, Heinemann educational books, London 
 
Bevir,  M.,  Rhodes  R.A.W.,  and  Weller  P.,  (2003),  Comparative  Governance:  Prospects  and 
Lessons, Public Administration, Vol. 81: 191 – 210 
 
Bird, K. (2008), The political Economy of Pro-poor Growth: The Challenges of Making Growth Pro- 
poor, ODI Briefing Paper No. 35, http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/827.pdf 
 
Bird, K., (2007), “Identifying and Communicating Pro-poor policy Messages to Policy Audiences: the 
case of chronic poverty in Uganda”,  Q-Squared Working Paper No. 43,  http://www.q- 
squared.ca/pdf/Q2_WP43.pdf 
 
Bird, K., Booth D., and Pratt N., (2003), “Food Security in Southern Africa: The Political Background 
to Policy    Failure”,    Forum    for    Food     Security    in     Southern    Africa,     ODI, 
http://www.odi.org.uk/projects/03-food securityforum/docs/PolProcesses_theme1.pdf 
 
Bird, K., Booth, D., and Pratt, N., (2002), “The contribution of politics, policy failure and bad 
governance to the food security crisis of southern Africa”, 
http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2003/odi-souafr-30jun.pdf 
 
Bird, K., Pratt N., O’Neil T., and Bolt V.J., (2004), “Fracture points in social policies for chronic 
poverty reduction”, ODI Working Paper No. 242, http://www.chronicpoverty.org 
 
Blaikie, N. (2000), Designing Social Research, Cambridge: Polity Press 
 
Blench,  R.,  (2004),  “Nigerian  maximizing  pro-poor  growth:  Regenerating  the  socio  economic 
database”, Background Document, ODI, London 
 
Bloom, G., Chilowa W., and Chirwa E., et al (2005), “Poverty Reduction during Democratic Transition: 
The Malawi Social Action Fund 1996 – 2001”, Institute of Development Research, Report 
56, Brighton 
 
Booth, D., Cammack D., and Harrigan J., et al, (2006), “Drivers of change and Development in 
Malawi”,       ODI       Working       Paper       261,        http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/odi- 
publications/working-papers/261-drivers-change-development-malawi.pdf 
 
  Booth, D., and Therkildsen, O. (2012) The Political Economy of Development in Africa: A Joint 
Statement from Five Research Programmes, Leaders, Elites and Coalitions Research 
Programme at www.lpdlec.org 
 
Bottomore, T., (1964), Elites and Society, Penguin Books, Middlesex, England 
 
Bowen, G.A. (2008), Naturalistic inquiry and the saturation concept: a research note, Qualitative 
Research, Vol. 8 (1): 137-152 
 
Bowles, P. (1989), Peripheral Capitalist Development Revisited, Studies in Political Economy, 
Vol. 28 (28): 183 – 203 
 
Bratton, M. (1994), Civil Society and Political Transition in Africa, IDR Reports, Vol. 11 (6): 1-22 
 
Bratton, M. and Masunungure, E. (2011), The Anatomy of Political Predation: Leaders, Elites and 
Coalitions in Zimbabwe, 1980-2010, Research Paper 9, www.dlprog.org 
297  
 
   Bratton, M. and Van de Walle (1994), “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa”, 
World Politics, Vol. 46 (4): 453 – 489 
Bratton, M. and Van de Walle (1997), Democratic experiments in Africa, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 
 
Brautigam,   D.   (2004),   The   Peoples   Budget?   Politics,   Participation   and   Pro-poor   Policy, 
Development Policy Review, Vol. 22 (6): 653 – 668 
 
Brautigam, D. and Diolle, T. (2009), Coalitions, Capitalists and Credibility: Overcoming the crisis of 
confidence at independence in Mauritius, Developmental Leadership Programme, Research 
Paper No. 4, www.dlprog.org 
 
Brecher,  M.,  (1968),  “India  and  World  Politics:  Krishna  Menon’s  View  of  the  World”.  Oxford 
University Press, New York 
Bretten, H., (1973), Power and Politics in Africa, Longman Group Ltd, London 
 
Brezis, E.S. and Peter T. (2008), Elites and Economic Outcomes, In Steven N. D. and Lawrence E. 
B., (eds) The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online. 
http://www.dictionaryofeconomics.com/article?id=pde2008_E000263>doi:10.1057/9780230 
226203.0464 
 
Briggs, A. (1961), Cholera and Society in the Nineteenth Century, Past and Present, Volume 19: 76 
 
– 96 
 
Brinkerhoff, D. & Goldsmith A., (2002), “Clientelism, Patrimonialism and Democratic Governance: 
An Overview and Framework for Assessment and Programming”, Report to United States 
Agency of International Development (USAID), Washington, 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnacr426.pdf 
 
Brock, K., Cornwall A., and Gaventa J., (2001), “Power, knowledge and political spaces in the framing 
of poverty policy”, Institute of Development Studies, Working Paper 143 
 
Brown, M.B., (1995), Africa’s Choices – After Thirty Years of the World Bank, Penguin Books 
Ltd, UK 
 
Brown, S., (2000), Malawi: The Trouble with Democracy, Southern Africa Report Archive, Vol. 15 
(4): 30 
 
Bryman, A (1988), Quantity and quality in social research, London: Unwin Hyman. London 
 
Bryman, A. (2006), Integrating quantitative and qualitative research: how is it done? Qualitative 
Research, Vol. 6(1) 97–113. 
 
Bryman, A., (2001), Social Research Methods, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
 
Bryman, A., (2008), Social Research Methods, Third Edition, Oxford University Press 
 
Bulmer, M. (2001), The ethics of social research, In Gilbert, N, (eds) Research Social Life, Second 
Edition, Sage Publication, London, pp45 – 57 
 
Bunce, V., (1984), “Of power, policy and paradigms: The logic of elite studies”. In: Linden and & 
Rockman B. (eds), Elite Studies and Communist Politics: essays in Memory of Carl 
298  
Beck, University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh Press, pp21 
Burnham J. (1941), The Managerial Revolution, The John Day Company, New York 
 
Burton, M.G. (1984), Elites and Collective Protest, The Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 25 (1): 45-65 
 
Burton, M. & Higley J. (1987a), “Invitation to elite theory: The basic contentions Reconsidered”. In: 
Donmhoff & Dye (eds) Power elites and Organizations, Sage Publications, London, p219 
– 238 
 
Burton M. and Higley J. (1987b), ‘Elite Settlements’, American Sociological Review, Vol. 52(3): 
295 -307 
 
Bwalya, E., Rakner L., and Svasand L., et al. (2004), Poverty reduction strategy processes in 
Malawi and Zambia, Chr. Michelson Institute 
 
Callinicos, A. (1984), Marxism and Politics, in Leftwich A. eds., What is Politics: The Activity and 
its Study, Basil Blackwell Publishers Ltd, England 
 
Cammack, D. (2011), Malawi’s Political Crisis: 2011, Africa, Power And Politics, ODI, Background 
Paper 
 
Cammack, D., (2004), Poorly Performing Countries: Malawi, 1980 – 2002, ODI Background Paper 
3: For the ODI study on Poorly Performing Countries, www.odi.org.uk 
 
Cammack, D., (2006), Malawi : The Politics of Hunger”, ODI Opinion 69 
 
Cammack,   D.,   (2007),   The   Logic   of   African   Neopatrimonialism:   What   Role   for   Donors? 
Development Policy Review, 25 (5): 599 -614 
 
Cammack, D., Golooba-Mutebi, F., Kanyongolo F. et al (2007), Neopatrimonial politics, 
decentralisation and local government: Uganda and Malawi in 2006, ODI Working Paper 2, 
www.odi.org.uk 
 
Cammack, D. and Kelsall, T. (2011), Neo-patrimonialism, Institutions and Economic Growth: The 
Case of Malawi, 1964–2009, IDS Bulletin, Vol. 42(2): 88 – 96 
 
Cammack, D. and Kelsall, T (2011), Neo-Patrimonialism, Institutions and Economic Growth: The 
Case of Malawi, 1964-2009', IDS Bulletin 42(2): 88-96. 
 
Cammack, D. and Kelsall, T. (2010), Developmental Patrimonialism? The Case of Malawi, Working 
Paper 12, London: Africa Power and Politics Programme 
 
Cammack, P. (1990),  A Critical Assessment  of the New Elite Paradigm,  American  Sociological 
Review, Vol. 55 (3):  415-420 
 
Cammack, P., (2003), What the World Bank Means by Poverty, 
http://www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/publication_files/CP_2003_Cammack.pdf 
 
Campbell, J.L. (1998), Institutional Analysis and the Role of Ideas in Political Economy, Theory and 
Society, Vol. 27 (3): 377 – 409 
 
Cavallo, S. (1995), Charity and Power in Modern Early Modern Italy: Benefactors and their Motives 
in Turin, 1541 – 1789, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
299  
Cavallo, S. (1991), The Motivations of Benefactors: An Overview of Approaches to the study of 
Charity. In: Barry, J. & Jones, C. (eds.) Charity and Medicine before the Welfare State. 
London: Routledge. pp. 47-62. 
 
Chabal, P., (2002), The Quest for Good Government and Development in Africa: is NEPAD the 
answer? International Affairs, Vol. 78 (3): 447 - 692 
 
Chabal, P. & Daloz J., (1999), Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument, James Currey, 
Oxford 
 
Chabal, P., (2009), Africa: The politics of Suffering and Smiling, Zed books, London 
 
Chambers, R. (2007), Poverty Research: Methodologies, Mindsets and Multidimensionality, IDS 
Working Paper 293: 1-59 
 
Chambers, R., (1988), “Poverty in India: Concepts Measurement and Reality”. Discussion Paper 
241, IDS, Sussex 
 
Charman, A.J.E., (2004), Agricultural Development and Food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Building a Case for More Support, Malawi Country Study detailed Findings. For the 
Agriculture Policy Analysis Unit (SAFP), Harare. 
 
Chazan, N., Lewis P., and Mortimer  R., et al. (1999),  Politics and Society in Contemporary 
Africa, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, Colorado 
 
Chenery, H., Ahluwalia, M. S., Bell, C. L. G., Duloy, J. H.  and Jolly, R., (1974), Redistribution with 
Growth, Oxford University Press 
 
CherryHolmes, C.C. (1992), Notes on Pragmatism and Scientific Realism. In Creswell J.W. (2003) 
Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches, 2nd edition, 
London: Sage Publication. 
 
Cherryholmes,   C.H.   (1992),   Notes   on   Pragmatism   and   Scientific   Realism,   Educational 
Researcher, Vol. 21 (6): 13-17. 
 
Chilowa, W. (1998), The Impact of Agricultural Liberalization on Food Security in Malawi.  Food 
Policy, Vol. 23 (6): 553 - 569 
 
Chilowa,  W.,  Milner,  J.,  Chinsinga,  B.,  &  Mangani,  R.,  (2000),  Social  Policy  in  the  Context  of 
Economic Reforms: A Benchmark Survey Report, SARIPS, Harare, Zimbabwe. 
 
 
Chingaipe, Henry and Adrian Leftwich (2007), The politics of state-business relationships in Malawi, 
A Research paper for the Consortium on Improving Institutions for Pro-poor Growth (IPPG), 
www.ippg.org.uk. 
300  
Chinsinga, B. (2011), The politics of land reforms in Malawi: The case of the Community Based 
Rural Land Development Programme (CBRLDP), Journal of International Development, 
Special Issue: The Institutions of Development and the Development of Institutions, Vol.  23 
(3): 380–393 
 
Chinsinga, B. (2003), The participatory development approach under a microscope: the case of the 
poverty alleviation programme in Malawi, Journal of Social Development in Africa, Vol.18 
(1): 129 - 144 
 
Chinsinga, B. (2002), The Politics of Poverty Alleviation in Malawi: A critical review, In Englund H. 
(eds) (2002) A democracy of Chameleons: Politics and Culture in the New Malawi, 
Christian Literature Association in Malawi, Blantyre, pp25 – 42. 
 
Chinsinga, B. (2007a), The Social Protection Policy in Malawi: Processes, Politics and Challenges, 
Future Agricultures Consortium,  www.future-agricultures.org. 
 
Chinsinga, B. (2007b), Reclaiming Policy Space: Lessons from Malawi’s 2005/2006 Fertilizer Subsidy 
Programme. Working Paper.      Future Agricultures Consortium. 
http://www.futureagricultures.org/pdf%20files/fertilizer_subsidy_case.pdf. 
 
Chinsinga, B. and O.Brien A. (2008), Planting Ideas: How agricultural subsidies are working in 
Malawi, African Research Institute, London 
 
Chione,  D.  (2005),  Economic  Planning  &  Development  Deputy  Principal  Secretary,  Nation 
Newspaper, 3rd February 2005, Malawi. 
 
Chipeta  C.  (1998),  Tax  reform  and  tax  yield  in  Malawi,  AERC  Research  Paper  81,  African 
Economic Research Consortium, Nairobi. 
 
Chirambo, R. (2004), Operation Bwezani: The Army, Political Change, And Dr. Banda’s Hegemony 
In Malawi, Nordic Journal of African Studies, Vol. 13(2): 146–163. 
 
Chirwa E., Patel N., and Kanyongolo F., (2003), Democracy Report for Malawi, 
http://www.idea.int/publications/sod/upload/Malawi.pdf. 
 
Chirwa E.W. (2004), Access to Land, Growth and Poverty Reduction in Malawi, 
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001007/P1123Malawi_Land_Chirwa_Aug2004.pdf. 
 
Chirwa E.W. and Chilowa W. (1997), ‘The Impact of Structural Adjustment Programmes on Social 
and Human Development in Malawi’, Bwalo – Forum for Social Development, Issue No. 
1, Centre for Social Research, Zomba. 
 
Chirwa E.W., Mvula P., Zgovu E. and Namata L. (1996), “Review of Credit Operations under Social 
Dimensions of Adjustment Project and other Programs”. Report prepared by Wadonda 
Consult for the Ministry of Economic Planning and Development. 
 
Chirwa W. (1994), The Politics of Ethnicity and Regionalism in Contemporary Malawi, African Rural 
and Urban Studies, 1 (2):93 – 118. 
 
Chirwa, W. (2001), Dancing towards dictatorship: political songs and popular culture in Malawi, 
Nordic Journal of African Studies, 10 (1):1 – 27. 
301  
Chirwa, W. (2005), “Community Broadcasting in Malawi”,  http://documents.amarc.org/files/2005-09- 
07/Africa_Malawi_Country_Report.pdf, accessed on 25/11/08. 
 
Chirwa, W., Patel, N. and Kangongolo, E., (2004), Democracy Report for Malawi, 
http://www.idea.int/publications/sod/upload/Malawi.pdf. 
 
Clay, E. and Schaffer, B. (eds) (1984), Room for Manoeuvre: An Exploration of Public Policy in 
Agriculture and Rural Development, Heinemann, London 
 
Clarke, G. and Sison, M. (2005), Voices from the top of the pile: Elite Perceptions of Poverty and the 
Poor in the Phillipines, In Reis E. & Moore M. (eds), Elite Perceptions of Poverty and 
Inequality, Zed Books, London, pp58 - 90 
 
Cohen, A.(1981), The Politics of Elite Culture: Explorations in the Dramaturgy of Power in a Modern 
African Society, University of California Press, Ltd, London 
 
Collins K., Onwuegbuzie K. and Jiao Q. (2007), A Mixed Methods Investigation of Mixed Methods 
Sampling Designs in Social and Health Science Research, Journal of Mixed Methods 
Research, Vol. 1 (3): 267 – 294. 
 
Conroy A. (2006), “The History of Development and Crisis in Malawi”. In Conroy A., Blackie M., 
Whiteside A., Malewezi J. and Sachs J. (eds), Poverty, Aids and Hunger: Breaking the 
Poverty Trap in Malawi. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Cooksey B, Court D, Macau B. (1994), Education for Self-reliance and Harambee. In J.D. Barkan, 
(eds) Beyond Capitalism and Socialism in Kenya and Tanzania, Boulder and London, 
Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 
Cornia, G.A., Jolly, R., and Stewart, F. (1987), Adjustment with a Human Face, Vol. I: Protecting 
the Vulnerable and Promoting Growth, Oxford University Press 
 
Cornia, G.A., Jolly, R., and Stewart, F. (1988), Adjustment with a Human Face, Vol. 2: Ten Country 
Case Studies, Oxford University Press 
 
Cornwall, A. and Brock, K. (2005), Beyond Buzzwords:   “Poverty Reduction”, “Participation” and 
“Empowerment” in Development Policy, Overarching Concerns Programme Paper, No. 
10: 1 – 25, UNRISD. 
 
Cornwall,  A.  and  Gaventa,  J.  (2001a),  ‘Bridging  the  Gap:  Citizenship,  Participation  and 
Accountability’, PLA Notes 40: 32–5 
 
Cornwall,  A.,  &  Gaventa,  J.,  (2001b),  “From  Users  and  Choosers  to  Makers  and  Shapers: 
Repositioning Participation in Social Policy, IDS Working No. 127. 
 
Craig, D. and Doug P. (2003), ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: A New Convergence’, World 
Development, Vol. 31(1): 53–70 
 
Crain-Dorough M. (2009), Mixed Methods Research: Exploring the interactive continuum, Journal 
of Mixed Methods Research, Vol. 3 (2):197-198. 
 
Creswell J. & Plano Clark V.L., (2007), Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research, 
Sage Publication, California. 
302  
Creswell   J.W.   (2003),   Research   Design:  Qualitative,   Quantitative   and  Mixed   Methods 
Approaches, 2nd edition, London: Sage Publication. 
 
Creswell J.W. (2009), Mapping the field of Mixed Methods Research, Journal of Mixed Method 
Research, Vol. 3 (2): 95 -108. 
 
Cromwell, E. and Chintedza, A. (2005), Neopatrimonialism and Policy Processes: Lessons from the 
Southern African Food Crisis, IDS Bulletin, Vol. 36 (2): 1 – 8. 
 
Crook, R.C. (2003), Decentralisation and Poverty Reduction in Africa: the Politics of Local-Central 
Relations, Public Administration and Development, Vol. 23 (1): 77-88. 
 
Curtis,  B.  (1984),  Capitalist  Development  and  Educational  Reform: Comparative  Material  from 
England, Ireland and Upper Canada to 1850, Theory and Society, Vol. 13 (1): 41-68. 
 
Dahl, R. A. (1958), A critique of the Ruling Elite Model, The American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 52 (2): 463-469 
 
Dahl, R (1961), Who governs: Democracy and Power in an American City, New Haven and 
London, Yale University Press. 
 
Dahl, R (1984), Modern Political Analysis, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey. 
 
Dasgupta A. and Beard V.A. (2007), Community Driven Development, Collective Action and Elite 
Capture in Indonesia, Development and Change, Vol. 38 (2): 229-249. 
 
Daunton M. (1986), Charity, Self-Interest and Welfare in the English Past, UCL Press: London 
 
Davis, P.R. (2001), Rethinking the Welfare Regime Approach: The Case of Bangladesh, Global 
Social Policy, Vol. 1(1): 79–107 
 
Dawson R.E. and Robinson, J.A. (1963), Inter-party Competition, economic variable and Welfare 
policies in the American State, Journal of Politics, Vol. 25 (2): 265 – 289 
 
De Swaan A. (1988), In Care of the State: Health Care, Education, and Welfare in Europe and 
the USA in the Modern Era, New York: Oxford University Press 
 
De Swaan A. (2005), “Elite Perceptions of the poor: Reflections on a Comparative Research Project” 
In: Reis and Moore (eds), Elite Perceptions of Poverty and Inequality, Zed Books, 
London, pp18 -194 
 
De  Swaan  A.,  Oyen,  E.,  Reis,  E.  (2000),  Elite  Perceptions  of  the  Poor:  Reflections  for  a 
Comparative Project, Current Sociology, 48 (1): 43 - 54 
 
Deacon B. (1997), Global Social Policy: International Organisations and the Future of Welfare, 
London Sage 
 
Deacon, D., Pickering M., and Golding P. (1999), Researching Communications: A practical 
Guide to Methods in Media and Cultural Analysis, Arnold. London 
 
Dellinger A. et al (2007), Towards a Unified Validation Framework in Mixed Methods Research, 
Journal of Mixed Methods Research, Vol. 1(4): 309-332 
303  
Denscombe M. (1998), The Good Research Guide for Small-scale Social Research Projects, 
Open University Press, Buckingham 
 
Denzin,  N. and  Lincoln,  Y.  (eds.)  (2011),  The  Sage  Handbook  of  Qualitative  Research,  Sage 
Publication Ltd, London 
 
Denzin  N. &  Lincoln  Y. (2003),  Handbook  of  Qualitative  Research,  Thousand  Oaks,  Sage 
Publications, California 
 
Denzin, N.K. (1970). The research act: A theoretical introduction to sociological  methods. 
Chicago: Aldine 
 
Dewey,  J.  (1917),  The  need  for  a  recovery  of  philosophy,  In  J.  J.  McDermott  (1981),  The 
Philosophy of John Dewey, pp. 58-97, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Dewey,  J.  (1931),  The  development  of  American  pragmatism,  In  H.  S.  Thayer  (Ed.)  (1989), 
Pragmatism: The classic writings, pp. 23-40, Indianapolis 
 
Dey  I.  (1993),  Qualitative  Data  Analysis:  A  User-Friendly  Guide  for  Social  Scientists, 
Routledge, London. 
 
Devereaux, S. (1999), Making Less Last Longer: Informal Safety Nets in Malawi, IDS Discussion 
Paper, No. 373: 1- 75 
 
Devereux S., Baulch B., and Macauslan I. et al. (2006), “Vulnerability and Social Protection in 
Malawi”, IDS Discussion Paper 387, www.ids.ac.uk/ids/bookshop 
 
Devereux,  S.  (1997),  Household  Food  Security  in  Malawi,  IDS  Discussion  Paper,  No.  362, 
December, Brighton, Sussex. 
 
Devereux, S. (1999), Making Less Last Longer: Informal Safety Nets in Malawi, IDS Discussion 
Paper, No. 373, Brighton, Sussex. 
 
DFID  (2011), UK Suspend Financial Support to Malawi Government, 
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/News/Latest-news/2011/Government-to-suspend-general-budget- 
support-to-Malawi/ 
 
DFID  (2010), The politics of Poverty: Elites, Citizens and States, 
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/publications1/evaluation/plcy-pltcs-dfid-rsch-synth- 
ppr.pdf 
DFID (2004), “Malawi: Country Assistance Plan 2004/05 – 2005/06”, 
http://www.eldis.org/assets/Docs/14697.html 
 
DFID  (2007), “Country Assistance Plan 2007 – 2011”, 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/consultations/malawi- 
cap.pdf 
 
DFID (2001), Making Government Work for Poor People: Building State Capacity. Strategy Paper. 
London: DFID. 
 
Diamant, A. (1959), Is There a Non-Western Political Process? Comments on Lucian W. Pye's "The 
Non-Western Political Process" The Journal of Politics, Vol. 21 (1):  123-127 
304  
Diamond L. (2003), ‘Moving Up Out of Poverty: What Does Democracy Have to Do With It?’ 
Prepared for the World Bank Workshop “Moving Out of Poverty: Growth and Freedom 
from the Bottom Up”, Washington 
 
Dicaprio,  A.  (2011),  The  Role  of  Elites  in  Economic  Development,  UNU  Wider  Book  Series 
(Forthcoming) 
 
Di John, J., and Putzel, J. (2009), Political Settlements, Issue Paper, www.gsdrc.org 
 
Dohlman E. & Soderback M. (2007), Economic growth versus poverty reduction: A ‘hollow debate’? 
OECD Observer N° 260 
http://www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory.php/aid/2173/Economic_growth_versus_poverty 
_reduction:_A_%93hollow_debate%94_.html 
 
Dollar, D. and Gatti, R. (1999), Gender Inequality, Income, and Growth: Are Good Times Good for 
Women? Policy Research Report on Gender and Development Working Paper Series, 
No. 1, http: //www.worldbank.org/gender/prr. 
 
Domhoff, G. W., (1967), Who Rules America? Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. 
 
Domhoff, G.W. and Dye, T.R. (1987), Power Elites and Organizations, Sage Publication, California 
 
Doner, R.F., Ritchie, B.K., and Slater, D. (2005), Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of 
Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective, 
International Organization, Vol. 59 (2): 327-361 
 
Dorward, A. and Kydd, J. (2004), The Malawi 2002 Food Crisis: The Rural Development Challenge, 
Journal of Modern Africa Studies,  Vol. 42(3): 343-361 
 
Dreze, J., and K. Reetika. (2000), Crime, Gender, and Society in India: Insights from Homicide Data, 
Population and Development Review Vol. 26 (2): 335-52. 
Duffield, J.S. (1999), Political Culture and State Behaviour: Why Germany confounds Neorealism, 
International Organization, Vol. 53 (4): 765 – 803 
 
Dunleavy P, (1991), Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice: Economic Explanations in Political 
Science, New York and London: Harvester/Wheatsheaf. 
 
Durevall  D.  (2002),  “Malawi:  Economic  Growth,  Public  Sector  Reform  and  Poverty”,  Country 
Economic Report, SIDA 
 
Dye  T.  and  Ziegler  H. (1996),  The  Irony  of  Democracy:  an  uncommon  introduction  to 
American Politics, Belmont, Wadsworth Publishing 
 
Dzilankhulani A. (1996), “The Begging Syndrome” The Nation Newspaper, Malawi, 
http://www.mwnation.com 
 
Easton, D. (1957), An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems, World Politics, Vol. 9 (3): 383 
– 400 
 
Edgerton, R.B. (2000). “Traditional Beliefs and Practices - Are Some Better than Others?” In L.E. 
Harrison and S.P. Huntington (eds.). Culture Matters. pp. 126-140. 
305  
Edigheji,  O. (2005), A Democratic  Developmental  State  in Africa?  A concept  paper,  Research 
Report 105, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg 
 
Edward O. Laumann, E.O., and Marsden, P.V. (1979), The Analysis of Oppositional Structures in 
Political Elites: Identifying Collective Actors, American Sociological Review, Vol. 44 (5): 
713-732 
 
EISA (2004), “Election Update 2004: Malawi”, http://www.eisa.org.za 
 
Ellis F., Kutengule M., and Nyasulu A. (2003), Livelihoods and Rural Poverty in Malawi, World 
Development, Vol. 31 (9):1495 – 1510 
 
Encyclopaedia of the Nations, (2008), “Malawi: Poverty and Wealth”, 
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Africa/Malawi-POVERTY-AND- 
WEALTH.html, accessed on 22/11/2008 
 
Englund H. (2002a), A democracy of Chameleons: Politics and Culture in the New Malawi, 
Christian Literature Association in Malawi, Malawi, Blantyre 
 
Englund   H.   (2002b),   Winning   elections,   losing   legitimacy   –   Multipartyism   and   the 
Neopatrimonial State in Malawi, Multi-party elections in Africa, James Curry, Oxford 
 
Englund, H. (2000), The Dead Hand of Human Rights: Contrasting Christianities in Post-Transition 
Malawi, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 38 (4): 579-603 
 
Englund, Harri (2002c), The Village in the City, the City in the Village: Migrants in Lilongwe, Journal 
of Southern African Studies, Vol. 28: 1, 137 — 154 
 
Erdmann G. and Engel U. (2006), “Neopatrimonialism Revisited – Beyond a Catch-all concept”, 
GIGA Working Paper 16, http://www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers 
 
EU (2003), Civil Society: Balancing Political and Economic Issues, The Courier ACP-EU, n° 201, 
http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/publications/courier/courier201/pdf/en_059.pdf 
 
Evans, Peter, (1995), Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation, Princeton, N.J,: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Fatton,  R. (1995),  Africa  in the Age of Democratization:  The Civic Limitations  of Civil Society, 
African Studies Review, Vol. 38 (2): 67-99 
 
Femia, J. V. (1981), An Historicist Critique of "Revisionist" Methods for Studying the History of 
Ideas, History and Theory, Vol. 20 (2): 113-134 
 
Ferguson, J. (1994), “The Anti-Politics Machine: ‘Development’, Depoliticization and Bureaucratic 
Power in Lesotho”. The Ecologist, Vol. 24 (5): 176 - 181 
 
Field, G.L. and Higley, J. (1980), Elitism, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 
 
Fledderjohann, J.   and Trinitapoli, J. (2010), “Perceptions and Planning: Extended Family 
Obligations and Family Formation in Malawi”, 
http://www.paa2011.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId=112411 
306  
Forster, P.G. (1994), Culture, Nationalism, and the Invention of Tradition in Malawi, The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, Vol. 32 (3): 477-497 
 
Foster, J.B (2007), Imperialist World System: Paul Baran’s Political Economy of Growth After Fifty 
Years, Monthly Review, Vol. 59 No. 1 
 
Fozzard A. & Simwaka C. (2002), “How, When & Why poverty get budget priority: Poverty Reduction 
Strategy  and Public  Expenditure  in Malawi”,  Case  Study 4, ODI Working Paper 166, 
United Kingdom 
 
Frankenberger, T., Luther, K., Fox, K. and Mazzeo, J. (2003), Livelihood Erosion through Time: 
Macro and Micro Factors that Influenced Livelihood Trends in Malawi Over the Last 
30 Years, CARE Southern and Western Africa Regional Management Unit (SWARMU) 
 
Freshwater D. (2007), Reading Mixed Methods Research: Contexts for Criticism, Journal of Mixed 
Methods Research, Vol. 1 (2): 134 -146 
 
Frey F.W. (1965), The Turkish Political Elite, In Huntington S.P. (1965), Political Development and 
Political Decay, World Politics, Vol. 17 (3): 386-430 
 
Fritz, V. and Menocal, A.R. (2006), Rebuilding Developmental States: From Theory to Practice, ODI 
Working Paper, No.274: 1 – 44, Overseas Development Institute 
 
Fritz, V. and Menocal, A.R. (2007), Developmental States in the New Millennium: Concepts and 
Challenges for a New Aid Agenda, Development Policy Review, Vol. 25 (5): 531-552 
 
Fritzen, S. (2007), ‘Can the Design of Community-driven Development Reduce the Risk of Elite 
Capture? Evidence from Indonesia’, World Development, 35 (8): 1359–1375. 
Gans, H. J. (1963), Urban villagers: Group life and class in the life of Italian-Americans, New 
York: Free Press 
 
 
 
Geertz, Clifford (1973), “The Interpretation of Culture”. In Deacon, D. et al (1999). Researching 
Communications: A practical guide to methods in media and cultural analysis, Arnold. 
London 
 
Gelbach, J.B. & Pritchett, L. (1997), More for the Poor is Less for the Poor: The Politics of Targeting, 
Policy Research Working Paper No. 1799, Washington D.C.: World Bank 
 
Geremek, B. (1994), Poverty: A History, Oxford and Cambridge, Oxford, Basil: Blackwell 
 
 
 
Giddens  A. (1976),  New Rules of Sociological  Method: A Positive  Critique of Interpretice 
Sociology, London: Hutchinson 
 
Giddens, A. (1974), "Elites in the British Class Structure," in Stan-worth, P. and Giddens, A. (eds.), 
Elites and Power in British Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp1-22. 
 
 
 
Giddens A. (1973), The class structure of the advanced societies, Halper Collins Publishers Inc 
307  
Gilbert Nigel (2001), Researching Social Life, 2nd Edition, Sage Publication, London 
 
Gilman L. (2004), The Traditionalization of Women’s Dancing, Hegemony and Politics in Malawi, 
Journal of Folklore Research, Vol. 41(1):33-60 
 
Gilman, L. (2001), Purchasing Praise: Women, Dancing, and Patronage in Malawi Party Politics, 
Africa Today, Vol. 48 (4): 43-64 
 
Glaser,  B.G.  and  Strauss,  A.L.  (1967),  The  Discovery  of  Grounded  Theory:  Strategies  for 
Qualitative Research. Chicago, IL: Aldine. 
 
Goetz, A. M. and Jenkins, R. (2005), Re-inventing Accountability: Making Democracy Work for 
Human Development, International Political Economy Series, Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
 
Gondwe, G. (2004), Budget Statement by the Minister of Finance,  38th  Parliamentary Session 
held on 5/09/04, Malawi 
Good K. (1999), The state and extreme poverty in Botswana: the san and destitute,  Journal of 
Modern African Studies, Vol. 37 (2): 185 - 205 
 
Gooptu, N. (1996), ‘The “Problem” of the Urban poor Policy and Discourse of Local Administration: a 
study in Uttar Pradesh in the Interwar Period’, Economic and Political Weekly, December 
14, pp 3245-3254 
 
Gordon, I., Lewis, J., and Young, K. (1993), Perspectives on Policy Analysis, In Hill, M. eds., The 
Policy Process: A Reader, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf 
 
Government of Malawi & United Nations in Malawi (1993), Situation Analysis of Poverty in 
Malawi, Montfort Press, Limbe, Malawi. 
 
 
 
Government of Malawi, (2008), Millennium Development Goals Report, Malawi 
 
Government   of   Malawi   (2007),   “Malawi   Growth   and   Development   Strategy:   2006-2011”, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr0755.pdf. 
 
Government of Malawi (2007), The 2007 Malawi Millennium Development Goal Report, Ministry 
of Economic Planning and Development, Malawi. 
 
Government of Malawi, (2005), “Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy: Annual Progress Report – 
2003/2004”, Ministry of Economic Planning, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/Malawi_APR(Feb-2005).pdf. 
Government of Malawi, (2002), Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Zomba, Malawi. 
Government of Malawi, (1971), Statement of Development Policies, 1971 – 1980, Government 
Printer, Zomba, Malawi. 
 
Government of Malawi, (1988), Statement of Development Policies, 1987 – 1996, Government 
Printer, Zomba, Malawi. 
308  
Grant  U.,  Horland  I., and  Curran  Z. (2006),  “Bringing  Community-learnt  Knowledge  into  policy 
debate: The case of Legal Aid Centres”, Working Paper 277, ODI, London. 
 
Gray C. & MacPherson M. (2001), The Leadership Factor in African Policy Reform and Growth, 
Economic and Cultural Change, Vol. 49 (4): 707 – 740. 
 
Grebe  E. (2009),  “Leaders,  Networks and  Coalitions  in the AIDS  Response:  A Comparison  of 
Uganda and South Africa”, LECRP Research Paper 03, 
http://www.lpdlec.org/ftp/download/Public%20Folder/LECRP%20Publications%20%28Phas 
e%20One%29/Research%20Papers/LECRP%20RP%2003.pdf 
 
Green, J., Statham, H., & Solomou, W. (2008), Assessing satisfaction: Insights from a multi-methods 
study, NCRM Working Paper No. 462, ESRC National Centre for Research Methods. 
http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/462/ 
 
Greene J.C. (2008), Is Mixed Methods Social Inquiry a Distinctive Methodology? Journal of Mixed 
Methods Research, Vol. 2 (1):7-22. 
 
Greene J.C., Caracelli V.J., and Graham W.F. (1989), Toward a conceptual framework for mixed- 
method evaluation design, Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, Vol. 11 (3):255- 
274. 
 
Greenough, P. (1982), Prosperity and misery in modern Bengal: The famine of 1943–44. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Greig A., Hulme D., and Turner M. (2007), Challenging Global Inequality: Development Theory 
and Practice in the 21st Century, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire. 
 
Grindle, M. (2007), Good Enough Governance Revisited, Development Policy Review, Vol. 25 
(5): 553-574 
 
Grindle M. (1980), Politics and Policy implementation in the Third world, Princeton University 
Press, 
 
Grindle, M.S. (1999), In Quest of the Political:The Political Economy of Development Policy Making, 
CID Working Paper, No. 17: 1-31,Centre for International Development at Harvard 
University. 
 
Grindle, M.S. and Thomas, J.W.  (1989), Policy makers, policy choices, and policy outcomes: "The 
political economy of reform in developing countries", Policy Sciences, Vol. 22(3/4): 213 – 
248. 
 
Grindle,  M.S. and  Thomas, J.W. (1990), After the Decision:  Implementing Policy Reforms in 
Developing Countries, World Development, Vol. 18 (8): 1163- 1181. 
 
Grix, J. (2002), Introducing Students to the Generic Terminology of Social Research, Politics, Vol. 
22(3): 175–186. 
 
Grootaert, C. et al. (1995), The dynamics of poverty: why some people escape from poverty and 
others don’t – an African case study, World Bank Working Paper Series 1499, Washington, 
DC: World Bank 
309  
Gunder Frank, A. (1969), Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution, Monthly Review Press: 
New York 
 
 
 
Gyimah-Boadi E. and Van De Walle N. (1996), The Politics of Renewal in Africa. In Ndulu B.J, Van 
De Walle N. and Appleton S. (eds), Agenda for Africa’s Economic Renewal, USA Third 
World Perspectives No. 21, Washington. 
 
Haddad, L., Ruel, M. and Garrett, J.L (1999), Are Urban Poverty and Undernutrition Growing? Some 
Newly Assembled Evidence, World Development, Vol. 27(11): 1891-1904. 
 
Haggard  S.  and  Kaufman  R.  eds.  (1992),  The  Politics  of  Economic  Adjustment,  Princeton 
University Press, New Jersey 
 
Haggard, S. (1990), Pathways from the Periphery: the Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrialising 
Countries, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
Ha-Joon Chang (2004), Globalisation, Economic Development and the Role of the State, Zed 
Books Ltd, London and New York, 2004 
Halper, Thomas (1973), The poor as pawns: The new deserving poor and the old, Polity, Vol. 6 (1): 
71 – 86. 
 
Ham C. & Hill M. (1984), The policy process in the modern capitalist state, Harvester Press 
Group, Sussex. 
 
Haralambos, M. & Holborn, M. (2000), Sociology: Themes and Perspectives, Collins Educational, 
London. 
 
Harber C. (2002), Education, Democracy and Poverty Reduction in Africa, Comparative Education, 
Vol. 38 (3): 267-276. 
 
Harrigan J. (1991), Malawi, Aid and Power: The World Bank and Policy-based Lending, 
Routledge, London. 
 
Harrigan J. (2001), From Dictatorship to Democracy: economic Policy in Malawi 1964 – 2000, 
Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, UK. 
 
Harrigan J. (2003), U-Turns and full Circles: Two decades of Agricultural Reform in Malawi 1981 – 
2000, World Development Report, Vol. 31 (5):847 – 863. 
 
Harrigan, J. (1988), Malawi: The Impact of Pricing Policy on Smallholder Agriculture 1971-1988, 
Development Policy Review, Vol. 6 (4): 415-433. 
 
Harris, J (2007), “Bringing Politics Back into Poverty Analysis: Why understanding of social relations 
matters more for policy on chronic poverty than measurement”, CPRC Working Paper 77, 
http://www.chronicpoverty.org/uploads/publication_files/WP77_Harriss.pdf 
 
Hartmann, M. (2007), The Sociology of Elites, Routledge: New York 
 
Hay, C. (2002), Political Analysis: A critical Introduction, Palgrave. New York. 
310  
Helmke, G. and S. Levitsky (eds.) (2006), Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons from 
Latin America, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Heroles J (2004),  Perceptions  and Misconceptions  in US – Mexico  relations  in Changing 
Perceptions, Woodrow Wilson Centre for scholars 
Hickey,  S. (2008),  “The Return  of Politics  in Development  Studies  (I): Getting  Lost  within the 
Poverty Agenda?” Progress in Development Studies, Vol. 8 (4): 349-358. 
 
Hickey, S. (2009), The Return to Politics in Development (II), Progress in Development Studies, 
Vol. 9 (2): 141-152 
 
Hickey, S. and G. Mohan (eds.), (2004), "Relocating Participation within a Radical Politics of 
Development: Insights from Political Action and Practice. In Hickey, S. and Mohan, G. (eds.) 
"Participation: from tyranny to transformation? Exploring new approaches to 
participation in development. London: Zed. 
 
Hickey S., (2005), The politics of staying poor: Exploring the political space for poverty reduction in 
Uganda, World development, Vol. 33 (6): 995 - 1005 
Hickey, S. (2007), Conceptualizing the Politics of Social Protection in Africa, Brooks World Poverty 
Institute, Paper 4,  http://www.bwpi.manchester.ac.uk/resources/Working-Papers/bwpi-wp- 
0407.pdf. 
 
Hickey S & Bracking S. (2005), Exploring the politics of chronic poverty: From presentation to a 
politics of justice? World Development, Vol. 33 (6):851 – 865. 
 
Higley J. & Gunther  R. (1995),  Elites  and Democratic Consolidation  in Latin  America and 
Southern Europe, Cambridge University Press, New York 
 
Higley J. and Burton M. (1989), The elite Variable in Democratic  Transitions and Breakdowns, 
American Sociological Review, Vol. 54 (1): 17 - 32 
 
Higley J., Burton M. & Field (1990), “In Defense of elite theory: A reply to Cammack”, American 
Sociological Review, Vol. 55 (3): 421 – 426 
 
Higley J., Field G.L., and Groholt K. (1976), Elite Structure and Ideology, New York, Columbia 
University Press 
 
Higley, J. and Burton, M. (1998), Elite Settlements and the Taming of Politics, Government and 
Opposition, Vol. 33 (1): 98–115 
 
Higley, J.,  and Moore, G. (1981), Elite Integration in the United States and Australia, The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 75 (3): 581-597 
 
Hill, D. (2003), Policy, Politics and Chronic Poverty: The experience of Bankura District, West 
 
Bengal, IDPM, University of Manchester 
 
 
Hill, M. (2009), The public policy process, (5th edition) Pearson education Limited, England 
 
 
Hill, M. (1993), The Policy Process, Prentice Hall: Harvester WheatSheaf, London 
311  
Himmelfarb G. (1984), The Idea of Poverty: England in the Early Industrial Age, Faber and 
Faber, London 
 
Himmelfarb  G.  (1995),  The  De-Moralization  of  Society:  From  Victorian  Virtues  to  Modern 
Values, IEA Health and Welfare Unit: Bourne Press, Dorset, UK 
 
Himmelfarb,  G.  (1991),  Poverty  and  Compassion:  The  Moral  Imaginational  of  the  Late 
Victorians, Vintage Books, New York 
 
Hirsch, P. (1990), “Development dilemmas in rural Thailand”. In Johnson C. & Start D. (2001) 
“Rights, Claims and Capture: Understanding the politics of Pro-poor policy”, ODI Working 
paper 145, http://www.eldis.org/static/DOC9174.htm 
 
Hirshman D. (1995), Starring Kamuzu: Malawi Ex-life President on Film, 1966 – 1969, Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 13 (2):245 - 261 
 
Hodes, R., Thorpe, J., & Stern, O. (2011), Structure and Agency in the Politics of a Women’s Rights 
Coalition in South Africa: The Making of the South African Sexual Offences Act, 2007, The 
Developmental Leadership Program, Research Paper 13. 
 
Hochman,   Harold   and   James   Rodgers   (1969),   "Pareto-Optimal   Redistribution,"   American 
Economic Review, Vol. 59 (4): 542-557 
 
Hofferbert R. (1970), Elite Influence in State Policy Formation: A model for Comparative Inquiry, 
Polity, Vol. 2 (3): 316 – 344 
Hoffman-Lange U. (1987), “Surveying national elites in the Federal Republic of Germany”. In: Moyser  
and  Wagstaff  (eds)  Research  methods  for  elite  studies,  Allen  and  Unwin, London, 
pp27 – 47. 
 
Hoffman-Lange  U.  (1989),  Positional  Power  and  Political  Influence  in  the  Federal  Republic  of 
Germany, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 17 (1):51 – 77. 
Hollingshead, A. B. (1949), Elmtown’s Youth, New York: John Wiley 
Holman R (1978), Poverty: Explanation of Social Deprivation, Robertson and Company, London 
Horowitz, D.L. (1989), Is There a Third-World Policy Process?, Policy Sciences, Vol. 22 (3/4): 197 
– 212. 
 
Hossain N. (1999), How do Bangladeshi elites understand poverty, IDS Working Paper 83 
 
Hossain  N. (2005),  Productivity  and Virtue: Elite  categories  of the  poor  in Bangladesh,  World 
Development, 33 (6): 965 - 977 
 
Hossain, M. and Matin, I. (2007), Engaging elite support for the poorest?: BRAC’s Targeted Ultra 
Poor Programme for Rural Women in Bangladesh, Development in Practice, Vol. 17 
(3):380 –392. 
 
Hossain N. and Moore M. (2002), Arguing for the Poor: Elites and Poverty in  Developing Countries, 
IDS Working Paper 148, Brighton: IDS 
 
Hossain N. & Moore M. (2001), Elites and Poverty in Developing Countries: Are Donors missing 
opportunities to engage constructively? IDS 
312  
Hossain, N. and Moore, M. (2005), So Near and Yet so Far:L Elites and Imagined Poverty in 
Bangladesh, In Reis E. & Moore M. (eds), Elite Perceptions of Poverty and Inequality, 
Zed Books, London 
Hossain N. and Moore M. (1999), Elite Perceptions of poverty: Bangladesh, IDS Bulletin 30(2) 
Howarth, D. (1995), Theory and methods in political science, Macmillan Press Ltd, London. 
Howlett M., Ramesh M. and Perl A. (eds) (2009), Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and 
Policy subsystems, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Hulme D. (2010), Just give money to the poor: The Development Revolution of the Global 
South, Kumarian Press, USA. 
 
Human   Development   Report   (2010),   The   Real   Wealth   of   Nations:   Pathways   to   Human 
Development, UNDP, http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/ 
 
 
 
Human Development Report (2009), Overcoming Barriers: Human Mobility and Development, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2009_EN_Complete.pdf 
Human Development Report (1990), Concept and Measurement of Human Development, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_1990_en_overview.pdf 
Huntington, S. (1968), Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press, London. 
Huntington, S. and Weiner M. eds. (1987), Understanding Political Development, Harper Collins, 
Boston. 
 
Huntington, S.P. (1965), Political development and political decay, World Politics, Vol. 17 (3): 386- 
430 
 
Hwedi, Osei (2001), The State and Development in Southern Africa: a comparative analysis of 
Botswana and Mauritius with Angola, Malawi and Zambia, African Studies Quarterly, 
http://web.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v5/v5i1a2.htm 
 
Hyden, G. (2005), Why Do Things Happen the Way They Do? A Power Analysis of Tanzania, Sida 
http://hei.unige.ch/news/files/Goran_Hyden_Power_analysis.pdf 
 
Hyden, G. (2006), Beyond Governance: Bringing Power into Development Policy Analysis, Paper 
presented to the Danida/GEPPA Conference on Power, Politics and Change in Weak States, 
Copenhagen, 1-2 March, online at 
www.geppa.dk/files/activities/Conference%202006/Goran%20Hyden.pdf 
 
Hyden, G. (2007), Governance  and Poverty Reduction in Africa, Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 104 (43): 16751-16756. 
 
Hyden, Goran (2008), Institutions, Power and Policy Outcomes in Africa, Power and Politics in 
Africa Programme (APPP), Discussion Paper No. 2, ODI, London. 
 
Hyden, G. and Bratton, M. (1992), Governance and Politics in Africa, Boulder, Lynne Rienner 
313  
Hyden, G., Court, J., and  Mease, K. (2004), Making Sense of Governance: Empirical Evidence 
from Sixteen Developing Countries. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
 
Hyung- Gon, Paul Yoo (2003), Corruption, Rule of Law and Civil Society: Why Patronage is Good 
for Developing Markets and Democracies, International Affairs Review, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~iar/articles/2003/WS03_Yoo.pdf 
Ihonvbere, J.O. (1997), From Despotism to Democracy: The Rise of Multiparty Politics in Malawi, 
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 18 (2):  225-247. 
 
IHS  (2005),            Malawi            Second            Intergrated            Household            Survey. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLSMS/Resources/3358986- 
1181743055198/3877319-1181928149600/IHS2_Basic_Information2.pdf 
 
Iliffe John, (1987), The African Poor: A History, Cambridge University Press 
 
International Monetary Fund (2005), ‘Good Governance: The IMF’s Role’, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/gvern/govindex.htm 
 
IMF and IDA, (2003), Malawi Poverty Reduction  Strategy Paper – Progress Report: Joint Staff 
Assessment, http://poverty2.forumone.com/files/Malawi_PRSP_APR_JSA.pdf 
 
Immergut E.M. (1992), Health Politics: Interests and Institutions in Western Europe, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 
 
Immergut, E.M. (1990), Institutions, Veto Points, and Policy Results: A Comparative Analysis of 
Health Care, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 10(4): 391-416 
 
Immergut, E.M. (1992), The rules of the game: The logic of health policy-making in France, 
Switzerland, and Sweden, In: S. Steinmo, K. Thelen, and F. Longstreth (ed.) Structuring 
Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 57- 89. 
 
Inglehart,  R.  (1988),  The  Renaissance  of  Political  Culture,  The  American  Political  Science 
Review, Vol. 82 (4): 1203-1230. 
 
International Fund for Agricultural Development [IFAD] (2007), Enabling the rural poor to overcome 
poverty  in  Malawi,   http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/english/regions/africa/mwi/index.htm, 
accessed on 22/11/2008 
 
Jahoda, M., Lazarsfeld, P. F., & Zeisel, H. (1931/2003), Marienthal: The sociography of an 
unemployed community, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers 
 
Jamali P. (2008), “Chimango Speaks on section 65”, Nyasa Times, 
http://www.nyasatimes.com/national/185.html 
James, W. (1907/1981), Pragmatism, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett. 
 
James, R. and Malunga, C. (2006), Organizational Challenges Facing Civil Society Networks in 
Malawi, KM4D Journal, Vol. 2 (2): 48-63. 
314  
Jang. E.E., McDougall, D.E., Pollon, D., Herbert, M. and Russell, P. (2008), Integrative Mixed 
Methods Data Analytic Strategies in Research on School Success in Challenging 
Circumstances, Journal of Mixed Methods Research, Vol. 2 (3): 221-247 
 
 
 
Jenkins, B. (1993), Policy Analysis: Models and Approaches, In Hill, M. (eds), The Policy Process, 
Prentice Hall: Harvester WheatSheaf, London, pp30 – 40 
Jennings, B. (1983), Interpretive Social Science and Social Analysis. In Callahan D  and Jennings B 
(eds) ‘Ethics, the Social Science and Policy Analysis’, New York, Free Press 
 
Jervis R (2002), Signaling and Perception: Drawing Inferences and Projecting Images, In Monroe 
K.R. (eds), Political Psychology, Taylor and Francis, pp293 - 312 
 
Jick,   T.D.   (1979),   Mixing   Qualitative   and   Quantitative   Methods:   Triangulation   in   Action, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 24(4): 602-611 
 
Johnson  B. (2008), Living with Tensions:  The Dialectic  Approach,  Journal of Mixed Methods 
Research, Vol. 2 (3): 203 - 207 
 
Johnson, C. (1987), “Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The Government-Business 
Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan”, in Frederic Deyo (ed.). The Political 
Economy of the New Asian Industrialism, Cornell University Press, New York, pp. 136- 
164 
 
Johnson C. & Start D. (2001), Rights, Claims and Capture: Understanding the Politics of Pro-poor 
policy, ODI Working Paper 145, http://www.eldis.org/static/DOC9174.htm 
 
Johnson R.B., Onwuegbuzie A.J., and Turner L.A. (2007), Towards a definition of Mixed Methods 
Research, Journal of Mixed Methods Research, Vol. 1 (2):112 - 133 
 
Jones, A., and Manda, D.L. (2006), Violence and 'Othering' in Colonial and Postcolonial Africa, Case 
Study: Banda's Malaŵi, Journal of African Cultural Studies, Vol. 18(2): 197-213 
 
Jordan G. (2004), “The Causes of Poverty: Cultural Vs. Structural: Can there be a synthesis?” 
Perspectives in Public Affairs, http://www.asu.edu/mpa/Jordan.pdf, accessed on 17/02/10 
 
Jul-Larsen, E.  & Mvula, P. (2007), Security for Many or Surplus for the Few? Customary Tenure 
and Social Differentiation in Southern Malawi, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 
35 (1): 175-190. 
 
Jutting J., Drechsler D., Bartsch S., and Sosya I.D.   (2007), Informal Institutions: How Social 
Norms Help or Hinder Development, OECD Publication, Paris. 
 
Kalati, N. and Manor, J. (2005), Elites Perceptions of Poverty and Poor People in South Africa, In 
Reis E. & Moore M. (eds)), Elite Perceptions of Poverty and Inequality, Zed Books, 
London, pp156 -181 
 
Kalebe-Nyamongo  (2010), “Mutual Interdependence  Between  Elites and the Poor”, UNU Wider 
Working Paper No 117. 
 
Kalinga, O.J.M (1996), Resistance, Politics of Protest, and Mass Nationalism in Colonial Malawi, 
1950-1960: A Reconsideration, Cahiers d'Études Africaines, Vol. 36 (143): 443-454. 
315  
Kalonga, P.K. (2002), Political Change, Economic Transition and Catalysis of IMF/World Bank 
Economic Models - the case of Malawi, Presented at Conference on ‘Malawi after Banda: 
Perpsectives in a regional African Context’, Scotland. 
 
Kamwendo G. (2002), Ethnic Revival and Language Associations in the new Malawi: The case 
of Chitumbuka, Christian Literature Association of Malawi, Blantyre. 
 
Kanbur, R. and Squire, L. (1999), The Evolution Of Thinking About Poverty: Exploring The 
Interactions, In Meier, G.M. and Stiglitz, J.E. (eds), Frontiers of Development Economics: 
The Future in Perspective, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
 
Kaspin,  D. (1990),  The Politics of Ethnicity  in Malawi's  Democratic  Transition,  The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, Vol. 33 (4): 595-620. 
 
Kaufmann,  Daniel  (2003),  Rethinking  Governance:  Empirical  Lessons  Challenge  Orthodoxy. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
Kelly, M. (2000), Inequality and Crime, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 82 (4):530- 
539. 
Kelley,  G.  (1976),  Seducing  the  Elites:  The  Politics  of  Decision  Making  and  Innovation  in 
Organizational Networks, The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 1(3): 66-74 
 
Kelsall, T., Booth D., Cammack D. and Golloba-Mutebi, F.  (2010),  Developmental Patrimonialism? 
Questioning the orthodoxy on political governance and economic progress in Africa, ODI 
Working Paper 9 
 
Kelsall,   T.   (2011),   Rethinking   the   Relationship   between   Neo-patrimonialism   and   Economic 
Development in Africa, IDS Bulletin, Vol. 42 (2): 76-87 
 
Kelsall, Tim (2008), Going with the grain in African Development,  Power and Politics in Africa 
Programme (APPP), Discussion Paper No. 1, ODI, London 
 
Kennedy W.K. (1996), Reaching the unreached: Challenges for the 21st  century, 22nd WEDC 
Conference, New Delhi, India 
 
Kerr, D., and Mapanje, J (2002), Academic Freedom and the University of Malawi, African Studies 
Review, Vol. 45 (2): 73-91 
 
Khaila, S. And Chibwana, C. (2005), Are Malawians Getting What They Voted For, Afrobarometer 
Working Papers, Working Paper No. 46 
 
Khaila, S.W., Mvula P.M., Kadzandira J.M., (1999), Consultations with the poor: Malawi, Centre 
for Social Research, University of Malawi 
 
Khan, Mustaq H. (2010), Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions. 
London: Economics Department, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of 
London. 
 
 
 
Khembo N. S., (2004), The Multiparty Promise Betrayed: The failure of Neoliberalism in Malawi, 
Africa Development, XXIX (2):80 – 105 
316  
Kingsbury D. et al. (2004), Political Development. In: Kingsbury D., Remenyi K., and McKay J. (eds), 
Key issues in development, Palgrave Macmillan Hampshire 
 
Kjellberg, F. (1977), Do Policies (Really) Determine Politics? And Eventually How? Policy Studies 
Journal, Vol. 5(1): 554 – 570 
 
Knack,  S.,  Kugler,  M.  and  Manning,  N.  (2003).  Second-generation  governance  indicators, 
International Review of Administrative Sciences, Vol.69 (3): 354–364 
 
Kolb E. (1978), A framework for Political Analysis, Prentice-Hall International Inc, London. 
 
 
 
Kopinak, J.K. (1999), The Use of Triangulation in a Study of Refugee Well-Being, Quality & 
Quantity, Vol. 33 (2): 169–183. 
 
Kreidl, M. (2000), Perceptions of Poverty and Wealth in Western and Post-Communist Countries, 
Social Justice Research, 13(2): 151 – 176 
 
Krippendorff,   K.  (2004),   Content  Analysis:   An  Introduction  to  its  Methodology,   Sage 
Publications, Newbury Park. CA, 2nd edition 
 
Krishna,  A.  (2007),  For  Reducing  Poverty  Faster:  Target  Reasons  Before  People,  World 
Development Vol. 35 (11): 1947–1960. 
Kurtz  M.  (1999),  The  Political  Economy  of  Pro-poor  Policies  in  Chile  and  Mexico,  World 
Development Report Background Paper 
 
Kurtz, M. and Schrank, A. (2007), Growth and governance: models, measures and mechanisms. 
The Journal of Politics, Vol. 69 (2): 538–554. 
 
Kuznets, S. (1955), Economic Growth and Income Inequality, The American Economic Review, 
Vol. 45 (1): 1-28 
 
Kydd, J. and Christiansen, R. (1982), Structural Change in Malawi since Independence: 
Consequences of a Development Strategy Based on Large Scale Agriculture, World 
Development, Vol.10 (5): 355-375. 
Kydd, J. and Hewitt, A. (1986), The Effectiveness of Structural Adjustment Lending: Initial Evidence 
from Malawi, World Development, Vol.24 (3): 347-365. 
 
Lahat, Lihi and Menahem, Gila (2009), "Causes and Remedies for Poverty: Perceptions among 
Local Elected Leaders in Israel," Poverty & Public Policy: Vol. 1(2): Article 2, 
http://www.psocommons.org/ppp/vol1/iss2/art2 
 
Lapalombara  J.  and  Weiner  M.  (1966),  Political  Parties  and  Political  Development  edited, 
Princeton University Press 
 
Lasswell, H.D. (1951), 'The Policy Orientation', in D. Lerner and H.D. Lasswell (Eds.), The Policy 
Sciences, (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press). 
 
Lasswell H.D. (1948), The Analysis of Political Behaviour, In Putman R.D. (1976) The Comparative 
Study of Political Elites, Prentice Hall, New Jersey 
317  
Lasswell H.D. (1958), Politics: The art of who gets what, when and how, World Publishing 
Company 
 
Lasswell, H.D. (1952), The Comparative Study of Elites, Stanford University Press, California 
 
Laws, E. (2010), 17th Century England: Deploying a Political Settlements Analysis, Development 
Leadership Programme, Background Paper No. 08, www.dlprog.org 
 
Lee, F. and Peterson, C. (1997), Content Analysis of Archival Data, Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology, Vol. 65(6): 959–969 
 
 
 
Leftwich, A. (2010), 'Beyond Institutions: Rethinking the Role of Leaders, Elites and Coalitions in the 
Institutional Formation of Developmental States and Strategies', Forum for Development 
Studies, Vol. 37 (1):  93 — 111 
 
Leftwich, A. (2009), Bringing agency back in: politics and human agency in building institutions and 
states. Leaders, Elites and Coalitions Research Programme at www.lpdlec.org 
 
Leftwich,  A.  (2008),  “Developmental  states,  effective  states  and  poverty  reduction:  the 
primacy of politics”, United Nations Research Institute for Social development 
(UNRISD) at: 
http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/projects.nsf/89d2a44e5722c4f480256b560052d8ad/68 
c40b61b9f737f6c125743900508c69/$FILE/Leftwichweb.pdf 
 
Leftwich, A., (2007), 'The Political Approach to Institutional Formation, Maintenance and Change: A 
Literature Review Essay', Research Consortium on Improving Institutions for Pro-Poor 
Growth, Manchester, http://www.ippg.org.uk/index.html 
 
Leftwich, A .  (2006), ‘ F r o m   Drivers  of  Change  to  Politics  of  Development.’  London:  DFID, 
http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/DOC104.pdf 
Leftwich A. (2005a),  Politics in command:  Development  Studies and the Rediscovery  of Social 
Science, New Political Economy, Vol. 10 (4): 573 - 607 
 
Leftwich,   A.   (2005b),   Democracy   and   development:   Is   there   institutional   incompatibility? 
Democratization, Vol. 12 (5): 686-703 
 
Leftwich A. (2000), States of Development: On the primacy of politics in Development, Polity 
Press, Cambridge 
 
Leftwich, A. (1995), Bringing Politics back in: Towards a model of the development state, Journal of 
Development Studies, Vol.31 (3): 400 – 427 
 
Leftwich  A. (1994), Governance,  the State and the politics of development,  Development  and 
Change, Vol. 25 (2):363 -860 
 
Leftwich, A. (1993), Governance, Democracy and Development in the Third World, Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 14 (3): 605-624 
 
Leftwich, A. (1984), What is Politics?: The Activity and its Study, Basil Blackwell Publishers Ltd , 
Oxford 
318  
Leftwich A. & Hogg S., (2007), “Leaders, Elites and Coalitions: The case for leadership and the 
primacy of politics in building effective states, institutions and governance  for economic 
growth and social development”, LECRP Research Paper 1, 
http://www.lpdlec.org/ftp/download/Public%20Folder/LECRP%20Publications%20%28Phas 
e%20One%29/Background%20Papers/LECRP%20BP%2001.pdf 
 
Leftwich A. & Hogg S., (2008), “The politics of Institutional Indegenization: Leaders, elites and 
coalitions in building appropriate and legitimate institutions for economic growth and social 
development”, LECRP Research Paper 2, 
http://www.lpdlec.org/ftp/download/Public%20Folder/LECRP%20Publications%20%28Phas 
e%20One%29/Background%20Papers/LECRP%20BP%2002.pdf 
 
Leftwich, A. and Sen, K., (2010), 'Beyond Institutions: Institutions and Organizations in the Politics 
and Economics of Poverty Reduction - a Thematic Synthesis of Research Evidence', IPPG 
Research Consortium on Improving Institutions for Pro-Poor Growth, University of 
Manchester, http://www.ippg.org.uk/index.html 
 
 
Levi, M. (1988), Of Rule and Revenue, University of California Press, Berkeley. 
 
Lewis, P.M. (1996), Review: Economic Reform and Political Transition in Africa: The Quest for a 
Politics of Development, World Politics, Vol. 49 (1): 92-129 
 
Li, C., and Bachman, D. (1989), Localism, Elitism, and Immobilism: Elite Formation and Social 
Change in Post-Mao China, World Politics, Vol. 42 (1): 64-94 
 
Lieberman R. (2002), Ideas, Institutions and Political order: Explaining political change, American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 96 (4): 697 – 712 
 
Lindblom, C. E. (1980), The Policy-Making Process, Prentice-Hall, Inc., New Jersey 
 
Lindblom, C.E. (1959), The Science of "Muddling Through", Public Administration Review, Vol. 19 
(2): 79-88. 
Linden R. & Rockman B. (1984), Elite Studies and Communist Politics: essays in Memory of 
Carl Beck, University Center for International Studies, University of Pittsburgh Press 
 
Lindenberg, M. (1989), Making Economic Adjustment Work: The politics of policy implementation, 
Policy Sciences, Vol. 22 (3/4): 359 – 394 
 
Lipton  M. and Ravallion  M. (1993),  Poverty and policy’  Policy Research  Department,  Working 
Paper Series 1130, World Bank 
 
Lipset, S.M. (1961), Introduction, in Michels, R. (1962), Political Parties: A Sociological Study of 
the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Bureaucracy, The Crowell-Collier Publishing 
Company 
 
Lister Ruth (2004), Poverty, Polity press, Cambridge, UK 
 
Lockwood, M. (1995), Structure and Behavior in the Social Demography of Africa, Population and 
Development Review, Vol. 21 (1): 1-32 
319  
Longhurst, R., Kamara, S., and Mensurah, J. (1988), 'Structural Adjustment and Vulnerable Groups 
in Sierra Leone', IDS Bulletin, Vol. 19 (1): 25 - 30 
 
Lowi, T.J. (1972), Four Systems of Policy, Politics and Choice, Public Administration Review, Vol. 
32 (4): 298 – 310 
Lowi, T.J. (1964), Review: American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political Theory, 
World Politics, Vol. 16 (4):  677- 705 
 
Lukes, S., (1974), Power: A Radical View, 2nd Revised Edition 2004, London: Palgrave Macmillan 
 
Lukes, S., (1977), Power and Structure, in Lukes, S. (eds.) Essays in Social Theory, London: 
Macmillan. 
 
Lund F. (2002), ‘Crowding In’ Care, Security and Micro-Enterprise Formation: Revisiting the Role of 
the State in Poverty Reduction and in Development, Journal of International Development, 
14 (6): 681 - 694 
 
Lwanda, J. (2006), Kwacha: The Violence of Money in Malawi’s Politics 1954–2004, Journal of 
Southern African Studies, Vol. 32 ( 3): 525-544 
 
Lwanda,  J.L.C.  (1996),  Promises,  Power  Politics  and  Poverty:  Democratic  Transition  in 
Malawi, Glasgow, Dudu Nsomba Publications. 
 
Lynd, R. S., & Lynd, H. M. (1929/1959),  Middletown: A study in modern American culture, 
Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace 
 
Lyne de Ver, H. (2008), Leadership, politics and development, Leaders, Elites and Coalitions 
Research Programme, Background Paper 3, www.lpdlec.org 
Magnet M., (1993), “The Dream and the Nightmare: The Sixties Legacy to the Underclass”. In 
Jordan G. (2004), “The Causes of Poverty: Cultural Vs. Structural: Can there be a 
synthesis?”  Perspectives in Public Affairs, http://www.asu.edu/mpa/Jordan.pdf, accessed 
on 17/02/10 
 
Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) (2007), Government of Malawi 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2007/cr0755.pdf 
 
Malawi Socialist League (1975), Review of African Political Economy No. 4, Taylor and Francis 
Ltd, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3997890 
 
Malawian Hansard, 22 January 1965: 414 
 
Mandiza, E. I (2002),  Civil-military relations in Malawi: An historical perspective, In Williams, R, 
Cawthra, G & Abrahams, D (eds), Ourselves to Know: Civil-Military Relations and 
Defence Transformation in Southern Africa, Institute of Security Studies 
http://www.iss.org.za/pubs/Books/OurselvesToKnow/Mandiza.pdf 
 
Manor, J. (2004), “User committees: A potentially damaging second wave of decentralisation?” 
European Journal of Development Research, Vol. 16 (1): 192–213. 
 
Manor, J., (1999), The political economy of democratic decentralization.  Washington, DC: World 
Bank. 
320  
Manyozo,  L.  (2004),  Hegemony,  Ideology  and  Political  Journalism   in  Democratic  Malawi’s 
Broadcasting Media, Africa Media Review, Vol. 12 (2):  73–92 
 
March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1976), Ambiquity and Choice in organizations, Harald Lyche and 
Co, Norway 
 
March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1995), Democratic Governance, The Free Press, New York 
 
Maroleng C. (2003), Malawi: the Slippery Slide Towards Autocracy? 
http://www.iss.co.za/af/current/Malawi_Slipslop.html 
 
Marquette H. (2003), Corruption, Politics and Development: The Role of the World Bank, 
Palgrave: Basingstoke 
 
Marquette, H. (2011), ‘Finding God’ or ‘Moral Disengagement’ In the Fight against Corruption in 
Developing Countries? Evidence from India and Nigeria, Public Administration and 
Development,  Published  online  in  Wiley  Online  Library  (wileyonlinelibrary.com)  DOI: 
10.1002/pad.1605, http://db.tt/ZGVtPcw3 
 
Marsh D. and Stoker G., (2002), Theory and Methods in Political Science, Basingtoke, Palgrave, 
2nd edition. 
 
 
 
Marshall C. et al (1995), Designing Qualitative Research, Sage publications, London 
 
Marshall, Gordon (1994), The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Sociology. Oxford University Press, 
New York. 
 
Marshall, C. & Rossman, G.B. (1995), Designing Qualitative Research, Newbury Park, CA: Sage 
 
Mason, J (2002), Qualitative Researching, 2nd edition, Sage Publications, London 
 
Matiki, A.J. (2001), The Social Significance of English in Malawi, World Englishes, Vol.20 (2):201 – 
218 
 
Matthews Sally (2004), Post Development Theory and the Question of Alternatives: A View from 
Africa, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25 (2): 373 – 384 
 
Mbeki M. (2005), Underdevelopment in Sub-Saharan Africa: The role of the Private Sector and 
Political elites, Foreign Policy Briefing No. 85, Cato Institute 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbnefs/fpb85.pdf 
 
McCracken,  J.  (2008),  Politics  and  Christinanity  in  Malawi,  1875  –  1940:  The  Impact  of 
Livingstonia Mission in the Northern Province, Kachere Series, Zomba 
 
McCracken, J. (1998), Democracy and Nationalism in Historical Perspective: The Case of Malawi, 
African Affairs, Vol. 97 (387): 231-249 
 
Meinhardt H. & Patel N. (2003), Malawi’s Process of Democratic Transition: An Analysis of Political 
Developments in Malawi between 1990 and 2003, Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 
http://www.kas.de/db_files/dokumente/7_dokument_dok_pdf_4156_1.pdf 
321  
Menocal A. (2008), Hybrid Regimes and the Challenges Of Deepening and Sustaining Democracy 
in Developing Countries, South African Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 15 (1):29 - 
40 
 
Michels, R. (1915), Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of 
Modern Bureaucracy, Dover Publications: New York 
 
Michels, R. (1962), Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of 
Modern Bureaucracy, The Crowell-Collier Publishing Company 
 
Miller,  R.A.  (1974),  Elite  Formation  in  Africa:  Class,  Culture,  and  Coherence,  The  Journal  of 
Modern African Studies, Vol. 12 (4): 521-542 
 
Miliband, R., (1969), The State in Capitalist Society, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
Milliband, R. (1983), Class Power and State Power, Verso Edition, London 
Mills C.W. (1956), The power elite, Oxford University Press, New York 
 
Mills, C. W. (1970), The Sociological Imagination, Harmondsworth:Penguin 
 
Mills, C.W. (1956), The Power Elite, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
 
Minogue, M. (1993), Theory and Practice in Public Policy and Administration, In Hill, M. (eds), The 
Policy Process, Prentice Hall: Harvester WheatSheaf, London, pp10 – 29 
 
Mitchell, J.M. and Mitchell, W.C. (1969), Political Analysis and Public Policy: An Introduction to 
Political Science, Rand McNally and Company 
 
Mitra, S.K. (1991), Room to Maneuver in the Middle: Local Elites, Political Action, and the State in 
India, World Politics, Vol. 43 (3): 390-413 
 
Mkandawire  T.  (2003),  Freedom  and  Empowerment:  Challenges  to  Democracy  in  Africa, 
Montfort Media, Malawi 
 
Mkandawire, T.   (2001) “Thinking about Developmental States in Africa,” Cambridge Journal of 
Economics Volume 25 (3): 289–313. 
 
Modell, S. (2009), In defence of triangulation: A critical realist approach to mixed methods research 
in management accounting, Management Accounting Research, Vol. 20 (3):  208–221 
 
Moodie, G.C. (1984), Politics is about Governing, in Leftwich A. eds., What is Politics: The Activity 
and its Study, Basil Blackwell Publishers Ltd, England 
 
Mooij J. (2003a), Smart Governance?: Politics in the policy process in Andhra Pradesh, India, 
ODI, http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/1793.pdf 
 
Mooij, J. (2003b), Policy Processes: An Annotated Bibliography on Policy Processes, with Particular 
Emphasis on India, ODI Working Paper 221 
 
Moore, G. (1979), The Structure of a National Elite Network, American Sociological Review, Vol. 
44 (5): 673-692 
322  
Moore, K. (2001), Frameworks for understanding the intergenerational transmission of poverty and 
well-being in developing countries, CPRC Working Paper 8, 
http://cprc.abrc.co.uk/pdfs/08Moore.pdf 
 
Moore M. & Putzel J.  (2001), Thinking Strategically about Politics and Poverty, IDS Working Paper 
101 
 
Moore M. (1999) Politics against poverty: Global Pessimism and National Optimism, IDS Bulletin 
30(2) 
 
Moore,   M.   (2001),   Political   Underdevelopment:   What   causes   ‘bad   governance’,   Public 
Management Review, Vol.3 (3): 385-418 
 
Moore, M. (2010), An Upside Down View of Governance, The Centre for the Future State, Brighton: 
IDS 
Moore, M. and Hossain N. (2005), Elites, Poverty and Public Policy, In Reis E. & Moore M. (2005) 
Elite Perceptions of Poverty and Inequality, Zed Books, London, pp195 – 207. 
Moore, M., Leavy, J., Houtzager, P. and White, H. (1999), Polity Qualities: How Governance Affects 
Poverty, The Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton 
 
Moran-Ellis, J., Alexander, V.D., Cronin, A., Dickinson, M., Fielding, J., Sleney, J. and Thomas, H. 
(2006), Triangulation and Integration: Processes, Claims and Implications, Qualitative 
Research, Vol. 6 (1): 45 – 59 
 
Morrissey, O. (2001), Pro-Poor Conditionality for Aid and Debt Relief in East Africa, CREDIT 
Research Paper, 01 (15) 
http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/economics/credit/research/papers/CP.01.15.PDF 
 
Morse, J.M.  (1991), Approaches to qualitative-quantitative methodological triangulation, In Creswell 
J. & Plano Clark V.L., (2007), Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research, 
Sage Publication, California 
 
Morton, A.D. (2003), Historicizing Gramsci: Situating ideas in and beyond their context, Review of 
International Political Economy, Vol.10 (1): 118-146 
 
Mosca G (1939), The Ruling Class, McGraw-Hill Book Company, London 
 
Mosley P. (2004), Pro poor politics and the New political Economy of Stabilization, New Political 
Economy, Vol. 9 (2): 272 – 295 
 
Moyser, G. & Wagstaffe M. (1987), Research Methods for Elite Studies, Allen and Unwin, London 
 
Muluzi B. (1997), State Address on 10th October, Malawi Parliament 
 
Munthali, Gedion (2007), Field York case: Mpasu ordered Bank Governor, The Daily Times, 
Malawi 
 
Munthali, T.C. (2010), The quest for an ideal option for Malawi’s economic and development policy, 
http://www.kas.de/mosambik/de/publications/19880/ 
 
Muntharika B., (2005), Delivering on our Promises, Budget Speech delivered to Parliament on 6th 
June, 2005 
323  
Munyae, M. and Mulinge, M.A.M. (1999), The Centrality of a Historical Perspective to the Analysis of 
Modern Social Problems in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Tale From Two Case Studies, Journal 
of Social Development in Africa, Vol.14 (2):  51-70 
 
Mukherjee, N. (1992), Villagers’ perceptions of rural poverty through the mapping methods of PRA, 
RRA Notes 15, London: International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), 
http://www.planotes.org/documents/plan_01503.pdf 
 
Nafziger, E.W. (1988), Inequality in Africa: political elites, proletariat, peasants, and the poor, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
 
Narayan D., Patel R., Schafft K., Rademacher A., and Koch-Schulte S., (2000), Voices of the Poor: 
Can anyone hear us? University Press, Washington 
 
National  Statistical  Office  (NSO)  (2005),  Integrated  Household  Survey  2004-05,  Volume  I: 
Household Socio-Economic Character, Zomba. 
 
Ncube  C. (2010), Contesting  Hegemony:  Civil Society and  the  Struggle for Social Change  in 
Zimbabwe, 2000 – 2008, Unpublished Thesis, University of Birmingham 
 
Ndulu, B.J. and O'Connell, S.A. (1999), Governance and Growth in Sub-Saharan AfricaThe Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 13 (3): 41-66 
 
Neuman, W.L. (1994), Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches, 
Allyn and Bacon, Boston 
 
Ng’ambi, F. (2011), Malawi: Effective Delivery of Education Services, Open Society Foundations, 
http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/report/Afrimap%20Malawi%20web-ready.pdf 
 
North,  D.C.,  Wallis,  J.J.  and  Weingast,  B.R  (2006),  ‘A  Conceptual  Framework  for  interpreting 
Recorded Human history’, NBER Working Paper 12795, Cambridge, Mass., NBER. 
 
North, D.C. (1998), ‘Five propositions about institutional change’, in Jack Knight and Itai Sened (eds.) 
Explaining Social Institutions, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, pp 15-26. 
 
North, D.C. (1993), Institutional Change: A Framework of Analysis, in Sjostrand, S., Institutional 
Change: Theory and Empirical Findings, M.E. Sharp Inc Publishers, USA 
 
North, D.C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
National Statistics Office (1998/2008), Population and Housing Census, www.nso.malawi.net 
 
Nthara, K, (2003). ‘Malawi’s Economic Development since 1994: Implications for Democratisation in 
From Freedom to Empowerment’. In: Immink, B; Lembani, S; Ott, M and Peters-Berries, C. 
(Eds): Ten Years of Democratisation in Malawi, Montfort Media, Balaka, Malawi. pp.107- 
120. 
 
Odetola, T. O., (1980), Social Policy, Modernization and Crime among the African Youth: A 
Comparative Analysis, Journal of African Studies, Vol. 7(4): 213-218 
324  
Odumosu, O.F. (1999), Social Costs of Poverty: The Case of Crime in Nigeria, Journal of Social 
Development in Africa, Vol.14 (2): 71-85 
 
Okoth, A. (2006), A History of Africa: African Nationalism and Decolonisation, East African 
Educational Publishers Ltd, Nairobi, Kenya 
 
Olsen, M.E. and Marger, M.N. (eds) (1993), Power in Modern Societies, West View Press, Oxford 
 
Olson, M. (1969), The Replacement between Economics and other Social Sciences, in S.M. Lipset 
eds., Politics and the Social Sciences, Oxford University Press, London, pp. 137 - 162 
 
Olson M. (1965), The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, 
Oxford University Press, London 
 
O'Neil, T. (2007), Neopatrimonialism and Public Sector Performance and Reform, ABIA Background 
Note 1, London: Overseas Development Institute 
 
Onwuegbuzie A. and Johnson B.R. (2006), The Validity Issue in Mixed Research, Research in the 
Schools, Vol. 13 (1): 48 – 63 
 
Onwuegbuzie A. and Teddlie C., (2003), “A framework for analyzing mixed methods research”. In: 
Tashakkori A. and Teddlie C. a Handbook of mixed methods in social and behavioural 
research, pp351 – 385 
 
Ott M. et al (2003), From freedom to empowerment: Ten years of democratization in Malawi, 
Lilongwe: Montfort Media, Malawi 
 
Oyen E. (1999), The Politics of Poverty Reduction, CROP, UNESCO 
 
Packenham R., (1964), Approaches to the Study of Political Development, World Politics, l7 (l): 
108 - 120 
 
Pareto, Vilfredo (1935), The Mind and Society, Jonathan Cape Limited, London 
Parry G (1969), Political Elites, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, Great Britain 
Parsons, T. (1937), The Structure of Social Action. New York 
Pasha, H (2002), Pro-poor Policies, http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/policy_library/data/01104 
 
Patel N. (2005), Political Parties:  Development  and Change  in Malawi,  Eisa Research  Report 
No.21, South Africa: http://www.eisa.org.za/PDF/rr21.pdf 
 
Patton M.Q. (1990), Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods, Sage Publications, Newbury 
Park. 
 
Pearce, J., et al (1996), Living on the edge – a study of the rural food economy in the Mchinji 
and Salima Districts of Malawi, London: Save the Children UK 
Peirce, C. S. (1905), Review of Nichols' A treatise on cosmology, In H. S. Thayer (Ed.) (1984), 
Meaning and action: A critical history of pragmatism, pp. 493-495, Indianapolis 
325  
Pelser, E. et al. (2004), Crimes of Need: Results of the Malawi national crime victimisation Survey, 
Crime &       Justice       Statistical       Division,       National       Statistical       Office, 
http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/CrimesOfNeed/Contents.htm 
 
Pelser, E., Burton, P. and  Gondwe, L. (2007), Crimes of Need: Results of the Malawi national 
crime victimisation Survey, Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies. 
 
Pennock, J.R. (1966), Political Development, Political Systems, and Political Goods, World Politics 
Vol. 18 (3):415 - 434 
 
Peters, P.E. (1996), Failed Magic or Social Context? Market Liberalization and the Rural Poor 
in Malawi,          Harvard          Institute          for         International          Development, 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/hiid/562.pdf 
 
Peters, Pauline E.(2002), Bewitching Land: The Role of Land Disputes in Converting Kin to 
Strangers and in Class Formation in Malawi, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 28 
(1): 155 — 178 
 
Phiri K. (2000), A case of revolutionary change in contemporary Malawi: The Malawi army and the 
disarming of the Malawi Young Pioneers, Journal of Peace and Military Studies, Vol. 
1(1): 41 - 50 
 
Platteau,  J.P. (1995), A Framework for the Analysis  of Evolving  Patron-Client Ties in Agrarian 
Economies, World Development, Vol. 23 (5): 767-786, 
 
Platteau, J.P. (2004), Monitoring Elite Capture in Community Driven Development,  Development 
and Change. Vol. 35 (2): 223-246 
 
Poole, P., Gauthier, R. and Mizrahi, A. (2007), Rural Poverty in Mexico: Assets and Livelihood 
Strategies among the Mayas of Yucatán, International Journal of Agricultural 
Sustainability, Vol.5 (4): 315-330 
 
Potter D. (2000), “Democratization, ‘Good Governance’ and Development,” in Allen T. and Thomas 
A. (eds.) Poverty and Development into the 21st Century, Oxford University Press, pp. 
365-382 
 
Power J. (2010), Political Culture and Nationalism in Malawi: Building Kwacha, University of 
Rochester Press, Suffolk, UK 
 
Power J. (1998), Remembering Du: An Episode in the Development of Malawian Political Culture, 
African Affairs, Vol. 97 (388):369 – 396 
 
Power, J. (1993), Race, Class, Ethnicity, and Anglo-Indian Trade Rivalry in Colonial Malawi, 1910- 
1945, The International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 26 (3): 575-607 
 
Power,  Joey  (2002),  Building  Relevance:  The  Blantyre  Congress,  1953  to  1956,  Journal  of 
Southern African Studies, Vol. 28(1): 45 — 65 
 
Pryor  F.  (1990),  The  Political  Economy  of  Poverty,  Equity  and  Growth:  Malawi  and 
Madagascar, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
326  
Pryor,  F.L.  (1990),  Changes  in  Income  Distribution  in  Poor  Agricultural  Nations:  Malaŵi  and 
Madagascar, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 39 (1): pp. 23-45 
 
Putman R.D. (1971), Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of Ideology, The American Political 
Science Review, 65 (3):651 - 681 
 
Putman R.D. (1976), The Comparative Study of Political Elites, Prentice Hall, New Jersey 
 
Pye, J. (1958), The Non-Western Political Process, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 20 (3): 468-486 
 
Rakner L., Mukubvu L., Ngwira N., et al, (2004), “Budget as theatre – The Formal and Informal 
Institutional Makings of the Budget Process in Malawi”, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway 
http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/?1928=the-budget-as-theatre-the-formal-and-informal 
 
Randall V. & Theobald R. (1998), Political change and underdevelopment: A critical introduction 
to third world politics, Duke University Press, USA 
 
Ravallion M. (2011), On Multidimensional Indices of Poverty, Policy Research Working Paper 
WPS5580, The World Bank, Research Development Group, http://www- 
wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2011/02/28/000158349_20110228 
142416/Rendered/PDF/WPS5580.pdf 
 
Read, Melvyn, and Marsh, David (2002), “Combining qualitative and quantitative methods”. In: Marsh, 
D. and Stoker, G. (Eds.), Theory and method in political science Basingtoke, Palgrave 
Record R. (2007), From policy to Practice: Changing Government Attitudes Towards the Private 
Sector, Journal of International Development, 19 (6):806 – 816. 
 
Reis  E. & Moore  M. (eds)  (2005),  Elite Perceptions  of Poverty  and Inequality,  Zed  Books, 
London 
 
Reis E.P. (2005), Perceptions of Poverty and Inequality among Brazilian Elites, In Reis E. & Moore 
M. (eds), Elite Perceptions of Poverty and Inequality, Zed Books, London, pp27 - 56 
 
Reis E.P. (2010), Poverty in the Eyes of Brazilian Elites, UNU Wider Working Paper No. 103 
 
Reis E.P. (1999), “Elite Perceptions of Poverty: Brazil”, IDS Bulletin 30(2) 
 
Reis, E. P., and Cheibub, Z.B. (1996). ‘Bureaucratic Elite, Political Culture, and Democratization in 
Brazil’. Nova Economia, 6 (1): 143–62. 
 
Remenyi J. (2004), What is Development, Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire 
 
Riddell, A. (2003), The Introduction of Free Primary Education in Sub-Saharan Africa, UNESCO, 
http://portal.unesco.org/education/en/file_download.php/f2055e1e3843e56bddf020ab7fe49e 
d1The+introduction+of+free+primary+education+in+sub-Saharan+Africa..doc 
 
Riddell, J. B. (1992), Things Fall Apart Again: Structural Adjustment Programmes in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 30 (1): 53-68 
327  
Riddell R (1999), “The end of foreign aid to Africa? Concerns about donor policies”, African Affairs, 
Vol. 98 (392): 309 - 335 
 
Ritchie, J. and Lewis, J. (eds) (2003), Qualitative Research Practice, Sage, London 
 
Robins R.S. (1976), Political Institutionalization, Sage Publications, London 
 
Robinson J (2003), Politician-Proof Policy, Background Paper to the 2004 World Development 
Report,   www.citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.5.8660 
 
Rockman, B.A. (1984), Elites and Social Inquiry, In Linden, R.H. and Rockman, B. A. (eds), Elite 
Studies and Communist Politics: Essays in Memory of Carl Beck, University Center for 
International Studies, University of Pittsburgh, pp325 
 
Rockman  B.A.  (1976),  Studying  Elite  Political  Culture:  Problems  of  Design  and  Interpretation, 
University Center for International Studies Occasional Paper Series 
 
Rodrik D. (2000), Growth versus Poverty: A Hollow Debate, Finance and Development, 37 (4), 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/mrcbg/research/d.rodrik_finance.and.development_growth.vers 
us.poverty.reduction.pdf 
 
Rogers, J.D. (1989), Theories of Crime and Development: An Historical Perspective, The Journal 
of Development Studies, Vol. 25 (3): 314-328 
 
Rostow,  W.W.  (1960),  The  Stages  of  Economic  Growth:  A  Non-Communist   Manifesto, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Rubin, O. (2008), The Malawi 2002 Famine: Destitution, Democracy and Donors, Nordic Journal of 
African Studies, Vol. 17(1): 47–65 
 
Rustow, D.A (1966), Review: The Study of Elites: Who's Who, When, and How, World Politics, Vol. 
18 (4): 690-717 
 
Rytina, J. H., Form, W. H., and Pease, J. (1970), ‘Income and stratification ideology: Beliefs about 
the American opportunity structure’. In Holman R (1978) Poverty: Explanation of social 
deprivation, Robertson and Company, London 
 
Sabatier, P. A. (2007), Theories of the Policy Process (2nd edition), Boulder, CO: West view 
Press. 
 
Sabatier,  P.A.  (1991),  Toward  Better  Theories  of  the  Policy  Process,  Political  Science  and 
Politics, Vol. 24 (2): 147-156 
 
Sahely, C., Groelsema, B., Marchione, T., and Nelson, D., (2005), The Governance Dimensions of 
Food Security in Malawi, A Report Prepared for USAID Malawi: Lilongwe, Malawi 
 
Sampson J. And Bull A. (1992), ‘Victorian Britain: Victorian Medicine’, pp34 -36 
 
Sandbrook, Richard (2000), Closing the Circle: Democratization and Development in Africa, 
Zed Books, Ltd 
328  
Sandbrook,  R.  (1993),  The  Economics  of  Africa’s  Renewal,  Cambridge  University  Press, 
Cambridge 
 
Sandler, T. (1992), Collective Action: Theory and Applications. Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press. 
 
Sartori, Giovanni (1987), The Theory of Democracy Revisited, Part One: The Contemporary 
Debate. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers 
 
Schou,  A. (2007),  Demand-driven  Poverty  Programmes  and  Elite  Capture  in Malawi:  Between 
Prebendalism and Benevolence, The European Journal of Development Research, Vol. 
19 (4):594 - 613 
 
Scott, J. (2008), Modes of power and the re-conceptualization of elites, The Sociological Review, 
Vol. 56 (1): 25 – 43 
 
Searle, G.R., (1971), The Quest for National Efficiency: A study in British Politics and Political 
Thought, 1899-1914, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 
 
Sebudubudu  D.  and  Molutsi  P.  (2009),  Leaders,  Elites  and  Coalitions  in  the  Development  of 
Botswana, LECRP, Research paper 2, 
http://www.lpdlec.org/ftp/download/Public%20Folder/LECRP%20Publications%20%28Phas 
e%20One%29/Research%20Papers/LECRP%20RP%2002.pdf 
 
Selee, A. (2005), Perceptions and Misconceptions in US-Mexico Relations, The Woodrow Wilson 
Center and                                   Letras                                   Libres, 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Mexico_Perceptions_new.pdf 
 
Sen, A. (1999), Development as Freedom, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
 
Shapiro H. and Taylor L. (1990), The State and Industrial Strategy, World Development, Vol. 18 
(6):861 - 878 
 
Sharkansky I. (2002), Politics and Policy Making, Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc, Colorado 
 
Sharkansky, Ira (1968), "Regionalism, Economic Status and the Public Policies of American States”. 
In Hofferbert R. (1970) Elite Influence in State Policy Formation: A model for Comparative 
Inquiry, Polity, 2 (3):316 - 344 
 
Shawa (1991), Response to Budget Statement, Malawi Parliament 
 
Sher, G. (1983), Health Care and the 'Deserving Poor' The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 13(1): 9- 
12 
Shore, C., and Wright, S. (1997), Anthropology of policy: Critical Perspectives on Governance and 
Power, Routledge: London 
 
 
 
Silverman,  D  (2000),  Doing  Qualitative  research:  A  practical  Handbook,  Sage  Publication, 
London 
 
Skinner, Q. (1969), Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas, History and Theory, Vol.8 
(1): 3 – 53 
329  
Slack, P. (1988), Poverty and Policy in Tudor and Stuart England, Harlow: Longmam 
 
Slater R., & Tsoka, M., (2007), Social Protection in Malawi: A Status Report, Centre for Social 
Research, Malawi and Overseas Development Institute, United Kingdom 
 
 
 
Slomin-Nevo et al (2009), Conflicting Findings in Mixed Methods Research: An Illustration from an 
Israeli Study on Immigration, Journal of Mixed Methods Research, Vol. 3(2): 109 - 128 
Smelser, N.J. (1962), Theory of Collective Behavior, Routledge and Kegan Paul and New York: The 
Free Press of Glencoe 
 
Smith  B.C.  (1996),  Understanding  Third  World  Politics:  Theories  of  Political  Change  and 
Development, Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis 
 
Smith, L.D. (1995), Malawi: Reforming the States Role in Agricultural Marketing, Food Policy, Vol. 
20(6): 561 – 571 
 
Smith, R.M. (1992), “If Politics Matter: Implication for a ‘New Institutionalism’”.  Studies in American 
Political Development, Vol.6 (Spring): 1 - 36 
 
Soss, J., Fording, R.C. and Schram, S.F. (2009),  Governing the Poor: The Rise of the Neoliberal 
Paternalist State, Paper prepared for presentation at the 2009 Annual Meeting of the 
American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada. 
 
Squires, P. (2008), The Politics of Anti-Social Behaviour, British Politics, Vol.3: 300-323 
 
 
Squires P. (1990), ‘Anti-Social Policy’. In Lister, R. (eds). Poverty. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press 
 
Stambuli K. (2002), State Hegemony Macro effects and private enterprise in Malawi, Surrey 
Institute of Global Economic Research, Surrey 
 
Suleiman, Ezra (1978), Elites in French Society: the Politics of Survival, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton 
 
Sutton. R. (1999), The Policy Process: An Overview, ODI Working Paper 118, London 
 
Swidler, A. and Watkin, S. (2009), ‘‘Teach a Man to Fish”: The Sustainability Doctrine and Its Social 
Consequences, World Development, Vol. 37 (7): 1182–1196. 
Tadros, M. (2011), Working Politically Behind Red Lines: Structure and agency in a comparative 
study of women’s coalitions in Egypt and Jordan, The Developmental Leadership Program, 
Research Paper 12. 
 
Tambulasi, R.I.C. (2009), All that glisters is not gold: new public management and corruption in 
Malawi’s local governance, Development Southern Africa, Vol. 26 (2): 173 – 188. Tashakkori, A. & 
Teddlie, C. (eds) (2003), Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral 
Research. Sage Publication, London. 
 
Tashakkori A. and Teddlie C. (2008), Foundation of a Mixed Methods Research: Integrating 
Quantitative and Qualitative Approachs in Social and Behavioural Sciences, Sage 
Publication, London 
330  
Taylor I. & Williams D. (2008), Political Culture, State Elites and Regional Security in West Africa, 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 26 (2):137 – 149 
 
Tembo J.Z.U. (2000), Response to the Budget Statement titled “Choosing a new course for a better 
future”, Hansard, Malawi Parliament 
 
The  African Executive, (2005), 
http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?article=143. 
 
The Socialist League of Malawi (LESOMA) (1981), Review of African Political Economy, Taylor & 
Francis, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3998141 
 
Thomas, S. (1975), Economic Developments in Malawi since Independence, Journal of Southern 
African Studies, Vol. 2 (1): 30-51 
 
Thomaz, O.R. (2005), Haitian Elites and Their Perceptions of Poverty and of Inequality, In Reis E. & 
Moore M. (eds), Elite Perceptions of Poverty and Inequality, Zed Books, London, pp 128 
- 155 
 
Thomas, S. (1975), Economic Developments in Malawi since Independence, Journal of Southern 
African Studies, Vol. 2 (1):  30-51 
 
Thomson, R., Stockman, F., and Torenvlied, R. (2003), Models of Collective Decision-making: 
Introduction, Rationality and Society, Vol. 15 (1): 5 – 14 
 
Thurmond, V.A. (2001), The Point of Triangulation, Journal of Nursing Scholarship, Vol. 33 (3): 
253-258 
 
Tornquist O. (1999), Politics and Development: A critical Introduction, Sage Publication, London 
 
Toye, John (1999), Nationalising the Anti-poverty agenda, IDS Bulletin, 30 (2):6-12 
 
Toye, John (2007), Poverty Reduction, Development in Practice, Vol. 17 (4):505 – 510 
 
Tschirley, D.L. And. Jayne, T.S (2010), Exploring the Logic Behind Southern Africa’s Food Crises, 
World Development, Vol. 38 (1) 76–87 
 
Tsoka M. & Slater R. (2007). Malawi Social Protection Status Report. World Bank Working Paper, 
Report No. 40027. www.wds.worldbank.org 
 
Turner M. & Hulme D. (1997), Governance, Administration and Development: Making the state 
work, Macmillan Press Ltd, London 
 
Turshen, M. (1989), The Politics of Public Health, London: Zed Books 
 
UNDP  (2000), “Overcoming Human Poverty”, Human Development Report. 
http://www.undp.org/povertyreport/ENGLISH/ARfront.pdf 
 
UNDP (2001), Malawi: National Human Development Report 2001, Design Printers, Lilongwe, 
Malawi 
331  
UNDP  (2007/2008),  Fighting  Climate  Change:  Human  Solidarity  in  a  Divided  World.  Human 
Development Report. http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008/ 
 
UNDP  (2009),  Overcoming  Barriers:  Human  Mobility  and  Development.  Human  Development 
Report. http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2009/ 
 
UNDP  (2010),   The   Real  Wealth  of  Nations:   Pathways   to  Human   Development,   Human 
Development Report, http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HDR_2010_EN_Complete_reprint.pdf 
 
UNDP  (United  Nations  Development  Programme)  (1997),  Governance  for  Sustainable  Human 
Development, New York: UNDP. 
 
UNICEF  (1987), Annual Report: Adjustment with a
 Human Face, 
http://www.unicef.org/about/history/files/unicef_annual_report_1987.pdf 
USAID (2005), ‘Democracy and Governance’, 
http://www.usaid/gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/ 
 
USAID, (2002), “Malawi: Making Cities Work”, 
http://www.makingcitieswork.org/files/pdf/africa/Malawi.pdf,  accessed on 22/11/2008 
USAID, (2002), “Urban Profile: Malawi”, http://www.makingcitieswork.org/files/pdf/africa/Malawi.pdf 
 
USAID, (2008), “Malawi: Water and Sanitation Profile”, 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADO934.pdf. 
 
Van de Walle, S. (2006), The State of the World's Bureaucracies, Journal of Comparative Policy 
Analysis: Research and Practice, Vol. 8 (4): 437–448 
 
Van De Walle N. (2007), The path from Neopatrimonialism: Democracy and Clientelism in Africa 
Today, Working Paper Series No. 3 – 07, Centre for International Studies, 
www.einaudi.cornell.edu 
 
Van  Donge,  J.K.  (2002),  The  Fate  of  an  African  'Chaebol':  Malawi's  Press  Corporation  after 
Democratisation, The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 40 (4): 651-681 
 
Van Wyk J., (2007), Political Leaders in Africa: Presidents, Patrons or Profiteers, Occassional Paper 
Series, 2 (1), ACCORD, Durban, South Africa, 
http://www.accord.org.za/downloads/op/op_2007_1.pdf 
 
Vandemoortele  J.  (2003),  The  MDGs  and  Pro-poor  Policies,  United  Nations  Development 
Programme, New York 
 
Varshney A. (2005), “Democracy and Poverty”. In Narayan D. ‘Measuring Empowerment: Cross 
Disciplinary Perspective”, World Bank, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTEMPOWERME 
NT/0,,contentMDK:20261474~menuPK:486457~pagePK:64020865~piPK:149114~theSiteP 
K:486411,00.html 
 
Varshney,  A.  (2001),  “Democracy  and  Poverty”.  In  World Development  Report 2000/1:  The 
Responsiveness of Political Systems to Poverty Reduction, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPOVERTY/Resources/WDR/DfiD-Project- 
Papers/varshney.pdf 
341 
 
Varshney, Ashutosh (1999), Mass Politics or Elite Politics: India’s Economic Reforms in 
Comparative Perspective, in Sachs, J.D., Varshney, A. and Nirupam Pajpai (eds.), India in 
the Era of Economic Reforms, Oxford University Press, New Delhi etc. pp. 222–260 
 
Von Doepp P. (2002), “Are Malawi’s Local Clergy Civil Society Activists: The Limiting Impact of 
Creed, Context and Class”. In Englund H. (2002) A democracy of Chameleons: Politics 
and Culture in the New Malawi, Christian Literature Association in Malawi, Blantyre 
 
Wade, R. (1990) Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East 
Asian Industrialisation, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Wallis, J. (1987), Employment, Politics and Economic Recovery in the Great Depression, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, Vol.69 (3):516–520 
 
Ward, Michael, (1999), Perceptions of Poverty, IDS Bulletin, 30 (2) 
 
Waterbury, J. (1977), "An Attempt to put Patrons and Clients in their place". In Robinson J (2003) 
Politician-Proof Policy, Background Paper to the 2004 World Development Report, 
www.citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.5.8660 
 
Weber R.P. (1990), Basic Content Analysis, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, CA 
 
Webster  N. et al (2002),  In the name  of the poor: Contesting Political  Space  for Poverty 
Reduction, Zed Books 
 
Weiss & Hobson, (1995), States and economic development: a comparative historical analysis, 
Polity Press, Cambridge 
 
Wharton, C (1990), Reflections on Poverty, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 72 
(5): 1131 - 1138 
 
White, H. (2002), Combining Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches in Poverty Analysis, World 
Development, Vol. 30 (3): 511–522 
 
Whitworth  A,  (2004),  “Malawi’s  Fiscal  Crisis:  A  donor  Perspective”,  Presented  to  Members  of 
Parliament, Civil Society and the General Public. 
 
Whitworth A. (2007), “Is Malawi’s Fiscal Crisis Over? A Donor Perspective”, 
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0002943/Malawi_Fiscal_Paper_Whitworth_2007.pdf 
 
Wilson, R. (1992), Compliance Ideologies, Rethinking Political Culture. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Witteveen   A.  et  al,  2008,   “Perceptions   of  Poverty”,   Briefing  Note  2,   http://www.poverty- 
wellbeing.net 
 
Wong, S. (2010), Elite Capture Or Capture Elites? Lessons From The ‘Counter-Elite’ And ‘Co-Opt- 
Elite’ Approaches In Bangladesh And Ghana, UNU Wider Working Paper No. 82 
 
Woolf, S. J., (1986), The Poor in Western Europe in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 
London: Methuen 
342 
 
Woolley C.M. (2009), Meeting the Mixed Methods Challenge of Integration in a Sociological Study of 
Structure and Agency, Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 3(1): 7 - 25, 
 
World Bank (1975), “Recent Economic Development and Prospects of Malawi”, Country Programs 
Department 11: Eastern Africa Region Report No. 560a-MAI, World Bank: Washington 
DC 
 
World Bank, (1982), Malawi Growth and Structural Change: A Basi Economic Report, No 3082a- 
MAI, Eastern Africa Regional Office, Washington D.C. 
 
World Bank (1989), Sub-saharan Africa: From Crisis to sustainable Growth, World Bank, Washington 
DC 
 
World Bank (2000), Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance: A World Bank 
Strategy. Washington, DC: World Bank 
 
 
 
World Bank (2003a), ‘Multi-Sectoral AIDS Project’, http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects 
 
World  Bank  (2003b),  Gender  Equality  and  the  Millennium  Development  Goals,  Gender  and 
Development Group, World Bank 
 
World Bank (2006), “Malawi: Country Assistance Evaluation”, Report No. 36862 
 
World Bank (2007), “Malawi Social Protection Status Report”, International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, World Bank, Washington 
 
World Bank, 2000/2001 “World Development Report”, http://go.worldbank.org/7KWQQ1WVT0 
 
World   Bank   (1998),   Assessing   Aid:   What   Works,   What   Doesn't,   and   Why,   http://www- 
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/02/23/000094946_9 
9030406212262/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf 
 
World Bank (1997), World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World, World Bank 
and Oxford University Press 
 
World  Development Report (WDR) (2004), Making Services Work for the Poor, 
http://www.worldbank.org/wdr 
 
World Development Report (2002), Building Institutions for Markets, The World Bank, Washington 
DC 
 
World   Development   Report   (1978), Prospects   for   Growth   and   Alleviation   of   Poverty, 
http://www.worldbank.org/wdr 
 
World Development Report (1990), “Poverty”, http://www.worldbank.org/wdr 
 
World Development Report (1999), “Entering the 21st Century”, 
http://www.worldbank.org/wdr/2000/fullreport.html 
 
World Economic Outlook (2011) Malawi Inflation Rate, IMF 
343 
 
Yin R.K. (2003) Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Sage Publications, London 
 
Zuckerman, A. (1977), The Concept "Political Elite": Lessons from Mosca and Pareto, The Journal 
of Politics, Vol. 39 (2): 324-344 
 
Zuckerman, H. (1972), Interviewing an Ultra-Elite, Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 36 (2): 159 – 17. 
344 
 
APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Observation Check List 
 
This checklist has been designed to observe elite behaviours linked to poverty reduction and the poor. 
The observations served as a check against participants subjecting reporting on what they believe and 
do, as well as gaining an understanding of how elites discuss issues of poverty and the poor amongst 
themselves.  The observation checklist was based on the face-to-face interview questions 
 
Criteria Comments 
 
Identification 
 
Elite   perceptions   of   the   poor   (their   nature, 
numbers and locations); 
 
How different from themselves do elites consider 
the poor to be? 
 
In which areas do the elites identify with the poor? 
 
Interdependence 
 
The impact of poverty on elite welfare; 
 
How threatening or how promising in respect to 
their own position do elites consider the poor to 
be? 
 
Generalized responsibility 
 
The priority given to poverty reduction; 
 
Do elites believe something should be done to 
improve the position of the poor? 
 
Policy action 
 
Which policies do elites believe can improve the 
lives of the poor and reduce poverty? 
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Appendix 2: Interview Invitation Sample Letter 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Development Department 
School of Public Policy, Edgbaston, B15 2TT United Kingdom 
 
28 March, 2008 
 
Dear Participant, 
 
ASSISTANCE REQUIRED FOR RESEARCH 
My name is Chipiliro Kalebe-Nyamongo, a PhD Candidate at the School of Public Policy, University of 
Birmingham, United Kingdom. My research seeks to examine the role of Elites in the politics of pro- 
poor policy in Malawi. As part of my research I am required to gather primary data in support of my 
thesis. You have been selected to participate in this study. Your contribution is vital for the successful 
completion of my degree and I therefore count on your assistance. 
 
Sir/Madam, I would like to further emphasize the importance of this research in understanding elite- 
level politics and policy-level discussions about how best to support public policies that help the poor in 
Malawi. The study is also significant to not only public policy and implementation but importantly to the 
Malawian nation struggling to engender new political and economic values amongst its leaders, 
especially their commitment and political will to push forward Malawi’s developmental agenda. Therefore 
the study will serve as a theoretical and empirical framework for understanding and developing pro-poor 
policies that are sensitive to the political dimensions of poverty and how best pro- poor alliances can be 
created amongst the elites in Malawi. 
 
This study is an academic exercise; your responses will be treated as confidential and will be used for 
academic purposes only. Attached is an introductory letter from my University and a time schedule from 
which you can choose or suggest a date and time that suit you. 
 
Thanking you in anticipation of your favourable cooperation. I can be contacted on  or email 
address:  
 
Sincerely, 
Chipiliro Kalebe-Nyamongo 
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Appendix 3: Sample Time Schedules for Interviews 
 
 
 
INTERVIEWS ON THE ROLE OF ELITES IN THE POLITICS OF PRO-POOR POLICY 
 
SCHEDULE 
 
May/JUNE 
(Date) 
 
AM 
 
AM 
 
PM 
Alternative 
Date/ time 
26 08.00am 10.00am 02.00pm  
27 08.00am 10.00am 02.00pm  
28 08.00am 10.00am 02.00pm  
29 08.00am 10.00am 02.00pm  
30 08.00am 10.00am 02.00pm  
2 08.00am 10.00am 02.00pm  
3 08.00am 10.00am 02.00pm  
4 08.00am 10.00am 02.00pm  
5 08.00am 10.00am 02.00pm  
6 08.00am 10.00am 02.00pm  
 
 
 
PLEASE PICK OR SUGGEST AN APPROPRIATE TIME/DATE THAT IS SUITABLE FOR YOU. 
PLEASE FEEL FREE TO SUGGEST ALTERNATIVE TIMES OR DATES WITHIN THE MONTH OF 
MAY. I CAN BE CONTACTED ON . 
 
THANK YOU 
347 
 
Appendix 4: Research Questionnaire 
 
 
 
Questionnaire: Elite perceptions of poverty and poor people in Malawi 
 
This questionnaire is designed to gather information as to the values, beliefs and ideas that shape 
perception on social problems in society particularly the issue of poverty and poor people. Please tick 
as appropriate. 
 
 
SECTION A 
 
1.   Sex: Male [   ] Female  [  ] 
 
 
 
2.   Age on last birthday ………….. 
 
 
 
3.   Which organization/institution do you work for?....................................... 
 
 
 
4.   Marital Status 
 
a) Single [ ] 
b) Married [   ]   
c) Cohabiting [ ] 
d) Divorced [ ] 
e) Separated [ ] 
f) Widowed [ ] 
 
 
5.  Current Position held……………………………………… 
 
 
 
6.  What is your highest level of education attained? 
 
a)  Secondary and lower                  [   ] 
b)  Bachelors degree                        [   ] 
c)  Higher National Diploma             [   ] 
d)  Masters degree                           [   ] 
e)  Doctoral degree and Higher        [   ] 
f)   Other ……………………………………. 
 
 
 
7.   How long have you worked for this organization?....................................... 
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SECTION B 
 
8.   What are the main obstacles to democracy in Malawi? Circle yes or no. 
 
a) Low educational levels of the population [yes ][no] 
b) High levels of poverty [yes ][no] 
c) Lack of party political tradition/ideology [yes ][no] 
d) Incompetence of those in power [yes ][no] 
e) Selfishness of the elites [yes ][no] 
f) Political Clientelism [yes ][no] 
g) Too much power in the hands of the executive [yes ][no] 
h) High inflation rate [yes ][no] 
 
 
9.   In your view, what are the most important problems facing the country today? Circle yes or no. 
 
a) Inflation [yes ][no] 
b) Education and Health [yes ][no] 
c) Poverty [yes ][no] 
d) Governability [yes ][no] 
e) Income distribution [yes ][no] 
f) Political patronage/ clientelism [yes ][no] 
g) Corruption [yes ][no] 
h) Behaviour of the elites [yes ][no] 
i) Moral crisis [yes ][no] 
j) Unemployment [yes ][no] 
k) Foreign dependency [yes ][no] 
l) Other social issues [yes ][no] 
m) Other Political issues [yes ][no] 
n) Other economic issues [yes ][no] 
 
 
10. Please indicate in your own view, what should be the nation’s policy objectives in the medium 
 
term. 
 
a) Increase educational levels [yes ][no] 
b) Reduce the size of the state [yes ][no] 
c) Eliminate poverty and reduce inequality [yes ][no] 
d) Increase popular participation in political decisions [yes ][no] 
e) Preserve democracy [yes ][no] 
349 
 
 
f) Guarantee economic growth [yes ][no] 
g) Integrate the economy into the international market [yes ][no] 
h) Protect the environment [yes ][no] 
i) Implement a social protection policy [yes ][no] 
j) Keep order [yes ][no] 
 
 
11. What do you consider to be the cause of poverty? 
 
a) The government does not fulfill its social function [yes ][no] 
b) Lack of political will to fight poverty [yes ][no] 
c) Elites lack social sensitivity [yes ][no] 
d) Insufficient economic development [yes ][no] 
e) Monopolization of opportunities [yes ][no] 
f) Corruption/patronage/clientelism [yes ][no] 
g) Lack of effort on the part of the poor [yes ][no] 
h) Other………………………………………………….  
 
 
12. Please indicate what you consider to be the main means of reducing poverty? 
 
a) Promote agrarian reform [yes ][no] 
b) Increased spending on education and educational reforms [yes ][no] 
c) Increase the efficiency of public social services [yes ][no] 
d) Control population growth [yes ][no] 
e) Deregulate the economy [yes ][no] 
f) Increase social expenditure [yes ][no] 
g) Introduce social protection for the poor [yes ][no] 
h) Increase income tax [yes ][no] 
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a) Bad planning/implementation [yes ][no] 
b) Lack of political will or low priority [yes ][no] 
c) Political &/or personal use of these policies [yes ][no] 
d) Corruption [yes ][no] 
e) Characteristics of the elite (selfishness, short-sightedness,  
 authoritarian etc) [yes ][no] 
 
13. Which of the following social policies do you consider desirable and viable? Please indicate in 
 
the table below. 
 
 
 
POLICY Viable & 
 
desirable 
Desirable but 
 
not viable 
Viable but not 
 
desirable 
Neither Viable 
 
nor desirable 
Free and Universal Education     
Fertiliser Subsidies     
Cash transfers/  direct welfare 
 
transfers 
    
Popular Housing Programmes     
Public Works Programme     
Old Age Pensions regardless of 
 
previous contributions 
    
Child Benefits     
Food Distributions Programmes     
Unemployment Insurance     
Free and Universal Access to 
 
Health services 
    
Free University education     
National safety Nets 
 
Programme 
    
Micro finance     
Minimum income for different 
 
age groups/ sectors 
    
 
 
14. Why do social policies fail to meet their objectives? Please list top five answers in order of 
priority. 
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f) Paternalistic &/or palliative nature of policies [yes ][no] 
g)  State concentrates on other activities(i.e. the state is too big and also too active in 
direct economic activities, thereby diverting human and capital resources from social 
 
 areas) [yes ][no] 
h) Lack of resource to implement social policies [yes ][no] 
i) Lack of participation by civil society [yes ][no] 
j) Structural economic problems [yes ][no] 
k) Lack of private sector participation in implementation [yes ][no] 
 
 
15. What are the worst consequences of poverty in urban areas? 
 
a) Violence, crime and insecurity [yes ][no] 
b) Dehumanization [yes ][no] 
c) Risk of social conflict or social chaos [yes ][no] 
d) Declining quality of life [yes ][no] 
e) Unemployment [yes ][no] 
f) Social misery [yes ][no] 
g) Vicious circle of poverty [yes ][no] 
h) Obstacles to development [yes ][no] 
i) Housing problems (slums) [yes ][no] 
j) Threat to democratic stability [yes ][no] 
k) Encourages political opportunism [yes ][no] 
 
 
16. Which institution is ultimately responsible for anti-poverty action? 
 
a) Government [yes ][no] 
b) Private sector [yes ][no] 
c) Civil Society Organizations [yes ][no] 
d) Donors [yes ][no] 
e) Other…………………………………………..  
 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU 
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Appendix 5: List of Interviewees 
 
Name of Respondent Organisation Date of Interview 
1. Member of Parliament Malawi Parliament 28/03/08 
2. Member of Parliament Malawi Parliament 08/04/08 
3. Member of Parliament Malawi Parliament 17/04/08 
4. Minister Public Sector 07/05/08 
5. Minister Public Sector 21/04/08 
6. Minister Public Sector 15/04/08 
7. Member of Parliament Malawi Parliament 16/04/08 
8. Member of Parliament Malawi Parliament 06/05/08 
9. Minister Malawi Parliament 30/04/08 
10.  Parliamentary Committee Member Malawi Parliament 31/03/08 
11.  Principal Secretary Public Sector 17/04/08 
12.  Principal Secretary Public Sector 02/05/08 
13.  Principal Secretary Public Sector 17/04/08 
14.  Principal Secretary Public Sector 05/05/08 
15.  Principal Secretary Public Sector 05/05/08 
16.  Head of Section Public Sector 28/04/08 
17.  Principal Secretary Public Sector 11/04/08 
18.  Principal Secretary Public Sector 23/04/08 
19.  Principal Secretary Public Sector 23/04/08 
20.  Principal Secretary Public Sector 28/04/08 
21.  Principal Secretary Public Sector 02/05/08 
22.  Executive Director Public Sector 05/05/08 
23.  Chief Executive Officer Private Sector 13/05/08 
24.  Acting Executive Director Private Sector 12/05/08 
25.  Deputy Director Private Sector 12/05/08 
26.  Executive Director Civil Society Organisation 11/06/08 
27.  Managing Director Civil Society Organisation 06/05/08 
28.  National Coordinator Civil Society Organisation 06/05/08 
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29.  Executive Director Civil Society Organisation 12/05/08 
30.  National Coordinator Civil Society Organisation 21/05/08 
31.  National Secretary Civil Society Organisation 07/05/08 
32.  Executive Director Civil Society Organisation 15/04/08 
33.  National Coordinator Civil Society Organisation 17/06/08 
34.  National Coordinator Civil Society Organisation 13/05/08 
35.  Director of Programmes Civil Society Organisation 07/04/08 
36.  Programme Director Civil Society Organisation 13/05/08 
37.  Bureau Chief Media - Newspaper 16/05/08 
38.  Regional Manager Media - Newspaper 09/04/08 
39.  Regional Manager Media Institute 16/04/08 
40.  Regional Manager Media Agency - 
Newspaper 
09/05/08 
41.  Senior Reporter, Regional 
Controller 
Media Agency - Radio 19/05/08 
42.  General Manager Media Agency - Radio 15/05/08 
43.  Regional Manager Media Agency - TV 16/05/08 
44.  Resident Representative Donor Agency 25/05/08 
45.  Head of Policy INGO 24/04/08 
46.  Leader Donor Agency 05/06/08 
47.  Country Director INGO 27/05/08 
48.  Country Director INGO 24/04/08 
49.   Advocacy Manager INGO 27/05/08 
50.  Program Management Governance 
Specialist 
Donor Agency 06/06/08 
51.  Operations Manager Donor Agency 16/06/08 
52.  Lecturer University of Malawi 08/05/08 
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Appendix 6: Interview Guide 
 
 
 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE: GENERAL ISSUES 
 
1.   Identification 
  Elite perceptions of the poor (their nature, numbers and locations) 
  How different from themselves do elites consider the poor to be? and 
  In which areas do the elites identify with the poor? 
 
 
 
2.   Interdependence 
  The impact of poverty on the elite 
  How threatening or how promising in respect to their own position do elites consider 
the poor to be? 
 
3.   Generalized responsibility 
  The priority given to poverty 
  Do elites believe something should be done to improve the position of the poor 
 
 
 
4.   Feasibility 
  Do elites consider that the conditions of poor people can be improved? 
 
5.   Policy action 
  Which policies do elites believe can improve the lives of the poor and reduce poverty? 
 
6.   Collective action 
  How do elites see effective coordination with their peers can be ensured? 
  How can non-collaboration by some peers be prevented? 
 
 
 
 
INTERVIEW GUIDE SUMMARY OF QUESTIONS 
 
1.   Elite perceptions of poverty and the poor – their nature, numbers and locations 
What are your views on poverty in Malawi? 
If you were to identify a person as being poor, what attributes would assist you in 
arriving at this conclusion? 
   Between the rural and urban areas of Malawi, where would you say the poor are 
located, especially in terms of visibility? 
What percentage of Malawians do you consider to be poor? 
Within this percentage of poor people, what categories can you identify in terms of 
severity of poverty? 
In terms of inequality, how would you describe Malawi? 
Which social groups are at risk of poverty in Malawi? 
 
2.   What do you consider to be the root causes of poverty in Malawi? 
Why do you think poverty has persisted in Malawi? 
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    Do you think the behavior and attitudes of the poor people themselves contributes to the 
level of poverty in Malawi? 
 
3.   Impact of poverty on the elite 
Do elites have contact with the poor? If so what type of contact exists? 
How does poverty impact you personally and professionally? Do you consider direct 
assistance- for instance towards relatives or the poor in general -  as a moral obligation 
for elites) 
Do you think elites benefit from the persistence of poverty? 
Is there a link between poverty and other social ills such as crime/disease/epidemics? 
Do you believe  that the behaviour  of poor people  has a bearing  on elite welfare 
through crime, disease or the threat of social unrest? 
   Are you ever afraid that if the levels of poverty became unbearable poor people might 
rebel or carry out an uprising or cause political instability? 
 
4.   Priority given to poverty 
Do you think poverty or the plight of poor people is a concern for elites? 
If elites are not concerned, is it because they have the resources to seek private 
education and medical assistance even the ability to travel abroad for treatment or 
education and other social needs? 
Is or should the reduction of poverty be an operational priority? 
Is poverty reduction a more urgent issue than other national problems of society 
particularly economic growth? 
 
5.   Kinds of antipoverty action favoured 
Do you feel that solutions exist to deal with poverty? 
What solutions can you offer that would reduce poverty? 
What is your opinion of social protection policies – cash transfers, subsidies and public 
works programmes? 
 
6.   Collective action 
Which institution in society is responsible for changing the plight of the poor? 
Which other institutions can make the greatest contribution to poverty reduction efforts? 
How can effective coordination amongst various actors in Malawi be ensured? 
 
7.   Leadership 
   How  important  is  leadership  in  ensuring  that  poverty  reduction  efforts  are  effectively 
implemented and bear the desired fruits? 
   How can Malawi foster a sense of nationalism, patriotism and unity particularly on reducing 
poverty despite the prevailing differences? 
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Appendix 7: Key Macroeconomic Indicators 1986 – 1992 
 
 
 
 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
% Growth Rare of Real 
 
GDP 
1.06 0.46 3.29 4.06 4.77 7.80 -4.00 
Small Scale Agriculture 1.03 -0.86 0.50 0.16 -3.44 15.79 -25.33 
Estate Agriculture -0.91 7.19 7.13 9.84 9.20 10.98 8.99 
Manufacturing 2.22 0.94 3.27 8.50 11.25 3.00 2.69 
Investment % of GDP 12.3 15.4 18.7 20.2 19.1 20.2 19.8 
Inflation Price Index 14.8 26.8 31.4 15.7 11.5 11.9 22.7 
Source: Harrigan (2001) ‘From Dictatorship to Democracy: Economic Policy in Malawi, 1964 – 2000’, 
p249 
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Appendix 8: Coping strategies of the vulnerable segments of society 
 
 
 
Strategy Rural Urban National 
Begging 4.8 1.6 3.2 
Assistance from relatives 67.6 45.3 56.5 
Assistance from friends 40.7 50.9 45.8 
Charitable organisations 1.4 3.0 2.2 
Street vending 5.1 8.2 6.6 
Past savings 13.2 28.6 20.8 
Working for food 17.3 2.0 9.7 
Prostitution 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Selling used clothes 1.2 4.5 2.8 
Buying second hand clothes 13.9 17.5 15.7 
Sending kids to relatives 3.9 1.8 2.8 
Other 57.6 2.7 40.4 
Source: Chilowa et al, 2000 ‘Social Policy in the Context of Economic Reforms: A Benchmark Survey 
 
Report’, p61. 
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Appendix 9: Donor support to the budget 
 
 
 
Fiscal year 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 
% of total 
expenditure 
37.1 24.7 20.6 36.7 37.7 51.1 56.8 53.7 
 
As % of 
  GDP   
 
9.2 
 
6.4 
 
6.7 
 
12.2 
 
12.4 
 
18.1 
 
19.0 
 
17.4 
 
Source: DFID, Is Malawi’s fiscal crisis over? A Donor Perspective, paper presented at ECAMA Public 
Talk, 5th October 2007, Lilongwe 
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Appendix 10: Safety-net Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 
Poverty Status Target Group Intervention Outcome 
 
 
Chronically (core) poor 
 
No  capacity  to  generate 
income 
- Chronically ill 
 
- Elderly 
 
- Disabled 
 
 
Welfare   transfers   (food 
and assets) 
 
 
 
Poverty Alleviation 
- Malnourished under 5s 
 
- Vulnerable Pregnant 
and lactating mothers 
 
 
 
Targeted nutrition 
-Rural poor with labour 
 
- Urban poor 
Public  works  (asset  and 
 
food) 
Transient (marginal) poor: 
 
ability   of   move   out   of 
poverty 
Rural poor with land Targetted inputs for 
 
productivity enhancement 
Poverty reduction 
Source: Government of Malawi, 2002:65 
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Appendix 11: Needs and Social Protection Initiatives 
 
 
 
Poverty Group Key Characteristics Major Needs Initiative 
Ultra Poor Destitute     or     near 
destitute; very small 
asset base; small 
landholdings;         per 
capita;               single 
livelihood activity 
Consumption Cash transfers 
Food transfers 
Education Cash transfers 
Bursaries 
School feeding 
Asset building - 
Micro credit 
Poor Limited asset base Consumption boost Food for work 
Cash for work 
Single activity Production boost Inputs transfer 
Input subsidies 
Vulnerable to shocks Asset building Cash for work 
Micro-credit 
Risk management Social insurance 
Grain options 
Transient Vulnerable to shocks Risk management Social insurance 
Grain options 
Weak asset base Asset building Micro-credit 
Consumption boost Food for work 
Cash for work 
Production boost Inputs transfers 
Input subsidies 
Source: World Bank (2007) ‘Malawi Social Protection Status Report’ 
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Appendix 12: Timeline of National Poverty Policies in Malawi 
 
YEAR POLICIES 
 
1971 Statement of Development Policy 1 whose objectives were attaining 
an 8 per cent growth in the GDP, to be attained by increased public expenditure in 
agriculture and supporting sectors; raise the living standard of the rural population; and 
achieve a balanced development of the three regions of the country. 
 
1981        Structural Adjustment Policies emphasising marketization, price controls and removal of 
farmer subsidies 
 
1987         Statement of Development 2 was supported by Policy Framework Papers, national 
programme of action for survival, and protection and development of children. 
Reinstatement of the subsidy programme following food shortages 
 
1994         Poverty Alleviation Policy which saw the introduction of the free primary education, 
Malawi Social Action Funds, EU Macro project, the Bakili Muluzi Initiative etc 
 
1998            Vision 2020 is Malawi’s long term development strategy whose aim was to ensure that by 
2020 Malawi is secure, democratically mature, environmentally sustainable, self- reliant 
with equal opportunities for and active participation by all, having social services, vibrant 
cultural and religious values and a technologically driven middle- income economy. The 
PRSP and MEGS were derived from this strategy 
 
2000         Malawi signs up to the Millennium Development Goals which has specific time targets for 
reducing poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, child mortality, environmental degradation 
and discrimination against women. 
 
2002           The  Malawi  Poverty  Reduction  Strategy  aim  was  to  ensure  sustainable  poverty 
reduction through empowerment of the poor. It was built around four pillars: sustainable 
pro-poor growth; human capital development; improving the quality of life of the most 
vulnerable; and governance. 
 
2004          The  Malawi  Economic  Growth  Strategy  (MEGS)  was  a  realisation  that  growth  is 
essential for sustained poverty reduction initiatives. Key initiatives were in tobacco, tea, 
sugar, tourism, mining, manufacturing with particular emphasis to agro-processing, 
cotton, textiles and garments. 
 
2005           Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) entitled from growth to prosperity is 
a five year plan to reduce poverty through sustained economic growth and infrastructure 
development. The MGDS has aligned its priorities along the MDGs which it considers 
important for improving the wealth and welfare of people in Malawi. 
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Appendix 13: Results of the June 1999 parliamentary elections (number and 
 
percentage of seats by regions) 
 
 
 
Region UDF MCP AFORD INDEPENDENT 
North 1 (3%) 4 (12%) 28 (85%) 0 
Centre 16 (22%) 54 (75%) 1 1 
South 76 (87%) 8 (9%) 0 3 
Total 93 (48%) 66 (34%) 29 (15%) 4 (2%) 
Source: Brown S, (2000) ‘Malawi: The trouble with democracy’, Southern Africa Report Archive, Vol 15, No.4 
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Appendix 14: Crossing the floor and Section 65 
 
 
 
Since the transition to democracy in 1994, defections are not an uncommon occurrence in Malawi. 
Consequently, Section 65 of the 1995 constitution authorised the Speaker of Parliament to declare 
vacant a seat of any member of parliament who leaves the party on whose ticket he was elected and 
joins another party in the National Assembly. In 2001, the section was amended to include parties not 
represented in parliament to include associations whose objectives or activities are political in nature 
although this was successfully appealed. Between 1994 and 2005, section 65 was not invoked despite 
AFORD members of parliament being appointed to the UDF government’s cabinet. However, the section 
was not applied to them because they did not formerly resign from their party (Cammack, 2007). 
However, the UDF applied section 65 to its members and AFORD members that broke away from 
UDF following disagreements over a bill to lengthen Muluzi’s tenure to three five year terms. In its 
original intent, section 65 was meant to enforce accountability of MPs to their parties and constituents 
by barring them from crossing the floor without seeking a fresh electoral mandate. In practice, the section 
has not stopped MPs from changing party alliances nor made them accountable to their constituents 
(Cammack, 2007). The absence of the recall provision in the constitution has enabled MPs to change  
political  parties with little consultation  with their constituents  and the section  has been applied 
selectively. 
 
 
Following the 2004 election, the subsequent breakaway of Bingu Wa Mutharika from the UDF and the 
formation of his own Democratic Progressive Party resurrected the issue of section 65. The failure to 
change the constitution to allow Bakili Muluzi a third term in office forced him to pick a successor for the 
2004 elections. He opted to pick an outsider from the party, Dr Bingu Wa Mutharika whom in 1999 had 
had a failed attempt at the Presidency under the United Party. Although Mutharika was sold to 
Malawians as the solution to the economic crisis Malawi was facing, many believed that Muluzi was 
attempting to rule behind the scenes following his third-term bid failure. In early 2005 following his 
successful election as President, Mutharika quit the UDF, taking with him almost half of the UDF 
members, formed the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) within parliament and continued as head of 
state. MPs from UDF, MCP, Aford and independents joined the DPP but failed to give the party a 
working majority in parliament. The UDF, which had been pushed into opposition worked together with 
other opposition parties to impeach the president and failing to do so, asked the Speaker of parliament 
to declare vacant the seats of the DPP MPs basing their argument on section 65. 
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The issue of section 65 becomes magnified during the budget sessions of parliament. Since 2004 
government has been in a standoff with the opposition who have refused to pass the budget unless 
certain seats in parliament are declared vacant. Government has had to use civil society organisations, 
traditional chiefs and the society at large to put pressure on opposition to pass the budget. This has at 
times worked as the budget has been seen as the main tool for the delivery of pro-poor policies. The 
DPP has therefore campaigned for the passing of the budget by arguing that the opposition is denying 
the citizens of Malawi development. 
 
 
Section 65 serves political party interests rather than those of the citizens and the debate around it 
clearly illustrates the logic of neopatrimonial politics which enables disputes over the formal rules of the 
game. During its rule, the UDF government removed the only tool that really gave constituents power to 
remove MPs who were not working in their interests, which is the recall provision. Instead they left 
section 65 which was disregarded in the party’s quest to boost its position in parliament. From 1994 
until 2004, UDF took the position that regardless of section 65 it can appoint MPs from opposition into 
cabinet without consulting their party members. When UDF lost power to Mutharika, it was argued that 
any opposition member appointed into cabinet should lose their seats in accordance with section 65 
(Cammack, 2007). On the other hand, despite Malawi’s constitution  clearly stating the rules under 
which a seat can be declared vacant and the court’s ruling that Section 65 is valid, the speaker has 
failed to act on petitions to declare these seats vacant. The speaker in 2008 informed parliament that 
he was unable to rule on Section 65 stating ‘my hands are tied’ (Jamali, 2008). 
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Appendix 15: Inflation 
 
Year Inflation, average 
consumer prices 
1980 19.19 
1981 12 
1982 9.524 
1983 13.768 
1984 19.745 
1985 10.638 
1986 14.183 
1987 25.053 
1988 33.838 
1989 12.453 
1990 11.857 
1991 8.227 
1992 23.236 
1993 22.775 
1994 34.659 
1995 83.148 
1996 37.733 
1997 9.137 
1998 29.779 
1999 44.759 
2000 29.597 
2001 27.247 
2002 17.43 
2003 9.586 
2004 11.424 
2005 15.464 
2006 13.904 
2007 7.961 
2008 8.71 
2009 8.427 
2010 7.41 
Source: IMF (2011) ‘World Economic Outlook’ 
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Appendix 16: Case Summaries - Questionnaire 
 
Case Summaries 
  Sex of 
respondent 
Age of 
respondent 
Marital 
status 
Employed by 
which 
organisation 
Position Highest level 
of education 
attained 
1 Male 44 married Donor Manager Masters 
Degree 
2 Male 47 married Academic Researcher Masters 
Degree 
3 Female 34 married Donor Programme 
Manager 
Bachelors 
Degree 
4 Male 50 married Donor Programme 
Manager 
Masters 
Degree 
5 Male 55 married Donor Manager Masters 
Degree 
6 Male 45 married Media Manager Higher 
National 
Diploma 
7 Male 61 married Government University 
Principal 
Secondary or 
lower 
8 Male 30 married CSO Director Bachelors 
Degree 
9 Male 39 married CSO Director Masters 
Degree 
10 Male 5109 married Parliament Member of 
parliament 
Doctoral 
Degree and 
Higher 
11 Male 51 married Government Principal 
Secretary 
Masters 
Degree 
12 Female 62 married Parliament Member of 
parliament 
Higher 
National 
Diploma 
13 Male 48 married CSO Director Masters 
Degree 
14 Female 33 married CSO Director Masters 
Degree 
15 Male 40 married Media Director Higher 
National 
Diploma 
16 Male 43 married INGO Director Masters 
Degree 
17 Male 30 married Donor Manager Doctoral 
Degree and 
Higher 
18 Male 46 married INGO Director Masters 
Degree 
19 Male 58 married Donor Deputy 
Representative 
Masters 
Degree 
20 Male 44 married Parliament MP Masters 
Degree 
21 Male 42 married Donor Manager Masters 
Degree 
22 Female 44 married Parliament Member of 
Parliament 
Secondary or 
lower 
 
 
109 ‘5’ denotes a missing value 
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23 Female 47 married Donor Manager Masters 
Degree 
24 Male 33 married Donor Manager Bachelors 
Degree 
25 Male 56 married Donor Resident 
Representative 
Masters 
Degree 
26 Male 38 married Donor Project 
Coordinator 
Masters 
Degree 
27 Male 33 married Donor Manager Masters 
Degree 
28 Male 62 separated Donor Deputy Head Doctoral 
Degree and 
Higher 
29 Male 49 married CSO Coordinator Higher 
National 
Diploma 
30 Male 47 married Donor Agric Specialist Masters 
Degree 
31 Male 39 married Government Principal 
Secretary 
Masters 
Degree 
32 Male 35 married INGO Financial 
Coordinator 
Masters 
Degree 
33 Male 45 married Government Chief Economist Masters 
Degree 
34 Male 30 married Parliament Committee 
Member 
Bachelors 
Degree 
35 Female 49 married Government Principal 
Secretary 
Doctoral 
Degree and 
Higher 
36 Male 54 widowed Government Principal 
Secretary 
Masters 
Degree 
37 Male 56 married Government Minister Other 
38 Male 64 married Parliament Member of 
Parliament 
Other 
39 Male 38 married Media Manager Bachelors 
Degree 
40 Male 49 married Parliament Member of 
Parliament 
Secondary or 
lower 
41 Male 68 married Parliament Member of 
Parliament 
Bachelors 
Degree 
42 Male 45 married Parliament Member of 
Parliament 
Masters 
Degree 
43 Male 61 married Media General 
Manager 
Other 
44 Male 57 married Private Sector General 
Manager 
Higher 
National 
Diploma 
45 Male 5 married CSO Director Masters 
Degree 
46 Female 30 single Media Regional 
Manager 
Higher 
National 
Diploma 
47 Male 43 married Government Advisor to 
President 
Doctoral 
Degree and 
Higher 
48 Male 64 married Government Advisor to 
President 
Masters 
Degree 
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49 Male 64 married Parliament Speaker Masters 
Degree 
50 Male 31 married CSO Director Masters 
Degree 
51 Male 53 married Media Regional 
Manager 
Bachelors 
Degree 
52 Male 34 married Media Bureau Chief Other 
53 Female 46 married Parliament Member of 
parliament 
Bachelors 
Degree 
54 Male 49 married Parliament Member of 
parliament 
Masters 
Degree 
55 Male 38 single CSO Executive 
Director 
Masters 
Degree 
56 Male 53 married Government Executive 
Director 
Masters 
Degree 
57 Female 48 married Government National 
Coordinator 
Masters 
Degree 
58 Female 47 married Parliament Member of 
parliament 
Secondary or 
lower 
59 Male 49 married Government Principal 
Secretary 
Masters 
Degree 
60 Male 46 married NGO Country Director Masters 
Degree 
61 Male 38 married Government Economist Masters 
Degree 
62 Male 32 single CSO National 
Coordinator 
Masters 
Degree 
63 Female 5 married Government Minister Higher 
National 
Diploma 
64 Male 43 married Government Director Masters 
Degree 
65 Male 50 married Government Director Masters 
Degree 
66 Male 44 married Government Director Masters 
Degree 
67 Male 71 married Government Advisor Higher 
National 
Diploma 
68 Male 41 separated Government Deputy Director Masters 
Degree 
69 Male 31 cohabiting Parliament Member of 
Parliament 
Masters 
Degree 
70 Male 43 married CSO Programme 
Manager 
Masters 
Degree 
71 Male 29 married CSO Executive 
Director 
Higher 
National 
Diploma 
72 Female 41 married Parliament Member of 
Parliament 
Higher 
National 
Diploma 
73 Male 34 married CSO Executive 
Secretary 
Masters 
Degree 
74 Male 68 married Government National 
Coordinator 
Bachelors 
Degree 
75 Male 5 married NGO Director Masters 
Degree 
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76 Female 58 married Government Minister Bachelors 
Degree 
77 Male 29 single CSO National 
Coordinator 
Bachelors 
Degree 
78 Male 42 married Parliament Member of 
Parliament 
Bachelors 
Degree 
79 Male 39 married Parliament Member of 
Parliament 
Higher 
National 
Diploma 
80 Female 44 single Parliament Member of 
Parliament 
Secondary or 
lower 
81 Male 59 married Government Director Masters 
Degree 
82 Male 48 married CSO Treasurer Secondary or 
lower 
83 Male 32 married CSO Coordinator Masters 
Degree 
84 Male 50 married Media Editor Bachelors 
Degree 
85 Male 53 cohabiting CSO Executive 
Director 
Higher 
National 
Diploma 
86 Male 35 single DONOR Political Advisor Masters 
Degree 
Total N 100 95 100 100 100 100 
 
